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CHRISTIANITY IN ITS MODERN EXPRESSION

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George Burman Foster

CHRISTIANITY IN ITS MODERN EXPRESSION

BY

GEORGE BURMAN FOSTER

Late Professor of the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Chicago; Author of "The Finality of the Christian Religion," and "The Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence"

EDITED BY

DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH

Dwight Professor of Theology in Yale University



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EDITOR'S PREFACE

George Burman Foster was born on the second of April, 1857, and died on the twenty-second of December, 1918. Prior to his occupancy of the chair of the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Chicago he was Professor of Systematic Theology in the Divinity School of the same institution. The present volume embodies his lectures on the dogmatics and ethics of the Christian religion in the form in which these were last delivered to his theological classes. The main body of the book is made up of the dictated portion of the lectures. The foot-notes contain a report, also practically verbatim, of elaborations and extemporaneous remarks introduced by the lecturer at the indicated points of the main discussion. Former students will recognize here especially many of the brilliant and memorable sayings of this inspiring and thought-provoking teacher.

Professor Foster was a remarkably sympathetic interpreter of points of view other than his own. But in his exposition of the appreciations and viewpoint of the Christian religious man, one knew that it was not a case of understanding through mere sympathetic imagination; he was speaking out of the depths of his own experience. He knew what religion was, for it was his daily life.

It was this in no small part that made him the fearless critic of unintelligent dogmatism in the name of religion. With him radical criticism was instrumental; the conservation of genuine religious values was the end. He was interested in the removing of those things which were shaken, that the things which were not shaken might be seen to remain. He could take more daring excursions into the realms of doubt than would have been spiritually safe for a less deeply religious man. He could venture to question even fundamentals, and the vitality of his religious life and spiritual appreciations would carry him

through to the home of abiding values. And he was great enough frankly to retrace his steps when he found any good reason for doing so.

Humane and sympathetic toward every fellow-sufferer, his sensitive soul was called upon to pass through many experiences which were peculiarly tragic. But in a very real sense it may be said that his suffering, even here, was vicarious. For he was able, as few are, to lead the afflicted and perplexed to the sources of spiritual strength. As he himself said, it is not those who suffer most who are in the greatest danger of losing their faith in view of the disasters and calamities to which human life is subject; their need of God is too imperious for them to be able to give him up. And, with all allowance for such modifications of opinion as are to be expected from time to time in the mind of so eager and incessant a thinker, I believe it may be said that this book as it stands represents in the main those moral and religious convictions to which in the various vicissitudes of life this sincere lover of truth was ever wont to return after all investigation and reflection.

As editor of this work, I must assume responsibility not only for the title, but for the fact of publication itself. I am not sure that Professor Foster ever contemplated giving these lectures to the public. However, I am glad to have the approval of Mrs. Foster in the present undertaking. Obviously the book lacks the finished form which it would have received had it been put forth by the author himself, but I must leave it to the interested reader to judge whether the decision to publish has been well- or ill-advised. The book must speak for itself.

D. C. Macintosh.

New Haven, November 11, 1920.

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CHRISTIANITY IN ITS MODERN EXPRESSION

FIRST TREATISE

THE DOGMATICS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

INTRODUCTORY

§1. *The Problem of the Scientific Treatment of the Dogmatics of the Christian Religion.*

1. The dogmatics of the Christian religion [1] seeks to give a scientific exposition of the Christian faith. It is a *doctrine* of faith, of the content of faith, and therefore of the world of faith, i. e. a world which faith affirms to be reality.[2] But it is precisely on this account that the fundamental difficulty of dogmatics arises, viz., How can the invisible spiritual *reality* affirmed by faith become an object of scientific investigation and exposition?

Notes to §1:1

1. Christian dogmatics, Christian ethics and Christian apologetics are commonly included under systematic theology. Other religions have their own dogmatics, ethics and apologetics.

Christian dogmatics is *not* identical with *biblical theology.* Biblical theology, as such, yields no universally valid truth. It is simply a branch of historical theology, of history. It tells what was, and is not at all concerned with what ought to be, and so biblical theology as such does not constitute the message of the preacher any more than isolated biblical ideas as such constitute the message of the preacher. Biblical religion, with its dogmatics and ethics, was historically and temporarily conditioned in a social and intellectual situation in which we do not participate.

Dogmatics, however, undertakes to set forth what is universally valid and preachable. The preacher's message is formulated in the dogmatics and ethics of the Christian religion.

Dogmatics is *not philosophy of religion,* although the study of dog-

matics raises many philosophical problems. Philosophy of religion has dogmatics as a part, and the most important part, of its subject-matter.

Hegel said that dogmatics set forth Christian truth in the form of *Vorstellung,* i. e. in a presentative, symbolic, pictorial form; but that philosophy of religion set it forth in the form of *Begriff,* i. e. of concept. Philosophy of religion would undertake to make the transition from the symbolic, which is proper in religion, to universal concepts. Hegel's general position in its original form has been overcome; but like John Brown, while its body lies mouldering in the grave, its soul goes marching on, and this particular distinction of *Vorstellung* and *Begriff* gives the general distinction between dogmatics and philosophy of religion. Dogmatics is not so abstract, nor does it seek so ultimate a universal. It seeks truth more nearly in the form of symbol. Thus it sets forth better what is preachable.

Biblical theology is concerned with facts. Philosophy is concerned with truth. Christian dogmatics is concerned with the religious truth belonging to the Christian religion. But dogmatics is concerned with the statement of Christian truth in such a form as can be domesticated in the experience of the modern man. There will be doubtful points, but they will be seen to be due to the connection of dogmatics with biblical and historical data regarding which scientific investigation is itself in doubt to-day. I am willing to say that when dogmatics comes to fruition, its statements will not be jeopardized by the fact or non-fact of historical elements. While we are not concerned in dogmatics to set forth what empirical sciences hold, we do aim to set forth the Christian religion so as not to clash with scientific presuppositions and procedure and results.

The reading most strongly recommended in connection with the course is Kaftan's *Dogmatik.* I am inclined to doubt its philosophical basis, but in the way he goes at the problem and in the Christian content and solidity of his thinking, Kaftan's work is unsurpassed to-day in dogmatics. [This was in 1905.]

2. Theology or dogmatics, as doctrine of religion (Kant's *Religionslehre*), or doctrine of faith (Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*), is included in the science of faith, or science of religion (*Religionswissenschaft*) as part of its subject-matter.

Whether or not Christian faith is right in its doctrines of God, the world, man and salvation, is not quite the business of dogmatics. That is the work of apologetics. Whether it is reality or illusion is not the question, though faith affirms the reality, and I do not see how faith could survive if the ideas were to be regarded as illusion. Christian dogmatics has not to defend the truth of the view of God and of man which is implicit in the Christian faith, but to set forth the content of that faith, the intellectual element which is integrally there.

Dogmatics is analogous to a statement of the tenets of the Repub-

lican party from the standpoint of the Republican party. The statement is made for a practical, not a philosophical end.

Is philosophy everybody's affair? Some are pragmatic, rather than speculative, and their religion must come that way. Others are metaphysical to the *n*th power. They have to wear out their teeth on the file of ultimate questions; whether they get anything thereby or not, they have to gnaw at it.

The dogmatic and practical has its place. There is something which ought to be done. If we are going to do it, we must do it together; and if we are to do it together, we must have a common platform, and it must not be too academic.

Philosophy has the right to criticize any dogmatic platform, to examine it from the standpoint of reason. It acts as a purifier, corrective, and ennobler. The last word is said by the philosopher. As people rise in intelligence, they are more and more influenced and led by the philosopher. But philosophy is more likely to be found outside the church and politics than inside. The ecclesiastical and the political crowd shrink and shrivel in the presence of philosophers. The practically-minded wince under philosophical criticism, and would be more comfortable without the philosophers. The program of the philosopher is not immediately practicable with the crowd, but ultimately it is the only practicable thing. Every philosopher dies some sort of death, but progress is the progressive appropriation of philosophical ideals. The crowd passes through three successive stages with reference to the ideals of the philosopher: conflict, compromise, capitulation. For leadership, one cannot be too far ahead of the crowd!

2. This difficulty would be avoided by assigning to dogmatics the task of delivering an exposition of dogmas subject to authoritative revision, i. e. of doctrines officially valid in a given church.[1] Moreover, some theologians have assigned dogmatics to historical theology. In that case the difficulty would be avoided. But historical theology is concerned with facts, not with truth; with what was, not with what ought to be. And indeed this limitation of the dogmatic task to historical theology has not been adhered to, even by these evangelical theologians themselves, least of all by Schleiermacher, who is the great champion of the conception. Moreover, this limitation is impracticable in connection with the evangelical appreciation of dogma, for the evangelical church subjects its beliefs, or dogmas, to a progressively better knowledge of the Scriptures. That is, dogma has no static and absolute value to the evangelical theologians.

Note to §1:2

1. Dogmas are deliverances concerning faith, sustained by ecclesiastical authority.

If dogmatics were exposition of dogmas authoritatively taught, the dogmatician would not be responsible for getting at the inner spiritual reality; the authority would be responsible for that. The historical theologian is not concerned with the search for the universally valid.

A dogma is like a political platform. It is conventional. The unconventional, the heretical, is bohemianism.

3. A different stating of the task of dogmatics grows out of a consideration of the nature of the Christian faith alongside of the historical problem. Christian dogmatics, it will be seen, inquires not only as to the *officially* valid ecclesiastical doctrine, but as to the *universally* valid Christian truth.[1]

Note to §1:3

1. When do dogmatic declarations pass as proved? Do they pass as proved when they are seen to be necessary constituents of the religious conviction as a whole that is valid in the evangelical church and peculiar to it? Have they validity apart from the presuppositions of faith? For example, that the world was created is a conviction of Christian religious faith. Is it a necessary constituent to that faith, inalienable from the Christian faith? If so, does it pass as proved on that account? Also, is that declaration valid apart from faith? Should we have the proposition, if we had no religious faith? Is it a concept which is an instrument in any of the sciences to-day? If not, and if dogmatic propositions are valid for faith, but not for science, it is not to be expected of science that it will furnish these propositions, or even corroborate them. They must only be such that science need not demolish them. Does science need to negate faith's proposition that the world was made by God? I do not have to make my faith valid from the point of view of science, do I? But suppose I say the world was made in six days. Science denies this. The added proposition is not a proposition of faith, but a datum for scientific consideration. It is a case of conflict between scientific theory and scientific theory, not between science and faith. To say "in six days" is to corrupt and weaken faith and expose it to attack, and to fall a victim to science which will either refute me, or else bring the subject under agnosticism.

4. Accordingly "theological encyclopedia" must assign to Christian dogmatics its place, not under the historical, but under the "normative" disciplines.[1]

Note to §1:4

1. An historical discipline would be concerned with officially valid

Christian doctrine. A normative discipline is concerned with universally valid Christian truth. The relation between explicative and normative sciences harks back to the great metaphysical discussion regarding the relation between cause and worth, which is the ultimate problem.

See Wundt's *Ethics,* on normative and explicative sciences. Cf. James: *Varieties of Religious Experience,* Ch. I.

5. If now according to this the task of a systematic, scientific determination of the content of the Christian faith still exists, the question arises, What is it that science in the nature of the case is competent to perform as regards our subject-matter, viz. the "world of faith" to which we referred at the outset?

§2. *Division of our Subject.*

1. In order to solve the question of §1: 5, we must consider first of all the character of Christianity as *religion,* and the proof of its claim to give universally valid truth of revelation. It is only when this is done that the essence of the knowledge which accrues to Christian faith and the share of science in the exposition of the content of the Christian faith can be determined. All this forms the *foundation* of Christian dogmatics, which must precede the *superstructure.* By foundation is meant simply the doctrine of principles.

2. Accordingly the foundation involves a more comprehensive task than the old "prolegomena to dogmatics." Indeed the task is three-fold: (A) to establish the essence of Christianity as religion; (B) to determine the truth of the Christian religion; and, on the basis of these two, (C) to expound (a) the knowledge which accrues to the Christian religious faith, (b) the theological-scientific doctrines of faith (i. e. dogmatics) in their inner connection and in their difference,[1] and (c) what the connection is, and what the difference, between thoughts that accrue to faith and thoughts concerning that faith. Under A and B the cardinal points of the philosophy of religion and apologetics must be discussed, but as auxiliary and instrumental. But the *unitary center* of the whole fundamental part is the fixation of the concept of Christian revelation; the *unitary goal* is the gaining of firm ground and a clear norm

or rule for a science of Christian faith. i. e. of the doctrine which accrues to Christian faith.

Note to §2:2

1. The theologian's fallacy (corresponding to James's "psychologist's fallacy") is the confounding of the theologian's own ideas about ideas which accrue to faith with those ideas themselves.

3. It is on account of this special end, but also from general principles (cf. §5), that we set out in Part A not with the universal idea of religion, but with (a) the concrete *historical phenomenon of Christianity,* in order to determine more comprehensively and more accurately the essence of Christianity (b) by means of a *psychological analysis* of the religious life and (c) by means of a *religio-historical comparison.*

PART I. THE FOUNDATION OF CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS

A. THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY AS RELIGION

a. The Historical Phenomenon of Christianity

§3. *Faith in Christ as the Center of Christianity.*

1. As an historical phenomenon Christianity, as its name indicates, is to be referred to a unitary starting point and to an original basic character.[1]

Note to §3:1

1. Was there no Christianity before Christ? Historically, No. Philosophically and religiously, Yes. Wherever there is a Christian relationship, there is Christianity.

2. Faith in Jesus as *Christ* (Χριστός), and therein as *Lord* (Κύριος) was constitutive for the formation of a self-dependent Christian religious community. It is precisely this faith which constitutes (a) the *connection* of Christianity with the religion of the Jewish people, but also (b) its *severance* from it, and (c) its *distinction* from all other religions.

3. This Christ-faith is by no means a mere addition or accretion which contradicts the original proclamation of Jesus. Rather is it an answer or response to *Jesus' own claim* to possess Messianic dignity.[1]

Note to §3:3

1. Since the above notes were prepared, I have come to be more doubtful as to whether Jesus really did lay claim to Messianic dignity. According to Weinel it is our scientific duty to confess that the data are wanting for a sure judgment with reference to the matter one way or the other. H. J. Holtzmann said recently that from the point of view of Christian faith it makes no difference whether Jesus made that claim or not.

Was there any such being as the Messiah, as a matter of fact? Primarily the Messiah is an idea, a concept. But if there was no such reality, what value is there in the concept? What function did the concept serve? What would become of Jesus and his effectiveness without that category? By which sign did he conquer — as Jesus or

as Messiah? Outside of Palestine the term "Messiah" was dropped, and that of "Logos" was taken up; later other interpretations were substituted. Which is the more effective, that which the collective life contributes to the ideal construction, or the actual Jesus of history? The datum donated or the construction by which he is categorized?

Is the specifically *religious* feature the datum Jesus, or the construction which has been made from age to age? Is not religion a collective expression of life? Must not the religion of the people be made by and for the people? Is Jesus the founder of the Christian religion? Sects are founded, but is religion founded? Is Jesus incidental or essential to the Christian religion? Is there anything in the past, which is in the past alone and not also in the present, which is essential to Christianity?

The preponderating weight of evidence is to the effect that Jesus did claim to be the Messiah. On any other hypothesis it would be hard to account for the death of Jesus.

At all events, Jesus understood Messianism in a new way. By word and deed he attributed to his person a fundamental significance for the accomplishment of the divine will in history as a whole, and in the individual man.

4. This Christ-faith, reaching back to Jesus and the first Christian community, has experienced manifold *constructions and transformations* during the further history of Christianity, and to-day it is customary to consider it as constitutive for the Christian religion, since every ignoring or setting aside or perversion of the Christ-faith has involved or drawn in its train a confluence or fusion of Christianity with religious or philosophical tendencies of a different character.[1]

Note to §3:4

1. The abandonment of the specific Christ-faith, or its equivalents, ends in the amalgamation of Christian with non-Christian ideas. Does this involve dropping down to natural religion and a depotentiation of our best religious values? Is our coming type of religion specifically Christian?

Perhaps the highest category we can apply to Jesus is not Messiah, but *man*. Do we know anything higher than the human? Are we modern men saying the highest we know how to say in saying that Jesus is human, and ideally human? Former generations did not think of man as we do. There was dualism in the older thought of man.

Does a cause ever triumph strictly on its inner merits? Is the race adequate to that sort of triumph? Ideals which are too high for petty humanity must die to live.

§4. *The Christian Faith in God in Connection with the Idea of Redemption.*

1. The specifically Christian *faith in God* is inwardly connected with the faith in Christ, or the Christ-faith. The connecting link is (§3: 3) the idea that the divine redemptive will is realized through Christ.

2. *Jesus* himself defines the *salvation* to be gained by his disciples through his message of the *kingdom of God* as central in his preaching. The expression "kingdom of God" signifies rule of God, beginning through a work of divine power, victorious over all hostile powers. It is also intimately connected with the promises and expectations of the Jewish people. (a) This kingdom of God is proffered as a saving and blessed gift, which includes a fulness of purely spiritual goods. It is promised as such for the coming age (*αἰὼν μέλλων*). Its goods, however, projected into the present, are manifest wherever men in filial confidence and in the practice of love, imitating God, are subject to the will of God and enjoy his reign in order to their salvation.[1] This *future-present* redemptive good was proclaimed in the first Christian community (partly in other expressions) as content of the gospel of Christ. Equally so this Christian redemptive good has in the later history of Christianity, although understood very variously, formed a distinguishing characteristic of the Christian religion. (b) This redemptive good of the kingdom of God is as to its content indissolubly connected with the *task and problem of the perfect righteousness* (*δικαιοσύνη*). Jesus delineated this good vividly in free fidelity toward the Old Testament commandments. It is not an ascetic relation, but the love of God and neighbor, which has world-abnegation and self-abnegation only as its negative and obverse side. The first community further exemplified this new law of Christ. It has remained during subsequent history a constitutive factor of Christianity, although under manifold depletions and distortions, and under greatly changed cultural conditions. (c) The relation between the divine gift and the human task is defined by Jesus: the fulfilment of the divine will is the condition of the participation in the full blessing of God; but God first meets man with his forgiveness and educa-

tive blessings, especially in Jesus Christ himself as bringer of the kingdom of God (§3:3). This conception, powerfully formulated by Paul, has persisted in Christianity, in spite of much fluctuation and corruption.

Note to §4:2

1. The *goods* of the Kingdom were already present to the consciousness of Jesus, but the *Kingdom* was to come.

3. The *God-idea* which corresponds to Jesus' original message of the kingdom of God is expressed in the name of God as "*our Father in heaven.*" This name of God has become regulative for Christianity by virtue of its position in the Lord's prayer.

b. The Peculiarity of the Religious Life, as against Other Sides of the Life of the Spirit.[1]

Note to b

1. What do we mean by the *spiritual* life? The æsthetic, ethical and scientific are included. But the religious is also included, and I know not what else there is in the spiritual life. Does the religious connote something as specific in the life of the spirit as the others mentioned, or is the religious an attitude toward reality including all of these others?

§5. *The Way to a Knowledge of the Essence of Religion.*

1. The historical phenomenon of Christianity, whose content we have to present in its most salient features, is combined with a series of other historical phenomena, under the *universal concept of religion.* It serves the more comprehensive and more accurate knowledge of Christianity itself, and therewith the solution of our problem, if we make clear to ourselves the character of the whole aspect of the human spiritual life designated by the name religion.

2. We may not derive the essence of religion from the uncertain *etymology of the word,* but only from an investigation of the phenomenon itself. (a) But such investigation cannot stop with an investigation of only the most elementary forms of religion.[1] (b) A process of induction would be abortive which specified the common marks of all empirically given

religions, without distinction. Such a procedure would result in a too indefinite universal concept.

Note to §5:2

1. One cannot understand the essence of man from a study of the human embryo merely. A present fad among scientists (e. g. Lester F. Ward) is to discover the essence of religion by an embryological study of religion. The resulting concept is extremely poverty-stricken, as compared with the richness and fulness of the higher forms of religious life. Moreover, we are able inwardly to understand foreign religions only from the standpoint of our own religion. Absolute impartiality is impossible, but we can enter sympathetically into what we may suppose to be the experiences of other religious people, and compare them with the religious life with which we are familiar.

3. Thus we are led to this, viz. to take our starting-point in a definite content of the historical life, and of course in the content which is highest and best known to us, that is, therefore, in the *Christian.* Using the Christian as a *type,* or species, we may investigate the specific character of the religious life, and to be sure, first of all *in comparison with* the other sides of the spiritual life. When we have once found these single features, we shall have to indicate how they may be recognized in other religions, although effaced in many ways, in many ways modified, perhaps thoroughly distorted.

§6. *The Salient Distinguishing Marks of the Religious Life.*

1. The religious life, considered first of all in its Christian form, is differentiated from the other sides of the spiritual life by the following characteristics: (a) It is swayed and governed in its entire course by (α) the certainty of a *supramundane power* on which we, together with the world, are totally dependent. To be sure the believer is able to represent this power only with the aid of fantasy.[1] But the believer lives at the same time in the firm conviction that that which is thus represented is *reality.*[2] (β) To this power is attributed a morally binding *authority* over us. To it is attributed also decisive importance and inner participation in and sympathy for us and our life, primarily in and for our *blessedness or salvation.* (b) Toward this power accordingly from the human side there is *a relation of feeling and willing of a peculiar*

character, viz. (α) a surrender of the *will* to it in submission and obedience, expressed in conduct of the life and in worship and prayer; and (β) a *feeling* of humble submission and of cheerful confidence. (c) In this way a *personal communion* is sought with that supramundane power itself. This communion embraces the gaining of blessedness, which is dependent upon it, and a position of freedom over against the world.[3]

Notes to §6:1

1. The supramundane power is represented symbolically by means of such expressions as "Rock," "Shield," "High Tower," "Friend," "Captain," "Pilgrim," "Father."

2. Feuerbach regarded religious ideas as injurious illusions; Lange held that they were useful illusions. Now there is a certain function which illusion often has in experience, but if the believer should come permanently to the conviction that all the characteristic ideas of religion are illusion, the result would be fatal for his religion. Cancel the idea-element in faith and you destroy the faith. The emotional and volitional sides suffer atrophy, it would seem, when the idea-element is destroyed.

3. The three elements mentioned in (a), (b) and (c), are the three characterisics of the Christian religion.

The personal communion with the supramundane power and the blessedness will not appear as a donation, but as an achievement.

2. Something of all these characteristics must be found everywhere where we speak of religion at all. To be sure they appear in *infinitely many individual modifications.* (a) Everywhere there is the certainty of a supramundane power or powers, and everywhere an authority laying claim to man, and a decisive influence on his life and blessedness are attributed to that power or powers. But infinitely diverse is (α) the view of the supramundaneness of that power or powers, as also of the kind and extent of its influence, as also again of the kind and degree of the certainty of the existence and dominion of that power or powers.[1] Infinitely diverse also are (β) the ground of the authority of that power and the idea of the content of the expected blessedness, and of the relation of that power or powers to that blessedness, of the conditions of obtaining that blessedness.[2] (b) Everywhere there is a relation of will and feeling, which is analogous to 1 (b) above. But inexhaustibly manifold is (α) the surrender of will in relation to its inten-

sity and pureness; and indefinitely shaded and graded are (β) the feelings of submission and confidence, and their relation to each other.[3] (c) Everywhere there is some sort of communion with the deity and dominion over the world striven for. But the former is in various degrees of a spiritual and ethical character. So is the latter various in scope and content.

Notes to §6:2

1. The diversity extends from Spinoza at one extreme to Herrmann, the absolute dualist in theology, at the other.

2. In the Christian religion what we have to do with, ultimately, is a spiritual relation, not the holding of any particular historical datum as true. It is a supersensible, superhistorical relationship that we are concerned with; and the *requiring* of adhesion to any fact in history is subversive of the Christian religion. A jury of twelve scholars would scarcely agree on oath with reference to any historical fact in the life of Christ. Is it not too much, then, to require adhesion to this or that historical fact in order to be a Christian? Is it not too much to ask of Aunt Dinah down South? She cannot get at the facts, unless she takes them blindly, like the charcoal-man whom Luther questioned.

3. In view of this diversity, there is ground for large-hearted charity on the part of the preacher and pastor. There is also need of pedagogic diversity in dealing with the diversity of religious life and development. Moreover, there is a call for an optimistic spirit of appreciation of any degree of obedience, confidence and assurance.

For example, referring to obedience toward God, it may be shown that the thirsty man, drinking water, by so much obeys God; that the laborer, eating his dinner, is by so much obeying God. Any degree of recognition of the order of the world and submission to it is recognition of God. We can prove to the "atheist" that he is not an atheist, inasmuch as he eats his dinner.

§7. *Human Need and Surrender to Divine Revelation the Basis of the Religious Life.*

1. If in all religions there are the three characteristics indicated, the further question arises whether a unitary practical interest, i. e. interest in life, which binds men to religion, is not to be found everywhere also.[1] (a) The Christian religion becomes inwardly a part of man by awakening the practical question, the question of life, viz. Can I become blessed? Can I be saved? How can I obtain eternal life? (Cf. §6:1, a, β and c.) (b) But all other religions reckon with man's desire

for (positive) happiness, or at least (negative) *liberation* from definite evils, or human need and sin in general; and it is precisely in this that they have their root in the heart of their adherents. It is from this standpoint that all the particular characters specified in §6:2 are to be understood.

Note to §7:1

1. What we refer to is an interest of life, rather than of speculation. The distinction is not an absolute one, to be sure, but religion is concerned with practical, rather than theoretical interests. It did not come to satisfy theoretical interests, and even its doctrines came to satisfy practical needs. The theoretical interest is present, but the primary interest is practical.

2. But this desire which is powerful in all religions and all manifestations of their life does not perhaps generate the gods as mere "wish-beings" (*Wünschwesen*).[1] Rather the pious man not only in Christianity but also in all other religions knows himself to be bound by *divine authority and demonstration of power,* and he holds himself to definite impressive disclosures of supramundane power or powers, in other words to "revelations." The man who desires blessedness does not purposely create the gods, but finds them, lights upon them, as we say; and this is the case in the various religions of the phenomenal world.[2]

Notes to §7:2

1. When a person or a people is in dire need of help, does desire of rescue generate the rescuer, in the sense that the wish is father of the thought? The *idea* of a rescuer has a psychological origin, and so is generated; but we are speaking of the being to whom the idea is referred. God is felt to have authority. The authority-feeling is psychologically generated, of course; but is the authority of no objective validity?

Theoretically, we must consider the contention that we cannot tell whether the gods are mere *Wünschwesen* or not. But practically it is quite different. The only way one has religious assurance is practically. And while one may not be able to prove or disprove the objective validity of the belief in the authority of God on speculative grounds, practically one may become assured of it.

2. It is when practical religion weakens that the question seriously arises as to whether the gods are "wish-beings" or not.

3. Faith in such divine revelations is further upborne and sustained in all religions by *religious communions.* On the

basis of the revelations believed in, the various religious communions cherish in their circles definite religious views of God or the gods, of the world and of life; also certain sentiments, certain tendencies of the will, customs, commandments, promises and expectations; and these communions are held together on their side by this common possession.

§8. *The Importance of Feeling in Religion, and the Character of the Religious Judgment as Value-Judgment.*

1. *All the main psychic functions,* ideation and judgment as well as feeling and willing, participate in religion, no less than in all the unitary activities of our spiritual life.[1] This is true of Christianity, but also of the other religions. Nevertheless Schleiermacher was not wrong in assigning to feeling a central place in the religious life.[2] For the ideas belonging to religion, ideas of God and of the world, tendencies of the will and deeds, are expressions of personal piety in full measure only when they are apprehended in feeling, or better expressed, in what the Bible means by "heart," according to their importance or their worth for the unitary personal life of man. In other words, all this emerges from the reaction of the whole heart.

Notes to §8:1

1. An extreme Ritschlian tendency has urged that the intellectual movement is practically absent in religion. But that is psychologically impossible.

2. Starbuck, reviewing James's *Varieties of Religious Experience,* says that feeling is but the splash of the spray on the ocean of life. There is some basis for this, and yet the centrality of feeling in religion must be maintained.

2. It has become customary in theology to express the intimate relation of religious ideas and judgments to the heart that perceives values, by the proposition that all religious cognition terminates in *value-judgments.* This proposition is true and right, only under two conditions, viz.: (a) The concept value-judgment is not to be opposed to the concept existence-judgment. Rather is it essential to a judgment of faith to affirm a *reality* (v. §6:1 a and 2 b).[1] (b) Faith-judgments, especially the Christian faith-judgments, may not be understood as expressing that reality in the sense of a mere postulate which must be

drawn up on account of its worth. Rather faith-judgments affirm that reality on the basis of disclosures in the given world, or of *revelations* (v. §7:2).[2] But under these two conditions the characterization of the propositions of faith as value-judgments has its objective right. For they are not theoretical judgments, whose validity reposes on the necessitations of perception and thought, but, according to their epistemological significance they are "thymetic" judgments,[3] whose validity reposes on the attitude of the feeling and willing ego to the ideated objects, i. e. on an evaluation of revelation. More accurately, value-judgments are confidence judgments, or trust-judgments, in many religions fear-judgments.[4]

Notes to §8:2

1. This in opposition to the type of Ritschlianism represented by Bender.

2. This in opposition to Kant.

3. Cf. Reischle: *Werturteile und Glaubensurteile.*

4. Note the difference between what "the world" means to the man of religion, and what it means to the man of science; between "man" from the point of view of anthropology, and "man" from the point of view of religion. Even if the value-judgment be an existence judgment, it is not as existence judgment that you think of it.

3. Within the religious community faith-judgments considered psychologically, not epistemologically, are constantly in danger of *sacrificing their character as value-judgments,* and of becoming an object of assent without the participation of the evaluating "heart," [1] precisely as religious acts are in danger of deteriorating to mere legal or customary external acts.

Note to §8:3

1. This is what is meant by "intellectualism" in religion. It is adhesion to a set of ideas or formulas, theoretically, where there is no corresponding religious process in consciousness. It is the evil of both rationalism and orthodoxy.

There is a place for intellectual assent in religion. But religious judgments have a practical origin, and they have no values apart from the religious process in consciousness which structurally produces the religious idea. What is the good of the God-idea without religion? What is the good of the flag without patriotism? (Of course the flag shows that there was patriotism once upon a time!) Of what use is it to be on my knees, if there is no prayerfulness in my spirit? There is constant danger that the fixed, static God-idea

may be out of relation with experience, through failure to reconstruct the God-idea ever anew as a mode of expressing our new values and our reactions to the world and human history.

4. The character of religious value-judgments becomes more distinct still when we assign them their place in the *scale of value-judgments* in general. These value-judgments may be classified as follows: (a) Natural or hedonistic value-judgments, which we form on the basis of natural inclination and impulse and of the ends growing out of these. (b) Legal value-judgments, which we exact on the basis of the rules of right, and of our position in society. (c) Ideal or normative value-judgments, which we express on the basis of ideas, or norms, and therefore with the claim to universal validity. These ideal value-judgments are (α) æsthetic, (β) intellectual, (γ) moral, and (δ) religious.

§9. *The Relation of Religion to the Other Spiritual Activities of Man, i. e. to the Aesthetic, the Scientific and the Moral.*

1. The value-judgments specified in §8:4 are only the expression or exhibit of man's corresponding practical activities, or reactions. In particular, the ideal value-judgments mentioned in §8:4 (c) are the manifestation or exhibition of the human *spiritual life,* according to its various sides, æsthetic, scientific, moral and religious.[1] It is important to relate religion to these other three reactions of spiritual life.

Note to §9:1

1. There is difference as well as kinship between the religious function and other functions of the human spirit. The modern tendency to monism must not interfere with fidelity to facts and the disparateness of spiritual facts. Only when we have recognized multiplicity have we the problem of monism on our hands.

2. The *æsthetic-spiritual activity* rests on this, viz. that by means of the complex of ideas which nature proffers or art creates, the free play of our fantasy and at the same time of our sensations and feelings is excited and thereby an æsthetic pleasure awakened. Now without doubt, religion has a certain similarity to the æsthetic elevation of feelings, and religion has ever employed art as a means of expression and

manifestation. Because of this religion and art are often confounded. But in *essence* they are very *different.*[1] In æsthetic life it is the relation of the ideated object to fantasy that comes into consideration. The question of the reality of that object is incidental. But in the religious life everything depends upon the practical question of our blessedness, our salvation in some sense of the word, and therefore upon the reality of the supramundane power or powers of which we form ideas.[2]

Notes to §9:2

1. In much of worship of a higher, sacramental order there is æsthetic rather than religious elevation. The apprehension of the peculiar religious object is wanting. The ethical authority of that object also is consequently wanting. The sense of harmony is present, but that is a truncated religious experience. The roots are not there. Art has æstheticised the Cross, and religion makes use of this, but the attitude of the religious man is different from that of the mere artist, as the attitude of the thirsty man toward water is different from that of the artist who is not thirsty.

2. Religion may externalize itself in æsthetic forms, e. g., in music, architecture, vestments, cross, and cult; but æsthetics is not concerned with the *reality* of the object set forth æsthetically. Religion, on the other hand, is fundamentally concerned with this.

But by no definitive scientific proof can you compel a man to hold that God exists. Indeed, as Schultz points out, in his *Grundriss der christlichen Apologetik,* much of the power and blessedness of religion depends upon the fact that scientific proof is impossible. Otherwise one might be made pious as one is made mathematical. If the proof of religion were scientific, then impiety would be mere nonsense. The remedy for doubt and the fear of subjective illusion is mainly practical; it is to live deeply and fully on one's religious possessions and in the experiencing of their values.

3. Scientific activity is guided by the ideal of truth and sets out from a comprehensive cognition of the real.[1] In religion also, in the propositions or tenets or articles of faith, the question as to the truth, and therefore as to the reality of that which is believed, is essential.[2] Therefore an intellectualistic tendency can constantly take root in religion.[3] But leading interests, proof of truth, content and goal of truth in religion and in its faith-judgments are of a different kind, according to §8:2, from what they are in science and in its formulas.

Notes to §9:3

1. Science knows no law but its own, and no authority but truth. It wants the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Science cannot stand unveraciousness, subjectively, or untruth, objectively. Is that as true in religion as it is in science?

2. If one is persuaded that the traditional tenet is not true, he may keep the form and stuff it with a new content. If he cannot do this, he will give it up, even if he thinks he will go to the devil for it. John Stuart Mill said he would not hold that that was right for God which would be wrong for man, and if God would send him to hell for that, to hell he would go.

3. Intellectualism is the worst one-sidedness in religion. It is worse than either emotionalism or moralism.

4. Even the moral life is essentially different from the religious. The former is guided by the thought of the "ought," that is, a rule of human relationship and conduct, acknowledged to be unconditioned and universally valid; or, in other words, the moral life is guided by the idea of the good. Religion on the other hand is related to a real supramundane power, authoritative for us, ordering, disposing, guiding our lives. Religion therefore is ruled by the thought, not of the good, but of the Supreme Being, and at the same time by the idea of the chief good. Ethics as such does not need to relate itself to a supramundane object; but in Christianity the religious and the moral are in the most intimate relations to one another. In this their reciprocal penetration, they form that activity of the human personality which is ethical, that is, guided by norms for the will, and free. In other religions the connection with the moral life, therefore the ethical personal character of the religion, is attained only in very various degrees.

5. Religion is *allied with all these spiritual activities.* In the latter as in the former, man as spiritual being seeks to mount above mere naturality, mere natural conditionedness or determinedness, although in very various degrees, to be sure.[1] But in this whole matter religion occupies a *special* position over against all other sides of the spiritual life. Religion would put human life into relation with a supramundane reality. This striking difference between religion and the rest of the cultural life is manifest in the history of humanity, and

in the strained relation of religion again and again to the entire secular culture.[2]

Notes to §9:5

1. Of science itself the real spiritual function is simply the mounting of the human spirit above naturality, inner and outer; it is the achieving of a certain supramundaneness. The spiritual function of art is the spirit's mounting above the rawness and ugliness and repulsiveness of much of our empirical life — again the becoming supramundane of human personality. Similar things may be said of morality and religion.

2. The nub of the conflict between religion and science was that science wanted dependableness and system, and it could not get on with the religious object, so it undertook to eliminate that object.

But the most pitiable conflict is the conflict between religion and morality, a conflict which is going on today. Many men who are most interested in the moral function today are not quite clear about the religious function. They try to show the identity of the two, yet the conflict persists. Morality wants religion to do away with the supramundane object and take the moral ideal as its object. Religion can not do it, and it would ruin morality in the long run if it did.

History ought to be worth something to us. In the entire history of religion there has been present without exception a power outside of the human power, which is best designated therefore by the word "supramundane," a power, or powers, or being, in which man has believed. This is an inalienable feature of religion, high and low, at home and abroad, millennium after millennium.

Now this is what the modern moral man is trying to get rid of. Modern morality, with its ideal which has grown up out of experience, now wants to be content for the specifically religious consciousness also. But the moral function and the religious function are not identical. Our moral function consists in the production of values, goods. Religion is the conviction that the structure and function of the universe are such as to render the production of values (moral values included) possible. We would not sow wheat if we were convinced that the field would not grow wheat; nor would we be so likely to produce moral values, if we thought the universe was against these values. Thus the religious conviction is implicit in the moral, æsthetic and scientific life. But my production of æsthetic values is different from my conviction about the universe, even though the two are intimately related. Similarly, morality is not religion, nor religion morality; and yet religion without morality would become less religious, and morality without religion less moral. The divorce of morality and religion would be the destruction of both — not necessarily for the individual, but for society and the race.

Religion is not always worship of a personal God, to be sure.

Take Buddhism, for instance. It staggers the man who tries to define religion, and there is a temptation to treat it as a philosophy, rather than a religion. It is a philosophy, but it is also a religion. What, then, is the religious object in Buddhism? It believes in gods, spirits and ghosts, but its belief in them is not a religious belief. Buddha did not believe himself to be dependent on them. But he had an object on which he believed both gods and men to be dependent, and with which he sought harmony. That object was the moral order of the world. The moral order of the world functioned for Buddha as God functions for us. Whence comes the moral order? Buddha did not ask that question, for the same reason that the theist does not ask, Whence comes God? Where we ask about the ground of the moral order of the world, the Buddhist would ask about the ground of the existence of God.

Now the religious object of original Buddhism, the moral order of the world, being impersonal, worship, in the ordinary sense of the term, was not called for. Is cult, then, a *sine qua non* of religion? In religion there is (1) belief in a supramundane being, or power, or powers; (2) man feels himself dependent upon that being, or power, or those powers; (3) he seeks to be in harmony with that object (being, power, or powers); and (4) in that harmony he finds his freedom. Cult comes in in connection with the third of these, the seeking of harmony with the religious object. In present-day Christianity cult is suffering eclipse, because of the passing of the old theory of redemption. Historically, the purpose of cult has been to get God on our side, by giving gifts or doing something. It was not originally to get ourselves into harmony with God, but to get that being or power into harmony with us. But if that power is external and changeless, as in Buddhism, what is the good of cult? It could be subjectively serviceable only, enabling the individual to get into harmony with the religious object.

Has cult any other than this subjective value, and if we say it has not, will cult survive the change in point of view? The Old Testament prophets criticized the people for offering cult (sacrifices, feasts and fasts, and prayers) instead of morality. Lincoln was not so much concerned with the question whether God was on his side as with the question whether he was on God's side. The stars do not go out of their course for any man; does prayer effect any change in God? Would you be willing to assume responsibility for all the consequences of the literal fulfilment of your petitions? Is not the ultimate prayer, "Not my will, but thine be done"? It is not meant, however, that the effect of prayer is merely "reflex"; but rather that there is at bottom a point where the divine and the human will are one (for otherwise God would be a fractional God only), and that true prayer is an expression of our deepest and truest life, which is God's life in us. It is not an external deed, something that we go about doing; it is the normal functioning of our spiritual life, the

most fundamental activity of spiritual life. Does it pay to pray? There is something almost blasphemous about the question. As well might one ask, Does it pay to admire the rainbow? or, Does it pay to love? It is like supposing that the only value of a work of art is its money value. There is no value, so far as getting things is concerned, in getting down on our knees and asking for them. "Your Father knoweth that ye have need of these things." But there is value in giving form and expression, externalization and realization to the prayer-life.

Buddhism, as we have seen, is peculiar in having as its religious object the moral order of the world. Would not modern natural science find it easier to affiliate itself with the Buddhistic than with the Christian point of view? What room is there anyway for a God who is disparate from the natural and moral order of the world? And if we were to insist on Buddhists adopting the idea of a personal God, without any change in their whole view of the world, might we not be forcing upon them a lower category than their own? Even in Christianity have we not had a thousand years of history in which the highest category was not personality, but substance (*οὐσία*)?

Either God is person, essentially as we know personality, or, so far as we are concerned, God is not personal at all. And if we strip off the attribute of personality from God, we have not much left. If we say God's personality is like ours, we are picturing God to ourselves by means of a symbol which is doubtless inadequate, but not necessarily erroneous. If we say God's personality is not like ours, we land in agnosticism. If God is personal, and personality is what we find in man, is not God also more than that? The trouble here is that we cannot put any content into the notion of "super-personality," except a sub-personal content. It is our right to use the highest category we have to set forth God, and that highest category is personality. And as for the modern cutting out of the God-idea, it is so radical and so foreign to the Christian religion that I do not recognize it.

If Christianity keeps on retiring our convictions regarding God and immortality in favor of the modern emphasis upon sanitation, education, regard for natural law, and the like, will there be any great difficulty in unifying Christianity with Buddhism? Will our religion stand the stripping off from our faith of the belief in immortality? Is it personal immortality enough if my spiritual effectiveness persists forever? Or is it essential that I myself be there?

§10. *Examination of Deviating Conceptions of Religion, and Comprehensive Definition.*

1. The results of our religio-psychological analysis (§§6 to 9) are in conflict with *various other conceptions* of religion.

In these latter there are justifiable moments, indeed, though presented in a one-sided manner. (a) The results to which we attain are in conflict with the *theoretical* conception of religion as advocated in recent times on the one side by the speculative philosophy (the Hegel notion that religion is an expression of philosophical truth in the form of imaginative representation, *Vorstellung*), on the other side by empirical investigation (religion an element of the interest in causation, v. §9:3). All this is too intellectualistic.[1] (b) These results are in conflict with the æsthetic-mystical conception, e. g. that in Schleiermacher's Discourses, especially the first edition, reflected in his later definition of religion as feeling of dependence.[2] This conception is also combined with the theoretical interpretation of religion, and Hegel himself is not free from this combination (cf. §9:2). (c) These results are in conflict again with a one-sided endæmonistic conception, such as that of Feuerbach. Such a conception is not just to the importance of faith in revelation, i. e. it is not true to the objective reference of religion, nor is it just to the interaction of religion and morality on the other hand (v. §7:2; §9:4). (d) These results are in conflict, again, with the one-sided moralistic or rigoristic conception, e. g. of Kant, and on the part of rationalism (v. §9:4).[3] (e) These results are in conflict with the combination of different conceptions, without any clear point of unity, as is found, for example in Biedermann (cf. §7:1).[4]

Notes to §10:1

1. Here religion would be primitive science, or (with Hegel) primitive philosophy.
2. Man is active in religion, not merely dependent.
3. Kant's definition of religion as the treating of human duties as divine commands, fails to do justice to the feeling of dependence, to the revelation-concept, and to cult (if cult is to be regarded as belonging essentially to religion).
4. Biedermann tries to ride two horses which are not always going in the same direction.

2. We may now combine the characteristics of the religious life in its developed form as set forth in §§6 to 9 as follows: Religion is faith in spiritual being, or beings, or powers, or

power, ruling outside of and above the sphere of man; feeling of dependence on these powers, and the need of getting into harmony with them (which, when accomplished, brings freedom and peace). Or, more fully, religion is man's seeking communion with a supramundane power, or powers, which lay claim to him and determine his life, a seeking which is nurtured within a community, consummated in ideas and judgments of faith, in feelings of reverence and trust, as well as in surrender of the will and in worshipful acts. This seeking has its roots in the worth-perceiving heart and in the desire for blessedness on the part of man, and it is evoked by impressions due to disclosures of that power in the real world. In brief, religion is the uplift of man to the supramundane, an uplift that is practically conditioned and of a practical kind.[1]

Note to §10:2

1. Are worshipful acts instinctive and organic in the religious consciousness, and so, abiding? Or are they a passing phase in religious expression? The philosopher, as such, has no cult. Has he gone astray, or will religion come to this? Has religion a right to have its own peculiar way of expressing itself, as art has, and as morality has? Or will moral acts be the expression of religion? Must you have a flag for there to be patriotism? I am in doubt about the whole matter; but while I believe in moral service as the expression of religion, I believe that worshipful acts are instinctive and spontaneous. They have place, not because they pay in getting the Deity to do something, and not because they pay in superinducing a mental condition, but for the same reason that the lamb plays on the hillside in the sunshine, or the child goes to its mother, or the chick lifts up its head. Worshipful acts are the organic and proper way of expressing religious emotions.

§11. *The Question as to the Origin of Religion.*

1. Our religio-psychological analysis setting out from Christianity attempted to elucidate the religious life of man given as fact, and the life of humanity in the sense of religion. But the question as to the origin or rise of religion in the individual man and in humanity is a different question from this.[1]

Note to §11:1

1. It is not the business of dogmatics to do the historical and psychological work in connection with this problem, but to formulate

the net results of such investigation, and to employ those results in its own task.

An interesting contribution has just been made by L. von Schroeder in an essay entitled *"Der Ursprung der Religion"* in a volume entitled *Beiträge zur weiter Entwickelung der christlichen Religion* (Munich, 1905). He agrees that nature-worship and soul-cult (v. H. Spencer and J. Lippert) have been factors in the genesis of religion, but claims that religion has had another root, more important than these two. He refers to the widespread faith, even among the lowest peoples, in a supreme, good Being, thought of as creative, and requiring altruistic morality of the individual, a Being regarded as not demanding any definite cult, but as being worshipped when one did right and good (cf. A. Lang; *The Making of Religion*). Schroeder finds the roots of altruistic ethics in the animal kingdom, in instinctive love, mutual help, subordination to a common end, and the instinct of self-sacrifice of the individual for the species, as when the parent risks life for the protection of its offspring. The theory as to the origin of religion is then developed as follows: When in the course of evolution there appeared an individual reflective enough, after feeling the power of the inherited altruistic animal instinct leading into recognized danger and suffering, to raise the question, Why do we do this? Why *must* the individual sacrifice itself? the answer would not be in terms of the psychology of instinct, of course, but would probably take the form of the suggestion, There must be some one who wills that we act in this manner. He is not to be seen, yet he must be the greatest and mightiest and highest, since all must follow his will without seeing or hearing him. Then, if these primitive thinkers conceived the simple thought that this great Being must be the one who made the world and man, they would be led to conclude that he must be friendly, since he had made so much for man. Thus the thought arose of the supreme, good Being, whose will was the law of self-sacrificing morality for man. It was the great birth hour of humanity as humanity, the real birth hour of religion and the real birth hour of morals in human understanding.

Now if this theory of Schroeder is historically correct and can be made out, it is very important for our task. It is true that nature-worship and soul-cult do not quite explain the genesis of the moral in religion. But this theory would mean that the kernel of the faith is indissolubly bound up with the moral, with the idea of the good. It puts a stop to the modern cry that religion and morality can be divorced, and it indicates that on fundamental problems the primitive answer was essentially that of our most profound philosophy.

We have here too a further illustration of the way in which what Christianity has most feared often turns out to be a foundation stone indispensable to it. A generation ago the evolutionary hypothesis produced a panic in religion. Now it would seem that the only

adequate defense of the Christian religion involves the evolutionary hypothesis. Here we have an evolutionary vindication of the view that altruistic good is organic, structural, original in life. We cannot make the transition (logically) from abstract egoism to abstract altruism, but here we are able from an evolutionary point of view, to explain (psychologically) how an egoistic person can make the transition to altruism.

2. The origin of religion *in the individual man* is everywhere mediated by religious tradition and education. But such origin presupposes an original endowment in man, i. e. the endowment to spiritual personality, or to the unity and freedom of the self over against the world, and also the consequent question as to the meaning and performance of the whole cosmic process.[1] With the teleological thought of endowment, however, the limits of ætiological explanation are indicated.[2]

Notes to §11:2

1. The traditional is not the original. Spontaneity is the original.
2. There can be causal explanation of the passive, the acquired; but what does the acquiring cannot be so explained.

3. The question as to the origin of religion "*in humanity*" leads first of all into historical investigation as to the original form of religion. But this investigation, like all investigation into the first beginnings of life, loses itself in the obscurity of pre-historical existence.[1] All that remains, therefore, unless one foregoes all effort at scientific explanation, is the possibility of a psychological hypothesis which seeks to make the genesis of religion understandable on the basis of the general psychological endowment and external situation of man.

Note to §11:3

1. The animal kingdom has a kind of history; values are acquired in animal life. As far as we can go in our investigations, all is most reassuring to one who believes in the originality and the structuralness of the good in reality. Would it not be a more adequate God-faith to hold that reality is originally and structurally good throughout, even if we had to give up the questions as to personality, trinity in unity, etc., than to hold to the old doctrine of an absentee good Being, with a cosmos which was not originally or structurally good? Is this what people mean when they say that the God-idea is passing away?

4. The psychological hypotheses concerning the genesis of religion move in different directions, ever according to the conception and meaning of religion (cf. §10). The hypothesis most approximate to the view set forth above may now be given. The origin of religion is to be explained as follows: (a) On the one hand it is to be explained from the problem of the happiness of man over against the world (v. §7), a problem in which the tendency to the unity and freedom of the self comes to elementary expression. (b) On the other hand at the same time, the origin of religion is to be explained from the immediate impression of certain natural phenomena upon men, the impression that a power announces itself in these phenomena, a power which claims man and is or may be made mindful of his happiness and well-being. This is what Schroeder would call the nature-worship root of religion. (c) The ancestor-worship root is the soul-cult theory set forth by Schroeder. (d) Finally, according to Lang and Schroeder, by the side of the egoistic root mentioned above there is equally original and structural the altruistic root. This last is the source of the moralization of religion and accounts for the indissolubility throughout of religion and morality. But as yet hypotheses remain indefinite and uncertain in details, on account of our ignorance of the state of primitive man. Moreover, all hypotheses lead to an *original endowment* in man, and thus to the limits of ætiological explanation.

5. *If* the *truth* of religion is acknowledged, then the presupposition underlying the human inner life must be viewed as (a) a *divine endowment,* while that from without which awakens this impression must come under the point of view of (b) a *divine disclosure.* The religious knowledge thus gained must be viewed as (c) *divine self-disclosure* to man by means of those disclosures. But these thoughts lead beyond the pale of religio-psychological and religio-historical consideration.[1]

Note to §11:5

1. The truth of religion is wrapped up with the question regarding the revelation-idea of religion. Religiosity is psychological and indubitable. But the revelation-idea is a presupposition to account for this religiosity from the standpoint of religion. But this is not a

psychological or historical, but a metaphysical question. Is religion true? Psychology cannot say. Dogmatics cannot escape philosophy, the Ritschlians to the contrary notwithstanding.

c. The Peculiarity of Christianity as against Other Religions.

§12. *The Gradation of Religion* (*Stages of Religious Development*).

1. In spite of our setting out from Christianity in our analysis of the religious life, we have drawn in the other historical formations of religion by way of comparison. They are to be distinguished from Christianity and from one another; and yet never by mere single externals, but by the *individual stamp or mold of all the features* of the religious life (v. §6). The individuality of a religion has its root (a) in the revelation-basis which gives norm to that religion (v. §7:2), or (b) in the hoped for or enjoyed redemptive good (§7:1).

2. Effort has been made to gain a survey at least of the inexhaustible manifoldness of religions, by *classification* into groups. This classification has unconsciously assumed the character of a gradation, of stages of worth or development. These classifications have been very variously constructed, always in accordance with the main point of view. Also they aid in very diverse degree in an inner understanding of the distinctions important for the life of religion.

3. If we set out from the revelations of the various religions in their correlation to the happiness striven for, we get the following fundamental order or arrangement: (a) *Nature religions,* which hold to disclosures of divine powers in striking natural phenomena and orders, especially in beneficent and injurious natural phenomena. The *lowest* stages of nature religion are fetichism and animism. The *highest* stages pass in fluid transition over into (b) *folk religions,* or ethicized or humanized nature religions, in which divine disclosures are found not only in the region of nature, but above all in the region of the folk-life, with its processes and orders. To this (polytheistic) double group, a second double group (exalted above polytheism) fastens on, viz. (c) *law religions,* which (α) find the regulative revelation of God in the communica-

tion of a unitary law of life and (β) expect retribution for man according to the measure in which he fulfils the law; and (b) *redemption religions,* which believe in a redeeming disclosure of deity, viz. (α) mystical redemption religion, (β) pessimistic redemption religion (Buddhism, which, in its original form, some think is not real religion at all), and (γ) Christian redemption religion, which is of a positive, ethical and historical character.

§13. *Comparative Characteristics of Christianity.*

1. Christianity is *historical* redemption religion par excellence, in so far as it has its center in faith in Jesus as the Christ, and therewith as redemptive revealer of God (v. §3). Now other religions also condition connection with their religious communities upon recognition of their historical founders. This is especially the case with the two world-religions associated with Mohammed and Buddha. But there is a distinction between Christianity and them in this matter. (a) Christianity by virtue of its inner character acknowledges Jesus Christ not only as prophet and supreme model, but as redeeming Savior and Lord, and as abiding ground and immediate object of personal faith (cf. §3). (b) Another distinction is the *kind and content* of the salvation expected from Jesus Christ.

2. *Ethical* redemption religion (cf. §9:4) — this is what Christianity is by virtue of its law of life and its redemptive good. (a) The law religions are also expressed in a unitary law of life (§12:3, c), but the new *law of life* arising from Jesus has, as compared with them, (α) a different content, i. e. a spiritual, moral content (cf. § 4:2, b); (β) another kind of validity — i. e. it is valid on account of its *inner worth;* and (γ) another position in the whole of religion, especially in relation to the redemptive good (cf. §4:2, c) — i. e. the law in law religion is the cause of its redemptive good; in Christianity it is its effect. (b) The *redemptive good* itself, in distinction from (α) the good striven for in nature religion and folk religion, also from (β) the reward expected in law religions, is of a *purely ethical* kind, and it is this fact that distinguishes Christianity from the other redemption religions.

The latter redeem man to (α) absorption of the soul in God, or to (β) self-liberation from a painful existence.[1] But redemption in Christianity signifies the uplift of spiritual personality from sin and guilt to filial communion with the perfect God and with all the children of God (cf. §4: 2, a).

Note to §13: 2

1. The ontological, pantheistic religions end with man's absorption in God, with the dissipation of his personality and individuality. He may enrich the life of the Absolute, as dead leaves falling to the ground enrich the life of the tree. He becomes a fertilizer of the Absolute.

In the newer idea, the re-inclusion of man in God is left out of account, and the race is put in place of God. The personal life ceases, it is held, but it enriches the life of the race. At death there will take place my absorption in the race for the fertilization of the race.

Pantheism and the older theism are both overcome; *panentheism* is now more nearly the word we should use.

Christianity is not so much concerned with redemption from pain, as it is to make pain auxiliary to the development of moral personality.

3. Also the *Christian view of God* as heavenly Father (§4: 3), or as redemptive and pedagogic holy love, compared with the view of God of other religions confirms the characteristic of Christianity as historical and positive ethical redemption religion, or as religion of the Gospel.[1]

Note to §13: 3

1. The new religio-historical movement in Germany, represented by Troeltsch, Bousset, Wernle, J. Weiss, and Weinel, is the culmination of what has been going on for two hundred and fifty years. It accepts the absolute relativity of all historical life, and hence of Jesus. It eliminates the idea of the isolatedness and singularity of Christianity and puts it into genetic connection with the development of the historical religious life, and relativizes it. It accepts seriously the hypothesis of universal evolution. It tends to hold that the distinction between God and the world is an abstraction of importance, but only an abstraction, a distinction comparable to the distinction between volition and act, or between inside and outside. But the men of this school confess Jesus as a creative revelation-personality, and are enthusiastic in their devotion to him as Savior and Lord (cf. G. B. Foster: "Some Modern Estimates of Jesus," *American Journal of Theology*, Vol. IX, 1905, pp. 333 ff.).

Weinel says, "After Jesus, it is his religion, or none." But is it Jesus' religion, or is it our religion with faith in Jesus?

§14. *The Essential and Permanent in Christianity.*

We may now gather up at the close of this main division (A) the salient features which confront us in (a) the historical phenomena of Christianity (§§3 and 4), and in (b) the comparison of Christianity with other religions (§§12 and 13).

1. As to *objective* content, Christianity may be defined as the gospel of the love of God the heavenly Father, who redeems us and educates us for his kingdom, this love being revealed in Jesus Christ.[1] *Subjectively* considered, the Christian life consists in our trustful surrender to Jesus Christ,[2] by means of which we win (a) filial communion with God, and (b) sanctification in discipline and love.[3] By means of these (communion and sanctification) we gain (c) eternal life, beginning here already and awaiting consummation hereafter.[4]

Notes to §14:1

1. Must Christianity be considered as the absolute religion, or may it be superseded? Not all of the content of Christianity has yet been externalized. The adjective "Christian" will best characterize the human ideal forever. Tertullian was right: "*Mens humana naturaliter Christiana.*" The more one develops along the lines of inherent manliness the more he will come to be like Christ in his disposition. To be truly human will ultimately be to be Christian. To Christianize is not to dehumanize humanity, but to humanize humanity.

2. In substituting Jesus' person for his cause [the gospel about Jesus for the gospel of Jesus], has Christianity gone astray from its birth? The essential thing in the Christian faith in Jesus is that God is as good as Jesus is, even though appearances may sometimes be to the contrary. If we can stick to this in all the grind and torture and darkness of this world, we can live in hope and die without despair. If the will at the heart of things is, in its attitude toward us, as good as the will of Jesus, I can bury my child, I can pass through invalidism, lose my fortune, be maligned, and die forgotten before I die; I can assume too that the divine attitude toward me in my guilt will be one of mercy. If God is truly represented by the will of Jesus, made omnipotent, what need I fear? If we depart from this, we depart from the Christian religion. As people decline to believe this, they decline, theoretically and practically, from Christianity.

3. The doctrine of sanctification illustrates the interpenetration of religion and morality in Christianity. In Christianity there is no relation to man which is not a relation to God, and no relation to God which is not a relation to man.

4. See, in this connection, Lessing's "Education of the Human Race"— an old rationalistic book, but one which might have been written yesterday — and Lessing's "The Demonstration of the Spirit and of Power."

2. All these features point to the essential and permanent content of Christianity and the Christian life. (a) But the gospel had to be preached by Jesus himself in the use of the ideas and forms of expression of his time.[1] (b) Also the Christian life was lived by the disciples of Jesus in the definite relations and tasks under which they stood.[2] Thus the gospel and the Christian life have formed manifold individual formations under changing times and circumstances. But, for all that, in the points specified above, the changing forms can preserve an inner unity and continuity with the original gospel. In the degree that these changing forms bring those characteristic features to distinct individual expression and organization are they really Christian.[3]

Notes to §14:2

1. The difficulty in adapting the gospel to the modern world-view lies in the fact that it was at first preached lashed close home to the dualistic conception. This is reflected in such expressions as "Your Father in heaven." God is in the rosebud and in the soul of the little child as well as in heaven. Besides, "heaven" has not the same significance now as it had then.

2. In our generically different world-view and tasks, we cannot copy primitive Christianity, theoretically and practically, and this gets us into trouble with orthodoxy. Monism is not dualism. Immanent values of present human life are in conflict with transcendent eschatology, and that is the end of that matter too.

3. There are churches to whom we send missionaries. They are very different from us, but are we sure that they are not Christian? They may worship images, appropriate the perpetual body of Christ through their physical organisms in the mass, believe in evil spirits and witches, and in a literal resurrection of the physical body — hair, teeth, stomach and all — but if they trust the love of God in Jesus Christ, commune with God and thereby grow in a holy life, which is eternal life here and hereafter, they are Christians, and all these other things are not such as necessarily keep them from being Christians. We are introducing the Western civilization to certain churches of the Near East under the guise of missions; it is an optical illusion, which has its advantages. The one thing, the lack of which in their Christianity is most serious of all, is the idea of

the capacity of development in Christianity, and to get that idea into them, you must get them to develop.

Now let us turn to the other extreme. May one trust the love of God in connection with the idea that man is a unity, that the distinction between altruism and egoism is not absolute, that the distinction between God and the world is an abstraction, that personality as we know it is inadequate as an expression of God, that a more adequate expression is the moral order of the world? Here the problem is more serious. Do the gospel and the modern view of the world (with its monism, its divine immanency, its dynamic and energic becoming) inwardly belong together? It is hard to make this go, but I believe it can be done.

3. Thus understood, Christianity, in distinction from the rigidity of law religions and from the unhistoricalness of the other redemption religions, is a religion of the spirit, which, along with the permanent features it contains, enters into living history, i. e. it itself enters into a process of development.[1] Precisely in this capacity for development by which Christianity is distinguished from other religions do we find the basis (a) for its missionary claims more consciously and more consistently than can be made by any other religion, and (b) for its claim to be the ultimate religion, and to proclaim *universally valid,* permanent truth.

Note to §14:3

1. Christianity is a religion of the spirit. Law religion is, in the nature of things, historyless, static. Even other redemption religions are, as a matter of fact, historyless. They have a static metaphysics. Christianity is distinctively historical, a religion of the spirit, and it belongs to the nature of spirit to externalize itself, to enter into process and development.

B. THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION[1]

a. The Effort to Provide a Theoretical Proof of the Truth of the Christian Faith.[2]

§15. *The Stimulus to Attempts at Theoretical Proof.*

1. If the claim of Christianity to be universally valid truth is to be justified it would seem best at first sight to take the same path which leads to the fixation of otherwise universally valid truths, viz. the path of a *scientific proof* wherein the

necessitation of perception and of thought would be the decisive criterion.

Notes to B

1. As in Part A dogmatics gives a résumé of the psychological, historical and philosophical study of religion, so in Part B it gives a résumé of the apologetic vindication of the right of the Christian religion to a permanent function in the development of the spiritual life of man.

2. Apologetics is in a state of flux to-day, and I hesitate to do anything with it any more, and reserve the right to change all this if I have to do so. But I am still inclined to think that, much as our thinking is being colored by pragmatism and the activity-philosophy, the main contention of our apologetics abides.

2. Mediæval scholasticism has made this effort within the history of Christianity in a certain scope; so did scholastic orthodoxy, but in more definite limits. This attempt has been repeated in manifold forms in rationalism and in various branches of modern philosophy and of modern theology.

3. The other side of the shield, that is, the obverse side of this attempt to make the world of faith of Christianity, or a part of it, directly accessible to a theoretical proof, is, however, the *danger* that science and faith fall into hostile camps. Since this contradiction can be legitimized only temporarily by the thought of a "two-fold truth," the further danger arises of violent efforts at unification, whether these efforts be by (a) a hierarchical subjection of science under the yoke of "faith," or (b) a rational reduction of faith to the universal truths of reason.

4. But our question is not merely concerning these dangers, but concerning the possibility of a theoretical proof of the objects of faith, or of a part of them.

§16. *The Insufficiency of the Traditional Theistic Arguments.*

1. Efforts at a theoretical proof of the fundamental idea of the Christian faith, have been concentrated upon the so-called proofs of the existence of God. The traditional forms of these proofs are (a) ontological, (b) cosmological, (c) teleological, (d) psychological, (e) historical. These persist still, even in the present, though in developed form. Even where new

proofs are attempted they share with the last four mentioned the method of regress from a given state of fact to its metaphysical presuppositions.

2. None of these proofs has power to compel the assent of the intellect. They lack the necessitation of perception and of thought (a) partly in their starting-point, (b) partly in the progress from this starting point. What survives in these proofs is (a) in part postulates of thought, (b) in greater part postulates and expressions of the worth-perceiving heart. These postulates are of great preliminary importance for the Christian faith, but in themselves they are still too indefinite and general to be able to lead us to the Christian God-idea in its determinateness.

§17. *The Comprehensive Reason for the Collapse of All the Attempts at Theoretical Proof of the Existence of the God of Christian Faith.*

1. The insufficiency of *all* theoretical proofs flows *on the one side* from the essence of the religious, and especially of *the Christian faith in God.* The Christian God-idea has for its essential content (§4:3 and §13:3) the idea of a holy and gracious God, who will redeem and educate us for blessedness in his kingdom. The reality of such a God and of his dominion in the world can never be reached by a syllogism of the understanding, but can be apprehended in the heart's receptivity for redeeming and pedagogic love (cf. §8).

2. *On the other side* the collapse of all efforts at proof is grounded in the *character and limits of theoretical cognition.* (a) Theoretical knowledge, according to its *character,* apprehends the given material of perception in the forms of space and time, and as a manifold of causally successive interacting things and processes. It orders the world just apprehended as comprehensively as possible into (α) a system of concepts and laws, but also into (β) an intelligible system of development, especially in the region of animated nature and of mental life. This ordering is accomplished by the aid of hypotheses, which widen and refine the net of conditions. (b) Now in doing this work we hit upon the *limits* of knowledge, which cannot

be transcended. As an absolutely given presupposition of knowledge there is on the one hand (α) the stuff of sensation streaming to us, and on the other hand (β) our own cognitive consciousness, with its necessary cognitive forms and ideals. Over against these two limiting points, all that is possible is only the *cognitive postulate,* viz. that the given stuff of sensations will be adapted to our cognitive consciousness, in that it will admit of being ordered by the latter into a unitary system of knowledge. But it is impossible to press on by way of logically necessary steps to a knowledge of the *content* of the ultimate ground both of the world and of our consciousness. Now the proofs of the existence of God, at least on their theoretical side, are only vain attempts to transcend the limits herewith specified.[1]

Note to §17:2

1. After orthodoxy gained, by these proofs, the existence of God, its further procedure was as follows: (1) God is above and outside of man. God is in heaven; man, on earth. These stand not only for different localities, but for different values. (2) God is holy and merciful, but man on the earth is ruined and empty of holiness. (3) The relation between God and man must of necessity be one of communication, or of revelation from God to man, from heaven to earth. (4) How is this communication or revelation to be known by man, dissociated from God, to be revelation? Only by outer objective signs. That is, revelation must announce its origin from Absolute Intelligence by predictions, and from Aboslute Power by miracle. Prediction and miracle are the signs that it is revelation from God. (5) In order to the perpetuity of this revelation, communicated in definite time and space, to the subsequent world, the revelation must be embodied in Sacred Scripture. But how is the Scripture to be guaranteed to be revelation? To this end the Scriptures must be inspired by the Author of the revelation. (6) So far the whole process is by God himself, all on the object-side — all this that is to make revelation certain and accessible to man; the mediation to the subject is still wanting, and this is most important. (7) The subject appropriates the revelation by the interpretation of the Scriptures; but how will the subject detect that the supposed revelation is really divine? The answer is, By the miracle and prediction accompanying the original communication of the revelation. Very well, but how detect that these are real miracles and predictions? The answer is, By the witness of the Scriptures. Very well again, but how detect again that the witness of the Scriptures is true? The answer is that the Scriptures are inspired by a truthful

God. Good again, but how detect the inspiration as divine? The answer is, By the inner witness of the Holy Spirit, who, as we read in the Holy Scriptures, recognizes his own work therein. Good again, but how shall we be certain that this really originates from the Holy Spirit, and not from our own spirit? (8) Here the thread of the orthodox system snaps. In place of the divine witness for revelation we now put *human proofs,* arguments from the genuineness and trustworthiness of the Biblical writings to the truth of that which they narrate of revelations of God, and from the divine worthiness of the content of Scriptures to their divine origin. But many human doubts correspond to these human proofs. The genuineness and trustworthiness of the Scriptures have been assailed. Possibilities of deception or of self-deception, and of the obscuration of historical truth by legendary narratives and mythical formations, have irresistibly suggested themselves. The Bible appears as an aggregate of writings of very unequal merits. At times there was no fulfilment to the prediction; at other times, no prediction to the fulfilment. Miracle is dissolved by mythical explanations. In the revelation man recognizes his own laws — laws, if not of his reason, of his feeling and imagination.

The above is the critical self-dissolution of the dualistic view of the world, and of all the efforts to patch it up. Some, e. g., E. Zeller, have said that with dualism goes the Christian religion. Strauss tried to affiliate the Christian religion with a monistic view of the world, but failed, and came out into materialism and æstheticism. Baur, Pfleiderer and the Cairds make the same attempt, and remain Christian. Others say, We cannot do anything with the problem, and so we will be anti-metaphysical philosophers. Kaftan exemplifies this position; he has to employ metaphysics to quite an extent in order to get rid of metaphysics. He has never criticized his concept of "revelation." But, in any case, dualistic supernaturalism has been retired. But what are we to have in place of it — monism or pluralism? I am sure as to negations, not as to affirmations.

3. This critical limitation of theoretical knowledge has, however, a great indirect worth for the proof of the truth of the Christian faith. (a) It may be turned critically against the tendencies of a dogmatic metaphysics which is hostile to Christianity, against materialistic monism. (b) It shows that on the side of theoretical knowledge the region remains free in which Christian faith moves. (α) Along with the knowledge of the single phenomena of the world there is, as equally essential for man, the apprehension of worth in various value-judgments (v. §8). (β) Along with the effort after a cognitive system of the world, there is the question as to a unitary mean-

ing of the world. (γ) Along with the ætiological explanation, there is the teleological understanding of the world and its last End and Ground.

4. By means of this distinction, in connection with our question as to the truth of the Christian faith, we are led over from the attempts at theoretical proofs to the attempts at a substantiation that is practically direct.

b. Practical Substantiation of the Truth of the Christian Faith.

§18. *The Two Main Points of Practical Proof, and the Modern Views of the World Which Confront Christianity.*

1. In the practical proof only those reasons are to be systematically apprehended to which the Christian proclamation itself appeals, and on which the plain Christian reflects in his religious life, when he assures himself of the truth of his faith against his doubts. These reasons lie (a) in reminding ourselves of *what we have in our faith* for our innermost life, and (b) in reminding ourselves of the evidences, or disclosures, in which the power of a holy, redeeming and pedagogic love confronts us as reality in a manner that convinces the heart.

2. In these two points (a and b above) Christianity has to compare itself with *other modern views of the world* which rest on a different interpretation of the world and of our destiny in it; especially (a) with æsthetic, or naturalistic *pantheism,* (b) with *pessimism,* into which a naturalistic or materialistic world-view consistently lands us. Also (c) scepticism, or *agnosticism,* fluctuates between these two views of the world (a and b just mentioned).

3. In the conflict of Christianity with these three world-views, it is not faith against science, but *faith against faith.*[1] The question is, (a) Which *faith* is the one that corresponds best to the essential needs of man and of humanity? Which faith functions most serviceably in the development of the spiritual life of man and of the race? (b) What faith can claim for its support the inwardly convincing disclosures of the world in which we live? That is, do the facts, manifestations of the world in which we live, comport better with naturalism,

pessimism, or agnosticism on the one hand, or with the Christian conviction on the other? In which direction does our *inward conviction* point? (On the basis of our inward conviction, considering wide reaches of time and space, can we be pessimists? Does the trend of things require pessimism?)

Note to §18:3

1. If the Christian religion is a sum of propositions, then it must be propagated by proof. But if its content is will and personality, then its propagation must be by will and personality (cf. the recent article by Theodor Kaftan on "The Christian Faith in the Intellectual Life of the Present"; also H. Münsterberg, *Psychology and Life,* pp. 112, 113).

§19. *The Immediately Experienced Worth of Christian Faith for the Individual and the Community.*

1. What has the *single Christian* in his faith, so far as he actually lives in it? (a) First, a supreme goal of his endeavor, viz. that of filial communion with the holy God, and therewith true righteousness at the same time (v. §4:2, a and b). Precisely this goal, however, is certain to him as the unconditionally worthful and obligating, especially in comparison with all other goods and tasks.[1] Still the latter often result somehow in distraction and dissipation, and in servility, but the Christian's goal places before him an inner stay and content of life without drawing him away from the world itself.[2] In this way the Christian passes from distraction to inner unity, from dependence on the world to inner freedom from it, and precisely therein to a truly *spiritual* personal life, to the gaining of the ψυχή. Hence the conviction that one is able to appeal to the conscience of others by holding this goal up before them. (b) But the Christian is not simply left to his own endeavor after this goal, but he lives on faith in a redeeming and pedagogic power of God. Thereby the Christian wins *free uplift* above the crippling and crushing experiences which confront him on the way to the goal; that is to say, above *guilt* and *weakness* in temptation, above *pain* and *death.* There does not seem to be a theoretical explanation for the Christian of these four dark riddles, but there is a practical solution, viz. through the uplifting certainty (α) of

the forgiveness of guilt,[3] (β) of God's holy power shielding us from temptation, (γ) of education through pain, (δ) of redemption from death.[4] Thus *even here* the Christian in his faith can experience something of the supramundane eternal life in communion with God.[5]

Notes to §19:1

1. The profoundest religious spirits have felt this: "What have I in heaven but thee? And on earth there is none that I desire beside thee." "Thou hast been our dwelling place in all generations." "Thou, my everlasting portion." "The soul is restless till it rests in thee." Not the gifts of God are God, but God himself is God. Man's other goods and tasks are not his goal, but instruments to that greater goal. As motion of nerve and muscle may be bearer of the look of love, that most precious gift which one human heart can give another, so the whole social nervous system should be expression and bearer of higher values.

2. According to the old dualism, if you are to have the one, you cannot have the other. According to the newer insight, you can have the one (rightly) only in the other. "Is this vile world a friend to grace, to help me on to God?" When it came to the erecting of natural impulses into ethical, the older Christianity failed. It condemned all dancing, for instance; but, while there may be evil in connection with it, proper dancing produces a distinct moralization and socialization of life. Not even the saloon is an unmitigated evil; its strength, hold and value are to be found in its function as a social rendezvous, and this its good point should be utilized and retained.

The reason why monism has not become theoretically clear is that it has not been carried out practically in society. Practical monism must precede theoretical monism. The divine element is present in impulses and instincts and appetites, as well as in goals and ideals. After all, psalm-singing is not an *indispensable* means in the spiritualizing and ethicizing of life; but play *is* indispensable. Segregation of the natural impulses results in inner diremption, and tends toward a life of servility to these things. The older Christianity surrendered its case; it virtually maintained that the suppression of natural impulse was so good that it was altogether *too good* for man. But the goal of the Christian, rightly appreciated, gives him a content of life which acts as a stay and gives him balance in the suppression of natural impulses.

3. The notion of the forgiveness of guilt seems to be dropping out of preaching. Why? Is it because we do not know what it means? Is it because of the inviolability of law and the principle of causation in the moral as well as in the physical? Is "forgiveness of guilt," as applied to the divine, a figure of speech? Or is

not restoration of fellowship and communion, together with the consciousness that a sense of paralysis has gone, evidence of forgiveness?

4. The notion of redemption from death has largely dropped out of preaching. The attitude of most with regard to death is that of the ostrich, which sticks its head in the sand; it is an attitude of stoical waiting, with as little thought on the matter as possible. That is no victory over death. Has not the Christian an abiding victory over death; not some mere antidote to chloroform him for a while, but an inner triumph, making death servant and minister to his life? The absence of problem to Jesus in these things is the remarkable thing. The inner mastery of Jesus, the constancy and thoroughness of his inner triumph over pain, death and all evil, makes him redemptive for us. The impression he makes upon us is redemptive in its effect (cf. Kant).

5. Eternal life is life in enjoyment of the inner values of personality.

2. Christian faith is worthful for human fellowship. It is not *merely* mediately worthful, as means of promoting culture and the fellowship of culture. Rather the kingdom of God with its communion of religio-ethical personalities in faith and love proves itself immediately to be the absolutely worthful thing for humanity. Besides, experience shows that secular culture is stable and beneficent only through this eternal content and end; without the latter, the former is hollow and pernicious.[1]

Note to §19:2

1. Eternity is the persistence of the worthful through the mutations and illusions of the temporal; it is essentially continuity of values. Eternity is thus not a gift, but an achievement. The eternity of Christ was achieved by him. Nothing ethical is obtained by the sheer attitude of passivity toward it. Eternity is not a continuation of existence. All that persists of the achievements of the past is the value for which these achievement are the raw material.

The notion of resurrection has no place in this view, except as it is taken figuratively. In early Christianity, until adjustment was made to Greek ideas, resurrection was a straightforward conception, meaning resurrection of the body. The whole notion is historically conditioned; it belongs to the old Judaic eschatology, and is not of abiding significance.

[In answer to a student's question as to what became of the body of Jesus] I'm not on tap on everything!

I spent an hour before a congregation once, marshalling proofs

of the bodily resurrection of Jesus. "Your sermon did not give me the uplift it usually does," said a woman. "You did not prove your point," said a man. It was indeed a failure, both religiously and scientifically. Christianity is not a proposition, to be proved by historical arguments. If it were, the way to Christianize would be not by bearing witness, but by studying logic. But that would be to get off the Christian platform. My sermon was not a Christian sermon, and it was not of any account.

3. The importance that personalities have for the proof of the truth of Christianity follows from 1 and 2. Personalities in their life and in their work for others authenticate the worth of Christian faith for the individual and for human society.

§20. *Philosophic Amplification of the Question of Worth.*

1. If, according to §19: 1, the individual Christian can win in Christianity inner unity and freedom, and thereby the character of a spiritual personality, *philosophy,* or the science of the essential activities of the human spirit, shows the following: (a) The effort for that spiritual personal life is nothing accidental for man, but pervades all his spiritual activities as their unitary, fundamental activity. This fundamental tendency attains a pronounced character in the *moral* life, with its acknowledgment of an unconditioned "ought." But this tendency does not come to its completion in this moral life alone; the moral life requires a religious view of God and the world to which man may yield himself. Indeed such a view is the stay of morality.[1] (b) From this point of view two considerations may be mentioned: (α) All that a moral command ought to do for a man is done by the Christian moral commandment in a more perfect manner, not to be intensively or extensively surpassed. (β) A religious view of God and the world which is in perfect harmony with the perfect moral law is proffered in Christianity. (The elaboration of α and β is the essence of the problem of Christian ethics.) Therefore, according to α and β Christianity brings to completion the tendency referred to under (a) above — the tendency to a true spiritualization of personality, a tendency essential to man.[2]

Notes to §20:1

1. This is vital to Christianity. So far as I can see, the bottom falls out, if this goes. There is much in life which looks as if it were not true; but closer examination will show that it *is* true, I believe.

Note the relation of *consistent* pessimism to the moral life.

2. The tendency to ethicization and spiritualization of personality is structural, organic with man, and Christianity falls right in with the structural nature of man. Christian ethics must make much of this.

The spiritualization of reality is the cosmic task.

2. The same thing is taught us by the philosophic consideration of human society. (a) Human society is, as to its basis, nature and interest society, just as the human individual is, originally and fundamentally, nature and interest individual; but the society points with inner necessity, just as in the case of the individual, to a progressive regulation (or moralization) and spiritualization, which is striven for also in our human cultural development. In this connection, therefore, the question arises as to a supreme unconditioned norm, and a supreme, absolutely unconditioned goal of development. (b) But since progress in history is not effectuated as nature-process, but by human deed, the further question arises at the same time as to the moral personal *powers* by means of which society can be held together, and development carried on further.

3. In connection with the considerations amplified in 1 and 2, the superiority of Christianity (a) to *other religions* and (b) to the other views of the world mentioned in §18:2 may be indicated.

c. The Revelation-Basis of our Christian Faith.

§21. *The Need of Supplementing the Value-Judgment Argument.*

1. The worth-argument for the Christian faith is, of course, indispensable. But if it were decisive by itself alone, we should be restricted to a moral postulate in the sense of Kant.

2. This postulate-standpoint, however, (a) would be insufficient, for it would require us to uplift our own selves on the strength of our own moral convictions to the certainty of God,

and would leave us in doubt as to whether we were not supporting ourselves merely on the uplifting, subjective thought of God. (b) This postulate does not correspond to the character of real religion (§7: 2), least of all to Christianity with its reference to revelation.[1]

Note to §21: 2

1. The value-judgment argument has as its necessary correlate the revelation-concept; otherwise it lacks objectivity.

3. Therefore in intimate connection with the worth-question, the revelation-question is to be investigated (v. §§3, 7, 18).[1]

Note to §21: 3

1. The Ritschlians are wrong in finding *only* value-judgment in the Christian doctrine of the resurrection, and ignoring the psychological basis of the value-judgment.

Does Christian faith need to be distressed by the vicissitudes of critical investigation? Historical science cannot give immediate certainty of God, which is a religious acquisition; but it may be helpful to religion in taking away false props. Religion has its hearth and home elsewhere.

§22. *The Revelation of God in the Person and Spiritual Work of Jesus Christ.*

1. Where does the redeeming and pedagogic love of God disclose itself in the actual world in a way that convinces and conquers the human heart? The Christian proclamation itself directs our attention not merely to single individual experiences, but to a *disclosure belonging to human history,* that is, to the person and spirit-work of Jesus Christ.

2. Jesus Christ's own person shows in his entire discourse, in his conduct, in his sufferings and death, that God's holy love concerned with the actualization of his kingdom was inexpugnably *certain* to Jesus on the basis of his inner experience. Jesus Christ's own person shows also that his whole *life* was determined by this inner communion with God, and was unfolded, drawn out in the service of God, and also in the service of holy love for man. Precisely this character of the person of Jesus accredits itself to our hearts and conscience as a reality of the supramundane divine life; more accurately, of the holy love of God in that life.

3. But Jesus' person is not to be considered by itself alone. It is to be considered in its effects.[1] If one analyzes the unitary, spiritual effect which has gone out from Jesus within human history in the circle of his immediate followers, and also in entire subsequent Christianity, four sides of that effect may be distinguished, viz.: (a) the awakening of conscience to the recognition of that which we men fall short of, and which we ought to be; (b) the peace or comfort of the hunted and fearful conscience, peace and comfort which Jesus as Savior brought to publicans and sinners, and since then to all who trust in him; (c) along with this, at the same time, impulse and ability to a life of sanctification through discipline and pruning, especially through love; and (d) power to overcome pain and death by communion with him. But all these four sides in the present spiritual effects of Christianity point us back to Jesus himself as the personal bearer and bringer of this resultful spirit. Therefore, a power of God redeeming us from sin and the world, and in this regard supramundane, confronts us as real and as operative.[2]

Notes to §22:3

1. Some aspects of reality cannot be fully understood, because that reality is not yet finished. The effects of the person of Jesus are not yet ended.

2. It is not quite accurate to say that Jesus does it. It is God in him that does it. The object of faith is God himself; but the disclosure of God is in the spirit and disposition of Jesus. Not Jesus with God, but God in Jesus, is the object of religious faith.

4. Therefore the person and spirit and work of Jesus Christ brings us face to face with the decisive question of trust or confidence. But if we ourselves, on the basis of the impression of Jesus' person and work, surrender ourselves trustfully to him, we can have the *experience* in ourselves that the spiritual working of God, and therewith of God's redeeming and pedagogic holy love, is an operative reality (v. Titus 2:11, 12).

5. The spiritual person and effectiveness of Jesus Christ is therefore the central revelation of God, in the last analysis the basis of faith. It is only from the standpoint of this revelation that all further disclosures of God in the history of

Jesus himself, in Christianity, or in our own lives, are intelligible to us.[1]

Note to §22:5

1. As we could not know man by a mere embryological study, so we can not know the Christian revelation of God by merely investigating the historic Jesus as an isolated individual and apart from his effectiveness in human life and history.

§23. *Justification and Amplification of the Proof from Given Revelation.*

1. Two objections of the most serious character possible are made to the foregoing argument on the basis of revelation. (a) First objection: Our *historical knowledge* of Jesus Christ is too uncertain for faith to rest upon and adhere to his person.[1] But (α) in receptivity for the impression of the Jesus Christ of the gospels and for his spirit-work in Christianity with which we come into contact, and (β) in one's own experience of his redemptive power, an experience flowing from faith, *an immediate certainty of the divine spirit in him and in his work may be gained.*[2] (b) Second objection: Jesus Christ, as member of history, cannot be bearer of absolutely divine life and of absolute truth, but can have only *relative* importance.[3] But this affirmation is itself only a dogma either of (α) pantheistic faith, or of (β) a natural science theory of evolution.[4]

Notes to §23:1

1. It is not the man who has not certainty that Jesus existed that is none of his; it is he who has not the spirit of Christ that is none of his. This is what I say to myself in these days in which the historicity of Jesus is denied (e.g., by Kalthoff); but I am not quite certain about the matter, for the question arises, Can we have the spirit of Christ, if we lose the certainty that Jesus existed?

2. This was written before I fell into a degree of doubt about the matter.

Historical science will keep on erecting Jesus into a problem; otherwise it becomes static, and science dies. The certainty we need is religious as against historical certainty. Its basis is not an historical scientific inquiry, but a moral and religious experience.

3. Objection (a) is the most serious that can possibly arise on account of the work of historical science; objection (b), the most serious that can arise on account of philosophical developments. The Hegel-

ian philosophy urges that it is not like the Idea to shake out all its fulness into a single historic exemplar. This would mean the necessary relativity of any Jesus of history.

[Professor William Adams Brown relates that on one occasion he asked Professor Foster the question, "What problem are you working on now?" and received the reply, "I am looking for the Absolute in history, and I am convinced that unless we can find it, it will be fatal for the Christian religion."]

4. The philosopher would prove that Jesus is relative, by saying that everything in history is relative; but how will he prove that everything historical is relative? When it is affirmed that the absolute is to be found in the historic Jesus, that it is dogma does not disprove it.

Naturalism would explain Jesus as remainderless construction of environmental forces. Now we may admit the traditional and evolutionary factors in the life of Jesus; but it is still true that *no* consciousness can be remainderlessly explained by external forces. There is a moment of spontaneity in every personality. And assuredly there is an active and creative moment in the consciousness of Jesus. It is a judgment of faith that Jesus Christ is self-uplifted above the whole evolutionary series; and this judgment of faith science can neither establish nor refute. Spontaneity and novelty are not breaches of continuity, for they are everywhere. It is only a higher degree of empirical inexplicability that we find in Jesus. The principle of activity is original; for if the static were original, nothing could get started. Why may not an entirely new spiritual force appear in the cosmos? May not the cosmos be like a symphony, with a new instrument appearing? The ongoing of existence is not at an even pace. There have been times when a thousand years have been as a day, and there have been crises in which one day has been as a thousand years. Even new species may appear by mutation, in a single leap. And so the affirmation that Jesus is purely relative and to be transcended in history, is a dogma; it is not a necessity of scientific and philosophical reflection.

2. A philosophical amplification of the given revelation-proof, as already of the worth-proof (§20), may be attempted. We relate the revelation in Jesus Christ to the rest of human history in its actual course. (a) Suppose we consider revelation on the basis of the religious and moral development of humanity. It may be viewed as *consummation* of that which was actually sought by man in that development, or which was only approximately gained therein. That is, it may be the fruition of man's own yearning. To be sure the Christian historico-philosophical treatment must grant the impenetrabil-

ity of many intricate waves of religious and moral history, especially on account of the disturbing encroachments of human sin in the course of that history. (b) Conversely, suppose we consider human history from the standpoint of revelation. Then that history gains for us its spiritual *meaning and point of unity* first through the actualization of divine life in Jesus Christ; in him the acme of history is given, but at the same time the starting point of a new life, which is itself capable again of infinite unfolding.[1]

Note to §23:2

1. Is the redemptive revelation in Jesus Christ new in *content?*

3. On the basis of this amplification critical comparison may be elaborated (as was done in §20:13). (a) Christianity as compared with *other* religions, rests on a convincing and comprehensive revelation. (b) It is superior to the two world-views previously mentioned, viz. æsthetic pantheism and pessimism (§18:2, 3); superior not only in its worth, but superior in its understanding of the world; superior not only religiously, but also philosophically (for there is implicit in Christianity a world-view of its own).

§24. *Connection between the Revelation-Proof and the Worth-Proof.*

1. The revelation-proof is most intimately connected with the worth-proof. (a) That which is worthful in Christian faith, viz. the consummation or perfecting of man and of humanity, is revealed in it, is already reality in the being and work of Jesus Christ.[1] (b) The reality to which Christian faith holds is known only in his name, and it is understood and experienced in his redeeming worth.

Note to §24:1

1. What is the distinctive peculiarity of Jesus? It is his faith in the infinite worth of human personality before God. This accounts for his attitude toward sinners and toward children, and for such sayings as that about the sun and rain on the evil and the good.

How did he get that faith? Not from his environment. At that time emphasis was laid upon the worthlessness of man. He got his estimate of human worth from his own human self-consciousness, and he interpreted God as being like what he found in himself.

I am more and more struck with the way Jesus falls in line with humanism. And the modern type of Christianity is Christian humanism. Once, people made little of man, in order to make much of God. Now we must make much of man, if we are to make much of God. And as for Jesus Christ, we must insist on his humanity, if we are to see his dignity. The old view was that in spite of his humanity he was great. The modern view is that through his humanity he was great.

2. It is precisely in this reciprocal relationship of the worth-proof and the revelation-proof that the practical proof of the truth of the Christian faith is to be found as a whole. The sum of it is this, viz.: The *need* of man (cf. §7:1) — and indeed not the accidental but the supreme spiritual-moral need of man — is not merely awakened, but perfectly *satisfied* and stilled by the revelation of God in Jesus Christ (cf. §7:2).

d. Inferences from the Christian Revelation-Concept.

§25. *The Fundamental Character of the Christian Revelation-Concept.*

1. The Christian concept of revelation is implicitly gained by means of the proof of the given revelation. At all events it is different from the *revelation-concept of the orthodox ecclesiastical dogmatics.* The latter rests on the equivalence of *revelatio specialis* with the Sacred Scriptures. In consequence of this, revelation is conceived (a) as communication of doctrine; (b) as internally authoritative and statutory; (c) as miraculous in the sense that main stress is placed upon the absence of natural mediations; (d) as historyless.[1]

Note to §25:1

1. Given the old *Weltanschauung,* it was hard to escape the orthodox conception of revelation.

2. This revelation-concept of orthodoxy has experienced a sharp and definitive criticism by *rationalism.* But rationalism did not extricate itself from the orthodox putting of the question. It was with Schleiermacher that the gradual transformation of the revelation-concept set in.

3. In opposition to (α) the orthodox ecclesiastical as well as to (β) the rationalistic and (γ) the modern liberalistic con-

ceptions, revelation is to be understood directly on the basis of the person of Jesus Christ, and on that basis, is to be defined as follows: (a) Revelation is, more centrally, disclosure of personal life in which God is known and experienced. The concept of external revelation is not to be subordinated or retired in favor of an inner revelation. To be sure every revelation of God necessarily involves an effect upon the inner life; but it is essential to Christian faith to keep to outward historical disclosures of God from which this inner effect emanates.[1] (b) Revelation has the character of (α) an inwardly grounded *authority,* so far as it accredits itself as such in conscience;[2] and of (β) a norm of *freedom,* in that it requires only full acknowledgment, recognition, assent.[3] Thus the liberalistic reproach of blind authority-faith and of external positivism is done away with, and yet justice is done to the orthodox thought of an authority for faith and of a positive historical basis of Christianity. (c) Revelation is the consummation or the perfecting of human nature for its eternal destiny and vocation. Thus revelation signifies the entrance, not unmediated, of a truly supramundane life, and of the *Spirit* in our world. (d) Revelation is an *historical phenomenon* which is yet *super-historical* in content and kind, i. e. transcends the temporal, finite, in its content of life, and in its efficiency encroaches into the time series of history. Thus understood the concept of revelation designates Jesus Christ not only as starting-point of the Christian religion, but as *permanent center* of the personal religious life. To be sure, there are many roads that lead to faith, and many stimuli of the Christian life without *direct* relation to Jesus Christ. But it is only through this latter that Christianity is vigorous and procreative.

Notes to §25:3

1. The merit of rationalism was its subjectivity, its insistence upon the inwardness of revelation. The merit of orthodoxy was its objectivity, its insistence upon the outwardness of revelation. Here the point was to avoid limiting revelation to subjective experience in the absence of any stimulus for that experience; in other words, to avoid illusion.

2. Karl Pearson points out that science will oppose the concept of revelation only when it is appealed to in justification of conduct,

but will oppose it then in the interest of the moral function of science (as seen in scientific ethics).

3. Revelation is a stimulus which requires a free *moral* response to it. But revelation as Catholicism conceives it does not *admit* of free assent.

4. Accordingly, therefore, revelation in the Christian sense may be defined as a disclosure of God within human history for the purpose of our salvation — a disclosure which sustains and gives norm to the faith of the Christian. As to the Bible we may say, Only that in the Bible is authoritative which is revelation of God, and only that in the Bible is revelation of God which is capable of being mediated by religious faith.[1] [2]

Notes to §25:4

1. The supramundane has to do with values. What does the will will? Can the will strive for more time and space? Or does it strive for more significance, value, meaning? What *does* the will desire? Is striving for eternal life striving for more time, or striving for value? (Cf. Münsterberg: *The Eternal Life.*) Münsterberg believes in the eternity of the values, but he does not make the connection between the value and whom the value is for.

2. To me, "fact" means what I cannot deny.

§26. *The Content of the Christian Revelation-Concept in Relation to the New Testament Proclamation of Jesus Christ.*

1. The decisive, central revelation of God is in Jesus Christ, in his personal spirit and efficacy (§22:5). The question then arises, What is the relation of the *various single sides* of the New Testament narrative and witness concerning the being and work of the earthly and exalted Jesus Christ to this central revelation? This question does not exist for those who hold that the *whole Biblical Christ* is, as "undivided and indivisible unity," revelation of God. But owing to the character of the Biblical proclamation as a whole, which is an articulated thing, and owing to the question as to how, on our part, we can attain to inner understanding and to independent certainty of faith concerning the single sides of the Biblical Christ, we are under the inner necessity of signalizing one center of faith within the Biblical collective witness (Gospels and Epistles) concerning Jesus Christ. That center is the so-called historical Christ, the Savior-person of Jesus Christ

in its spiritual being and work, belonging to our human history. It is only from the standpoint of this center that the single moments of the narrative of Jesus Christ, as members of the revelation of God, can be understood, and the various witnesses of him can be evaluated.

2. *Jesus' words* are revelation in the degree that they interpret what is embedded in his Savior-person. *His deeds and suffering* are revelation in the degree that they are part of his work as Savior. The *miraculous* deeds of Jesus Christ are not as such the decisive criterion of the revelation of God to him; but if we are made certain of these deeds through his person as Savior (not by historical science), the powers (δυνάμεις) of Jesus in their importance for his redemptive work become to us members of the total revelation given in him.

3. It is only on the basis of the center designated, i. e. on the basis of the supramundane content of the person of Jesus that we can be certain that the *appearances of the Crucified One* to his disciples were not illusions, but divine revelations, by means of which the Crucified One was declared to be the Lord that overcame the world and death. Only this revelation in the Risen One, terminating the earthly life of Jesus, casts full light backward on the power and worth of Jesus' earthly life-work, and forward on the life and work of the Exalted Christ and God's saving power.[1] The New Testament revelation of God is closed in the crucified and risen Jesus Christ, and accordingly there is *full* Christian revelation-faith only where the surrender and trust toward Jesus' earthly person culminates in the certainty of faith in his appearances after death. So only do we appreciate the full power of his person in its saving value upon those who felt that power in his life.

Note to §26:3

1. See Arnold Meyer: *Die Auferstehung Christi.*

4. The revelation of God, which was concluded as above, continues in the further course of history in a certain sense.[1] (a) This Jesus Christ and the will of God in him are inwardly revealed to every believer. (b) In the spiritual power of the Christianity of Jesus Christ, the power of the Spirit and God's plan of redemption are further made known. (c)

Yet all this is *not a new revelation of God* as to content, for new revelation would carry with it a new religion. It is only the effective unfolding of the one regulative revelation of God in Jesus Christ, and of the Spirit of Jesus Christ.

Note to §26:4

1. Science is a revelation of God, a revelation that Jesus did not make. The same is true of art. But at one point — in his inner disposition, his attitude toward God and man — Jesus made a revelation that has not been surpassed. To Christian faith it is satisfactory and unsurpassable, but its unsurpassableness is not scientifically demonstrable.

The Messianic consciousness of Jesus did not permit him to reveal the wealth of ultimate reality in the realms of science, art, and the order of the state.

Arnold Meyer says that in Jesus humanity revealed its innermost secret, viz. that everyone who bears a human countenance immediately belongs to God, and is, each in his own way, an image of God. Now every man ought to be brought to this consciousness, and if this is to be done, it must be done by some one. Is every one competent to do it? Is every one competent to perform a similar service in art, in science, or in government? There must, of course, be something Shakespeare-like in all of us, or Shakespeare would not grip us; and there must be something Jesus-like in all of us, or Jesus would not appeal to us. But it is in the presence of Shakespeare, not in his absence, that we can become like Shakespeare; and it is in the presence of Jesus, not in his absence, that we can become like Jesus.

§27. *The Question of the Extension of the Revelation-Concept to Old Testament History and to Extra-Christian Humanity.*

1. From the Christian standpoint we recognize by faith the final revelation of God, regulative for us, in Jesus Christ alone.[1] But the Old Testament history, evaluated from the Christian standpoint, is preparatory revelation of God, or it is the basis and soil of the Old Testament. That is to say (a) on the one hand, that the God who has revealed himself in Jesus Christ gradedly actualized his redemptive will in the history of the people of Israel, which was a coherent, teleologically ordered history. A religio-ethical knowledge and life was awakened there, which approximated the Christian, but of course in various degrees. It was awakened (α) by divine guidance of

this people, as well as (β) by prophetic personalities. The pedagogic efficiency of God was carried on in this way (v. Lessing's *Education of the Human Race*). (b) *On the other hand,* this pedagogic efficiency of God did not reach its goal on the soil of that history, but first in Jesus Christ. Thus the moral religious knowledge and life of Israel points on beyond itself. A new covenant is promised, even in the Old Testament itself. Besides, there are thoughts and problems in the Old Testament which begin to break through the pale of the Old Testament religion, e. g. internal and external universalism. (c) For *us Christians* this preparatory revelation of God is not the decisive ground and regulative norm of faith. It is, however, means to pedagogic introduction into the Christian faith; also confirmation and enrichment of that faith. The Old and New Covenant together form *one* revelation-history, combined in Jesus Christ.

Note to §27:1

1. The precepts of Jesus are not to be isolated from his time and self, and erected in a legalistic way as a norm for life. Even the spirit of Jesus is not to be externally copied. And yet the ultimate consummation of human personality and of society is in and through the efficiency of the spirit which was in Jesus.

2. Already according to §23:2 the *pagan development* is not to be put outside all teleological connection with the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Within the former also there are revelations of God, in nature and in history, also in the religions, and especially in the moral history, in conscience and especially in great personalities, in guiding spirits; elements of *Christian* truth are to be found in the religious life of extra-Christian peoples. But we have there no unitary development leading directly to the Christian revelation, as is the case in Israel. We have rather a manifold striving among the various peoples on the basis of the forms of revelation just mentioned. This striving calls upon Christianity as a question for an answer. But in the attempted solutions, in spite of many approximations to Christianity, it is ever again deflected from the path that leads to Christianity, be it (a) in nature worship, or (b) in the humanization of the gods, and

pantheism, or (c) in external legality, or (d) in false ways of redemption, as set forth in §12:3.

C. THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH ACCRUES TO CHRISTIAN FAITH, AND CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS

a. The Character of the Knowledge which Accrues to the Christian Religious Faith, and of the Theologico-Scientific Knowledge of that which is Believed.

§28. *Christian Religious Knowledge as Faith's Understanding of Revelation.*

1. *The character, or species, of the knowledge of Christian truth* is determined according to one's view concerning the proof of the truth of Christianity. According to its essence it is as follows: (a) *Understanding of the revelation* of God in Jesus Christ. The invisible spiritual reality above us, around us, for us, in us and before us, which Christianity proclaims becomes certain and understandable through the revelation sketched and articulated in §§25, 27. According to the New Testament, it is accessible to us only through the Spirit of God, and because this Spirit proceeds from Jesus Christ through the revelation of God in him. (b) *Faith's understanding* of that revelation. One can become aware of that revelation only by trustful surrender and there can be a personal experience only on the basis of this faith, i. e. a perception of its effects in our own life (§22:4).

2. The knowledge which accrues to Christian faith is, accordingly, fastened to *personal* conditions; i. e. (a) to the willingness to acknowledge and fulfil Jesus' moral requirements, and (b) to the willingness to accept his redeeming benefits. Therefore the conviction of faith is one that *grows* with the growing Christian personality. This is true of knowledge which accrues to experience. One can experience God's power only by venturing upon that power by faith, in the tasks and conduct of life.

3. The knowledge which accrues to Christian faith finds its immediate *expression* in enthusiastic confession of what is believed or of what is experienced in faith.[1] This confession

is usually fixed in the Christian community in articles of faith. These are designations of invisible spiritual realities of which the Christian can and should become aware through confidence in God's revelation in Jesus Christ.

Note to §28:3

1. Normally there is no confessionless faith. Like patriotism, faith must externalize itself. Only as it expresses itself does it realize itself.

§29. *Scientific Dogmatics in its Distinction from the Knowledge which Accrues to Christian Faith.*

1. The theological-cognitive work of scientific dogmatics is different from the knowledge which accrues to personal faith (cf. the problem in §1).[1] This difference consists in the *methodically prosecuted reflection* (a) concerning the grounds of our certainty of the reality of the invisible world of faith, in which the Christian lives, (b) concerning what belongs to that world, and (c) concerning how it is related to the knowable, empirical world of science. *On the one side,* the work of dogmatics is closely related to the life of faith, for the reflection referred to above will be possible only to him who earnestly desires to live in Christian faith. *On the other side,* the work of dogmatics is different from the life of faith as such, and the capacity for the former depends upon entirely different conditions from the personal knowledge that accrues to faith.[2]

Notes to §29:1

1. The difference is similar to that between practical, experiential knowledge of the world and the scientific knowledge of the world.

2. It would seem as if the endowments and tasks of the prophet tended to incapacitate him for the sobriety and impartiality of disinterested scientific reflection. Still, the theologian must be a man of faith and a man of scientific reflection.

2. Accordingly the *exposition* of scientific dogmatics is different from the confessional expression of personal faith.[1] Christian dogmatics, in the propositions developed by it, strives (a) for as clear an exposition as possible of the principles or grounds decisive for faith itself, (b) for definiteness and sharpness of concepts, (c) for completeness and independence,

(d) for inner connection and yet clear demarcation between it and the *theoretical knowledge of the world;* and dogmatics does *not* strive (e) for homiletic testimony and edification.

Note to §29:2

1. There is a difference between theology and preaching. The latter should be the immediate testimony which is the dynamic in religion. The theologian, on the contrary, must not assume the attitude of the mere homilist; his special concern is methodical, scientific formulation of religious conviction. But theology is necessary for permanent effectiveness. Preaching begins with inner certainty. When doubt comes with further experience, reflective certainty must then be achieved. We must earn it; we cannot take it as a gift. The modern preacher has to make himself an epitome of the past two hundred and fifty years. In patience let him possess his soul, and he will have his message. The patient, long way is the sure and strong way.

3. But with all its conceptual sharpness and definiteness, dogmatics cannot fully exclude (a) Biblical expressions from its designation of the reality of faith,[1] nor (b) the analogies of human life. But it must seek to use these expressions and analogies so that they shall correctly and clearly designate what is experienced by the Christian in his living faith in Jesus Christ.

Note to §29:3

1. Biedermann, in the constructive part of his dogmatics, does away with Biblical expressions, and makes use of the Hegelian jargon of aseity, proseity, etc. The result is a metaphysic of religion which is the least interesting part of his work. To the historical and critical part of his book, however, I am indebted probably more than to any other one book in theology.

§30. *The Relation of the Knowledge which Accrues to Faith, and the Relation of Dogmatics also, to the Theoretical Knowledge of the World.*

1. The knowledge which accrues to faith and the theoretical knowledge of the world are different (cf. §17:2; §28; §9:3). (a) They are different as to their *foundations.* The former reposes on the persuasion and conviction of conscience through divine revelation; the latter on the necessitation of idea and judgment through perception and the laws of logical thought.[1] (b) They are different as to their *character.* The former is

a trusted acquaintanceship; the latter an apprehending and ordering of the given in our forms of thought (v. §8:2).[2] (c) They are different as to their *goal*. The former seeks to understand the purpose of the world and of God as the Founder and Preserver and Guide of the World; the latter seeks to explain the world as a system of concepts and laws.[3]

Notes to §30:1

1. See F. W. Roberston's *Sermon on Conscience*.

2. The difference is similar to that between knowing a man and knowing a proposition. The latter is easily done, but the former takes time.

3. Scientific knowledge has for its ultimate presupposition the unity which underlies its principle of natural causation. Religious knowledge is not content with just that unity, but must have it enriched. The problem is the inner synthesis of the scientific and the religious. Will the conviction suffice for religion, that the structure and function of the universe are such as to render the production of values possible? Is this what "God" symbolizes? Can we escape the coincidence of the theistic and the cosmic conceptions? The cosmic process is meaningful for us in our production of values. Is this the religious conviction, and is it adequate to life?

Personality is another symbol. Instead of the old "soul" we have now the progressive synthesis of experience. Is there a progressive synthesis of cosmic experience? The new "cosmos" is a great triumph of science over sense in any case, and perhaps "personality" is our best symbol after all, even in cosmology.

2. But the difference referred to (in 1, above) does not amount to relationlessness. Not only are there connecting links between the knowledge which accrues to Christian faith and the theoretical knowledge of the world but the two touch in the *object*.[1] (a) The faith-knowledge draws the knowable world into its region; not that it seeks to explain that world causally, as science counts causal explanation; but it seeks to understand that world in its meaning.[2] (b) However faith-knowledge does not limit itself thereby to the bounds of the empirically given world, but mounts above it and beyond it to the reality (to faith) of the divine will with its supramundane ends. The task of teleologically articulating the empirically given knowable world into the world of faith follows for the knowledge which accrues to faith from (a) and (b) above, taken together.

Notes to §30:2

1. Faith affirms teleology; modern science affirms causality simply. The so-called "religion of science," a religion of causality without teleology, has failed.

2. Philosophy mediates between science and religion, between description and valuation.

3. For the *knowledge which accrues to personal faith,* this arrangement and articulation must begin by learning to understand the history and tasks of one's own life as the leadings and requirements of God for our salvation,[1] and it must strive forward to the goal that the world in general is understandable to us by faith as the theater for introducing the kingdom of God. To be sure, riddles of life and of the world remain which require the conflict of faith; but faith is enriched by every solution which it makes, and strengthened by every true conflict.[2]

Notes to §30:3

1. One's vocation should be not only means to getting one's daily bread, but instrumental to the working out of our redemption. "Being saved" is the constant maturing of character, and is effected in the daily vocation.

2. A mother who lost three children in the Iroquois fire could find no religious consolation until she accepted the thought that God is in fire, as well as in Jesus. Fire is God's fire, and he does not suspend its nature.

4. Scientific Christian dogmatics can only aim (a) *on the one side* to make clear by methodic reflection the inalienable affirmations and limits of the faith-knowledge; (b) *on the other side* to test by methodic criticism the picture of the world of present science, as to its principles; and on the basis of (a) and (b), (c) to bring to as clear an exposition as possible the teleological articulation of nature and history, as these present themselves to our present scientific knowledge. (d) Yet scientific dogmatics has no *specifically* different means of solving the riddles of life and of the world than faith itself has. Moreover, with all its endeavor at a Christian natural and historical philosophy, dogmatics will be able to produce only piece work; as Paul says, "We know in part," even at the best.[1]

Note to §30:4

1. Ostwald and Mach have worked out their philosophies of nature as if there was nothing in the world called the Christian religion, and yet they have made valuable contributions to Christian apologetics.

b. The Sources of the Knowledge that Accrues to Christian Faith and Dogmatics.

a. The Sacred Scriptures.

§31. *Exposition and Appreciation of the Ecclesiastical Doctrine of Inspiration.*

1. If, according to §28, faith-knowledge, and according to §29, Christian dogmatics rest on the understanding accruing to faith of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the question arises as to the *source* from which this knowledge is to be drawn. The Sacred Scriptures present themselves as such source, but in what sense?

2. The orthodox ecclesiastical doctrine of the Scriptures affirms their inerrancy. In this assumption it is dominated by a definite view of the *origin* of the Scriptures, that is to say, that the Scriptures originated from inspiration. (a) The inspiration-concept is itself implicated in the doctrine of inspiration.[1] The definition of Scriptures and of the properties (*affectiones*) belonging to the Scriptures are intimately connected therewith. (b) The whole doctrine is *based* essentially on the "inner witness of the Holy Spirit" (*testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*). (c) The rules for the employment of Sacred Scriptures in Christian dogmatics are deduced from the inspiration doctrine.

Note to §31:2

1. There have been many attempts to change the inspiration-concept without changing the inspiration-doctrine. This marks the beginning of the downfall of orthodoxy.

3. The religious motives of the ecclesiastical doctrine of inspiration emerge most clearly in view of the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti,* and they are especially understandable against

the background of the conflict with the Catholic Church on the one hand, and with what was called at the time *Schwärmer* (fanatical sects) on the other.[1] But critical questions have arisen, *first* as to 2 (b) above, that is, the question whether the inner witness of the Holy Spirit suffices; (α) whether that inner witness equally includes the entire Scriptures, and (β) whether it can extend also to the mode of the origin of the Scriptures; *secondly,* as to 2 (a) above, the question as to whether the doctrine of the witness of the Spirit corresponds to the given facts in the case as regards the Sacred Scriptures, viz., (α) the actual character of the Scriptures, and (β) the explicit testimony as to the human source of the Sacred Scriptures. From these two points it follows that the old inspiration-doctrine has the character of a postulate, (a) which as such is neither to be derived from the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, nor to be harmonized with the character of Christianity, and (b) which in addition does not at all satisfy the end which it seeks to serve. From this it follows as to 2 (c) above, that the use of Scripture based on this inspiration-doctrine has only the appearance of fidelity to the Scriptures, but in truth does violence to them.[2]

Notes to §31:3

1. The inspiration dogma was originally gotten out by the Protestant State Church as a deadly instrument against the Roman Catholics and the Anabaptists. The Baptists have taken up what was originally a club to break their own heads.

2. See Sabatier: *Religions of Authority,* and G. B. Foster: *Finality of the Christian Religion,* chs. III, IV.

4. Therefore that view of the Sacred Scriptures needs reconstruction, both on the basis of *historical fact* and on the basis of the *Christian revelation-faith.* The question is, (a) How far does the historical judgment concerning the Scriptures lead (v. §32)? (b) On the basis of the Christian revelation-faith what is to be said concerning the importance and origin of the Sacred Scriptures (v. §33)? (c) What principles flow therefrom for Christian dogmatics and its employment of the Sacred Scriptures?

§32. *Historical Judgment concerning the Importance and the Origin of the Old and New Testament Collection of Writings.*

1. With reference to the *New Testament writings,* this much may be established as historical fact: (a) The New Testament canon, once formed, has been of *fundamental importance* for the entire further history of the Christian Church. This is true with reference to the faith and the life both of the individual and of the community. On the one hand (α) the New Testament as a *conservative force* has insured the connection and continuity of the Church with the proclamation (κήρυγμα) of Jesus Christ which founded it. On the other hand (β) the New Testament as *progressive force* has been a determining influence in every rejuvenation of faith on the part of the Church. (b) With the fixation of the New Testament canon, in spite of all fluctuations and aberrations concerning the apostolic character of single writings, there has yet arisen a collection of books which gives us *original information concerning the witness to Jesus Christ which founded the Christian Church,* a witness, moreover, which is not essentially corrupted by an alien spirit. As regards the latter, the boundary which was drawn between the New Testament writings and other Christian literature is unassailable, at least to the extent that no further old Christian writing has an established claim to articulation in the New Testament canon. (c) Moreover, the composition of single writings themselves has issued from the original power of the new religious life proceeding from Jesus Christ.

2. And as to the Old Testament, this much is true: (a) Christianity became an historical power only in its connection with the Old Testament writings, and the Christian view of faith has worked itself out into clearness only with the aid of the Old Testament, partly under the positive influence of the Old Testament, partly in the criticism of the Old Testament. (b) With the fixation of the Old Testament canon which the Christian church took over from the synagogue, all the extant classic monuments of the development of the Old Testament religion have found reception in the Church. (c) The origin of the Old Testament Scriptures is to be ex-

plained for the most part *religiously*. That origin is either to be referred directly to the prophetic spirit announcing itself in Israel, or it issued indirectly from the faith (created by that Spirit) in the disclosures of God in the outer history and in the legislation of Israel.

§33. *The Judgment of Christian Faith Concerning the Importance and Origin of Sacred Scriptures.*

1. The Christian's judgment of faith does not merge into the historico-scientific judgment, but it has its self-dependent certainty, independently of scientific inquiry. It even puts into a religious life that which is to be historically established, and the judgment of faith answers the question, In what sense are the Scriptures Word of God? According to §§25, 27, only the person of Jesus Christ is Word of God to us in an *original manner*. It is to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ which is concentrated in his earthly person, but prepared for in history and unfolded in the disclosure of the Exalted One, that the *original properties* (*affectiones*) belong, which the church doctrine ascribed to the Scripture, viz. *auctoritas, sufficientia, perspicuitas, efficacia*. But in a *derivative manner* every witness which makes known to us the God revealed in Jesus Christ and awakens faith in Jesus Christ becomes God's Word to us.

2. Among these witnesses the New Testament occupies an entirely singular position. (a) It is only through its mediation that the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is still to-day accessible to us in its original power and fulness. And of course this depends upon the connection given in the New Testament between the narrative concerning Jesus Christ and the fundamental witness of faith concerning him. This worth of the New Testament as fundamental witness of God's revelation in Jesus Christ is abiding to the single Christian's conviction and experience of faith, and its worth is powerfully corroborated by the history of the Christian Church (v. §32: 1, a). (b) In the fulfilment of this task of ascertaining the original revelation of God, the New Testament, taken as a whole, has the properties stated in 1 above. But its single parts are not of equal worth. Its gradedness becomes evident

if one asks more definitely, (α) how far its content directly presents the gospel, or is only indirectly related thereto, and (β) how lofty is the understanding of Jesus Christ by faith which is deposited in it, how far it sets forth Christ. The single factors of the New Testament are therefore Word of God only in the degree that they proffer us the living Word of God in Jesus Christ.

3. There is a corresponding witness of the Christian faith and Christian experience in the Old Testament. That is (a) through the Old Testament mediation the preliminary revelation of God in Israel exercises on Christians and Christianity its pedagogic efficacy. (b) But the properties (*affectiones*) designated above do not belong to the Old Testament by itself alone, but only when it is understood in connection with the New Testament. (c) Also the diversity of value of single parts of the Old Testament is much greater than in the New.

4. Now it is from the faith in the significance of the Sacred Scriptures that judgments of faith follow concerning the origin of Sacred Scriptures, judgments which articulate the historical fund in the system of Christian faith. (a) As to the origin of the New Testament writings it is true that they have not arisen through real or verbal inspiration. Still they are the *work,* or product, or fruit, of *the Spirit of Jesus Christ,* and therewith of the *Spirit of God* which has informed the New Testament witness in its entire personal life, and therefore also pervaded its literary activity. This "inspiration of person" is not qualitatively different from the Spirit-produced illumination of all believers; rather the outstanding position and significance of New Testament authors is founded, not on their "inspiration," but on their special vocation, leadership and endowment. The judgment of faith concerning the composition of the Old Testament is analogous (cf. §32:2, c). Old Testament writings are directly or indirectly a work of the Spirit of God operative in Old Testament prophecy and in the guidance of the people. (b) In addition we judge in faith with reference to the fixation of the two canonical collections of writings. Both the formation of the New Testament canon (v. §32:1, b) and the taking over of the Old Testa-

ment canon (v. §32:2, b) took place under the guidance of the Spirit of Jesus Christ.

§34. *The Principles Guiding the Employment of Sacred Scripture in Christian Dogmatics.*

1. Since, according to §33:2, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is accessible to us in its originality only through the Scriptures, there must be a *scriptural proof* for every proposition in Christian dogmatics; but a proposition is not scriptural because passages can be quoted in its support. It is scriptural because it issues with inner necessity or consequentialness from believing surrender to the revelation of God to which the Scriptures bear witness.[1]

Note to §34:1

1. No religious teaching of the Bible can be *immediately* transferred into dogmatics. The conceptual machinery of the Biblical writers had a functional reality to them; are you on that account going to give to these concepts an ontological reality? Is the form of culture of a particular time to be erected into eternal validity?

2. The material for dogmatics cannot be obtained from the Scriptures by *purely exegetical, historical investigation.* (a) To be sure, the exegetical, historical work is indispensable for the dogmatic employment of Sacred Scripture; in particular the so-called New Testament theology directly yields basis for the dogmatic employment of Sacred Scripture, since it seeks to understand Jesus' proclamation as well as the witness of faith on the part of primitive Christianity in their actual historical meaning and connection. But New Testament theology yields, as such, *no Christian dogmatics,* even though New Testament theology does endeavor (α) to apprehend the living religious witness with conceptual clearness, (β) to shell out the spiritual content from the thought-forms of the time, and (γ) to investigate the inner unity in the multiplicity of witness. (b) Dogmatics seeks not only to understand what is given in the New Testament in its historical actuality, but to win a judgment concerning some other matters, viz. (α) with what *right* and in what *scope* faith may

and must recognize a real revelation of God in what is narrated concerning Jesus Christ, and (β) how correct was the understanding of the revelation on the part of the New Testament witnesses.[1]

Note to §34:2

1. In dogmatics one must steer clear of the philosophical on the one side and the merely historical on the other.

3. This dogmatic employment of Sacred Scripture must be guided by the following points of view: (a) In the light of the New Testament narrative concerning Jesus Christ, dogmatics, commencing with the earthly form of Jesus (v. §26:1) and with his word and work (v. §26:2), has to propound the question as to what in this Jesus Christ can and should become to us an object of the certainty and obedience of faith by virtue of its being a salvation-bringing revelation of God. (b) In the New Testament witness of faith in Jesus Christ, dogmatics finds introduction to the understanding and unfolding of the revelation given in him. But still the New Testament witness of faith must itself be tested by Jesus' word, work and life, and hence the following questions must be raised as to that witness: (α) What is actually witness of *faith* in Jesus Christ in this witness, and what on the other hand springs from another and different source of knowledge, perhaps from the picture of the world of the time? What is *direct* presentation of the experienced reality of faith, and what is perhaps an attempt at speculative explanation of that which is believed? (β) In what degree is a *faithful and full understanding* of the phenomenon of Jesus Christ discernible in the New Testament, given in that which is actually a witness of faith? In other words, how far does that witness of faith really set forth Jesus Christ? What is *common* to all the witness, and how far, on the other hand, does the *individual witness,* e. g. the Pauline, show itself to be especially adapted to disclose, to enrich, to ensure against false apprehensions faith's understanding of Jesus Christ? (γ) How far is the form of expression, in the faithful presentation of that which is believed, to be considered universally valid, and how far significant only for that time?[1] (c) As regards *Old Tes-*

tament use, dogmatics has to apply everywhere the New Testament as criterion, asking, How far does the Old Testament approximate the heights of the New Testament knowledge that accrues to faith?

Note to §34:3

1. Paul conquered with the cosmic Messiah, not with the historic Jesus. Can religion do without mythology? Can we conquer with the plain, simple categories of forgiveness, humility, righteousness, etc.? The great Messianic concept was the functional reality with which the primitive church conquered. They regarded it as ontological reality, but today we see that it was only machinery, and we put it aside as unusable by us, much as we put aside the old reaphook in harvest, and use the modern binder. But is it not of the nature of religion to messianize its reality, and must we not yet do that same thing? (See Gunkel's work on Genesis.)

The other alternative is to take up the idea of organizing our appetites and passions, our impulses and instincts into a whole of personality, keying ourselves closer together in the social whole, and using scientific and sociological conceptions, and to set up this as our salvation from sin and death and hell. There is nothing strange about this idea of maturing personality; no great historical facts of other-world significance are necessary. There is no poetry; all is plain prose, rational, very rational, almost rationalistic.

But it was the drama that did the work, not the Sermon on the Mount. It is character by salvation that appeals to the man in the slums, not salvation by character.

β. The Doctrine of the Church.

§35. *The Importance of the Development of Christian Doctrine in General for Our Faith-Knowledge and for Dogmatics.*

1. The thesis that the knowledge of the regulative revelation of God is to be drawn from the Sacred Scriptures alone is contested by the *Roman Catholic Church.* The latter maintains that it possesses not only a supplement to the material of the Sacred Scriptures, but also an infallible guide for their correct interpretation in the ecclesiastical *tradition* controlled by the teaching office of the Church, and it bases this assertion on the assumption of episcopal succession, but primarily on the postulate of faith of an infallible divine guidance of the Church in her doctrines and institutions. On the evangelical

side (a) that assumption is rightly rejected as an *unhistorical fiction,* and (b) this postulate of faith as a conclusion from a false conception of revelation.

2. For the real character of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ assigns to Christianity the task of gaining the content of that revelation from the Sacred Scriptures by means of common labor on the Scriptures. A gradually profounder and richer appropriation of that content can take place only in the experiences of life, and in the great movements of history through the conflicts of the spirit under the influences of great personalities. But under these circumstances the development is not ortholinear. It passes through manifold individual formations, fluctuations and regresses.

3. It is from every positive contribution of this development of doctrine and of life as it is presented in the life of the Christian community and deposited in Christian education and instruction, that faith derives its guidance to the understanding and to the practical appropriation of the revelation of God. Of course this development of doctrine and of life, when it has itself taken false paths, can also lead individuals astray; therefore access to the Sacred Scriptures, and thereby to the original revelation of God, is to be kept open and free to the practical knowledge that accrues to Christian faith.

4. It is only in connection with the advancement of the practical knowledge that accrues to faith that progress can be made in *scientific dogmatics* (v. §29), and of course scientific dogmatics, in its methodic reflection and criticism, has to borrow indices to a correct understanding of the subject from the development of doctrine and of life in the past on the one hand; and on the other hand it has to recognize the byways of error and of danger from which we must save ourselves.

§36. *The Importance of the Reformation Understanding of Salvation for the Knowledge which Accrues to Faith and for Dogmatics.*

1. As evangelical Christians we hold the Reformation to be the most important epoch in the development of the doctrine

and life of the Church. In the *Eastern Church* the gospel of salvation appearing in Jesus Christ was coined into Gnosis (γνῶσις) and cult mysticism (corresponding to the Greek spirit), by means of which the liberation from corruptibleness (or mortality) to incorruptibleness (or immortality) was said to be mediated.[1] In the *Roman Church* something of an ethical conception of Christianity was indeed preserved, but in legal, civic distortion of the gospel. Salvation was bound down to a hierarchically constituted Church.[2] The latter furnished (a) supernatural doctrines of truth and commandments of life, and (b) sacramental powers of grace, through the obedient reception of which (a and b above) the faithful members of the Church were said to be enabled to good works and to the acquiring of eternal life. As against all this, in *the Reformation* the gospel of the sin-forgiving grace of God bestowed upon us in Jesus Christ was put in the center. It called every individual to the independent personal appropriation by faith of this gospel to which the Sacred Scriptures witnessed, and which was entrusted to the community of faith; and it did so in the conviction that this personal appropriation of faith also produces a life in the spirit of Jesus Christ, and on that account in the kingdom of God. With this life also there was blessedness.[3]

Notes to §36:1

1. The true place for a gospel which has immortality as its central fact is in Greek Catholicism, not in Protestantism.
2. See Kaftan's *Truth of the Christian Religion,* Vol. I, and Harnack's *History of Dogma* and *What is Christianity?*
3. In the Reformation we see the beginning of moral individualism and autonomy under God, as opposed to institutionalism and heteronomy. There is a getting away from the ecclesiastical man to a human man, religious, moral and intellectual; from the externality of ecclesiasticism to the internality of the moral and religious man.

2. According to our evangelical judgment this reformation understanding of salvation is no quantitative supplementing nor qualitative transcending of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, but only an elaboration of its true content, on the basis of a profound penetration into the Scriptures as original witness thereof. Therefore the practical knowledge which ac-

crues to Christian faith can be derived from this reformation understanding of salvation as it is propagated in the evangelical churches in various degrees; but in the sense that this knowledge led an *independent derivation* from the Scriptures, evangelical dogmatics finds a guide here, but no legal restriction. For the evangelical church doctrine seeks to contain the reformation apprehension of salvation; but it has not the character of a dogma, exhausting the content of the revelation of God, and infallible as to form. Our judgment as to the importance of the evangelical confessional writings follows from this.

§37. *The Importance of Evangelical Confessions for Faith-Knowledge and for Dogmatics.*

1. In reference to the historical fact, (a) it is precisely the oldest and most important among the confessional writings that were *not* drawn up as doctrinal law for the evangelical churches, but (α) as public testimony of the newly gained understanding of the gospel on the part of faith,[1] and (β) as basis for controversy, if need be, with the opponents of the Reformation. (b) The confessional writings were originally nothing but witness to the understanding of the Sacred Scriptures gained at that time. They subjected themselves, therefore, simply to the norm of Sacred Scripture. In the later confessional writings this was the case also, so far as a certain presupposition was concerned, viz. that not only the gospel to which they witnessed, but also the *forma doctrinae* deposited in them was the only scriptural one, and therefore binding for all time.[2] Orthodox ecclesiastical dogmatics has only refined upon this judgment.

Note to §37:1

1. All creeds ought to be primarily *our testimony,* not a *test* for some one else.

2. The main error was in supposing that theological theory could be immediately transferred from Scripture to dogmatics, as of permanent normative validity for faith. It was a pardonable error then, for historical science was as yet unborn; but it is an unpardonable error now.

2. The worth of confessional writings from a consistent

evangelical standpoint is to be defined as follows: (a) As officially acknowledged documentary witness of the self-formed evangelical churches, they are the most important for evangelical dogmatics among the historic guides which show us the doctrinal development of Christianity — most important also in part for the practical evangelical knowledge which accrues to faith.[1] The confessional writings have this double value all the more, the more they have the character of religious witness, not of theological doctrinal exposition, and the more they themselves present *new creations* from the newly gained understanding of the Scriptures. (b) But it is at the same time the absolute right of dogmatics critically to evaluate the confessions as *human productions,* and to judge them by the new understanding of Scripture and the new experience of life of each new time.

Note to §37:2

1. But distinction is to be made between kernel and shell in historical confession, as well as in Scripture.

3. When does a dogmatic have claim to the name "ecclesiastical," or "confessional"? (a) Only when on the basis of an independent investigation of Sacred Scripture, it assents to the one cardinal article common to confessional churches, viz. that we have forgiveness of sin and eternal life through faith in Jesus Christ. (b) Only when on that basis the dogmatics acknowledge the *practical religious view* of our confessions concerning the attitude of the Christian to God, to the world, to the Church, to the neighbor, as the correct revelation-knowledge. But on this basis a progress of faith-knowledge as to *content* and a further development of theological form are not only admissible, but obligatory in evangelical churches.

c. The Method of Christian Dogmatics.

§38. *The Method of the Orthodox Ecclesiastical Dogmatics.*

1. The decision concerning the method of dogmatics to be followed is implicitly given with the view already presented concerning the character and sources of the knowledge which

accrues to faith and dogmatics. But it is necessary to define the relation of this method to other methods, and first of all to that of the orthodox ecclesiastical dogmatics.

2. There are four methodic elements combined in orthodox ecclesiastical dogmatics. (a) The orthodox ecclesiastical dogmatics seeks especially to be *Scripture-dogmatics.* Each doctrinal section is said to be borrowed and proved from the inspired Scriptures. (b) The orthodox ecclesiastical dogmatics is *tradition-dogmatics,* for the Scripture is explained according to the analogy of faith (*analogia fidei*), i. e., however, in the last analysis, according to the sum of the articles of faith acknowledged as authoritative — partly of the old church confession, partly of the evangelical confession. (c) There is a speculative precipitate; i. e. it is *speculation-dogmatics.* This is not only contained in the dogmas that were taken over from the Church, but ecclesiastical dogmatics has elaborated the material gained according to (a) and (b) above by means of logical definitions, inferences and chains of reasonings, into a system of doctrine wherein that which is believed is presented in its objective connection and proved, within certain limits, to the reason. (d) But in one very important point the orthodox ecclesiastical dogmatics is also the dogmatics of the Christian experience, viz. so far as it bases its proof of Scriptural authority on the *testimonium Sancti Spiritus internum.*

3. The right and the wrong of ecclesiastical dogmatics as to Scripture and tradition follow from the two preceding sections, and need not be reproduced here. But with reference to the speculation element there is the following objection. The character of Christian knowledge as faith-knowledge in distinction from science-knowledge is obscured when the faith-truths are viewed, as to their origin, as miraculously communicated, but are treated in scientific exposition as objects of theoretical knowledge. With reference to the experience element, the following should be noted. Full right is to be accorded to the inner witness of the Holy Spirit, but it is also to be required that the inner authorization of Christian truth shall come to validity not merely in this one point which orthodoxy emphasizes, viz. as to scriptural authority, but in every single article of faith or proposition of dogmatics.[1]

Note to §38:3

1. Orthodoxy delimited its experience-theology to the authorizing of Sacred Scripture.

§39. *The Various Methods of Modern Dogmatics.*

1. After the disintegrating criticism by rationalism the various elements that were externally and rather uncritically combined in ecclesiastical dogmatics fell apart of themselves. But in more recent times those very elements reappeared in new combinations, or else in such a way that one of these elements is the leading one, and the others contributory. (a) There is the method of development from the Christian consciousness, and in the case of one system in particular, from the experience of regeneration.[1] This method brought the fourth element of the orthodox method into prominence. In various degrees the Christian consciousness has been understood as a consciousness inwardly united with Sacred Scripture and church doctrine. The right of this method is (α) its rejection of a legalistic employment of Sacred Scripture and church doctrine, and (β) its rejection of the treatment of the world of faith as object of purely objective, theoretical knowledge. The danger of this method is (α) the overgrowth of subjectivity, and (β) unclearness concerning the relation of subjective faith to its historical basis and to the ecclesiastical development of Christianity. (b) The speculative method unfolds the element mentioned above in §38:2, c. By indicating a necessary progress of thought, it seeks (α) either to develop the entire Christian dogmatics according to its rational content of thought, or (β) at least to develop all the rest of Christian truth from the basis of a certain central position of *faith.* This is done partly in philosophical interest mainly, partly in theological interest mainly, now in a critical and now in an ecclesiastical spirit.[2] The right of this method is the idea of (α) the rationality and (β) the inner unity of the Christian faith.[3] But since it hopes to prove both the rationality and inner unity in a dialectical, logical way, it dangerously tends to convert our faith-knowledge into gnosis, and fails to do justice to the full import of revelation.[4] (c) The confessionalistic method (v. §38:2, b) takes

its standpoint in ecclesiastical confession. It seeks to establish this confession, or to preserve it as a living power, by "organic development." Its right is that it emphasizes the worth of ecclesiastical doctrine for dogmatics.[5] But on the other hand its wrong may be pointed out. So far as it seeks only the repristination of ecclesiastical doctrine, this method falls under the condemnation of unhistoricalness. But so far as it seeks re-establishment and development of ecclesiastical doctrine, it must enter into compact with other methods, e. g. with the dogmatics of the Christian consciousness, or with the speculative method, or with both. (d) The Biblicistic method (v. §38:2, a) is guided by the principle that Scripture doctrine, and of course the whole Scripture doctrine, must form the material of Christian dogmatics. Its right is on the one hand (α) its penetration into the Scripture thought; on the other hand (β) its liberation from an outward *ecclesiastical* doctrinal law, as well as (γ) the endeavor to be free from *merely* subjective experience and (δ) from philosophical speculation. Its defect is (α) its under-estimation of the ecclesiastical doctrinal development, and (β) its unhistorical apprehension of Scripture, which, in order to get a Biblical doctrinal *system* out of the Scriptures, must do violence to the Scriptures, and yet again recur to speculation or to Christian experience. In this discussion (from a to d) various *combinations* are indicated. Rich in such performances or taking its point of departure mostly from (a) above, is especially the so-called *mediating* theology.[6]

Notes to §39:1

1. See F. H. R. Frank's *System of Christian Certainty* and *System of Christian Truth.*

2. Hegel in an ecclesiastical spirit; Baur and Strauss in a critical spirit.

3. Pfleiderer stands for the rationality and inner unity of Christian faith. On the other hand Kaftan says it makes no difference with what proposition we begin in dogmatics, thus jeopardizing the Christian conviction of the inner unity of the Christian faith.

4. There is more in rationality than what can be got at dialectically and logically. Its inner unity centers not in the intellectual side, but in the moral disposition of the will.

5. No irreverent and violent breach with the past is scientific.

6. Beginning with Schleiermacher, and developing into radicalism in some instances, and into a repristination of orthodoxy in others.

2. The mediating theology sought after a higher unity of the methods already mentioned, but did not really attain it. In *more recent times* the way has been to pass back from Christian consciousness and church doctrine to the Scriptures, and within the Scriptures themselves to pass on to the *living revelation of God in Jesus Christ,* and on that basis to develop in Christocentric treatment all Christian doctrine, not speculatively but as *faith's understanding* of revelation.[1] (a) In this way *on the one side* (Ritschl) within the revelation regulative for faith it is the proclamation in word and deed of Jesus himself that becomes the central norm according to which dogmatics, employing the N. T. witness of faith, and leaning upon the Reformation ecclesiastical confessions has to construct the unitary religious view of the Christian community concerning God, the world and life. (b) *Other dogmaticians* set out in a somewhat different way; for them the scriptural material and church doctrine are to be evaluated and the entire dogmatics drawn up on the basis of the fundamental religious experience of God's justifying gift of himself in Jesus Christ. But these dogmaticians emphasize (v. §26: 1) the self-revelation of God in the *whole Biblical Christ,* instead of simply making the earthly Jesus prominent. Thus they keep closer to the line of the Biblicistic method from which they set out.[2]

Notes to §39: 2

1. This is the method of Kaftan, Schultz, Reischle, Troeltsch, Herrmann, Harnack, and of the modern younger theologians of our own country. It will stay so long as Jesus Christ is the center of our religion and revelation. If he fails to maintain that central place, this method will go by. But in that case dogmatics will go, and we shall have only philosophy and psychology of religion.

The religio-historical movement is rubbing out the line of peculiarity in Christ. We are in a real crisis — a terrible one. Wrede quotes a note from one of the ecclesiastical newspapers in Germany which says that the religio-historical movement means war; for if the gospel as they understand it is preached, the church is overcome and perishes as church; it will be the end of ecclesiastical religion.

For example, the new view claims that the difference between

James and Paul is greater than the difference between Jesus and the pious Jews of his day. They claim that the whole theological, Messianic interpretation of Jesus must be stripped off, and he be just man; that whereas the old view put Jesus over against man, we must now put him in the human category entirely; the attitude one takes toward the question of the divinity of Jesus will depend upon one's philosophy, and will correspond with one's valuation of man, the difference being one of degree only.

If this religio-historical movement is mere historical science, giving facts and relations, but no value-judgments, there is left room for the value-judgment of dogmatics. If not, there would seem to be no place left for dogmatics. And it is hard for men to give to science only what belongs to science, and not to add value-judgments and philosophical interpretation.

Does the surrender of discontinuity in religious experience exclude the possibility of the supremely worthful? Are the supremely worthful and the causal incompatible? There will be no solution of this problem till all the historical material is given over to the philosophy and psychology of religion.

2. As the Ritschlians say, the revelation which comes to us through Jesus Christ comes from his earthly career alone. What vocation in the world has the Jesus of today — the super-earthly Jesus? None. God alone is all in all. But God is the God whom we know in and through the earthly Jesus. The value of Jesus for religion is the significance of his earthly life as indicating the kind of God there is. Yet the modern theologian believes in Jesus' immortality, because the kind of God who is revealed in Jesus would not snuff out the object of his love, such as Jesus was.

§40. *Comprehensive and Constructive Statement of the Dogmatic Method.*

1. According to the view developed concerning revelation (§§25–27), concerning the character of faith-knowledge and science-knowledge (§§28–30), and concerning the importance of Sacred Scripture and the ecclesiastical doctrinal development (§§31–37), the method of *faith's* understanding of revelation (sketched in §39 : 3) and hence the Christocentric treatment of dogmatics, although not the basis of dogmatics, seems to have the most to commend it. Any deviation from this method is to be gained by a clearer understanding of the two expressions, "revelation" and "the understanding which accrues to faith." (a) In line with §39 : 2 (a) above, and in opposition to §39 : 2 (b) above, in dogmatic work we have to

lay hold of the earthly person and work of the Savior, Jesus Christ, as the center of the whole revelation of God and as the starting-point of the independent certainty of faith and the inner understanding of faith (cf. §26).[1] But instead of this hindering, it should help us to employ the *whole* revelation of God (as against the Ritschlians), concentrated in that center indeed, in the dogmatic development of the propositions of Christian faith, and thereby to preserve vital connection with the witnesses of the New Testament community. Thus there is truth also in the revelation-dogmatics allied to Biblicism. (b) But scientific dogmatics cannot develop the content of revelation in a purely objective historical fixation. It cannot be satisfied simply to indicate that this or that religious view of God, world and life occupies an essential place in the proclamation of Jesus, or in the circle of thought of the apostles. Rather on the basis of methodic reflection it must show, in the case of every single proposition of faith, how we may become aware of the spiritual reality expressed in that proposition; how we may become aware of it by *personal faith* in God's revelation, and therefore become able to expound that reality in judgments of faith (cf. §29).

Note to §40:1

1. Everything depends for dogmatics and the church upon the *permanent* validity of the above statement. It is difficult enough to give up the centrality of the pre-existent and post-existent Christ. But if the centrality of the earthly Christ were given up, our religion would no longer be necessarily called Christian.

The concatenations of Jesus with historical, developmental factors do not necessarily destroy his significance and validity for life. Worth need not cease to be supremely worthful on account of causal connection. The supremely worthful does not happen every day; but that is not to say that it cannot have happened at all.

2. Thus, according to (a) and (b) above, the leading methodic question of dogmatics is as follows: What is the invisible spiritual reality of which we are to become aware, and whose inner connection we are to know through trustful surrender to the whole revelation of God, concentrated, however, in the earthly life and work of the Savior, Jesus Christ? Such a dogmatics can take up into itself the truth of the other meth-

ods mentioned in §39:1. (α) It draws upon the Scriptures and must be scriptural in the sense defined in §34:1. (β) It proceeds upon the basis of a critical knowledge of church doctrine, and is thus *confessional* within the limits specified in §37:3. (γ) It seeks to do justice to the importance of the Christian consciousness; i. e. in the case of every single proposition it seeks to show how it is authenticated to us in our *subjective religious consciousness,* i. e. in personal trust and, on the basis thereof, in inner experience (v. §28). But in so far as the subjective religious consciousness points to basis and norm of faith lying outside of us, the danger of subjectivism is checked. (δ) It recognizes, with speculative dogmatics, the need to exhibit the rationality and *inner unitariness* of the ideas that accrue to Christian faith. But it is a question whether it is not simply the functional instead of ontological reality of these ideas with which it is concerned. In the former case it seeks not theoretical but practical proof of rationality. Do the ideas function serviceably in life? The proof of the truth of the ideas is the answer to that question. Also it gets at the *inner unity* not by a dialectical development of one proposition out of another, but it seeks to show how the Christian propositions of faith, in their inner emergence from faith's understanding of Jesus Christ, as a fact do present a unitary view as a whole, and lead to a unitary, practical relationship. If the ideas are treated as ontological realities then we confront a metaphysical problem of the old kind, as to whether or not that ontological reality may be known as such. The functional contention, in its more cautious moods, not affirming, yet does not deny ontological verity, but contents itself with agnosticism with reference to the matter. Ontological agnosticism is overcome in orthodoxy by its whole view of revelation and of the Bible.

§41. *Definition and Demarcation of Our Further Task.*

1. Through the determination of the method, the scientific task of the Christian dogmatics, sketched in §29, is more fully defined, and the problem of §1 is concluded. Our further task is to expound the *content* of the Christian faith in scientific reflection. It involves three special tasks which are (a)

the thetic (v. §29:2, 3), (b) the apologetic [1] and (c) the critical.[2]

Notes to §41:1

1. The apologetic task cannot be entirely isolated from the thetic (i. e. constructive dogmatic) task. Each proposition of modern dogmatics carries with it the assumption that the content of faith is in no necessary contradiction with the approved results of modern science. For example, the doctrine of creation *can* be so stated as to conflict with natural science, and so there is need to show that the exact requirements of Christian faith do not precipitate a conflict with science. This involves an epistemological delimitation of boundaries between dogmatics and natural science.

2. The religio-critical is necessary, since there must be discrimination between the theological construction and the religious incentive underlying that construction, and distinction also between the religious and the philosophical apprehension of spiritual reality.

PART II. THE SUPERSTRUCTURE OF CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS

§42. *Introductory.*

1. We shall adopt the Christocentric procedure in dogmatics, for reasons given in the former part of our discussion. But this does not of itself decide as to the arrangement of the different parts, or sections.

2. It does not follow from the method previously worked out that the Christocentric method must begin with the doctrine of Christ. In the first main division the revelation given in Jesus Christ was presented as the basis of all knowledge that accrues to faith. (It is not meant that quantitatively there is no knowledge accruing to faith outside of person and work of Jesus Christ, but we are to know of the faith-knowledge alien to him by virtue of its homogeneity with the faith-knowledge we have in Jesus Christ.) It is on this basis that we must first treat of the power embracing and determining the whole world as that world is to Christian faith, i. e. God revealed in us. Then Jesus' person and work have to be related to this God and his dominion. Then again there is the connection of the new spiritual forces and order which have issued from Jesus Christ in history, and of which we become certain through the experience of faith. This too is to be presented in dogmatics. That is, then, we have Jesus Christ in his relation to God as the power and source of all with which faith has to do, and we have Jesus Christ in his relation to the fruits in history and in personality of the divine presence in his historical life. We thus arrive at three parts for dogmatics: A. God and the World; B. God and Jesus Christ the Lord; C. God and the Holy Spirit. Part A may be analyzed again into three main subdivisions: a. The Nature of God Revealed in Jesus Christ; b. God and the Finite World in General; c. God and the Moral Order of the World.

A. GOD AND THE WORLD

a. The Nature of God Revealed in Jesus Christ.

α. Fundamental Definition of the Nature of God.

aa. The View of Scripture and of Church Doctrine as to God.

§43. *The Old Testament and the New Testament Knowledge of God.*

1. When we proceed to set forth the nature of God revealed in Jesus Christ, we are confronted with the fact that Jesus nowhere in his discourses seeks expressly to establish the existence of God, or to delineate the life and power of God in a coherent and comprehensive way. The reason of this is that Jesus together with his hearers stood on the soil of the Old Testament. (He stood immediately upon the soil of the apocalyptic knowledge of God of his contemporaries, but this again was conditioned by the Old Testament.) [1] He presupposes in the case of his hearers, in spite of many aberrations, a conviction of God's existence, and correct views concerning God's nature and character.

Note to §43:1

1. Until a year or two ago [this was in 1905] I thought that Jesus overleaped contemporary thought and made connection with the prophets. But I am now of the opinion that this was not the case.

2. What is the content of the Old Testament knowledge of God? (a) In its *prophetic culmination* it has a two-fold character. It is (α) sustained by the certainty that Jahweh has revealed himself in history, particularly in leading the people from Egypt, but also afterwards in the later history of Israel, and previously in the time of the patriarchs. But all these historical providences gained (β) their importance first through the prophetic proclamation in which they are put into most intimate connection with the moral orders of the folk-life, and are interpreted as beneficence and judgment of a morally ruling God. Prophets took up events and actualities of history and evaluated them religiously. By means of the intimate connection of these two sides (α) and (β), Jahweh

appears as the exalted God who gloriously reveals himself in blessing and judgment upon Israel, but at the same time as the merciful, faithful covenant God, who redeems his people. (b) In a later time the revelation is more and more concentrated in legislation. In this way a particularistic national feature, a juridical thought of retribution and a conception of natural sanctity were embodied in the God-idea; but on the other hand a spiritualization and more intimate apprehension of the relation of God to the individual saint was also involved in this stage.[1]

Note to §43:2

1. This period of legalism was not entirely bad. In this period there was emphasis upon the relation of God to individual life, as well as to folk-life.

3. Compared with the Old Testament knowledge of God, Jesus knew that he did not preach a new God; but he knew that he brought the promised all-fulfilling redemptive revelation of the old God. But this involved the claim that he possessed the full insight into the nature or character of God, which had not been formerly entirely veiled. Jesus, through his living redemptive work, could make man certain of the God of whom he himself was certain. This full penetration of Jesus into God's purpose of salvation found its expression in designating the name Father as the controlling name for God, which gives norm to all views concerning God.[1]

Note to §43:3

1. In the Old Testament the prophetic summit discloses God as Father of the folk. In the apocalyptic writings the notion of God as Father of the individual appears. But they do not seem consciously and definitely to isolate this name as regulative for the Kingdom of God.

[Discussing the question of the originality of Jesus] Must not somebody have originated something on his own account? This remainderless regress in explaining means explaining everything by nothing. The good God surely did not give the Jews their long existence as a mere parenthesis! There has been spontaneity and creative originality all along, even in the roots and juices at the beginnings.

There is greater sensitiveness regarding the truth of religion today than there is regarding the truth of anything else.

Human categories are better than civic, in interpreting God's nature. When they are used, the divine right of man is substituted for the divine right of kings, popes and officers.

4. Thus too the disciples of Jesus were certain that through Jesus Christ they had gained the full unveiling of the divine counsel, and thus the full knowledge of God, not first and not primarily through Jesus' word, but through his whole person in his life, suffering, death and resurrection, and through the Spirit proceeding from the Exalted One. All this is expressed in the designation of God as "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." [1]

Note to §43:4

1. We are reminded here of Weinel's heroic confession of faith, "After Jesus, it is his religion, or none." After Jesus' God, it is his God, or none. Perhaps not, speculatively and ontologically, but practically, morally, religiously, spiritually — more particularly, in the God-attitude toward man and history and the world.

5. This name of God assigns to dogmatics the task of systematically developing the content of the Christian knowledge of God on the basis of faith in Jesus Christ.

§44. *The Doctrine of God in the Orthodox Ecclesiastical Dogmatics.*

1. This task (mentioned in §43:5) was set through the Reformation views of the way to a true knowledge of God. Yet it was not consistently and firmly carried out by the orthodox ecclesiastical dogmatics. To be sure the latter had expressed the principle that the perfect knowledge of God was to be borrowed only from *revelation;* but, by identifying revelation with Sacred Scripture viewed as a text-book (cf. §25:1), it was hindered from deriving the knowledge of God from the living revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

2. The orthodox ecclesiastical dogmatics, however, did not stop with the simple narration of Bible utterances concerning God, but gradually advanced to a systematic development. But in this connection it allowed itself to be misled by the *scholastic tradition,* and the result was that it made the universal determination of the essence of God accessible to the "natural knowledge of God" the ground-stock of the doctrine

of God, in which it then engrafted the specifically Christian determinations.[1] In this way it could not win a sure and unitary exposition of the Christian doctrine of God, owing partly to the fluctuating character and partly to the alien origin of the "natural knowledge of God." Instead of this scholasticism we have to take the path indicated in §43:5, in agreement with the character of the New Testament proclamation concerning God (v. §43:3 and 4), and at the same time conformably to some old dogmatic method (§40:1). Thus we have, *first,* on the basis of faith in Jesus Christ, to set forth the single moments of the Christian idea of God; *secondly,* to combine these moments into a unitary expression.

Note to §44:2

1. Are you proposing to begin with a speculative, dialectical determination and construction of the God-idea, making this the groundstock of the God-conception, and grafting in the Christian concept? The reaction of the whole functional movement in philosophy is against doing this. Hegelism in its original form did this.

In modern philosophy there is a great return to a point of view more akin to the Christian religion in general. Is the idea of God to be excogitated through speculative endeavor, or is it to come through great historical unfolding? Through life it is, and not through speculation, except as speculation is a part of life.

bb. The Systematic, or Constructive Development of the Christian Doctrine of God.[1]

§45. *The Absolute End of God Revealed in Jesus Christ, or the Kingdom of God.*[2]

1. The first moment of the knowledge of God revealed in Jesus Christ is the content of the divine will, or the absolute end of God as regards the world. (a) Jesus Christ's whole life as *person* has its unitary character in his knowledge that his filial vocation is to usher in the kingdom of God, and to surrender himself entirely to this goal.[3] (b) Trust in Jesus Christ as revealer of God involves, therefore, the conviction of faith that this kingdom of God is the goal of the divine will, or the divine end of the world.

Note to bb.

1. The God-idea of the Christian faith was not discovered specu-

latively and apriori. The procedure was very different from that old method which had the general standpoint that a thing must be so, therefore it is so. According to our modern standpoint, things are what they are, and we will look into them and find out what they are. This is science *versus* apriorism. This scientific approach to the God-idea of Christian faith is truer to the Christian faith, and honors God more, than the speculative approach. Still, at the end it will be found necessary (as against Ritschlianism) to call in philosophy, in order to delimit and rationalize the God-idea by putting it into our system of concepts.

Note to §45

2. The "Kingdom of God" is set forth in eschatological form in Scripture, and yet its kernel is ethical; we need not give up the phrase.

Note to §45:1

3. "Surrender" is not a good word. Formally there is in it an appearance of a master-subject relation. But this is not true in any legalistic implication. The "surrender" in question is a *free* surrender; it does not abridge, but develops personality. "Devotement" is perhaps a better word.

2. The Kingdom of God is supramundane.[1] (a) That is to say, qualitatively as to its inner character, it does not consist in the production of any sort of mundane orders and the communication of mundane goods, but in the possession and the exercise of a personal life exalted above the world.[2] This personal life is not of an ascetic, mystical kind. It is a life in filial surrender to the perfect God and in the initiation and exercise of God-like righteousness in the fellowship of love. (b) This inwardly supramundane kingdom of God, as concerned with the region of its actualization, is also transcendent; i. e. it transports us into connection with a reality which lies beyond this empirical world of our knowledge (cf. §30:2, b).[3] This inwardly supramundane kingdom of God can attain its consummation for the individual and the community only under other than these earthly convictions of existence.

Notes to §45:2

1. This does not mean dualism. "Supramundane" is a noble word. Personality is supramundane, as against the raw and unorganized. It registers a protest against causality as a category that exhausts reality. It is almost teleological in its significance.

2. "The Son of man hath not where to lay his head." That is, there is no appropriate environment to the son of man in merely natural goods. Jesus was thinking of the supramundane.

3. The natural world gives (1) sensuous gratification, (2) work, (3) science and (4) human love. Beyond all that is *the spiritual.* Work is good, but no man's work is so perfect or so fully appreciated as to give abiding satisfaction. Science is good, but instrumental, and very limited at that. It cannot forgive sins, nor can it give comfort in the hour of sorrow and death. Human love is good, but where is it so perfect and so constant in its perfectness that the human heart is not pointed to something beyond it? The human spirit in its highest moments points above and beyond the world of empirical reality. "Whom have I in heaven but thee? and on earth there is nothing beside thee." "Thou hast been our dwelling-place in all generations." Because you cannot weigh and calculate the supramundane, is it nothing?

3. The concept "kingdom of God" commends itself as the comprehensive designation of the divine end of the world, even on historical grounds. It is central in the proclamation of Jesus. It is not so prominent in the apostolic witness, but it is used in significant passages, and its meaning is contained in other New Testament expressions. It is involved in faith in Jesus Christ as "Lord" (κύριος), therefore also in the concept of God as "Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" (πατὴρ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ).[1] In later history of doctrine this concept, "kingdom of God," is ever revived. On the Catholic side the concept is preserved but also corrupted by identifying the kingdom of God with the Church of Rome. On the Protestant side the comprehensive content of the concept was reached in the time of the Reformation and has been occasionally expressed in the confessions of the various churches.

Note to §45:3

1. The Christian's God is the kind of God of which Jesus Christ is a fair representative. After Jesus, it is his God — i. e. essentially — or none.

4. But this concept "kingdom of God" is available on systematic grounds also. It is the most comprehensive designation of the Christian salvation, for the kingdom of God is presented in our salvation (a) as at once religious and moral, (b) as at the same time immanent and transcendent, present

and future, (c) as an affair both of the human community and of the individual, (d) as God's supreme end and as our personal supreme end. Through all this the *absoluteness of the divine end* comes to expression most distinctly on two sides. It is unconditionally worthful, and it does not exist for the sake of the world, but the world for it.

5. With this definition and determination of the divine end, the Christian *God-idea* is exalted into the sphere of the *supramundane,* and owing to the ethical content of that end, it is exalted into the sphere of the *purely ethical.* Moreover, the God-idea is thereby freed in principle from all the limits (a) of nature-, folk- and law-religions, as well as (b) of the other redemption-religions (e. g. Buddhism and Neo-Platonism; v. §13), as also from those (c) of the Old Testament views of God (v. §43:2). It is only when we rise into that sphere of the ethical life that we ourselves can come to the God of Christian faith.[1] [2]

Notes to §45:5

1. There is nothing to be said more important than this, that it is only when we rise into the sphere of the ethical life that we can meet the God of the Christian religion. Also morality is healthy and strong only in the warm sunshine of religious enthusiasm. In Marcus Aurelius, Seneca and Epictetus we see a fine morality. Yet there is one thing lacking, and so it does not become a procreative reality. What is lacking is the note of victory, such as we find in Paul's "Rejoice in the Lord always; and again I say, Rejoice." Stoicism may be heroic, but it is not enthusiastic. Its morality is like that of the Indian, hitched to a tree and not flinching, though arrows are shot at him. Christian morality is like that of the fireman saving the child. The one looks selfward; the other, outward and onward.

2. In the whole history of religion there seem to be two ways in which God has been looked upon as coming to man, viz. in *revelation* and in *sacrament.*

Revelation is inner, personal, spiritual, ethical. It ought not to be made complex and difficult to us. It is the way you reveal youreslf to your friend, when you live with him.

Sacrament is defined as an external communication of the divine substance to man, through the senses. The God-idea involved is sub-Christian and pre-Christian. It is not yet lifted up into the fully ethical sphere. What is required of you that you may meet God by way of sacrament? The service of brothers? Not at all, and so its way of getting God is wrong.

Jesus was absolutely free from this sacramentism. His way to

God is the free fulfilment of certain moral requirements. He annihilates the sacraments. Sacramentism is wrapped up with asceticism and mysticism, and has no social reference. The old psychology of *possession* underlies mysticism; this was the way of accounting for all inner crises and cataclysms. It persists in the doctrine of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. Such mysticism is not necessarily ethical, and it has to go. There is no verifiable psychology of possession. Martin Luther shared the old psychology of possession. One cannot imagine the modern business man throwing an inkstand at the devil; but it does not follow that he is greater than Luther. Luther is Luther all the same. The same may be said of Paul. He introduced pre-Christian elements in his rationalizing of the death of the Messiah; but he could wish himself accursed for his brethren's sake. Luther made the modern world; Paul made a new type of civilization. They were great in spite of their defective psychology and apologetics, which did their work in their own time and place. Perhaps Paul ought to have thrown overboard more than he did, but he saved the ship, and that is the main consideration.

The correlates of revelation and sacrament on the human side are *prayer* and *offering*. Prayer is not saying prayers. It is communion with God — a moral yearning. It is profoundly ethical. Offering was originally something given to God which it was believed he would enjoy, as something to eat, or to smell. But the Christian's God is the being to whom nothing can be given, since he has all things — except your will, and to give this to God is to possess it more surely. A catholicizing deterioration of religion began with the apologetics for the death of Christ, when the offering-idea was introduced. The Messiah's crucifixion was regarded as the Christian's propitiatory offering to God. A deterioration of Jesus' religion began in this, no matter who did it.

When did sacraments begin to take the place of revelation and prayer? When the Lord's Supper and baptism took on redemption values. Paul makes an argument for the resurrection out of vicarious baptism for the dead. And was it mere figure of speech when he spoke of eating the body and blood of Christ? Was there not some sacramentism in Paul? Wrede and Weinel think Paul was essentially a Roman Catholic sacramentist. I am not convinced that this is as true as they try to make out. With Paul, the *kernel* was the same as with Jesus, viz. the moral and the religious. At any rate, sacrament and offering are pre-Christian and sub-Christian. Revelation and prayer, the religion of morality — this is what makes up the content of the teaching of Jesus. No offering is required but the day's toil and the night's prayer. The blessing comes not through sacrament, but through communion.

I am not prepared to say that sacrament and offering have had no pedagogic value. But they are not Christian; they are not the summit and finality of our religion. Perfumery, the "dim religious

light," candles, and the like — all this is the easy way of the child and the undeveloped. The race seems to fail to rise to Jesus' attitude. In the morality of his inner disposition and in his religion of a moral God, it looks more as if the race would never get up to Jesus, than that it would get ahead of him, and he fail to be final.

§46. *The Spiritual Work of God Revealed in Jesus Christ, in order to the Realization of His Kingdom.*

1. In order to the full Christian view of God [1] and in order to the full concept of the supramundaneness and ethical perfection of God there must be not merely the knowledge of the divine *end,* but also of the *work* constantly directed to the actualization of that end, and especially of the work of God powerfully revealing itself in the life of the human spirit.[2]

Notes to §46:1

1. There is a great difference between a religionless, speculative manufacture of a God-idea, and going to a definite religion and seeing what kind of a God-idea the religion has produced.

2. My friend, James Ten Broeke, holds that a man's essential reality is the purpose he sets up and the energy with which he sets himself to realize that purpose. May we not apply this to the God-idea as well?

2. This is embraced in the Biblical concept also of "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" (*θεός καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν* Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ). (a) *Jesus himself* was conscious of presenting the kingdom of God as the divine end of the world, but also of ushering it in with his Messianic work in a way that through him a redeeming power of God became operative in the hearts of men. (b) Accordingly the *first community* was certain that in Jesus Christ, both the earthly and the exalted one, God's redeeming work of grace became mighty, in order to the actualization of his counsels in that community. God himself thus became to the primitive community "God our Savior" (*θεὸς Σωτὴρ ἡμῶν*).

3. In agreement therewith the certainty of a work of God redeeming and educating us for his kingdom is the result for us of faith in Jesus Christ. This appears (a) centrally in *the personal life of Jesus Christ himself,* which is the only possible starting point for the supramundane rule of God becoming directly actual in the hearts of men (cf. §26:1–3);

(b) in addition, in *the spiritual life of Christianity,* through which that redeeming work of God in Jesus Christ is mediated to us to-day (§26:4);[1] (c) but also in God's work of revelation *preparatory* for the kingdom of Jesus Christ.

Note to §46:3

1. On the basis of the old psychology and world-view men could easily conceive of the mediation of God's redeeming work by the real presence of the exalted Jesus, now omnipresent in the individuals and in the community, and the redemptive work of God could be thought of as carried on by the post-existent ubiquitous Christ. This was elaborated greatly by the post-Reformation theology. But there are two difficulties with this view. The first is a psychological difficulty, rendering unintelligible the mystic real presence of Christ's consciousness in us. The other difficulty, which is philosophical, is that of how the man Jesus could become ubiquitous and omnipresent. It means the integration into the man Jesus, on His return to the Father, of the Divine attributes of omnipotence and the rest. This is philosophically unthinkable, and the whole conception lacks ethical effectiveness. Theologians and Biblical historians have retired the thought of a post-existent redemptive efficiency of the ubiquitous Jesus, in favor of the persistence of the power of the human, historical Jesus, and the redemptive effect of the spiritual community on its members and on others outside. The idea of a physical-metaphysical, human-superhuman influence of the post-existent Jesus is rightly given up. The conception of a pre-existent being laying aside his attributes, and a post-existent being taking back his attributes, would have significance for a metaphysical, not for a moral, way of salvation. Moreover, this whole conception of an extra-historical being entering the human race is mythology pure and simple. Indeed the old conception of the Trinity and of the Deity of Christ is pure mythology, and there can be adhesion to the mythology without the inner process of redemption.

To return to the psychological difficulty, it is to be admitted that to the seer hallucination is as real at the time as the perception of reality. And in the old psychology the inner seeing was thought of as real. But from the point of view of modern psychology what is seen, even in Paul's experience, is simply subjective "vision." At all events, we must interpret Paul's vision and the drunkard's vision similarly, i. e. either both according to the old psychology or both according to the new psychology. Besides, the real proof of Paul's conversion was not the vision or the voice, but the right-about-face in his life. Paul could beat them all at visions, but he showed a more excellent way — the way of ethical love. No, the religio-historical school are wrong in their interpretation of Paul. He knew what was worth while.

4. Thus we recognize in faith in Jesus Christ God's spiritual power directed to the actualization of the divine end of the world. It is in this way especially that God is revealed within the spiritual, historical life of humanity as *the living One,* or as "Life," "Light," "Spirit." This is not true in the sense that God's life is to be identified with the whole life of humanity, but in the sense that within the latter God develops a supramundane kingdom with redeeming power. It is only in personal receptivity for the kingdom of God that we ourselves find the living God.

§47. *The World-Governing Work of God Revealed in Jesus Christ in order to the Actualization of His Kingdom.*

1. The Christian God-idea is not yet fully formed with the two moments already developed (§§45, 46). For did one stop there a gnostic God-idea and a dualistic world-view would not be repelled. The reason we cannot stop there is to be found in the intimate connection between history and the order of nature.

2. There is indeed a third moment in the Biblical faith in God. (a) *Jesus* led his disciples in all the gifts they received and in all their sufferings to look up to God as the Lord *even of the natural order* ("Lord of heaven and earth"), and Jesus himself finished his entire work with the certainty that all that befell him even according to the natural order, even though it were brought on by the will of the sinful human world, was yet absolutely subject to the *necessity* (δεῖ) of the divine counsel. (b) The first community fastened on to the Old Testament conviction of faith as to God's world-ruling power, and they did this directly in the paradox of the cross of Christ, and in the experience of his appearances after death.

3. For us also this same certainty is founded in the faith that in the case of Jesus Christ everything, even suffering and death, served and had to serve the consummation of his person and work, and that this inner consummation must lead to outer victory. This faith receives further confirmation or corroboration whenever anything of the guidance of the outer process of the world is seen to serve the end of the kingdom of God —

anything in the order and process of the world, whether it be (a) in the outer fortunes of the children of Israel, or (b) of Christianity, or (c) of the rest of human history, or (d) in the leadings of our own life. Yet such outer guidances in their importance and significance are never so externally evident that *faith* in God's world-ruling power becomes *vision;* and insight into the guidances of God understandable to us is never so extensive that this side of Christian faith can dispense with its foundation in Jesus Christ.[1]

Note to §47: 3

1. What would constitute the Christian triumph over pain, suffering, evil in the world? Taking it away or discovering some antidote is a negative solution of the problem. The Christian triumph is in chaining the evil to our chariot wheel, converting the burden or menace into a servant of the maturing of the inner life. This is absolute victory, making my master my slave.

This mastery is not through perfect knowledge and explanation of God's will with reference to it. It is not by sight, but by faith. It is not that we know how God behaves empirically, but that we know God, the God of Jesus Christ, and knowing him we say, "I do not know why this evil is in my life; perhaps I could not know; but I know that God knows why it is there. It is enough for the child to know that the Father knows." "We know that all things work together for good," wrote Paul. Now Paul did not *know* either the "all things" or the "working together" or the "good"; but, knowing God, he passes to this conviction by faith, and triumphs by it. Mere explanation would be inadequate to produce this result.

§48. *Comprehensive Definition of the Essence of God (God as "Love," as "Heavenly Father").*

1. The three moments of the God-idea developed in §§45 to 47 are indissolubly interrelated; therefore it is impossible to derive one from another, but it is of course possible to seek a unitary comprehensive expression for the three (i. e. the supramundaneness, the end and the work), and this in adhesion to the New Testament wherever possible.

2. In the New Testament we have a comprehensive characterization, above all in the proposition, "God is love." The content of this concept ("love") is made clear in (a) the ever-imperfect analogy of the noblest human love; above all

(b) in the perfect love of Jesus Christ, who not only visualizes, so to speak, but brings God's love to us; (c) in the personal experience of God's love in our own inner and outer life.

3. This is regulative for Christian dogmatics also. (a) For it also the concept "love" is the best designation of the unitary character of God which the Christian view of God, in opposition to the thought of an impassive ("impassible") Being, or of an arbitrary or capricious God, affirms and must affirm. (b) Dogmatics has to borrow the definition or determination of the content of this concept of love from revelation of God. (c) The single moments of the concept "love" which may be thus gained are the following: (α) The *object* of love is spiritual personalities. In principle, not in fact, the original object of the divine love is Christ, accordingly then through Christ the community of the redeemed, then the world in general (John 3:16). (β) The *goal* of the divine love is man's spiritual and moral best; that is to say, the initiation and perfection of their personal communion with God, and their fellowship with one another in faith and love; and this goal thus dually expressed is yet a unitary one as regards this relation of fellowship.[1] (γ) The *mode* of the divine love to us is not, as with men, self-abnegation, but yet it does involve what used to be meant by the words "condescension" and "sacrifice"— sacrifice even to the surrender of his most worthy, his Son. Thus the death of Christ is the most precious asset in human history.

Note to §48:3

1. There is no relation to God which is not a relation to man, and there is no relation to man which is not a relation to God. If you treat man fairly decently, you treat God fairly decently.

4. The love of God in which we have faith mounts above all human love. (a) God's love is *holy,* i. e. it wills only the truly good and excludes everything that is contrary thereto, or all that is sinful. But since God's opposition to sin is active precisely in his redeeming and pedagogic love, there is no sort of tension between holiness and love, but true holiness is perfect love, and *vice versa.* (b) God's love, however, is exalted above the finite world and regnant over it. In simpler

expression all this is comprised in the phrase "Our heavenly Father" (ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος). The concept "Father" designates God not only as (a) author of spirits, but also as (b) generator of a new eternal life in the individual and in the community, and (c) as educator therefor. The concept "heavenly," even with our changed picture of the world, expresses most distinctly (a) his exaltedness above human finitude and sin, and also (b) the world-ruling power of God.

Note to §48:4

1. Dorner's phrase, "holy love," sets forth the essential character of the Christian God.

cc. Critical Limitation.

§49. *The Apparent Contradiction between the Concept "Personality" and the Absoluteness of God.*

1. Two concepts are included in the thought of God as heavenly Father.[1] These concepts illumine both the limitation of the Christian knowledge of God over against false conceptions, and also its own inner limits (cf. §41:2, c, α and β). (a) When we think of God as Father, or as holy Love, we apply to him the *concept of spiritual personality,* in which all those personal predicates inhere with which we as Christians speak of God. (b) When we think of God as "heavenly," or as exalted above the world, or as ruling over the world, we attribute absoluteness to him. In the system or connection of the Christian faith this concept cannot designate the entire nature or essence of God. It does not even give the main determination or definition of the divine essence from which all others could be derived. It is a logical abstraction. Its function is to set forth God as the *Unconditioned,* i. e. as the non-conditioned and the all-conditioning.

Note to §49:1

1. See J. Caird: *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity;* Wundt's *System der Philosophie* (the chapter on Religion); Paulsen's *Introduction to Philosophy* (chapters on Theism and Pantheism); Eucken: *Die Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion.*

2. But, thus understood, the concept, absoluteness of God, seems to be in strained relations with that of the divine per-

sonality. The concept, absoluteness, since it exalts God above everything finite, seems to exclude not only all gross anthropomorphisms, but also all psychological concepts in general and all analogies of human personal life from the correct knowledge of God, and places us before the *dilemma* of either dragging God down to the finite, or else making him unusable and incomprehensible for our religious life.[1]

Note to §49 : 2

1. How we manipulate and metaphysicize the God-idea till it is religiously valueless! Look at Neo-Platonism, for instance, with its "super-essential existence." Ultimate reality is set forth in symbols, to be sure, for religious people; but is there any reality which is not so set forth?

3. Two *speculative attempts* have been made to solve this difficulty. (a) *On the one side* there is the attempt to affirm the psychological conception that we apply to God as an adequate presentation of the form of the divine Being and work. But since these concepts never admit being developed to full clearness and freedom from contradiction, they ever prove to be inadequate with reference to the *form of God's inner life and mode of operation.* (b) *On the other side* there is the attempt to purify the psychological concepts of all inadequate elements, and in this way to attain to a purely logical knowledge of God. But this goal of purification is never entirely reached (witness Lotze and Weisse),[1] and as regards the God-idea precisely that is lost in this way which is the main thing to the Christian faith, viz. a divine purpose, an end, a disposition that we know of, because it is like the human.

Note to §49 : 3

1. By the time you have left out all that does not apply to God (Lotze), you have left *vox et preterea nihil.* If you say that God is personal, but that his personality is not of our kind (Weisse), what knowledge can we have of it? (This is like saying miracles are according to law, but a higher law than any yet discovered, whereas we do not know whether or not there is any such higher law.)

4. Hence we must substitute critical insight for these speculative endeavors. To begin with, that dilemma is falsely put. To be sure, all the psychological analogies applied to God may

not be considered as adequate delineations of the *form* of the super-temporal inner life of God.[1] But they do not seek to be adequate,[2] although they are the indispensable, thoroughly correct and clear designations of the *content* and direction of the divine nature and work revealed in Christ and knowable to faith.

Note to §49:4

1. The modern notion of personality contradicts the old notion of substance (οὐσία). But the contradiction is not so serious with the new idea of reality as purposive activity.

2. Neither in the Bible nor out of it is it claimed that psychology is an adequate delineation of God. Our ordinary descriptions, however, are functionally sufficient for the purposes of life, even while they are not a full delineation of the reality. No science penetrates into the interior of things; it is the business of life to get there, and it can be done with the aid of symbols and hints.

5. Above all, the not merely psychological but also ethical concept of *spiritual personality* designates God accordingly as he (a) who subordinates all work in the natural and human world to *purely spiritual ethical values,* i. e. to his kingdom of ethical personalities, and (b) who penetrates to the innermost needs of any single ethical personality, so that the latter, believing and praying, can enter into mutual relations with God.[1] This concept, which involves rejection of all pantheistic views of God, is not in conflict with the concept of absoluteness, critically circumscribed, but even exalts the latter to the concept of the absolute *self-dependence of God* (freedom).[2]

Notes to §49:5

1. This functional language is indispensable to religion.

2. The modern mind can predicate freedom only if it is true of everything.

§50. *The Revealed and the Hidden Sides of God's Being.*

1. The investigation of the problem of §49 has led us to the limits of the Christian knowledge of God in general. Its comprehensive delimitation follows from the Christian concept of revelation (see §§25 to 27). (a) The form of the supramundane *life* of God remains hidden to the Christian knowl-

edge of God, on the one hand; on the other hand the form of his *work*, i. e. the mode and manner, the way he begins to determine the world according to his end — this also is hidden. (b) Especially the "things that are freely given us of God" (τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ἡμῖν) are revealed for our knowledge and experience of faith, and the "deep things of God" (βαθῆ τοῦ θεοῦ) are made known to us, according to Christian conviction, in and through this same knowledge and experience of faith, i. e. the depth of his love, and the "mystery" (μυστήριον) of his counsel. Thus while we are not able to penetrate the form, we can the *real content of his eternal Being* and will, i. e. his purpose, behind which we have to seek no dark nature-ground in God, and no mysterious will otherwise directed.[1]

Note to §50:1

1. "God is Light, and in him is *no darkness at all*," i. e. nothing undetermined, unorganized, not concentrated purposively. This is the great idea from the point of view of Christian faith.

2. But an incompleteness ever belongs to our knowledge of God, even within the region accessible to us. (a) It is only gradually and imperfectly that the inexhaustibly rich content of the redemptive goal revealed in Jesus Christ (§45) and the redemptive work of God (§46) are capable of being known and experienced. (b) It is only gradually and by piecemeal that we learn to understand the outer processes in the world and life (§47), as means to the actualization of the divine will in the world and in the life of the individual.

3. We can give expression for ourselves and for others to that which is knowable of God only in *our forms of thought*, and with the help of the *concepts borrowed from our own psychic life*. This is equally true of scientific dogmatics (v. §29:3), and of the practical ecclesiastical preaching. Still the following norms are to be kept in mind in employing these expressions: (a) Those forms of expression are to be employed with the clear consciousness that they have only a parabolic character as regards the form of God's life and work. (b) They are to be so shaped as to designate the nature of God revealed in Jesus Christ as pertinently, as popularly and as impressively as possible, and they are correct and true accord-

ing as they attain this functional end. The functional reality will itself suggest what needs to be known of the ontological reality. (c) They should be preserved as much as possible in continuity (α) with the *Biblical* form of presentation, especially that employed by Jesus Christ, and (β) with the conceptual coinage of the evangelical churches, without thereby excluding a further development of forms of expression.[1]

Note to §50:3

1. Take, for example, the word "regeneration." We must not preach that character is so mercurial that it can be magically reconstructed all of a sudden. We must emphasize *growth*, as against old ideas of regeneration. And yet we must recognize times of cataclysm in human experience and life. The new words are out of the new life, and so are fitted to serve that life. But let us not make a breach with the past, save for purposes of service. We must gather the eternal gospel into the newer categories for some minds, and we must continue to use the old categories for others. The business of preaching is to *do* something. A sermon ought to function serviceably in the community, and so it has to fit.

β. The Trinitarian Unfolding of the God-Idea.

§51. *Exposition and Evaluation of the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity.*

1. Our principiant attitude toward the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity,[1] into which the doctrine *de Deo* of the old dogmaticians emptied, follows from our fundamental definition of the nature of God.

Note to §51:1

1. Shall we rip up and destroy the Trinitarian formulation, if by doing so we fall into the Unitarian formulation, whereas both are wrong?

2. In the *orthodox ecclesiastical* exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity we are to note the following: (a) Its character as a whole, i. e. its relation to reason, to Scripture and to the faith of the Christian. (b) The main propositions it lays down concerning (α) the one Divine Being, (β) the three Divine Persons, and (γ) the mutual separation and community of these persons. (c) The means of proof and of elucidation employed.

3. A criticism dependent upon the history of dogma of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity shows the following: (a) The religious basic views of Christianity gave impulse to its *formation in the old church.* But at the same time peculiar conceptions of the Christian salvation and speculative interests co-operated, and on that account other fruitful thoughts of the Christian religion were crowded out. (b) In the *reformation* the evangelical knowledge of salvation was interpreted in the use of the traditional doctrine of the Trinity. The new content did not burst the forms, which did not yet correspond to that content; but rationalism subsequently disintegrated these forms without, however, properly appreciating and protecting the religious content.[1]

Note to §51:3

1. Rationalism was scientifically more satisfactory to the intellect; but it was always unsatisfactory religiously.

4. *Biblical theological criticism* leads to the result that the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity is not a synthesis of the content of the Scriptures, but rests upon violent interpretation of single sayings in the Scriptures, and their artificial weaving together into a speculative whole. This is particularly true in the case of the Holy Spirit as the "third Person" in the Godhead.

5. *Systematic criticism* has to urge the following objections: (a) The different definitions of the doctrine have not been brought to inner unity, but only to a sort of equilibrium. (b) The ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity transcends the knowledge that accrues to religious faith (i. e. our understanding of things that comes from revelation). So far as it does this it dispenses not only with sure ground, but it *alters the evangelical concept of faith* also.[1]

Note to §51:5

1. It makes faith an assent to doctrines that are not intelligible on the basis of the religious life. This has been a source of permanent weakness in Protestantism.

If you were to blot out the concept "world," it would accrue to knowledge again. But if you were to blot out the doctrine of the Trinity, would faith so externalize itself again in the modern situation?

6. The attempts to reconstruct, or restore and repristinate, the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity by deriving it from the Christian consciousness, or by speculative construction of a metaphysical, psychological or ethical character, neither do justice to the ecclesiastical Trinitarian dogma itself, nor do they have convincing power in themselves, and such speculative attempts have no right at all on the evangelical soil of Christendom.[1]

Note to §51:6

1. Given the redemption-experience, what God-idea will emerge?

The ecclesiastical formula has done injury to faith, and yet it would be wise to keep the formula for pedagogic purposes, while telling what its essential and true meaning is.

Recognition of the Holy Spirit as a person other than the person of God is not warranted by Scripture.

Are there not three factors, three sides to the divine life? There is God's life, thought of as in psychological form, God's self-revelation in history, and God's self-communication to the spirits of men, and especially to the heart of his child (cf. Pfleiderer, Biedermann, Lipsius and Edward Caird).

§52. *The Christian Faith in God's Word and Spirit.*

1. The criticism in §51 is concerned only with the attempts to gain, in the doctrine of the Trinity, a disclosure concerning the relations of God's inner life (*opera ad intra*), not the thoughts of faith which are related to the nature of God revealed to us (v. §50:1 b). Christian faith cannot think of God whose essential content is disclosed to us in his redemptive counsel and work, (a) in rigid exclusiveness, or (b) in far-off transcendence, or on the other hand (c) in natural process of emanation, but only (d) in eternal, personal, living, self-unfolding self-relation to the world.

2. These thoughts of faith have points of connection with Biblical views.[1] (a) The Old Testament faith in God apprehended God's self-revealing essence as unfolded in many ways and therefore formed an intuitive (i. e. perceptual) idea of various powers belonging to God and proceeding from God, powers by means of which God entered into relation to the world (cf. "Angel of Jahweh," "God's Name," "Glory," "Spirit," "Word," "Wisdom").[2] Yet on the Old Testament

stage these ideas retain something fluctuating. In part also they betray the background of older, more elementary views of divine essences and forces, or they become artificial supplementations of a later abstract God-idea. (b) But the *New Testament community* was founded on the unitary *revelation* of God in Jesus Christ, and it lived in the certainty of a *communication* of the divine life through the spirit of Jesus, and the formation of its view of God was to the effect that God was to be thought (α) as exalted above the world and ruling over it, yet (β) always in connection with his revelation in Christ and his self-communication in the Spirit.

Notes to §52:2

1. I am not committed to the following with any steadfast confidence in it. To use Scripture to support a position commonly means taking the metaphysical and psychological elements of Scripture and making them the support.

2. Do these refer to inalienable constituents of our religion, or do they belong to a pre-Christian stage of religion, pointing to a Mediator between God and man? What need is there of mediation between Father and son? It does not follow from monotheism that mediation is not needed; but from the Christian view of God, it does.

3. God is holy love exalted above the world and ruling over it. There are three essential moments in this concept. (Do they justify the retention of the term "Trinity"?) (a) God is "God the Almighty" (*θεὸς ὁ παντοκράτωρ*), who as "Lord of heaven and earth" is "Father of Spirits" (*πατὴρ τῶν πνευμάτων*). (b) But as such he is at the same time the One revealing himself in time, and since it is founded in his eternal being to reveal himself, he is the One disposed to revelation in eternal living self-determination. Thus he is "God the Word" (*θεὸς ὁ λόγος*). (c) Moreover, by means of his revelation he wills to communicate himself at the same time. Thus in his temporal operation, which is founded in his eternal self-determination he is "God the Spirit" (*θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα*).

4. These are the three moments in the Christian faith in God, and it is also true (a) that not one of them may be swallowed up by the other. They are different self-relations of God to the world, each of importance for our Christian faith. (b) They may not be separated from one another. They not

merely emerge successively in the economy of salvation, but they are co-existent and in-existent as self-determinations of God. In this regard the *formula* of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity may be transferred to our soil.[1]

Note to §52:4

1. The vital essence of Trinitarianism is the idea of world-upholding holy love, with its self-revelation in history and its self-communication to the individual. I am not a Unitarian, but the doctrine of three persons in one Godhead is mythology.

5. But in distinction from the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity, we have not reached thereby three hypostases, but only three sides (modes of operation) of the Divine Being actively disclosing himself. At all events, the person of the historical Jesus Christ has a hypostatic self-dependence, over against God as Father, and so has the community of the *ecclesia* which has historically arisen. But whether and in what sense these self-dependent historical realities are to be understood as essential relationships of the eternal essence of God — this question leads over to the problem of the pre-existence of Jesus Christ, and to the eternal Election of the Church.

b. God and the Finite World in General.

a. God's Relation to the World as His Creature and Instrument.

§53. *The Christian View of God and the Christian View of the World.* (*Division of the Subject.*)

1. We have tried to define God's essence in §§43 to 52, only as it is manifest to us, therefore in its relation to the world.[1] But the task remains to relate the actual character of the world to God. Hence this subdivision b concerning the character of the world as finite, conditioned and legally ordered. It is all the more necessary to study the subject since the Christian religious view of the world and the scientific knowledge of the world touch and clash in so many points.

Note to §53:1

1. We are concerned with the functional reality, not with the ontological reality of God.

2. The world in its natural order may be articulated into the Christian faith in God by our understanding it as creature and instrument of God. Hence in α we shall seek to determine God's relation, in β God's attributes, in connection with the world as his creature and instrument. Under α we shall deal (aa) with the doctrine of creation and preservation, and (bb) with the doctrine of the divine government of the world, and providence. The former has to do with the given state of the world as grounded in God, the latter with its progressive course as subject to the divine ends.

3. If the entire part b relates the world as finite to God, or considers God as the author and director of the whole natural order of the world, the task will fall to part c to treat the human world in its ethical determinateness within the empirically given world, and to determine God's *moral world-order* from the standpoint of the Christian faith. There are three points to be expounded in part c, viz. α, the divine destiny of man; β, human sin; and γ, God's relation to sinful humanity.

aa. Creation and Preservation.

§54. *The Ecclesiastical Doctrine and the Biblical View of Creation and Preservation.*

1. The ecclesiastical doctrine of *creatio* offers, mostly on the basis of Genesis I, definitions concerning (a) the Creator, (b) the concept of creation, (c) the course of the divine creative activity, (d) the end of the creation and the purposefulness of the created. The doctrine of preservation (*conservatio*) is only the extension and application of the creation-concept to the present state of the world.

2. The question is as to how far the creation-doctrine of Sacred Scripture is true. (a) In the *Old Testament* the two creation-stories give an answer corresponding to the then state of knowledge, to the *knowledge*-question as to the whence of the world; but they form only the introduction to the redemptive history, and the cosmological material itself becomes auxiliary means in order to the answering of the faith-question as to the relation of the world and of man to God. (b) In the *New Testament* the Old Testament creation-faith is uncritically

taken over, but using the Old Testament conviction, faith in the spiritual new creation through Christ is accentuated. The natural creation is brought into intimate relation with that spiritual creation by means of the thesis that God made the world through, in and for Christ, and elected the church from the foundation of the world.

3. A comparison of the ecclesiastical doctrine with Biblical views shows (a) that of the religious views of the Scriptures the ecclesiastical doctrine has carefully preserved those which are found in the creation narratives, and which in the history of the ancient church formed a line of demarcation against ethicizing perversions, yet has not known how to employ many thoughts of the prophets, and especially the New Testatment views, in a really living manner.[1] (b) The ecclesiastical doctrine has sought to eternalize the natural science conceptions in the Old Testament along with its religious truths, and in this way has brought on a conflict with modern natural science.[2]

Notes to §54:3

1. The idea of will-less emanation is not Scriptural.
2. If the Genesis-story were blotted out, would faith-knowledge today say that the world was made in six days?

4. Modern attempts to retain the view of nature in the creation narrative, and to harmonize that view with present natural science, go to pieces on the historical state of fact of the Old Testament text itself, and these attempts do not fully give to natural science what belongs to it; but above all else they only injure the religious purity of the Christian faith itself.[1]

Note to §54:4

1. They import what faith does not create and cannot use. The time was when theologians could not discriminate between the temporal, scientific element in the Genesis-stories, and what was of eternal value for faith. But now we can keep the faith and leave the imperfect science. Note the influence of the question as to the essence of faith. We are now excluding from faith much, to have given up which would have caused panic in an earlier day.

§55. *Systematic Development of the Christian Tenets Concerning Creation and Preservation.*

1. In the Christian doctrine of creation we are concerned

neither with a scientific nor a metaphysical hypothesis in order to an explanation of the existence of the world, but with a conviction of faith regarding the end and ground of the world.

2. Trusting the God revealed in Jesus Christ, we should become personally certain of the following: (a) The existence and constitution of the material, the forces and the laws in the world are not the highest and the ultimate; but absolute reality is God alone and God's kingdom. Therefore the constitution of the world as a whole is only substratum and means for the absolute end of God, and therefore *creature and instrument* of his will. Moreover, the existence of all single things in the world is not only conditioned through finite causality, but even as member of the finite causal system, is determined by God's purposive creative will. But God's creative activity is not to be limited to a single past act; it is to be apprehended as an eternal relation of God to the world, controlling the entire course of time.[1] But (b) on the basis of (a) above, this dependence of the existence and constitution and course of the world upon God is to be more sharply defined still. (α) The world is neither of two extremes, viz. emanation on the one hand, or plaything of God on the other; it is a worthful work of his creative holy love. (β) As such it is founded in the self-revealing and self-communicating God or, to use the old phrase, in his Word and in his Spirit. (c) Since God's purpose with the world finds its full realization in Jesus Christ and the Christian community, Jesus Christ the author of the spiritual new creation and Lord of the Church is the goal of the natural creation also. The world is created "unto Christ," εἰς Χριστόν. Since, however, the existence and constitution of the world, or its right to exist rests only in its supreme spiritual end, it is also the Christian tenet that the world is created and consists "in Christ" (ἐν Χριστῷ). Does the world exist "through Christ" (διὰ Χριστοῦ), as the New Testament says? That can be determined only in connection with the question of pre-existence of Christ.

Note to §55:2

1. What is the function of creation-faith in the religious life? (A topic for historical, psychological, and constructive theological investigation.)

3. This Christian creation-faith is confronted with philosophic-religious views of the world of a different tendency, especially with the pessimistic and the æsthetic-pantheistic, but it has room for the relative truth of these views also.

§56. *Relation between the Christian Creation-Faith and the Present Scientific Picture of the World.*

1. It is not the function of the Christian creation-faith to give a scientific explanation of the world (v. §55:1), but it must come to terms with the world-picture which is formed by empirical science and *critical philosophy,*[1] a picture which, however, remains problematic in many points. There are some questions which fall to be considered here, as follows:

Note to §56:1

1. Dualistic and monistic philosophies may come and go; idealistic and materialistic philosophies may come and go. Critical philosophy abides.

2. The world as spatial-temporal brings us face to face with the problem as to whether the *world is limited or unlimited in space and time.* Philosophy is not able to solve this problem, but lands in antinomy. Hence the thought of the critical philosophy is suggested, that our whole idea of space and time is but the *form of intuition* of us finite limited beings. Moreover the Christian creation-faith gives no decision of the problem, but may be in harmony with either side of that antinomy. It is especially compatible with the above-mentioned thought of the critical philosophy.

3. The world as stuff leads us to the question as to the *essence of matter.* Different conceptions of this have arisen.[1] Moreover the Christian faith in God leaves this open, if it is only acknowledged that this our material world, or world viewed as material is indeed (a) presupposition of our finitude, but at the same time (b) a divinely appointed basis and material not only for our conduct, our moral conduct included, but also (c) for the upbuilding of the kingdom of God.

Note to §56:3

1. Ostwald and Mach are inclined to throw the concept "matter" overboard, keeping energy as the category which sets forth what is needed.

4. Natural science has led to reconstruction of the geocentric picture of the world, which underlies the creation-story. Extensive as that reconstruction has become and extraordinarily different as is the portrait that it presents, the creation-faith receives no mortal wound at this point either. To be sure, in the light of the degradation of the earth to a tiny body in the system of the world, faith cannot contest that God's eternal redemptive will may extend to a wider scope than this earth with its inhabitants. Whether one or myriad populated worlds be in need of redemption, faith can and must maintain at the same time that the supreme counsel of God is really disclosed to us in the end of the kingdom of God, and revealed to us in Christ. This counsel admits an extension in scope, of course, but it does not admit of being surpassed in content, according to the Christian faith.

5. Present science seeks a *developmental*-theoretical *explanation* of the present formation of the world, especially of the present biological forms of the organic world. And the Christian creation-faith is opposed in principle to the *evolutionistic* view of the world, whether it be naturalistic or idealistic or monistic.[1] On the other hand it leaves the investigation of the facts of development in the different regions of reality entirely free. Faith only requires the acknowledgment that development itself, with the formations proceeding thereby, is an actualization of the creative divine thought of an end, and must serve the absolute final end of God.

Notes to §56:5

1. Neither causality nor teleology in the Christian sense comes to its full right in an evolutionistic metaphysics of the Absolute. It does not do justice to the idea of a Will as the ground of what is, or to the idea of an end consciously set up and being realized. It drops back to a substance-God, a sort of cosmological-ontological God, a nature-being, rather than a strictly ethical being. Spiritualistic evolution might avoid this difficulty, although spirit is nature of a higher order and behaves in a nature way. In Christian creation-faith the divine causality is that of a moral will and purpose. The decisive problem for present-day theology is that of the relation between evolutionistic monism and the historically founded revelation-faith. Development is the fact. Evolutionistic metaphysics is an account of the fact which does not do justice to divine activity. Our position here is critical monism [in Höffding's sense of the term].

bb. The Divine Government of the World, and Providence.

§57. *The Ecclesiastical Doctrine and Biblical View of God's Providential Rule.*

1. The ecclesiastical doctrine of *providentia* goes side by side with the doctrines of *creatio* and *conservatio*. It seeks (a) under the concept of *concursus* or of *co-operatio* to define the causal relation of God, who is *causa prima,* to the *actiones* of *causae secundae,* and (b) under the concept of *gubernatio* to fix the teleological direction of all *actiones creaturarum* to God's goal, i. e. *ad fines Dei.* The material of the doctrine, especially of (b) above, is borrowed from Biblical history, especially of the Old Testament.

2. In fact the Sacred Scriptures live in the providence-faith. (a) In the Old Testament it underlies the whole Biblical-historical *narrative* and is expressed in powerful images and pictures. The key thereto is given by *prophecy* especially, which recognized the living morally-ordered providential rule of God in the history of Israel, but also of other peoples, and which interpreted it. Prophecy gave the providence of God the most comprehensive relation to happiness and unhappiness, to natural events and human conduct, especially to miracles and to every day occurrences. Later the *providentia specialissima* of God for the individual's sake is emphasized.[1] (b) In the New Testament (cf. §47:2) *Jesus* in word and life created a still stronger basis for the faith that God's providence ruled in the natural world, above all in the human world, and indeed not simply in order to the prosecution of his counsel in general, but also in order to the true salvation of the individual children of God, and with reference to their need and their prayer. On the basis of this faith, the *disciples* of Jesus have tried to understand this providential rule of God in redemptive history (*οἰκονομία*) in a kind of religious philosophy of history.

Note to §57:2

1. Ecclesiastical dogmatics spoke of *providentia universa, providentia generalis, providentia specialis,* and *providentia specialissima.*

3. The reformation emphasized again these religious views of the Scriptures in their full practical importance over against

all sorts of perversions. Moreover they are preserved in ecclesiastical doctrine, but here the basis of the faith is not properly stated, and its practical importance is obscured by its schematic elaboration. Moreover the effort is smuggled in to decide dogmatically various theological questions concerning the way in which God as *causa prima* works upon *causae secundae.*[1]

Note to §57:3

1. Cf. Pfleiderer's discussion of *concursus* in his *Glaubenslehre.*

§58. *The Ground and Content of the Christian Providence-Faith.*

1. The providence-faith together with the creation-faith constitutes the Christian *Weltanschauung,* or world-view, which corresponds to the Christian God-idea, and especially to the moment of that idea developed in §47. As in the creation-doctrine, so here in the doctrine of providence, the point is as to a *trustful conviction* to be gained in personal faith in Jesus Christ.[1]

Notes to §58:1

1. Cf. H. Schultz: *Old Testament Theology,* where it is maintained that providence-faith arose from practical needs, not speculatively.

2. This conviction includes the following moments: (a) The basic view is that, as with the constitution of the world, so with all process in the world, it is effectuated according to God's will, and therefore somehow serves the supreme *end of God.* (b) The most important application of this faith and the test of its vitality is the conviction that all things must serve our salvation, if we are real members of the kingdom of God; i. e. that they must bring God inwardly nearer to us, and that precisely in their natural causation they must furnish the material for our activity in the service of God. (c) In connection with this supreme goal of God (in its relation to the community and the individual) the single events or processes are to be graded as more or less remote fore-stages and means for that goal. The result is the thought (α) of a *system of divine ends* of a higher or lower order governed by that

supreme end, together with (β) an apparatus of *means* in order to their actualization.

3. The *complexity* and immensity of this system of ends makes it impossible to understand aright every single thing in its import within the whole world-plan of God. It is on this account that the attempts at a Christian philosophy of history, still more at a Christian philosophy of nature, must ever remain piecework. In particular, within the limits of our horizon we are able to harmonize many natural events — for example, natural catastrophes — with God's providence only indirectly, with the thought that even the legal order of the natural process through which such events are brought about is a necessary presupposition for the education of free finite spirits.[1]

Note to §58:3

1. We do not know enough to ascertain the divine purpose in a given catastrophe. Seeking to give comfort by explanation is consequently unsatisfactory, although the temptation to do so when dealing with the afflicted is nearly irresistible.

4. But with all the imperfection of his insight, the single Christian in his providence-faith may and should be free from (a) all fear of *chance and fate,* as from (b) all *superstition.* As to the former, God is conceived too deterministically; as to the latter, too capriciously. In the practical exercise of his providence-faith, the Christian will really experience in his life, step by step, something of the *providentia specialissima* of God.[1]

Note to §58:4

1. Providence-faith would not survive, if we could not revert to special providences in our lives. We cannot get rid of providence-faith religiously, however we may speculatively agnosticize it. It is a conviction of faith. You cannot compel another by argument to accept the view. It is difficult to distinguish between a conviction of this sort and superstition; but the conviction has more moral worth for the life. Superstition is essentially pseudo-science; faith is essentially religious. But the religious attitude which supposes itself to be of cognitive value as regards nature or history, or even with reference to God as an object of knowledge, is superstition. [The influence of Höffding is visible here.]

§59. *Providence and Miracle. Providence and Freedom.*

1. Two dogmatic problems arise in connection with an adjustment of the providence-faith with the given knowable world, viz. (a) the question as to the relation of providence to the natural legal order, and therewith the question of miracle; and (b) the question of the relation of providence to human freedom.[1]

Note to §59:1

1. The theological problem here is this: Given the Christian religious faith, what thought springs out of it concerning the relation of God to the world and to his children? This is altogether different from proceeding antecedently to determine how the Absolute is connected with these contingent and relative things. Metaphysics may have such a function as to solve this problem, but dogmatics has nothing to do with it. Is religious faith true? The only way to answer this is to find out the good of it in life.

I can say nothing to compel the assent of any individual to belief in special providence, if he does not hold the religious standpoint. Still, one can say much to rationalize the doctrine of special providence.

2. A *regularity or legality of causal relations* in the world is already observed in daily life, and is taken into account in all conduct and all business. In a much more comprehensive way it is presupposed by science and actually proved in a crude scope, but it is just on this account that the question arises as to whether there is room for *miracle in the metaphysical sense,* i. e. room for such events in case of which by means of divine encroachment (a) effects are intermittent which should follow according to the regular order of things, or (b) effects take place which do not follow from the natural connection.

3. This question does not admit of decision from the standpoint of science. Science cannot contest the possibility of metaphysical miracle on the one hand, but, on the other hand, science in its particular work must constantly repeat the attempt (a) to articulate all natural events, even the most inexplicable, in a legal system of nature, and (b) to understand in their psychological motivation the spiritual historical events which may not admit of explanation according to universal laws.

4. Moreover, *even from the standpoint of faith in Jesus Christ* we do not attain to a stringent decision of the metaphysical question (cf. §50:1, a).[1] Of course the conviction is essential to the Christian faith that God's work is free, world-controlling, and in so far a living, personal work. (a) A new spiritual life emerges in the temporal course of the life of the individual and of history, by virtue of such divine efficiency; (b) and such divine efficiency has regard for the deeds of man and the prayer of the children of God. (c) Finally such divine efficiency is able to bring about that which disappoints all expectations. These positions of faith, however, since the relation of the divine efficiency to the temporal course of the world is impenetrable (v. §56:2), cannot decide as to how far in the case of such events (a) a later creative activity of God encroaches into the created world, or (b) only originally created potencies or forces enter into temporal manifestation for us.

Note to §59:4

1. The God who would change water into wine for the sake of a wedding, but would not suspend the nature of fire to save little children from being burned to death is not a moral God from the point of view of the modern man, and there is no use in trying to make him believe it.

5. Even if faith must leave this metaphysical question undecided and can only be absorbed in the thought that and how far all process in the world serves the realization of the holy and gracious will of God; yet within the divinely guided process as a whole single processes or events arise as specially important and clear, perhaps also as specially striking and powerful disclosures of God's agency. These are signs (σημεῖα), or *miracles in a purely religious sense,*[1] i. e. such events are able to persuade us in a special degree of God's personal care for the prosecution of his redemptive will and for our own salvation, no matter whether these events be naturally mediated or not. These "miracles" become understandable for us in their full sense ever only within a great teleological system of redemptive history, or within our own life. Otherwise they remain a puzzling mystery.

Note to §59 : 5

1. It is metaphysically dogmatic to affirm either the possibility or the impossibility of miracles.

6. (a) While we comprehend thus not only nature but also human life and history under God's providence, we subordinate and subsume the free acts of man under God's providence also. In opposition to determinism, as also to an exaggeration of the encroachments of freedom, Christian faith lives on the certainty that God's efficiency does not repress the initiatives of human freedom, and yet does constantly keep that freedom under purposeful guidance. (b) The *theoretical question* how then the deeds of human freedom can co-exist with God's all-conditioning operation and be kept under his purposeful guidance can be brought to a decisive solution neither on the basis of Christian faith nor in a metaphysical way. The various attempts at solution, e. g. self-limitation of the divine prescience, or eternal knowledge of the acts of freedom, but light up our ignorance. (c) But for the practical religious attitude, the reference of acts to human freedom and their disposition by God's providence are harmonized without contradiction, and on the basis of this practical faith we may experience, especially in our own redemptive life, something of the fact that God's guidance and our freedom co-exist.[1]

Note to §59 : 6

1. This treatment of miracles does not transcend the limits of dogmatics.

§60. *The Doctrine of Angels.*

1. The *orthodox-ecclesiastical dogmatics* has united the doctrine of angels with that of creation and providence. It busied itself to gather from the Scriptures a series of definitions concerning the existence, the essence, the condition (morally good and bad), the activities, and the rank of angels. In this matter it passed beyond the declarations of Scripture itself, and has not taken into account the historical conditions of the Old Testament and New Testament idea of angels.

2. In the *Old Testament* the angel-faith was first gradually

formed from various sources, and was developed not without alien influence, and was thus erected into an *essential* part of the picture of the world. As such the angel-idea was taken over into the *New Testament,* but was made serviceable to the new content of the gospel. It imprints the living power of God in the history of redemption, his *providentia specialissima* for his people, especially for the "little ones" (μικροί). It witnesses to the spiritual character and comprehensive breadth of the kingdom of God.

3. *Dogmatically evaluated* this *content* hidden in the angel-idea (as *form*) seems something which should and can be directly certain and experienced in our trust in Jesus Christ. But *this is not equally true of the angel-idea itself.* The latter concerns the *form* in which the divine work knowable in faith is consummated over against the world, and thus touches a region withdrawn from the direct knowledge which accrues to faith. Also from the standpoint of our *scientifically* changed picture of the world, doubts arise, not against the thought of spiritual beings and spiritual kingdoms apart from us men (v. §56:4), but against the assumption of an invasion on the part of angel-powers into the natural course of our earth. (Natural law now takes the place of angelic agency of the olden time.) Thus modern theologians are accustomed to interpret and employ the idea of angels in the sense of a *poetic illustration* of the providence of God; but — and this is the main point to-day — negation of angelic mediation or efficiency must not be permitted to jeopardize the full vitality of the Biblical providence-faith.[1]

Note to §60:1

1. God is as teleologically concerned in the life of man as was indicated by the evangelical providence-faith.

β. God's Attributes in connection with the World as His Creature and Instrument.

§61. *Concept and Division of the Attributes of God.*

1. That the permanent essence of God revealing himself to us is displayed in the relation of God to the world finds its expression in the propositions concerning God's *attributes.*[1]

The attributive concepts applied to God designate, but ever in comprehensive expression, the various *constant relations of the unitary essence of God to the world, according to the various sides of the world.* They set forth, therefore, *secundum nostrum concipiendi modum,* the single indispensable moments in the concept of God as holy love, exalted above the world and ruling in it. We can only approximately interpret to ourselves (a) the riches ("glory") of the revealed God through the unfolding of these moments, and (b) his inner unity through their systematic co-ordination.

Note to §61:1

1. After setting forth an effect of God, we ask what attributes are specifically concerned with that effect? This method has obtained since Schleiermacher.

2. If all the attributive concepts display only the essence of God revealed in Jesus Christ, then these things follow therefrom: (a) The rejection of the three ways taken by ecclesiastical dogmatics in order to discover the divine attributes, viz. *via negationis, via eminentiae, via causalitatis.* They turn aside from the basis and standpoint of Christian faith, and lead over to a rationalistic doctrine of God. (b) The rejection of various traditional attempts at division. Especially untenable is the division into attributes of separation from the world and attributes of relation to the world (transeunt and immanent), and equally untenable the division into static (passive) and dynamic (active).

3. Corresponding to the distribution of subject-matter sketched in §53, we have to exhibit as first groups the attributes of God in connection with the finite world as his creature and instrument, i. e. the attributes of eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, wisdom, ever according as in God's creation and providence we have in mind (α) God's exaltedness and dominion over the world in its various sides, or (β) his good end, or (γ) suitability to this end of his activity. Then in a second group we set forth the attributive concepts which designate God in his ethical world-order, especially in his relation to human sin. We shall deal with both these groups in turn.

§62. *Eternity and Omnipresence, Omnipotence and Omniscience of God.*

1. The unconditioned exaltedness and dominion of the heavenly Father over the world finds expression in the concepts of eternity and omnipresence, of omnipotence and omniscience, ever according as the temporality or spatiality of the world, its causal determinateness or the hiddenness of its inner connections are had in mind.

2. (a) The concept of the *eternity of God* does *not* designate merely the beginninglessness and endlessness of his existence. (b) Also the thought of the exaltedness of God above all that is temporal, so long as we also understand it only as the timeless causality conditioning all that is temporal, remains an essentially *speculative* idea, never attainable fully on the part of thought. As against these (a and b) the Christian faith, in its understanding of the concept of eternity, does not first emphasize the negative and causal, but the *positive, teleological relation* of God to the temporal world. The eternity of God signifies that the whole time-series, including every single point in that series, is ruled by God's steadfast, unchangeable purpose, and that in so far God is "King eternal" (*βασιλεὺς τῶν αἰώνων*). From this practical view which accrues to faith there grows the intimation that God is not bound or restricted to our finite view of time (v. §56: 2) — an intimation, however, which can never become real knowledge in the scientific sense (v. §50: 1, a). Above all, however, the life and prayer of the Christian draw from that certainty of faith their confidence, especially in the face of a dark future. The superiority of the Christian view is plain.

3. The *omnipresence of God* likewise does not admit of being speculatively fathomed. Christian faith rises, of course, to the intimation that the world does not present itself to God in the spatial form of intuition in which it appears to us finite beings; but above all Christian faith affirms the practical truth in the concept of the omnipresence of God, that God with his holy love, judging and saving, is nigh to man in every place, especially to his own.[1] The inference for prayer is drawn in John 4: 21–24.[2]

Notes to §62:3

1. How different the significance of "Thou God seest me" to the martyr and to the guilty soul.

2. Worship is to be "in spirit and in truth." Cf. Tennyson: "The Higher Pantheism."

4. In the concept of the *divine omnipotence,* we express the faith that God as creator and pilot of the world is able to do everything which corresponds to his holy and gracious will, and can employ to this end the entire causal system of the finite world. In the Old Testament, still more in the New, the concept "omnipotence of God" sustains definite relation to God's "counsel," or purpose; thus the concept affirms that God is able to save and to perfect his kingdom, and with this definition of the concept, the insoluble scholastic questions of a former day drop away. The rule for Christian life and prayer which flows therefrom may be found in Mark 14:35, ff. Besides the "all things are possible to Thee" (*πάντα δυνατὰ σόι*), we should ever put the "if it be possible" (*εἰ δυνατὸν ἐστιν*).

5. Christian dogmatics cannot shape the intimation of faith that God's cognition is above human cognition to a psychology of God. Rather in the concept of the *omniscience of God* in adhesion to the Old Testament and New Testament it has to lay stress upon the practical religious content, viz. the conviction of faith that even the innermost, most hidden relations of things are not concealed from God's holy love, and especially that this is true of our own innermost thoughts and needs, both of our sinful emotions and of our spiritual impulses.

§63. *The Goodness of God.*

1. As regards the concept of *the goodness of God,* present usage has been fixed essentially by the influence of rationalism. God's love is understood thereby in its relation to the finite world in general, therefore not merely in its relation to the redemptive goal of the kingdom of God. Therefore the concept sets forth, according to the Christian faith, that the love of God extends to all of his creatures, and discloses itself also as regards man in the benefits of the natural life as well.

2. The *Old Testament and New Testament* give points of connection for this enlargement of the concept. Still, as

against a sentimental rationalistic and a pantheistic misinterpretation of the thought of the divine goodness, it is ever to be kept in mind that according to the Biblical, especially the New Testament, view the concept of the goodness and friendliness of God derives its firm basis and inner unity from God's will to save; hence an element of severity, of discipline, of pedagogy, is in the concept, and God shows that he is perfectly good and kind by creating in Christ his kingdom as the supreme good and the supreme goodness.

§64. *The Wisdom of God.*

1. The *wisdom of God* designates comprehensively the perfect teleology of the divine creation and the divine providence.

2. A rationalistic mode of apprehension recognizes the wisdom of God, above all (a) in the rational order of the world, (b) in the teleological equipment of living beings, and (c) in the constitution of nature to the end of utility for man. It has only found its æsthetic transfiguration (d) in the *pantheistic* worship of the harmony of the world.

3. On Christian soil it is certainly justifiable to investigate God's wisdom in the natural world, as this is done even in Old Testament passages. But according to the Biblical, especially the New Testament fundamental view, the concept of the wisdom of God receives its sure foundation and clear unitariness first through its relation to God's unitary final end. The wisdom of God is active in ways known to faith, yet often hidden to faith, in order to the realization of his kingdom.

4. But wisdom of God finds its supreme activity and verification as *pedagogic wisdom* in connection with human *sin.* Thus we are led over to the region of the ethical world-order in which, moreover, all the attributes above designated come into play likewise, but they also acquire further fulfilment as to their *content.*[1]

Note to §64: 4

1. Pfleiderer maintains that the ecclesiastical view of a dual stability of the good and the bad hereafter must yield to the thought of an infinite manifoldness of stages and forms of life, in which the infinite love shall have room to display its wisdom in pedagogic activity in further maturing of moral values.

c. God and the Ethical World

α. The Divine Destiny of Man

§65. *The Doctrine of Ecclesiastical Dogmatics concerning the Original State (Status Integritatis).*[1]

1. Ecclesiastical dogmatics defines the *natura* of man as a divinely *created* essence on the one hand, and on the other hand, it sets forth the original state of that nature, and its subsequent states. Man is delineated in such a way that the essential features of the ideal of perfection are exhibited in the original state (*status integritatis*), or more accurately, in the *imago* or *similitudo Dei* concreate in man, or the *justitia originalis.*

Note to §65

1. See Shedd's *History of Doctrine* and *Dogmatic Theology* (under "Anthropology"); Hyde's *Social Theology,* and Watson's *Christianity and Idealism.*

2. The ecclesiastical doctrine is not to be retained in this form. (a) It requires *Biblical criticism.* The delineation of the original state of the first man (Genesis 2) shows, even apart from the question of historicity, no state of ethico-religious perfection,[1] and the concept "image of God" (Genesis 1) has different import and application from what the ecclesiastical dogmatics makes out of it. But also in the New Testament Christ's appearance by no means signifies a mere restitution of that which was in the beginning, but rather a perfection of the human essence for the first time. Christ himself is the first true image of God, the embodiment of the "spiritual man" (ἄνθρωπος πνευματικός), of which Paul speaks. (b) At the same time a *systematic criticism* shows that an actualization of the Christian ideal is not possible as concreate state, but only on the soil of history.[2] (c) It is at this point that the criticism on the point of the history of dogma sets in — a criticism which exposes the rational, historyless character of that doctrine.[3]

Notes to §65 : 2

1. The ecclesiastical Adam is a different being from the Biblical Adam. The ecclesiastical Adam is a construction for a special purpose, affiliated with the Biblical Adam.

2. A ready-made moral perfection is a contradiction in terms (see Kaftan's *Dogmatik* on the *status integritatis*).
3. Like all rationalism, it is defective historically.

3. In this ecclesiastical doctrine, however, in spite of a false starting-point, there are two correct questions implicitly put, yet falsely mixed up with one another. (a) What is the divine destiny of man? and (b) What is the endowment given to man in order to attain the end of his being? Also on the basis of these two questions a series of correct answers is given; but they at bottom burst the framework of the old doctrine. We have to keep the two questions separate and clear, and take as the starting-point of their answer, not the Old Testament delineation of the original state, but the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

§66. *The Christian Propositions concerning the Divine Destiny and Endowment of Man.*

1. The divine destiny of man that we grow sure of through faith in Christ is one that is valid for the individual as well as for the community. (a) The supreme destiny of the individual man is divine sonship, or inner spiritual likeness to Jesus Christ. (α) This concept signifies both the religious character and the moral character that we ought to attain. In the actualization of this goal there is involved at the same time likeness to God himself, even a participation in the divine life, in the "glory" (δόξα) of God.[1] (β) These two establish at the same time a position of freedom and of dominion over the world. All this leads our thoughts from the destiny of man beyond the limits of this earthly existence to *an eternal consummation.*[2] (b) The supreme destiny of humanity is designated by the concept kingdom of God, and by the concept *ecclesia* as well. These two concepts are related to each other. They involve at least the union of men, on the one hand in prayerful faith and confession, on the other in mutual love and in the dwelling of God in the human community. This kingdom of God, like the individual, also awaits transcendent consummation. The two sides (a and b above) are so connected that only by the two together, i. e. in the consummation of the

individual and in the consummation of the community, can the image of God be entirely presented.

Notes to §66:1

1. In the last analysis it is God-likeness for which we ought to care. This is true even in imitation of the spirit of Christ.

2. The idea of the consummation in perfection of the individual is immanent and constant in our Christian religion in all its true expressions.

2. Guided by this knowledge of the goal, dogmatics has to designate the divinely ordained endowment in order to the fulfilment, or to the attainment of this goal.[1] (a) The divine endowment of the *individual man* lies in the tendency, essential and inalienable to man, to inner unity and freedom, above all in the *endowment of conscience* (that is to say, in the question essential to man, as to a unitary norm), and in the *religious endowment* (that is to say, in the desire for true blessedness, which becomes religious receptivity in connection with the experience of human limits and in the light of divine revelation). Along with these endowments common to all men there are individual talents, or gifts, through which each man is distinguished from all the rest; and these talents, or gifts, constitute the basis for the special divine destiny, or for the vocation to be fulfilled by each man. (b) A divinely ordained endowment of humanity for the kingdom of God consists in this, that the natural community of blood and interest yields the basis for a morally-regulated spiritual communion (v. §20:2), and that also the higher activities of the human spirit, especially the moral and religious (v. §§7 and 31), tend to form communities. But all these endowments attain their development first through history and the formative force ruling in history.

Note to §66:2

1. The essence of man, from this point of view, is not his cognitive bent, but his striving forward to a goal. In the Christian estimation of man, the moral is central.

3. If the propositions of faith expounded in 1 and 2 above be perfectly maintained, then the apparently insoluble *metaphysical question* as to the *nature* of the psychic essence, and

as to the mode of its emergence or procession from the natural and the historical, may be open for investigation.[1]

Note to §66 : 3

1. Faith is interested in maintaining that God sets man a goal, and that he gives him sufficient endowment to enable him to reach that goal. And these are precisely the positions which anthropology and psychology need not assail.

4. Also the *natural science question* as to the first entrance of man into the series of creatures can be relegated to empirical natural science investigation, if it be only borne in mind that a higher teleological thought of God, and therewith a higher stage of creation, is actualized in man as compared with the rest of creation. Equally so the question as to the original state of man, as to particulars, is a subject for historical (anthropological) investigation. The only important thing for faith is that the initial stage of man shall be held to be such as that a normal further development towards the highest goal of his destiny shall be possible. But this last thesis is a conclusion from the Christian view of sin.

β. Human Sin.

aa. The Essence of Sin and the State of Sin of the Individual and Humanity.

§67. *The Doctrine of Sin in Ecclesiastical Dogmatics.*

1. The ecclesiastical doctrine of *sin* is built throughout on the doctrine of the original state, and therefore is dominated by the concept of "original sin" (*peccatum originale*).[1] In particular (a) the *peccatum originale originans* is defined as to cause, course and result; (b) the *peccatum originale originatum* is defined in its essence, its mode of propagation, its relation to nature and to guilty character; (c) the stages and degrees of *peccata actualia* are defined; and (d) the whole state of man, burdened with hereditary sin, is defined in relation to *liberum arbitrium.*

Note to §67 : 1

1. What belief is logically possible is determined by the fundamental world-view. In a fixed, static world, the only way anything

new can get in is by cataclysm. Having begun with an "original state," there had to be a "fall," to account for later developments.

2. This ecclesiastical doctrine requires a *critical evaluation* in its character as a whole, but also in these special points indicated above. With reference to 1, d, above: It is correct that the natural man, i. e. humanity untouched by the spirit of Jesus Christ (and the same is true of its individual members), has not ability for the fulfilment of perfect good as goal. But the exaggerated emphasis of this truth does not sufficiently take into account man's capacity and yearning for redemption, and the great relative diversity of unredeemed men and groups of humanity.[1] With reference to 1, c, above: To be sure a gradation of guilt must be rightly acknowledged in the doctrine of *peccata actualia*. But this doctrine is drawn up according to a different criterion from the sinful state in general, and it deteriorates into an atomistic treatment of single acts of sin.[2] With reference to 1, b, above: Over against this the thought of a *unitary* power of sin persisting from generation to generation is justified throughout. But the working out of this doctrine apart from its *Biblical criticism* and its criticism on the basis of the *history of dogma* is also exposed to the *systematic judgment* that the concept of a hereditation of *guilt* is untenable, and that the derivation of this sinful continuity, or system, or connection, from only *physical* heredity is likewise one-sided. With reference to 1, a, above: The ecclesiastical doctrine is based throughout on Genesis 3. But there is the question as to the original meaning and historicity of this narrative.

Notes to §67: 2

1. Autosoterism does not take into account the efficiency of Divine and of social life in man's salvation.
2. This position landed in casuistry in Roman Catholicism.

3. This criticism leaves the *task* (a) to establish the *criterion, concept* and *fact* of sin, and to do so from the standpoint of the Christian faith itself, and according to the logic of that faith (§68); (b) to make intelligible the unitary power of sin in us and around us (§69); and (c) to bring the gradation of guilt into harmony with (a) and (b) above (§70).

§68. *The Criterion, Concept and Fact of Human Sin.*

1. The following *points of view* are regulative for a Christianly determined knowledge of sin. (a) Although an empirically given fact, sin also is to be established in its character as sin, only as a faith-judgment in which the given is evaluated, not only as anti-ethical, but at the same time as anti-divine.[1] (b) For Christian faith the criterion of this judgment can only be the *divine destiny of man* revealed in Jesus Christ (§66:1). Sin is any inclination of will, act of will, or social order issuing from the human will, that is contrary to this divine destiny of man. (c) The *application of this criterion* in particular is complicated by the fact that this supreme divine destiny has not been manifest everywhere and at all times in humanity. Therefore it is to be applied directly only in the self-valuation of the Christian, and in the valuation of that which passes as Christian, i. e. historical Christianity, especially. It is only indirectly valid for pre- and extra-Christian humanity. There sin is all that is in contradiction to the will of God already revealed at the given stage, and therefore in contradiction to the supreme divine destiny of men to which this stage of revelation is preparatory.

Note to §68:1

1. Strictly scientific ethics has not a word to say concerning "sin." The doctrine of sin is a faith-judgment.

2. The more accurate fixation of the *content* of the concept of sin flows from comparison with this supreme divine destiny of man. (a) Above all, sin on its *religious* side is to be understood as perversion of the right relation to God. (b) But at the same time on its moral side sin is to be apprehended (α) as *self*-surrender to impulse and inclination, or as lack of self-discipline and self-control, and (β) as egoistic regardlessness and lovelessness toward the neighbor. This apprehension, especially the prominence given to the religious side, corresponds to the New Testament, and it was also emphasized in the great Reformation movement.[1] So far, moreover, as fellowship of men with God on the one hand, and on the other the overcoming of the animal nature (σάρξ) and the regard for the neighbor, are revealed and recognized as goal in all the *pre-*

liminary stages of development, a corresponding determination of the content of sin is applicable in those regions also.[2]

Note to §68 : 2

1. Today sin is regarded too exclusively in its ethical as against its religious aspect.

2. The growth of the idea of sin must keep pace with the growth of revelation.

3. On the basis of this criterion and this content of the concept of sin, we have the thesis of the *universality of sin in humanity.* (a) This thesis can be founded only on this experience and that of others. To be sure, witnesses are to be examined from the pagan world, from the Old Testament and New Testament and from the history of Christianity. (b) This widened experience, however, leads to this thesis. It testifies not only to a wide distance between man and the perfect goal of his destiny, but also to a lagging behind the relative religious and moral knowledge reached at the various stages. It testifies further not only to a doing of sinful deeds by each man, but to a great *sinful system* within the individual man and within humanity.

§69. *The Grounds of the Power of Sin in Us and around Us.*

1. In the life of the single man there exists a great system and complex of sin. (a) This rests on the one hand on a *unitary root of all the single acts of sin.* (α) Actually there is in every man a multiplicity of impulses and inclinations which are given by nature and *contain no regulative norm in themselves.* (β) In the temporal development of the human ego the foundation of these impulses and inclinations (ἐπιθυμίαι) outstrip the rise in consciousness of religio-ethical norms. A decision of the will in favor of the latter (i. e. the religio-ethical norms) can be effected later, therefore, only in and through conflict with the still unbridled impulses and inclinations. There the impulse-life, or the σάρξ, is a source of constant temptation to sin. (γ) Any yielding of the willing ego to the ἐπιθυμίαι in contradiction to the already revealed religio-ethical norm is *vere peccatum.* It is an expression of a "minding of the things of the flesh" (τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς φρονεῖν) and be-

comes as deed a " fulfilment of the desire of the flesh " (ἐπιθυμίαν σαρκὸς τελεῖν). (δ) The inborn ἐπιθυμίαι are at first only natural endowment which may be favorable or unfavorable in various degrees to the ethical life (v. 2, c, below). But they become sinful passions in the degree that we let them rule us in contradiction to the known will of God, and thus from being a *state of nature* they come to be a state of *actual sin.* This last distinction can be joined on to certain Scriptural thoughts, along with which, however, other views exist side by side.[1] At all events it is a necessary distinction from *inner* grounds. (b) The consistency or complex or order of sin referred to above is founded on the other hand on the results arising from every sinful deed. It is not simply that inner consequence and the power of outer circumstances drive us steadily to further single acts of sin, but the decision of will itself establishes a tendency to repetition, and finally a bent to sin, and therewith a slavery of the will. This becomes irremediable completely when it is at the same time combined with bluntedness of conscience.

Note to §69 : 1

1. Ethical pessimism and dualism appear in the Scriptures, and were inherited by Paul.

2. There exists *a system of sin much greater still within human society.* It is intelligible from the following considerations: (a) Every sinful act can also itself become a temptation to sin to fellow-men (σκάνδαλον), be it (α) through enticing example, or (β) through compensation of evil with evil, or (γ) through confusion, or aberration, or sophistication of the weak conscience. (b) The anti-ethical views, principles, tendencies which are endured, formed, strengthened, or increased by the individual in intercourse with his fellow-men, but especially in pedagogic activity, found and established a dominion of sin for the contemporaneous and subsequent life of man. (c) Finally, it is confirmed by sociological observation that an abnormal strength of single impulses and inclinations, and therewith a disposition to special sins, is transferred by means of physical hereditation. These observations suggest the thought that we all share in some measure in such hereditary burden.

3. All these experiences specified above may be summed up in a kingdom of sin (cf. the concept κόσμος). This concept, which is more comprehensive than that of hereditary sin, makes the universality of sin affirmed in §68:3 understandable.

§70. *The Guilt of Sin and the Stages of Sin.*

1. On the basis of our previous exposition, the following concepts are to be discriminated. (a) Points of connection, constituting the ground of the possibility of sin, are the natural ἐπιθυμίαι belonging to the essence of man (v. §69:1, a). They are positive endowment to sin or inborn inclination to sin only so far as they appear in abnormal strength on account of the hereditary burden (v. §69:2, c). (b) *Sins themselves* are all tendencies of will, acts, and states arising from activity of the will, which *objectively considered* contradict (α) the will of God already known at the given stage, and therewith (β) the actualization of the divine destiny of humanity (v. §68:1). (c) Sin is *guilt* only in so far as sin is subjective contradiction on the part of the person against that will of God of which the person is *himself conscious,* a contradiction arising from full self-determination.

2. The relation between sin and guilt may be more accurately defined as follows: (a) In the case of every man there are such sins as are *not,* or at least *not entirely,* his own guilt, but are referable or traceable to the guilt of others. (b) As regards society at large it follows from this that all sin is somehow caused by its members. There is a fellowship of humanity in guilt, in which every one is enmeshed in sin through the guilt of others, but becomes also in turn guilty of the sin of others. This view is to be substituted for the impossible concept of hereditary guilt.

3. Within this sin- and guilt-fellowship there are the most diverse gradations of sin and guilt, both in the case of individuals and of groups of society. The highest degree of guilty sin is the conscious fundamental and definitive resistance of the revealed and known perfect will of God (blasphemy against the Holy Spirit). Where this perfect will of God is not yet entirely revealed and known (ἄγνοια), and where in consequence that definitive decision has not yet been made in this world

or in any other world, sin is still forgivable, however diverse the degree of guilt may be.

bb. Sin and Evil.

§71. *The Evil Embedded in Sin Itself.*

1. That sin constantly entails evil is the abiding teaching of ecclesiastical dogmatics. The connection between sin and evil is fixed in the concept of punishment, as we shall now proceed to show.

2. By evil in general, an injury to man in his personal life and its ends is understood. It follows from the propositions concerning the divine destiny of man that as a fact *sin itself carries with it the supreme evil.* For sin in its essence is separation from filial communion with God and exclusion from true eternal life. In the guilt-feeling as a state to be imputed to man, and as lowering his person, man becomes conscious of his separation from God and from the true goal of his own life. But this separation exists as supreme evil, even when the guilt-feeling is blurred — indeed in this case is all the more remediless (cf. §69: 1, b).

3. The concept of punishment is rightly applied to this separation from God. (a) There are systematic reasons for this. (α) The concept "punishment" is borrowed from the region of right, and signifies in this region a painful diminution of rights, which *causally* considered, is inflicted by civil authority upon the transgressor, and *teleologically* considered is designed to bring the damnatory judgment concerning the transgression to expression, and to protect the civil order itself. (β) Of course the divine destiny of man to the kingdom of God, and therein to divine sonship, does not found a legal relation (relation of right) between him and God, but the realization of that destiny or the enjoyment of filial right with God is dependent upon ordered *religio-ethical conditions.* Therefore even under the *causal* point of view the concept of punishment is applicable. The concept signifies a diminution or abrogation of the right of divine sonship, which ensues as result of transgression of those ordered conditions. (γ) Corresponding to the religio-ethical destiny of man the teleological

point of view is also applicable, only the *purpose* of punishment is not simply protection of the order of right, but *either* the leading of the transgressor himself to his divine destiny (i. e., pedagogic punishment), *or* the carrying through of the divine end (i. e. the kingdom of God) over against those who resist God's order (i. e. judicial punishment). (b) Also the view that the *separation from God* embedded in sin is not only supreme evil but also the peculiar punishment of sin, has historical right, the knowledge that this punishment does not lie in any sort of outer result of sin, but in remoteness or alienation from God himself, has its beginning in the Old Testament. It dominates the conception of the New Testament also (cf. the concept of "death" in the New Testament), and it was powerfully set forth by all the reformers. It is conserved in ecclesiastical dogmatics, but not consistently worked out there.

§72. *Sin and Outer Evil.*

1. The question arises whether *outer evil* (i. e. the hindrances which we meet in our endeavor after natural goods, after life, health, possession, honor) is to be viewed as punishment of sin.

2. The first thing to be observed as to this question is that the concept "evil," according to the general definition given in §71: 2, ever has a *subjective side.*[1] (a) Pain and suffering become evil for me only in the measure that they are an injury to my personal life and end (or purpose). (b) The degree in which the evils befalling man are felt by him as injurious evils depends upon his moral, still more upon his religious attitude. While suffering is *for the man who surrenders himself to the world,* who lives without God, a disturbance of the happiness of his life, a disturbance which seems to be due (α) to a malicious chance or fate, or (β) to the mysterious and melancholy lot of finitude, and while suffering is *for the man separated from God by the guilt-feeling* a judgment of God, it is *for the Christian reconciled with God* a dispensation of the fatherly love of God. (c) This diverse apprehension of suffering is not mere subjective illusion, but divine *order* as well. In particular it is divine punishment (α) that one fettered by earthly goods should experience suffering as most

grievous evil, and (β) that one estranged from God should experience suffering as *divine judgment.*

Note to §72:2

1. Is what we feel to be evil objectively evil and meant to be evil?

3. But it is another question as to whether apart from this subjective side the outer fortune of suffering on the part of the individual is to be considered as punishment of his sin. (a) If we inquire *on the one side* (cf. §71:3, a, α, β) as to a causal connection between the sin of the individual and the suffering that comes to him, it is a fact that such connection can be established in many cases, but it is also a fact that such connection cannot always be established. The degree of every suffering falling upon one depends in part upon entirely different circumstances. Indeed one brings down a special measure of suffering upon oneself through special fidelity in the service of God.[1] (b) *On the other hand* (cf. §71:3, a, α, γ) if we consider the divinely ordered purpose or end of suffering, suffering at all events can be (α) a penal judgment brand-marking and destroying sin; but it can also serve an entirely different purpose, especially (β) the beneficent education and purification of the sufferer, but also (γ) the revelation of the power of God and of Christ to gird us, as well as (δ) blessing to other men.[2]

Notes to §72:3

1. The supreme illustration of this is the death of Jesus. Note its historical inevitableness. Given Jesus and the tradition and spirit of his environment, and the cross was inevitable. It is an instance of the tragic law of the world-order itself. The bearer of the higher ideal falls a victim to the vulgar reality about him. Individual life here and there rises to a higher altitude of spiritual ideality and work. The collective life on a lower level rises up and surges against this higher life. It feels the condemnation involved in the presence of the higher, and resents it. Those who push out an inch beyond the multitude are likely to be crucified in one way or another. But by their fall they enrich the life which destroys them. This is a law of progress itself. (See F. W. Robertson's sermon on the text, "It is expedient that one man should die for the nation.") And the children of those who killed the prophets subsequently built the prophets' tombs.

2. See the article by Daab, entitled "Die Seele Jesu," in a recent number of *Das Suchen der Zeit.*

4. The decision of 3 above, concerning the suffering of the individual still leaves the question open as to whether the total collective suffering in the world has come into the world in consequence of human sin in general. (Query: Was the suffering antecedent to human sin, and to the existence of man even, anticipative consequence of sin?) (a) This *causal* connection (α) can be affirmed at least of a part of suffering, (β) but it may not be assumed as to the sufferings of man flowing from the natural order, that they subsequently came into this world on account of human sin. (b) Why, then, is the order of suffering in the world?[1] To this question the answer in a *teleological* sense may be given: on account of sin. That is, God has ordained and arranged for suffering in the world created by him as a finite world, because this world was to serve as the place for the education of a humanity that had fallen into sin.

Note to §72:4

1. This is not unlike the question asked by a child, "Why is there anything at all?"

§73. *The Doctrine of Satan.*

1. *The orthodox ecclesiastical dogmatics* found the ultimate cause of all sin and of all evil in Satan.[1] In the doctrine of Satan, which forms a part of angelology (cf. §60:1), it sought to collect the Scriptural disclosures concerning the essence, biography and work of Satan and of wicked angels. But in this matter the relation between the work of Satan and the sending of evil by God, remained in uncertainty, fluctuation, ambiguity and suspense, in the ecclesiastical dogmatics. The limits of Scriptural declaration, moreover, were transcended. Dependent upon Holy Writ, it was yet wise above what was written. The historical conditions, also, of the Satan-idea in the Scriptures were not taken into account.

Note to §73:1

1. This is the way orthodoxy gets its optimism.

2. In the Old Testament the idea of Satan and demons as well as that of angels (cf. §60:2) was gradually developed from different starting-points indeed, and also under alien in-

fluence in part, and was erected to an inalienable constituent of the picture of the world of that time. As such, it was taken over into the New Testament, even by Jesus himself.[1] It must serve only this end, however, viz. (a) to express the great opposition between the kingdom of God and the fearful kingdom of sin and of the evil connected with sin; (b) to strengthen faith in the overcoming of God-opposed spiritual powers through Jesus Christ, and (c) to spur the believers in Jesus Christ on to earnest conflict and indefatigable watchfulness.

Note to §73:2

1. It does not follow, because a personality shared a world-view now antiquated, that that personality is not incomparably nobler than ours may be with a more accurate view of the world. (See the chapter on "The Kingdom of God" in Renan's *Life of Jesus*.)

3. Dogmatically evaluated (cf. §60:3), this *practical religious content* of 2 above, embodied in the Satan-idea, seems to be something which should and can be directly certain to us, and experienced by us through faith in Jesus Christ. But this is not equally true of the idea or form of a personal Satan and his demons. That idea is (a) partly the pictorial expression for the grim fact of human sin and human evil, (b) partly an explanation of what is believed beyond the region of the direct knowledge which accrues to faith. But this explanation is no longer convincing to us, for on the standpoint of our scientifically changed picture of the world, scruples arise against the assumption of a real encroachment of Satan and of demonic powers into our life. In addition their relation on the one hand to the inframundane bearers and forces of moral evil, on the other hand to God's dominion and rule, remains ever unexplained and unclear. Thus it is advisable to employ (cf. §69:3) the Satan-idea *only* in the sense of a pictorial comprehensive expression for the kingdom of sin with its mysterious dominion. It is important to add, however, that whoever follows this suggestion must be all the more watchful that to him nothing of the *full seriousness* of the Biblical apprehension of sin shall be lost.[1]

Note to §73:3

1. In giving up old concepts there is danger of giving up their vital

content. It seems that the modern man must give up the Satan-concept, but not the Satan-content. Can one similarly give up the Biblical-ecclesiastical God-idea and save the God-content?

γ. God's Relation to Sinful Humanity.

aa. God's Dominion, or Rule, in Relation to Human Sin.

§74. *God's Decree, or Purpose, and Human Sin.*

1. The last sections, with their use of the concept "punishment," already passed over to the view which accrues to faith, as to *God's relation to human sin.* Still, faith in God's providential dominion (v. §§57 to 59) must be related to the facts of sin more comprehensively. The universal question is this, viz., How far is sin to be included in God's decree, or purpose?

2. The reformers in connection with predestination thoughts (a) referred sin partly to God's arrangement directly, but yet (b) affirmed the guilt of man at the same time. The reformed or Calvinistic dogmatics emphasized the former, i. e. (a) above. The Lutheran or Arminian dogmatics emphasized the latter, i. e. (b) above, and sought to avoid not only the idea of sin as a metaphysical necessity, but also the idea of any authorship of sin on the part of God.

3. In the system of Christian dogmatics two apparently contradictory propositions are to be introduced. (a) Since we through faith in Jesus Christ are inwardly persuaded of our *guilt* before God, it is implied already in this fact that we must stop at the decision of our own will as ground of our contradiction to God, that sin, therefore, *cannot be derived from the will of God.* (b) But since we, through faith in Jesus Christ, become certain of the creative activity and providence of God, we must affirm at the same time that sin, resisting the will of God, is not simply excluded from his decree, or purpose. God founded the possibility of sin in his creative order. He also founded there equally structurally the possibility of overcoming sin.[1] Sin is, however, all the time subject to his providential rule.

Note to §74:3

1. The moral, the good, the remedial is as original structural and initial as the opposite. There is original *grace.*

4. The question now is as to how these two theses (a and b above) are to be combined and harmonized. (a) Of course it is impossible for us to make intelligible *through causal explanation* on the basis of the relation of God to finite spirits, at once their contradiction to God and their dependence upon God. (b) Yet by way of an ever imperfect *teleological theodicy* we may understand so much at least, viz. (α) that the *possibility* of a sinful decision, a decision against God, is necessary presupposition of the kingdom of God as a kingdom of free moral persons; (β) that the *development* of sin, once begun, is the condition of its being really, inwardly overcome; (γ) that, in addition, in a series of special cases, human sin must directly serve the execution of the divine will.

§75. *God's Judicial and Pedagogic Guidance and the Goal of His Ethical World-Order.*

1. According to the previous section the development of sin is no unrestricted development. But as Christians we are certain of a dominion, or rule, of God, mighty and abounding over sin, of a *dominion limiting and judging sin.* We know this from the fact (a) that the guilt-feeling is given in and with sin, (b) that the order of suffering in the world operates against the unbridled dominion of ἐπιθυμίαι; (c) that within human society the works of sin contain the germ of the dissolution of sin; and (d) that finally the power of moral evil is often broken by outer judgments.

2. With this judging and limiting power a *pedagogic,* therefore a *positive,* counteraction on the part of God is interwoven. Already in his judgment upon sin, God is at the same time active in order to the education of the sinner; but God's positive, pedagogic work is directly disclosed in the establishment of the religio-ethical endowment of man and humanity (v. §66:2), as well as in the dominion of God in history, bringing that endowment to its unfolding. This dominion of God is specially manifest (a) in outstanding historical occurrences, and (b) in prophetic personalities through which a gradual uplift to religious and moral knowledge takes place; and in special measure this is to be recognized on the soil of the Old Testament, in the redeeming guidance of Israel, and in prophecy

and in law. All this points yet again to the supreme positive counteraction of God against human sin, i. e. to the redemption that is in Jesus Christ.

3. Therefore the supreme points of view for the understanding of God's historical order of the world are not juridical, but *ethical.* It is not an order of right, i. e. a legal order, for this would be guided by the ultimate principle of retribution. It is an order of education, i. e. a pedagogic order in which inner and outer punishment serves either the emancipation of the individual from sin, or also the consummation of the kingdom of God as a whole (cf. §71:3, a, γ and §72:3, b).

bb. God's Attributes in Relation to Human Sin.

§76. *In General.*

1. God's relation within his ethical world-order (according to §61:3), no less than God's relation to the finite world, is to be apprehended in a series of *attributive concepts.* To be sure all the attributes of God specified in §§62 to 64 appear in force in his ethical world-order, and seem here, as it were, only potentiated through their relation to human sin. Add now to these the attributive concepts which move *only* in this relation. But they too are mere unfoldings of the unitary divine essence of God as holy love, exalted above the world and ruling over the world.

2. The anthropopathic character which cleaves and must cleave to these attributive concepts in special measure is to be evaluated according to the principles enunciated in §49:4 and §50:3.

3. The division of attributes of this group can repose on the distinction set forth in §75.

§77. *The Attributes of God as Judging Sin.*

1. A *first series* of attributes of God follows from God's holy love which excludes all sinful reality from its fellowship. This side of holiness (cf. §48:4, a) may be best brought to expression in the concept of the earnestness of God. A more frequent designation for this is the concept "*jealousy*" or "zeal" of God, which in the Old Testament expresses the

energy of the disposition and of the conduct of God against his foes and for his chosen people; in the New Testament sense, however, the energy of the will and work of God, which is directed to the sanctification of the community and its members and the removal of all unholiness from them.

2. Closely akin to this concept is the other concept of the *wrath of God,* which expresses less a permanent attribute of God than a mode of relation under definite circumstances. While in the Old Testament the concept "wrath of God" is never entirely freed from the characteristic of vindictiveness and precipitate rashness, and thus while an unmediated opposition exists between wrath and grace, we yet have to designate the wrath of God corresponding to the whole tendency of New Testament views as the judicial reaction of the unitary holy love of God, ever consistent with itself against human sin. It cannot reach its culmination, however, prior to the close of temporal development. Still even now it discloses itself as an operative power within human history.

§78. *The Attributes of God as Redeeming Sinners.*

1. A *second series* of the attributes of God results from this, viz. that God's love as holy rebounds against sin indeed, but confronts the sinner, not yet definitive in his choice of sin, as a redeeming and pedagogic love. This faith is expressed in the designations of God as *longsuffering and patient,* as *merciful and gracious.* (a) The first two concepts (longsuffering and patience), in direct relation to God's judging activity, express the faith that the God revealed in Jesus Christ (α) gives sinful humanity time and opportunity to repent, and (β) allows sin fully to ripen in sinful humanity, before he pronounces his definitive judgment. (b) The last two concepts (mercy and grace), in direct relation to God's redeeming activity, express faith in a God who not only delays, but who turns in seeking love himself to sinners (v. Luke 15). (α) *Mercy* of God is interpreted in the Old Testament in part as compassion with man's weakness and mortality; according to New Testament views it is founded upon the ethical need of man and directed to man's eternal redemptive goal. (β) The concept *grace* is the specific expression for God's love so

far as it redeems the sinner without his merit.[1] But in the New Testament the concept designates less an attribute of God than God's active relation to sinners and God's gift to them, especially of the forgiveness of sin and the sanctifying power flowing from that gift.

Note to §78:1

1. This is an expression of the supreme morality of God.

2. The concept *faithfulness* of God especially emphasizes in God's holy love the thought that that love, when once in operation, persists in its redemptive purpose both as regards the individual and humanity, in spite of human sin and human unfaithfulness. This perseverance of God in his revealed counsel comes to be of necessity judicial exclusion with reference to those who definitively persist in opposing it (v. II Timothy 2:12, 13).

§79. *The Combination of the Two Series of Attributes as regards Human Sin.*

1. Even more than the concept of faithfulness of God, that of divine *righteousness* is a connecting link between the two series of attributes treated in §§77 and 78. (a) Already in the later period of the *Old Testament* the righteousness of God is recognized above all in this, viz. that in judicial act, it destroys the foes of his chosen people and therewith pronounces his justifying judgments upon the latter themselves. And in the *New Testament* in the idea of God's righteousness the thought is prominent that it announces itself in the justification of the believing sinner (v. Romans 3:23). (b) Accordingly it is best for *dogmatics* not to limit the concept "righteousness" to *primitive* righteousness, but to conceive it in such a way that God's forgiveness toward the believer, as well as his judgment upon the obdurate, may be derived therefrom. This is possible, best, if in adhesion to the widest concept of the New Testament itself, the attribute of God be understood as righteousness by means of which he founds and maintains the whole ethical order of the world.

2. But it is not only in a *single concept* that the bond between the two series of attributes is to be seen. The apparent ten-

sion between the two series is resolved by the knowledge that the single attributes are never to be isolated, but are to be understood as moments of the one holy love of God (v. §48:4), which is active in a unitary world-order for the actualization of its supreme supramundane end (v. §75:3). This activity of the one holy love of God in all its moments must be set forth in the doctrine of redemption through Jesus Christ, known in dogmatics as the doctrine of the person and the work of Christ. To that subject we next turn.

B. GOD AND JESUS CHRIST THE LORD.

(THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST, OR CHRISTOLOGY AND THE DOCTRINES OF GRACE.[1])

a. The Problem of Dogmatic Christology and the Way to its Solution.

α. The Problem, Especially in Relation to the Biblical Material.

§80. *What the Biblical Material is, and its Worth for Our Task.*

1. In the development of all the previous propositions of faith, Jesus Christ was the *ground* of the knowledge which accrues to faith, and the key to the world of faith.[1] But since he is also *object* of the knowledge that accrues to faith and himself an essential member of the world of faith, Christian dogmatics has for its task to determine the place of Jesus Christ in this reality of faith.[2]

Note to B.

1. As representing different approaches to the Christological problem the following works may be consulted: Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology* and Strong's *Systematic Theology;* John Caird's *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity;* Edward Caird's *Evolution of Religion;* Pfleiderer's *Glaubenslehre, Philosophy of Religion,* and *Philosophy and Development of Religion,* J. Watson's *Christianity and Idealism;* Hyde's *Social Theology;* Troeltsch's *History of Protestant Theology;* the theological works of Dorner and Martensen, and W. N. Clarke's *Outlines of Christian Theology;* Kaftan's *Dogmatik;* Schultz's *Evangelische Glaubenslehre;* Krüger's *Die Christliche Dogma der Dreieinig-*

keit, etc., and recent books and articles by Wrede, Baumgartner, Bousset, Hollman, Wobbermin, Jülicher, Teichmüller, et al.

Notes to §80:1

1. How does the Christian think of God? What is the Christian relation to God? It is determined by the personality of Jesus. God is the sort of being for whom Jesus could conscientiously be prophet. Jesus is the ground and source, the guarantee and determinant of the Christian view of God.

2. Is Jesus Christ indispensable to the Christian faith, or is he of only incidental importance in the world of faith? Is he like a schoolmaster, leading us to God, and then abdicating? Or does he belong centrally, inalienably and abidingly to Christian faith?

Has not Jesus become a troublesome factor in Christian thought? Take the miracle-stories, for example.

2. The ultimate basis of the solution of this task is to be found in one group of the Biblical material, viz. the narratives concerning Jesus Christ. That group consists of two parts: (a) It sketches a portrait of the character of Jesus (Charakterbild). (b) It reflects the self-witness of Jesus in the unity of his teaching and of his work. The material which furnishes the ultimate basis for the solution of our problems is to be found in these two things.

3. The harmonious *content* of the picture of his character and of the self-witness of Jesus is illustration and elucidation on the one hand of the full humanity and on the other hand of the divine Messianic dignity of Jesus. But the latter receives its profound interpretation in this, viz. that it rests on Jesus' own personal filial relation to God, and finds its essential content in his Savior-service to men.[1]

Note to §80:3

1. Did Jesus think he was the Messiah? The primitive church thought he was anyway, and their writings seem to make clear that he thought he was. But in the New Testament it is hard to distinguish between the faith and conviction of the primitive community on the one hand, and Jesus' own opinion on the other. There all is sketched from the standpoint of faith, not from the standpoint of critical historical fidelity. The witness concerning Jesus was primarily a confession of faith for evangelizing purposes, rather than a recording of history for after times. The primitive Christians did not suppose there would be any "after times." As a result it is so hard to distinguish the original words of Jesus from what is due to the enthus-

iasm of faith, that we must say with Weinel that it is our scientific duty to confess that we cannot answer with certainty the question as to whether Jesus did or did not hold that he was the Messiah. (However, the effort to become certain has value, even if it lands us in uncertainty.)

At first the Messianic hope had been for an earthly and historical hero of God, who should overthrow the world-powers, and reign as king. Later, the Messiah was thought of as supernatural and the coming of the kingdom as apocalyptic. Then it was asserted that the Messiah could come only if the people were pure, and the idea appealed to John the Baptist, and apparently to Jesus also. At all events, there were various modifications of the Messianic idea, and the question is whether there may not have been one to which Jesus could turn as an appropriate self-designation. Or may he not have said that he was a Messiah in a new sense? Although we can not become certain, the preponderant evidence seems to be in favor of the proposition that he did say he was the Messiah. To be sure, it must be remembered in connection with the recorded self-witness of Jesus at his trial, that apparently no disciple was present. And yet the explanation of the trial seems to be that Jesus was regarded as a false Messiah. And so the bearer of the higher ideal fell a victim to the vulgar reality about him. In the name of God the Son of God was nailed to the cross. Jesus was evidently not the Messiah the people wanted.

But why did Jesus put his new wine into the old bottles of Messianic expectation? On the one hand it must be remembered that although Jesus is the home of the eternal and the real, he could not be a child of man without being a child of his time. What is represented as his idea of the kingdom of God, coming from heaven suddenly, through God's power, is not in all respects identical with the modern conception, as represented by Kant and Ritschl, for instance. (Every faith is unique. A man cannot confess another's faith sincerely. Let us confess our own confession, with courage like that which Jesus showed. Let us be inwardly like him, even where we must be outwardly unlike him.) But on the other hand, in adopting the Messianic concept, Jesus regenerated and humanized it. He dignified the Messianic title; it was not the taking of the title that led to his dignity. His filial consciousness was the root of his Messianic consciousness, and not *vice versa*. It is Jesus himself, not the Messianic idea, that is the Gospel. Our thought as to the Messiahship of Jesus does not need to affect our certainty as to his disposition and love. It was not the Messianic in Jesus, but the human that was divine. And, finding the divine in the moral and human, we may safely keep the human Jesus, even if we must let the Messianic element go.

It is not denied that the Messianic drama has been a most potent factor in the history of religion. Its picture of a pre-existent heavenly Being, becoming incarnate, dying, rising again, being exalted,

and coming again to judge the living and the dead, formed the kernel of Paulinism, and was made the fundament of western ecclesiastical orthodoxy. It has been the channel through which millions of hearts have been given the best they have. And yet, whoever cannot put his faith in it, to him it is myth. Henceforth Paul must decrease and Jesus increase. At last the age of Jesus has come. (Is Arthur Bonus right when he says that religion cannot get on without myth, and that the need of the hour is a new one, suited to our modern world-view? After all, is error the right word to use of ideas in which one necessarily participates because he is a child of his time? There is hardly an idea which does not in time become antiquated, but must we call our thought erroneous on that account? Ontologically Santa Claus is unreal, but morally Santa Claus is as real as anything in the world.) Must dogmatics content itself with a faithful reproduction of the Biblical estimate of Jesus? Is the theological theory in the gospel narratives as binding as the moral and religious values discoverable there? There are decisive reasons against an affirmative reply to these questions. The intellectual conceptions of the New Testament writers were necessarily conditioned by the stage of culture of the time. Their Christological theory was determined by their world-view in general; they embodied their judgments in concepts of the time. And if that antique world-view was essentially transitory, then to eternalize the old Christological theory would be to confound what belongs to an age with what is eternal. Indeed there is a danger of injuring faith when what is of theoretical cognition is imported into it. There are times when we can only keep the faith by discarding the theory, and it must not be assumed that the New Testament theory is necessarily to remain eternally in theology. Assuming the new view of the world, the need of the hour is for the reconstructing of the Christological value-judgment on the basis of this new world-view, and this in such a way that it will serve the present situation as the Athanasian Christology served in its day. If the ancient Christians had a right to Messianize or Logosize the figure of Jesus, why have we not the right to do a similar thing to-day? The question is, What revaluation of Jesus is necessary to make him serviceable in the life of the modern man?

§81. *The Problem in Relation to the Biblical Witness of Faith in Jesus Christ.*

1. Dogmatic Christology is directly related to another group of Biblical material, viz. the witness of faith of the primitive community concerning Jesus, and this witness is contained in the New Testament. Three things are common to this witness: (a) The *main content* — and this is fixed in two formulas, viz. (1) "Jesus is the Christ," and (2) "the Lord

Jesus"; (b) The *basis* of the Messianic witness of these first witnesses rests upon (α) their certainty of the resurrection of Jesus and of his exaltation to heavenly glory; (β) their present experience of the fruits of the Spirit, issuing from him; (γ) the conviction that Old Testament predictions were fulfilled in him; and (δ) the knowledge of his earthly life and work.[1] (c) The *character* of this New Testament witness to Christ is (α) not dogmatic doctrine, but enthusiastic discourse. (β) Therefore this witness is given in a figurative and picturesque expression rather than in theoretical and philosophical conceptions and formulae. In particular (γ) Old Testament designations and types came to play a leading rôle, e. g. in the Epistle to the Hebrews. (δ) There are only approaches toward a real theological process of proof and conceptual formation.[2]

Notes to §81:1

1. Which has been more dynamic in the history of the church, the life of Jesus or the Messianic idea? Undoubtedly, the latter. We have had seventeen hundred years of Christianity without accurate knowledge of the historic Jesus. Is such knowledge necessary to-day?

Orthodoxy asks us to identify indissolubly the (largely mythological) Messianic idea with the essence of the Christian religion, and to keep both or give up both. But since the modern critical mind cannot make sure of that idea, it seeks to disengage the kernel from the shell, and to substitute the modern ideas of immanence and evolution for Messianism.

God is naturally the object of religious faith. But Jesus has become the object of religious faith also. This is the distinguishing mark of the Christian religion. How Jesus came to be the object of religious faith is a question of genetic-historical science. Whether he ought still to be an object of religious faith, and if so, in what sense — these are questions for the Christological part of dogmatics. But in answering these questions, we must seek to employ the results of the genetic-historical study. Who Jesus was, and what he thought of himself, are the two most important historical questions for dogmatic theology.

2. "The Door," "the Vine," "the Shepherd," "the Physician," "the Corner-Stone, "the Foundation," "the First Fruits," "the Morning Star," "the Bread of Life," "the Water of Life"— these are some of the pictures and symbols which faith uses in seeking to set forth its reality. A later theology has erected some of these symbols into theoretical formulae, e. g. "the Ransom."

Even Paul was not primarily concerned, even in the Epistle to the

Romans, with giving an organized system of theology. His aim was practical, missionary, evangelizing and edifying. Primitive Christianity is *almost* pre-theological.

2. Precisely this character of the common witness of faith in Jesus Christ leaves room for diverse individual formations of thought concerning Jesus. Thus in connection with the diverse apprehension of the redemption wrought by Jesus Christ, along with the Messianic witness of the primitive community, there is the special witness of Paul, of the Epistle to the Hebrews and of the Johannine writings.

3. Dogmatic Christology may not be content simply to give an arrangement as unitary as possible of this New Testament witness concerning Jesus Christ. Its task is independently to establish and systematically to develop what can and ought to be certain *to us* through personal trust in Jesus Christ, and to do this in the conceptual forms most intelligible to the present.[1]

Note to §81:3

1. What Jesus was and what Jesus willed; how Jesus viewed God, the world and man; how he answered the questions, What is the main thing in the mind of God? What is religion? — all this is clear. What does Jesus hope, believe, love? What did the name of God signify to him? What was his standard of the worth of man? Here we can be sure, and the answers come from the depth of the heart, not from the logic of the understanding. In the words of Jesus the main thing was confidence in God, purity of heart, mercifulness, humility, placability, yearning.

It was faith in Jesus which founded the Church. But what was secondary for the primitive church is primary for us. Jesus helps us to understand the world, ourselves and God. But when men gave to him the adhesion of their wills and of feeling, their intellects were stirred. Who was Jesus? they asked, and in answer to this question the creeds were formulated.

β. The Direction of the Principal Attempts at the Solution of the Christological Problem.

§82. *The Ecclesiastical Two-Nature Doctrine and its Persistence into the Present.*

1. One attempt to win a unitary conceptual construction of Christology on the basis of the Biblical material is to be found

in the orthodox ecclesiastical Christology. Christology was divided into three parts: (1) the doctrine of the nature of Christ; (2) the doctrine of the work of Christ; (3) the doctrine of the offices of Christ. Now as to (1), the doctrine of the *persona Christi* developed one proposition only, viz. very God and very man in one inseparable person. That one proposition treats, therefore, (a) *de duabus in Christo naturis;* (b) *de una Christi persona.* In treating the one person of Christ the following was developed: *Unitio et unio personalis; communio naturarum; communicatio idiomatum.*[1] Now as to (3), the doctrine of the states of Christ (*de statibus Christi*), the attempt is made to harmonize dogmatic Christology with the evangelical picture of the life of Jesus by means of the following distinctions: (a) *status exinanitionis* (κένωσις); (b) *status exaltationis* (ὕψωσις).[2]

Notes to §82:1

1. According to the doctrine of *communicatio idiomatum,* the peculiarity of the divine nature was communicated to the human, so that the human became omnipotent, omniscient, etc., and the peculiarity of the human was communicated to the divine, so that the divine could suffer, and atone for human sin. The orthodox theologians, required by their doctrine of Scripture to find this doctrine of *communicatio idiomatum* in the Scriptures, turn the saying, "Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is, God," into an argument for the full deity of the human, historical Jesus.

2. According to orthodoxy, the Son of God laid aside his divine glory and then took it up again; he alienated from himself certain divine qualities, and then integrated them again. What is meant is at bottom good, viz. that the great and merciful God serves us, and is not too good for our daily human food. Perhaps the form of the orthodox doctrine was necessary when the doctrine was excogitated, but that terrible being, the modern man, cannot do anything with it!

2. Ecclesiastical Christology has sought to preserve in its logical schematism the two essential convictions of faith: (a) that the character and work of God himself are known through Jesus; [1] (b) that through the worth of his sufferings and death, Jesus is able to reconcile man to God. Ecclesiastical Christology is the result of long work of the Church on the problem, How to make intelligible the divine efficiency of the man, Jesus, and to assure the right of faith in him. This question

is under discussion anew to-day, and two queries are raised, (α) What is the relation of the sufferings of Jesus to his whole life, and what is there in his sufferings that can effect the reconciliation of others to God? The other query is, (β) In what sense, if at all, is Jesus an object to which Christian faith is directed?

Note to §82:2

1. God is as good as Jesus is. This is the affirmation of Christian faith. But for the modern man with his monism, the question of apologetics is this: Is not God a terrible God, the God of the struggle for existence? Is he not more like Nero, or Herod, or Caiaphas, than like Jesus? What right have we to take Jesus as the analogy? Does not Herod belong to God as truly as Jesus?

You cannot have the object of religious faith and the object of prayer different. I pray to such a God as Jesus could be prophet and revealer of. The inscrutable God we do not know or love or trust. The God for us is the one that can be known from the person of Jesus Christ.

Is it fair to judge a musician by his best music, or by his worst? A personality by his best work, or by failures? Is it fair to judge the race by its best civilization, or by its worst? In the long stretch of time and space, is the trend upward, or otherwise?

We may judge reality by the best output of its expression. If Jesus is an alien importation into the race, then we cannot take Jesus as a piece of the whole, and judge by him. But if Jesus came up within the race, we can. Religion lives and thrives on the paradoxical situation which requires faith to be a venturing, a daring. It lives upon the tension and stress of human experience.

3. But with respect to the attempts of ecclesiastical Christology, criticism of the doctrinal form is required. (a) The criticism from the standpoint of the history of dogma. This treatment shows three things: (α) that the peculiar apprehension of salvation as a deification of human nature in the old Greek Church was regulative in the formation of the two-nature doctrine; (β) that the Western or Latin Church combined with this doctrine thus formed another interest, especially since Augustine — the interest, namely, in making intelligible the worth of the work of Christ upon God (according to the Greek Church the work of Christ was upon man; according to the Latin Church the work of Christ was upon God);[1] (γ) that the Reformation preserved the traditional

formula, but reinterpreted it in many ways in the sense of the new understanding of salvation.[2] (b) This leads to the systematic criticism: (α) that the form of doctrine does not agree with the new Reformation conception of salvation; (β) that it does not attain to a view of the person of Jesus that is true to life and to history;[3] (γ) that it transcends the limits of the evangelical conception of faith.[4] With this systematic criticism is interwoven (c) the Biblical-theological criticism, which shows (α) that the ecclesiastical-doctrinal form does violence to the Biblical portrait of the character of Jesus and to his self-witness; (β) that it lags behind and falls below the living wealth of the Biblical witness of faith on the part of the primitive community.

Notes to §82:3

1. For the old Greek church, the difficulty was primarily mortality, frailty, finitude, out of which man was to be saved into the infinite and immortal life of God. For the Latin Church, the difficulty was moral obliquity rather than psychological finitude. The work of Christ was to remove an obstacle in God, that God might be able to operate redemptively on man. But as against this, we must set the true Christian view, that Jesus did not die to make it possible for God to love man, but because God did love man.

2. The Reformers kept the two-nature doctrine, but continued that process of its moralization which had begun in the Latin Church. There has been a progressive ethicization of the Christological doctrine, and gradually the atonement-doctrine has been ethicized as well. The ontological alienation of man from God stressed by the Greek Church, gave way to the thought of a moral estrangement, the overcoming of which has come to be thought of as having God as its agent.

It would be strange, indeed, if God should require us to love our enemies, while he himself did not love his own enemies. The Latin doctrine was still sub-Christian and sub-moral, pre-Christian and pre-moral. It belongs to the very nature of love to be free, spontaneous, autonomous, and even to love one's enemies.

3. See an article by G. B. Foster, entitled "Jesus' Doctrine of God," *Biblical World,* May, 1898.

The ecclesiastical Christ was not a human being, not even man in general. The human all through suffered abridgment and elimination, except in formal and nominal matters.

4. The faith which saves is trust in the God of whom Jesus was prophet and revealer.

4. It is for these reasons that ecclesiastical Christology, though retained still in the Church, is yet retained in an attenuated form.[1] Effort has been made to do justice to the truth of the human nature and development of Jesus. This has led in the case of those theologians who defend the basis of the two-nature doctrine to manifold deductions from that doctrine; and those ecclesiastical theologians who maintain the kenosis of the divine Logos set themselves in contradiction to the fundamental thoughts of the ecclesiastical doctrine, and the religious content of ecclesiastical Christology is at bottom injured by these modernizations, and the unitariness of the doctrine is thereby destroyed.[2]

Notes to §82:4

1. The "orthodox" have departed from orthodoxy in a surprising degree. Only when liberalism is consciously held under the mask of orthodoxy is it immoral.

2. Topics for investigation: (1) Given Jesus of Nazareth as a real human being, what are the stages and conditions of the process in and through which the human was eliminated and he metamorphosed into an ontological entity in the third and fourth centuries? (2) What are the stages and conditions of that process through which transition has been made progressively from the Christological entity to the real Jesus whom Biblical science wishes to see?

§83. *The Rationalistic Christology and Its Persistence into the Present.*

1. A rationalistic criticism, especially in Socinianism, was executed upon ecclesiastical doctrine. This criticism sought to cut the knot of the problem which busied the Church in its religious significance, as follows: it treated the person of Jesus not as real and original object of faith, but attributed to him a religious importance only indirectly. But this rationalism grew up prior to the new philosophical development and world-view, and it fell into self-contradiction.[1]

Note to §83:1

1. What is the function in Christology of the original *character-sketch* of Jesus, of the *self-witness* of Jesus, and of the *primitive Christian witness?*

When the Christian religion was disengaged from its material Jew-

ish soil and struck root in the Græco-Roman soil, speculative philosophers, some of them agnostic, turned eagerly to this new religion. This ended in the Christian religion being moulded in the Greek philosophical categories. Then, on this Græco-Christian foundation, the ecclesiastical dogmas were formulated. What interest had the ecclesiastical theologians in the historic Jesus?

There are three different ways of considering Jesus, viz. historico-critically, ethically, and religiously. The ecclesiastical dogmatics was concerned solely with the religious question (What is Jesus worth for us and what conclusions can be drawn therefrom as to his relation to God and to us?), and the answers were given solely by philosophical speculation, with the use of the Greek philosophical categories. There was little concern as to the empirical, concrete man of Galilee. To-day we have returned to the historico-critical question; we are interested in rediscovering the man of Galilee. What shall we do next? Shall we proceed to an ethical evaluation, and thence to the religious consideration? Shall we be able to set forth the religious value of the man of Galilee in symbols as satisfactory to the theoretical consciousness of to-day as the older Christology was in its day?

Will Jesus continue to be a necessary function in religion, or will he be accidental and incidental? Shall we use his gifts and forget the giver, as we use knives and forks, or the institution of family life, and forget their inventors? Shall we have an attitude to God which was originated by Jesus, and yet Jesus cease to function necessarily in our relation with God? What is modern Christianity going to do with the historic Jesus, when it rediscovers him?

We cannot, as religious thinkers, waste all our time in purely historical questions. Either the Jesus of history will again be accorded a religious value, or he will be relegated to the historical realm and the soul will go directly to God on the basis of its own intuitions and needs, and hopes and fears.

2. For rationalistic theology the object of faith was at bottom the religion of reason preached by Jesus — a religion whose absolute truth was self-evidencing. Thus Jesus was only the "introductor" (Socinus) of this truth. So far he was indeed prophet of God and hero of humanity. Jesus is to-day still important as teacher and model, but a faith in Christ does not belong to the content of Christianity.[1]

Note to §83 : 2

1. Much should be made of the point of the imitability of Jesus. The imitability of the atonement rightly takes the place of its unique grandeur. But the copy-theory of morality, like the copy-theory of knowledge, must be discarded in favor of the view which regards the mind as creative both in knowing and in willing.

3. But for Kant also and for the speculative German philosophy it was the moral or the metaphysical as against either the merely ecclesiastical or the merely historical that was the sole saving power. But the rationalistic thoughts were deepened in the case of Kant, through the distinction between the soul-saving Christ-ideal and the historical Jesus, and in the case of the speculative philosophy through the distinction between the idea of divine humanity and the single person in whom that idea had actualized itself most perfectly.[1]

Note to §83:3

1. By Kant and the rationalists the transition was made from the Christological substance, the ecclesiastical entity of two natures in one person, the second of the three eternal persons, to an *ideal Christ*. Here it is not the empirical but the ideal Christ that saves. Is the ideal Christ the real Jesus of history? Kant would not have affirmed it. Intimations have come from the Jesus of history, but the ideal Christ is a construction of the religious consciousness itself.

In the speculative philosophy the idea of the divine humanity takes the place of the ideal Christ of Kant. That idea is regarded as having had its best actualization in Jesus. But, as Strauss put it, it is not the nature of the Absolute Idea to pour all of its fulness into a single historic exemplar. The idea is embodied, rather, in the whole of humanity. Where the Church said God is in one historic person, modern liberalism says God is in all.

4. In modern liberal theology the Christian principle as a rule takes the place of the Christ-idea. By Christian principle is meant the new spiritual and living power which entered humanity with Christianity. To the consistent advocates of this position the lofty declarations of the church-doctrine are valid originally and peculiarly only for this Christian principle, and not for the person of Christ. The person of Christ is only the vehicle, historically original and most important still, of the operation of that Christian principle.[1]

Note to §83:4

1. What shall we think of and do with Jesus, when religion is viewed from the functional standpoint?

Religion is not a dogma, nor a cult, nor an institution. It is a necessary and universal function of the life of the human spirit. Just what is that function. According to the functional psychologists, consciousness is a device by means of which the reactions of the organism to its environment are facilitated. Similarly, religion may be

described as a device by means of which the power of an organism in reaction with its environment is made equal to its needs and purpose by means of an alliance of the organism with higher powers. It is the human effort, in the presence of what looks like the uncontrollable fate of the world in which we live, to make our power equal to our purpose and our needs, as we strive onward toward our self-effectuation. A reality is sought, in alliance with which we can accomplish this self-effectuation.

Now is Jesus (1) a means by which we may have best insight into that "higher power," or is he (2) that higher power himself, or is he (3) simply a typical illustration — albeit our best illustration — of the religious function? If the Christological dogma does not function now as it once did, will the historic Jesus function, or shall I myself perform the function, Jesus being mere example, Pathfinder, in the effort of the human spirit to relate itself to the divine so that the human life shall attain the end of its being?

As the man of science seeks to pass from popular opinion to scientific conviction, so we must seek to pass out of the upheaving, tumultuous background of human wonder and query and anxiety and unsettlement into something more certain and thorough in our thought as to the function of Jesus in the life of religion.

5. How is this opposition between principle and person to be evaluated? In abstract scientific work there is no objection to our distinguishing the gospel brought by Jesus Christ, or the spiritual life and blessedness proceeding from that life, from the historical person, Jesus. And further, there is no objection to our raising the question as to the relation between principle and person. But the answer to our question consistent with historical Christianity must run as follows: It is only in Jesus' person itself that that spiritual life and redemptive good is ideally real and operative in creative power, and so the primary object of faith must still remain the person of Jesus. But the person of Jesus only because in and through him we have the fullest expression which we know of the character and purpose of God, so that in the last analysis one passes through Jesus to God as the sole object and portion of the Christian religious faith. It is precisely here that the strength of Christianity lies, for the ultimate as well as the richest reality of which we know is after all personal. We see in this conception, therefore, the right of the content of ecclesiastical Christology, over against the rationalistic Christology, much as it is true that the form of the ecclesiastical

Christology is untenable to the bearers of the modern view of the world.[1]

Note to §83:5

1. It may very well turn out that the enrichment of the concept "principle" that shall be adequate to make it an explanation of empirical personal reality may, so to speak, issue in the personalizing of the principle, and that the making of the person the home of permanent and eternal values, by virtue of which the personal comes to be indeed ideally personal, may issue in the widening of the personal into something of the character of the principle as well. Thus the old antinomy of principle and person may be seen to be capable of being transcended. This is the problem of thought. It is a part of that larger problem of the relation between the eternal and the historical in general, a larger problem in which the eternal is not historyless and history is not empty. Here it will be seen that eternity is but the persistence of our values in the midst of the process and mutation of the historical.

§84. *The Schleiermacher-Christology and its Further Development in the Present.*

1. In the midst of rationalism Schleiermacher had a profounder insight into the self-dependent essence of piety, into the historical basis of religion and especially of Christianity, and into the importance of fellowship in the Christian life, and hence the importance of the Christian Church for the Christian life.[1] (a) According to Schleiermacher the center of Christian piety (*Frömmigkeit*) is the consciousness of the redeeming power of Jesus Christ, whose portrait (*Bild*) the Christian community mediates to us. (b) His view of this matter conditioned his conception of the task and method of dogmatic Christology. Dogmatic theology, he thought, has to develop the declarations of the Christian consciousness concerning the dignity and efficiency of Christ in their reciprocal intimate inter-connection.

Note to §84:1

1. Schleiermacher did for religion what Kant did for knowledge. By an analysis of knowledge Kant found the immutable forms of knowledge. Analogously Schleiermacher distinguished between the formal and immutable factors of religion and its material and mutable content. The immutable form of religion he found to be the feeling of absolute dependence, or consciousness of the presence of the finite

in the infinite, of the relative in the absolute, of the temporal in the eternal.

2. In prosecuting this task (a) he sought to characterize the dignity of Christ as perfect unity of a single personality on the one hand and ideality (*Urbildlichkeit*) on the other, and to find therein the real being of God in Christ.[1] (b) He defined the efficiency of Christ as redeeming and reconciling as to its content, and as mystical as to its form, or character. (c) Combining these two, dignity and efficiency, he presented the whole phenomenon of Christ as the finished creation of human nature.

Note to §84: 2

1. See §103 of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* (the masterpiece of Protestant theology). Schleiermacher's Christological problem was this: Given Jesus, the man, with his real and full human nature, what must he have been to have produced the Christian consciousness? How much of what ecclesiastical Christology affirmed may we keep, consistently with the real and full humanity of Jesus? What Schleiermacher retained was simply what he subsumed under his category of *Urbildlichkeit:* Jesus as the archetype of human life. Of the deity of Christ, that only is retained which is necessary to account for the content of the Christian consciousness.

This procedure of Schleiermacher in Christology is similar to that of William James with respect to the metaphysical attributes of God. He asks what difference they make, what function they perform in the process of reality. As a matter of fact, he claims, we only need a God great enough to account for what is. He would have us observe the law of parsimony in theology. Similarly, in answer to the question, what must be that the Christian experience may be, Schleiermacher sets forth as the minimum the full human personality of Jesus as the archetype of human life.

3. Each of the points specified in 1 and 2 above contains correct intimations for dogmatic Christology. Each, however, gives occasion at the same time for critical hesitation and reflection. In 1 (a) where the center of Christian piety is stated, we miss the sharp conception of the redemptive good in its ethical content.[1] In 1 (b) a decisive return to the Biblical picture of Jesus is wanting. (For Schleiermacher Jesus is Man in general, but Man in general is no man at all.) [2] Accordingly 2 (a) and 2 (b) above glide over into an æsthetic construction of the person and efficiency of Jesus Christ, and

in 2 (c) clear teleological comprehension of the idea of the kingdom of God is wanting.[3]

Notes to §84:3

1. Schleiermacher came out of the romantic movement and out of the Moravian, mystical type of piety. These account for the abridgment of the ethical thought in the idea of redemption.

2. The Christ of ecclesiastical dogma was not so much a human being as an ontological substance. In Schleiermacher, Jesus is real and full human nature, but so abstract and universal as to seem a survival of the *Idea* of speculative philosophy.

3. Schleiermacher's general philosophical position is that of Spinoza, and like Spinoza he emphasizes causality to the exclusion of teleology. So here, dignity is determined by referring to Source, rather than to End (viz. the kingdom of God).

4. We may detect the incentives and influence of Schleiermacher in Christology in widely deviating tendencies. But these incentives have been most fruitful in the rise of a series of new theologians of diverse groups, who recognize the present, living, divine essence and redeeming spiritual work in the human phenomenon of Jesus himself.[1] But these theologians seek to transcend Schleiermacher (a) through clearer insight into the *ethical* character of the Christian redemption, (b) through a firmer grounding upon the Biblical character-sketch and self-witness of *Jesus,* and (c) through a more faithful employment of the *New Testament* witness of faith. (In these three particulars has Schleiermacher been transcended by modern theologians.)

Note to §84:4

1. Seeing the divine and the redemptive in the human Jesus himself — this is what is common in all modern liberal movements in Christology. Our modern world-view makes this possible, whereas the old world-view made it impossible.

γ. The Way to the Solution of the Problem.

§85. *Historical, Ethical and Religious Evaluation of the Person and Work of Jesus.*

1. Employing the negative and positive guidance given in the history of Christology, we have to develop the propositions of Christian faith concerning Jesus Christ in an orderly suc-

cession. The Church's faith in Christ is faith in the exalted, living and present Lord.[1] We have to take our starting point in dogmatics in Jesus' earthly being and work, as this is presented to us in the character-sketch and self-witness of Jesus in the gospels, and mirrored to us in the witness of faith and the life of the Spirit in Christianity.

Note to §85:1

1. Do we know anything of an extra-historical existence and activity of Jesus? Might his existence be historical instead of extra-historical, and yet be exalted? For exaltedness does not consist in the matter of locality. It is moral, rather than physical or ontological. Might Jesus be regnant forever on the throne of history, and yet be historical and not extra-historical in his life and operation? Is not the historicalness a condition of his exaltedness, rather than a menace to it? The old idea is a survival of Messianism, with its pre-existent and post-existent heavenly Being, even in his absence making encroachments on the world and dwelling in his people. May we surrender the drama of the pre-existent and post-existent Being, and hold to the historical presence of Jesus, in some such intelligible way as we think of Beethoven and of Kant as still at work in the life of humanity, or as "John Brown's body lies a-moulding in the grave, but his soul *goes marching on*"? Will that satisfy the religious needs of the people? (Will you preach it, and will the people come to hear it?)

The Christian says, in his moments of meditation, that he is conscious of the presence of Christ. What he knows indubitably is a certain kind of consciousness in its subjective aspect. But what is the objective correlate to that kind of experience? Is it Jesus? Or is it the Spirit of that God whom the Christian knows, the Spirit of the God of whom Jesus is the Prophet and Revealer? Will that satisfy the religious need? And is the Christian wrong in interpreting his experience as an effect of which Jesus is the present, *extra-historical* cause?

Should we pray to Jesus? To be sure, the God of the Christian is just like Jesus in disposition and bearing toward us. Can we not regard God as the true object of religious faith and prayer, and yet have that faith and prayer different from what they would be, if God were not interpreted in terms of Jesus? The primacy and supremacy of the God-idea are impaired if aught but God is made the object of prayer. Is prayer to Jesus saint-worship? Would Jesus have allowed worship of himself, and the erecting of him into the dignity of God? If Jesus did bind men to himself, the end was to bind men to God.

What shall we say of the idea that Christianity is the only true religion? Is it not as unreasonable to say that Christianity is the only true religion as to say that the English language is the only true

language? Are "true" and "false" the right terms to apply? Aren't "useful" and "good" better terms? Still, we may express the opinion that Christianity and the English language are going to win out in the struggle for existence. But is it correct to say that the English language is a favorite with God? Or that the Christian religion is? How different the old Christian religion and the old English language from their present forms!

2. There are three ways of viewing the being and work of Jesus: (a) The empirical, historical treatment. This seeks on the basis of critical investigation of the sources to establish the facts of the life and work of Jesus. (b) The ethical treatment. This is guided by the question, What worth and what dignity does the religio-ethical personality of Jesus, which we meet in the gospels, have *in and of itself?* (c) The religious treatment. This asks the following question, What importance and significance does the person of Jesus have for *us* by virtue of the effects proceeding from him and which we know from experience? Also the further question, What have we to say, on the basis of these effects, concerning the relation of Jesus to God and to men?

3. How now are these three views, the historical, the ethical and the religious, related to each other? (a) If we relate the historical consideration to the ethical and religious we find (α) the former cannot mount to judgment of faith. Conversely the ethical and religious judgment concerning Jesus cannot be made dependent upon historical critical work with its slow progress, its manifold arguments of mere probability and its limitation to technical scholarship.[1] (β) Yet historical work has an indirect worth for faith, viz. it can help to prepare for faith, and it can enrich and clarify faith. To be sure, on its side it draws from the ethical and the religious considerations the impulse to true self-restraint, to scientific sobriety. It also draws from the ethical and the religious important points of view, problems and questions. (b) If we relate the ethical and religious to one another we find the following: (α) The ethical consideration is necessary presupposition for the religious. The former with inner necessity leads to the latter, and finds its fulfilment and fruition in the latter.[2] (β) But it is the religious consideration that is directly fundamental

for dogmatic Christology, and this corresponds to the general Protestant position: "to know Christ is to experience his benefits" (Melanchthon).[3]

Notes to §85:3

1. Historical Biblical science cannot destroy our faith. Can the scientific explanation of the rainbow destroy our value-judgment as to its beauty? How can I know, simply by passing the existence-judgment regarding Jesus, whether he is to be evaluated as revelation of God or not?

Let us suppose that the judgment of faith must wait upon historical science. When shall we be free to be religious? We have had a hundred years of the synoptic problem already. Much of the outcome of historical science is problematic. The work is limited to technical scholarship. What is Aunt Dinah down South going to do about it? Or the scientific pagan in the laboratory? How is he to be made scientifically certain of the physical resurrection of Jesus as historic fact? Is that the evangelical process of salvation? That would be salvation, not by grace but by very hard work. Or else it would be substituting for the external authority of the priest the external authority of the historian. Faith would lose its spontaneity. The modern man would be no better off than the charcoal man who told Luther he believed the teachings of the Church, but could not tell what those teachings were. "What do you believe?" "I believe what the historical critics believe." "And what do they believe?" "I don't know." There is no inner certainty here. Can anything which the historical critical scientist, as such, is able to say be a matter of religious faith? Is it an object of religious faith that Jesus walked on the sea? No, and the same is true of other events of the life of Jesus. But the object of religious faith is there in Jesus. Historical science might conceivably destroy knowledge of Jesus. But faith is directed toward that which is timeless. The object of faith is an eternal content; not facts, but values. And so it is not he who has not the historico-critical scientific conviction concerning Jesus who is none of his, but he who has not the spirit of Christ that is none of his. Salvation is by character, not by knowledge.

Science is never done. It is its business to criticize. It makes Jesus a problem. The Jesus of history will never again cease to be a problem. But the object to which religious faith is directed cannot be shaken by historico-critical science; it will be shaken on grounds of life, if at all. Herrmann and even Cremer says that to require a man to hold historic facts to be real as a condition of his becoming a Christian is sin. The ground on which alone you have the right to require a man to hold that a fact of history took place is that it took place, and the only way of finding out that it took place is by scientific investigation. (Is that being saved by grace?) It is not that histor-

ico-critical study may not yield rich values in personalities for faith. But religious faith must not wait upon scientific investigation. Is not inner certainty the very root and core of religious faith? But how could you have that inner certainty if your religious faith was grounded upon scientific investigation? And how could God be good and make it necessary to guarantee what happened two thousand years ago before religious faith could find place in the life? *Knowledge* is a conviction of the reality and connection of things, grounded on experience of the senses and on the laws of thought. But religious *faith* is a conviction that there is a meaning in things, and that that meaning is good. There is nothing in time which cannot be in all time which can be the true object of faith.

Systematic statement of the relation between historic fact and religious faith. (1) We are placed in a stream of rich, historical, organic life. This stream brings us values which inwardly enrich us, which make us free, which redeem us, which lift us above ourselves. Those values are mediated to us by parents, teachers, friends, words, deeds, languages, etc. Through these media values are brought to us which we of ourselves are not able to produce out of ourselves. That is, the individual man is infinitely poor as compared with the wealth of history in which God has placed us. This wealth brings us spiritual values which man in isolated life would never have invented or discovered. Nor would the totality of men have done so, unless in the mystery of creative personalities, fructified by the stream of history, fountains had been opened from which higher values streamed out of eternity into our human world. Personalities are the channels of divine grace — the grace by which the Christian is redeemed. (2) The medium of these values, of this grace, is not science but life. Here as elsewhere life is the producer of life. Nothing in the past that is in the past *only*, and not also in the present, belongs to the essence of that gospel which saves and sanctifies the life. Take, for example, the bodily resurrection of Jesus. This is an historical fact, or something affirmed to be historical fact. As such it is to be strictly proved, or not proved. If it is to be proved, it is to be proved to everybody, even the most unbelieving. Therefore the attitude toward it is independent of all personal disposition. If it is not to be cogently proved, religion cannot make it a duty to let that pass as proved which has not been proved, or to proceed less conscientiously or less critically here than in other regions of historical knowledge and of science. That is to say, the acknowledgment of a single historical fact is a thing of knowledge and not of religious faith at all. Religious faith can be directed only to that which is of a timeless character, only to that, therefore, which can be immediately present to everyone, for only the timeless can be in all time. Whoever inserts an historical fact in the place of this timeless object externalizes faith, detains religion at a lower stage which has been overcome in the world-historical movement, and complicates

religion in an insoluble contradiction with all the rest of our life. It is said that Christianity collapses with the collapse of faith in the bodily resurrection, but on what is faith in the divine truth of Christianity founded? Not upon some datum in the region of historical science, but upon the new content of our religion, upon its new world of love and grace. Is this new world an illusion without the bodily resurrection? Let us not substitute "historical faith" for the omnipresence of spiritual and divine life. Let us not depart from a religion of spirit and personality, and relapse into a religion of signs and wonders. Christianity is not a religion of historical facts. It is a religion of spirit and of personality. Hence let us cease that amalgamating of history and faith which has brought unspeakable confusion upon modern humanity. No datum of history as such is an affair of religious faith.

2. Our moral vocation, the discovery and production of values, leads to the idea that if our work in the world produces these values, it must be that the structure of the world is such as makes this possible. The end of the world is thus revealed. Moral work necessarily leads to the religious view.

3. Note how certain conceptions of the past were not originally fruitful, but have been taken up later and made the basis of a system of theology. Thus Melanchthon's saying, quoted above, is the basis of the Ritschlian theology.

§86. *Fundamental Ethical and Religious Judgment concerning Jesus.*

1. The *ethical* judgment concerning the inner worth and the loftiness of the personality of Jesus is determined by the concept of vocation, or calling. Every ethical evaluation of a person, above all of a religio-ethical personality, with inner necessity leads to the concept of vocation. In particular this is valid for Jesus, so far as he himself subsumed his whole life and work under the point of view of a divine calling. The ethical judgment is directed to two points, viz.: (a) The loftiness or greatness of the calling of Jesus. The calling of Jesus to save souls and to usher in the kingdom of God was according to his view supramundane, and yet on the other hand, it comprehended the world. It is true that Jesus did leave to one side in his calling various important phases of the human cultural life.[1] This limitation is only a sign of the concentration of Jesus upon one goal, that was to him all-important. But that this goal was really God's will, this calling really God's work for us, can be maintained only in the *religious* judgment.

(b) The measure of the fulfilment of his vocation on the part of Jesus. Ethical judgment concerning this can only declare that the picture and self-witness reveal no gaps or defects in the fulfilment of his vocation. We have rather an example of extreme fidelity. On the other hand the conviction of the perfect fidelity and sinlessness of Jesus can be gained only through a religious judgment, a judgment of faith.[2]

Notes to §86:1

1. The old Socinian position was that the only value of Jesus was his imitability. But how many things were left out of the model! Science, art, patriotism, perpetuity of family, social reform, the life of gain, city sanitation, and so on. What did Jesus care for what we call "civilization"? He did not think there was going to be any twentieth century, or a future of the race in the sense in which there has been. Then how could he be expected to have an interest in art and science and philosophy and discovery and invention? Indeed, it would be hard to pick a man more unlike the modern man than Jesus.

And yet, entirely consistent with this is the fact that it is just the deep binding of the life of the modern man to Jesus that saves the modern man. Outer detachment from him is called for, and inner union with him. Disobedience to his words at times, but obedience to his inner spirit. Can the modern man give himself, without reserve, to art, to science, to philosophy, to politics, to the life of gain, and in so doing be a disciple of the Man of Galilee, who had no interest in any of these things? Or must even the modern man press on a peg to the point where he shall see that none of these things is of absolute worth, but that personality is? The origination and consummation and conservation of personality is the great end, and that for which Jesus cared. Purity and strength and maturity of inner disposition — in these things there can be likeness to Jesus, even in the midst of outward dissimilarity.

2. Was Jesus sinless? How can you find out whether he was or not? The Church's conception of his sinlessness is such as to exclude moral development in Jesus, and as to remove him from being an example to man. A marble coldness of a dogmatic sinlessness does not appeal to man. If it was a gift to Jesus, not a moral task to Jesus, it has no moral value for man. But sinlessness through struggle against temptation is of supreme value. Whether Jesus was sinless or not cannot be made out by historical science; the data are too meager. The one sentence about which there need be no doubt that Jesus uttered it — if this can be said of any of his recorded sayings — is the question, "Why callest thou me good?" And it is sanctimonious superficiality to spirit away such words. Jesus knew sin, not through omniscience, but through personal fight with it.

Yet there is no evidence of a breach with the past, no evidence that he was ever a penitent. His call to repentance does not *prove* his sinlessness, though it may have had that for its background.

It is often said that the moral sublimity of Jesus cannot be understood at all; that it is incomprehensible, and therefore unhuman. But who ever did fathom the depths of the life of any epoch-making personality? It is not within the capacity of moral science to penetrate into the mystery of personality. Even the lowest as well as the best of all personalities is incomprehensible. In so far as it can be apprehended and known at all, it is to be apprehended and known, not scientifically, but personally.

It is sometimes said that if there ever had been any moral imperfection in Jesus, the scars would have been left in his moral consciousness. But psychology does not show this to be necessarily true. There is a power of regenerating the injured cell, even in physical life, and the defects of youth do not necessarily leave scars forever.

In short, the proposition that Jesus was sinless is a proposition of dogmatics, not of historical science. It is a religious value-judgment. Jesus, as evinced by my experience of his power to make my life over anew, and who becomes Lord of my life, cannot be evaluated any lower than in the value-judgment that he was sinless. The word "sinlessness" is unfortunate, because negative. It were better to speak of the religious and moral perfection of Jesus. The value-judgment in which this is affirmed is made on the basis of the effect of his personality on the Christian community. Let us place the matter, then, on its proper basis. Do not seek to base the judgment on scientific investigation; the facts do not necessitate it. Claim it, rather, on the basis of your inner experience.

2. The fundamental religious judgment affirms the salvation-bringing efficacy of Jesus, of which we become certain through trust in his person. (a) Jesus awakens in us the consciousness of guilt and of the power of sin, but with this at the same time the consciousness of our divine calling and destiny.[1] (b) Jesus abrogates the guilt of sin by receiving us into the fellowship of his love which seeks the sinner.[2] (c) Jesus operates against the power of sin by means of the impulses and spiritual forces issuing from him. (d) Jesus transforms the evil connected with sin into a blessing. All these benefits may not be disengaged from the person of Jesus.[3] The untenability of the distinction in its traditional form between principle and person becomes clear to us in the measure that the loftiness of the world of Christian faith above all phenomena of the world comes to consciousness; above all in the measure that

the depth of the guilt, power and punishment of sin comes to consciousness. Therefore the religious judgment concerning the saving efficacy of Jesus Christ may be expressed in the words, Jesus Christ himself our Redeemer, or Savior.[4]

Notes to §86:2

1. Our vocation as human beings is to become personality. We are born pre-personal, or sub-personal, but with the endowment and calling to *become* persons. That is the *absolute* calling of man.

2. God is never parted from any human being, sinful or not; but there is a sense of separation from God, and that is the basic evil.

3. These facts of experience are the basis on which we pass to our value-judgment of Jesus. He must be as great as is necessitated by such facts. This personal judgment is beyond science, but it may be valid for all that. Does not a mother know more of mother-love than science can ever teach?

4. We are not saved by things or performances or institutions, but by persons. Perhaps a better word than "saved" or "redeemed" may be found for our values. These words do not quite correspond to the notion of personality. What really takes place is that mysterious, penetrating, overpowering influence of one personality over another. One personality makes another over again. If that is not being saved, what is being saved? It is not being snatched from some fate which is extra-personal, although the word "saved" has had and still bears the latter connotation. Being saved is for the bud to become a blossom and the blossom a fruit. But no theory, not even a theory of personality, will save a personality, any more than a theory of fire will ignite wood.

b. The Systematic Development of Propositions of Faith Concerning Jesus Christ. (The Man Jesus as Mediator Between God and Man.)

α. The Earthly Life of Jesus as the Being of God in Jesus and as the Being of Jesus in God.

§87. *An Examination of the Ecclesiastical Doctrine of the Three-fold Office of Christ.*

1. Jesus' relation to God and to humanity was originally summed up in the Messianic concept, but from the very beginning there has been the need of an interpretation of this concept. We have such an interpretation in the ecclesiastical doctrine of the three-fold office (Prophet, Priest and King).

2. This doctrine of the Protestant theology (*unus triplex*)

(a) was prepared for by Biblical ideas which were already used in the ancient Church, but was made especially fruitful in the Reformation, and was systematized by John Calvin. (b) In the most developed form of this doctrine the material of the life and work of Jesus was distributed among three offices, and each of these three offices found employment under the two states of Christ.

3. As to its *content,* this doctrine has its worth above all for edifying exposition, but also for dogmatic systematization. It is through this doctrine that what Jesus Christ is to Christianity as compared with the Old Testament and what he has brought to Christianity may be interpreted. Yet upon a more accurate evaluation of the formal construction of the doctrine it grows clear that the different material cannot always be distributed among these three offices, but that one and the same material of the life of Jesus is merely subsumed under different points of view. In addition to this, the three offices are not simply co-ordinate with one another. It is for this reason that the traditional doctrinal form has rightly been improved, so that Jesus as *kingly prophet* on God's side stands over against man, and as *kingly priest* on our side stands over against God.

4. These two leading points of view (kingly prophet and kingly priest) have their deeper ground, however, in the two essential relations of the idea of "Son" set forth in the Johannine words ("the Father in Me, and I in the Father," or "I and My Father are one"). The former, the being of God in Jesus, the latter, the being of Jesus in God, both are to be developed, each for itself and both in their inner unity.[1]

Note to §87:4

1. It is not a mere influence or manifestation of God, but the *being,* the *reality* of God that is in Jesus. God in his verity is there. When we know the inner spirit and love of Jesus, we know, in very fact, God. We know him in his deepest depths. There is no docetic character about the divine in Jesus, no mere phenomenalizing of the divine. In our modern revolt against ontology we must not go so far as to deny the reality *in fact* of God in Jesus. Otherwise there is no revelation in Jesus.

§88. *God's Being in Jesus. Jesus the Bearer of Divine Life.*

1. The being of God in Jesus which the Christian faith expresses is primarily an efficient presence of God in Jesus' own interior life. Here the central point is inner certainty of filial fellowship with the heavenly Father. (a) The *clear knowledge* of his Father flows from this: (α) As to the *content* of this knowledge, it is related to God's gracious and holy will, to man's need, to his own relation to God, and to his vocation as Savior. (β) As to *kind* this knowledge was of course nourished by Old Testament prophecy, but yet for all that it was an intuitive knowledge which included self-dependence in his understanding of the Scriptures for one thing, and an independence of the religious and moral prepossessions of his time. (γ) But this knowledge, according to Jesus' own testimony, had its limits. It was not omniscience in reference to all the single ways of God looking to the actualization of the divine counsel; it was not independent of the form of ideas of his time; it was not inerrant in questions of empirical or discursive knowledge. (b) In Jesus' *will-attitudes* the known will of God gave guidance, not in the form of a psychological compulsion, but in the form of a judgment of duty and of effective ethical stimulus or impulse. As to the content of his will it was a determination of his will by God's supreme end. The proof of this was his sureness in his conduct, above all the energy of his positive (not ascetic) subordination of all natural impulses to the will of God and his inner triumph over all outer opposition and hindrances. (c) In Jesus' *emotional attitude* his union with God is mirrored in the "peace" (εἰρήνη) and "grace" (χαρά) arising from his struggle, issuing from the conflict of his life.

2. But the being of God in Jesus' interior life signifies at the same time the presence of God in Jesus' work and words. (a) Jesus' work is God's work for us, so far as the unitary relation to the actualization of the divine redemptive will becomes directly or indirectly manifest therein.[1] (b) Jesus' word is God's word to us so far as the holy and gracious will of God revealed in Jesus is thereby made known to us. (c) Concerning Jesus' suffering and death a later section will treat.

Note to §88:2

1. If God is in Jesus' inner life, is God not also actually in Jesus' work?

See Daab's article in *Das Suchen der Zeit,* Vol. III.

3. Through the constant presence of God in Jesus' personal life and work Jesus is climax and close of all antecedent prophecy. Christian faith in Jesus may be summed up in the expression that the fulness of deity dwelt in his personal life, or in John's phrase, that he is "the only-begotten Son of God." [1] The essence of God is in him, livingly active there, but in the form and limits of a truly personal human life. In other words, God's essence is in Jesus as to its revealed content, but not as to its supramundane form of life.[2] [3]

Notes to §88:3

1. It is growing increasingly difficult to teach Christology. The most difficult thing in systematic theology is to enunciate Christological propositions which are verifiable in experience or demonstrable in thought. There can be no Christology unless to the existence-judgment, "Jesus is a man," you supply a spiritual judgment, a judgment of value or meaning. Our valuation of the historical man Jesus is to-day and is to be henceforth the content of our Christology. We must keep fact and meaning together.

(The worst of all dualisms is the separation of fact and meaning. One instance of this is the outlook upon joyless labor here and laborless joy hereafter.)

2. The supramundane form of the life of God we do not know from Jesus. The word "person" seems an inadequate word to apply to God, though it is probably the best we can do. The concept of super-personality, if understood as denying the personal, sinks for us to the sub-personal. But eliminate from human personality what it seems difficult to ascribe to God, and you destroy personality as we know it. In himself, God is Spirit; for us, he is best symbolized by the concept "person."

3. Would the Christian life be impoverished by a return to Jesus of Nazareth and his teaching, to the exclusion of all Christological predicates? Or must you supply to Jesus some great metaphysical predicate, to have a religion adequate to the needs of men? The Occident believes in history. The Orient believes in metaphysics without history. Can you take the merely historical Jesus to Oriental people, and do missionary work on that basis? Must we pass from the Jesus of history to something metaphysical, albeit as intelligible to us as the metaphysics of former believers was to them? (Metaphysics is not essentially different from value-judgments, but the question is as to the sort of value-judgment.)

Is not the solution to be found in a movement forward from a Christocentric theology to a theocentric theology, wherein God shall be interpreted in terms of the personality of Jesus? The cry of the soul is not for Jesus of Nazareth, but for the living God, not a God in the past, but a present, accessible God. And yet that God must not be interpreted in terms of any other than Jesus Christ, the best we know. Perhaps it would be good enough to interpret that God in terms of an ideal of which there is no counterpart in historic reality; but it is better if we can find a real counterpart and if Jesus' inner purpose of will can be made the basis of the interpretation. This idea of God in Jesus and Jesus in God will make the Christian religion cosmopolitan, as the Logos-religion was at an earlier time. Supplementing the watchword, "Back to Jesus," with this other, "Back from Jesus to God"; interpreting God in terms of Jesus and thus reading the night-side of reality in terms of the day-side, our theology, being theocentric as well as Christian, will once again win the world.

4. The objection that this faith expresses no *metaphysical* relation to God, but only an *ethical personal* relation, rests on a false antithesis, for in truth this ethical personal relation is the supreme metaphysical reality, reposing on the living activity of God, through which the whole temporal development of Jesus' life was determined from the beginning, ever according to its stages, however. In addition, the question how far the relation of the earthly life of Jesus to God points beyond and above that earthly life must be left open here.

§89. *God's Being in Jesus. Jesus the Bringer of Divine Life in Us.*

1. By means of the being of God in Jesus he is able to establish a divine life like his own in those that have faith in him. Through the holy love of God present and active in Jesus, believers are not only accepted into a relation of freedom from guilt, but become on the basis of this freedom themselves the bearers of the divine life and the organs of the divine activity. They become such in knowledge, feeling and willing, in work and words; they participate in the royal prophetism of Jesus himself, and this effect is manifest on the individual, within the *Christian community,* in which influences of the divine life stream to the members of the community from Jesus Christ as the Head.[1]

Note to §89:1

1. "*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus.*" This is not true of the external institution, but only of the spiritual Church.

You can teach the Bible and the history of religion, but you cannot teach religion, any more than you can teach love. Religion must be experienced by virtue of our religious endowment and through reciprocity with religious people. A good personality in the Sunday-School teacher is more important than scientific knowledge of the Bible.

2. This work of Jesus must be apprehended *in its kind,* not as magical, nature-like, not rationalistically, not æsthetically, but as of an ethical and historical character, mediated by personal trust in him as the bringer of the divine forgiveness. As such it is comparable with ethical influences which proceed from person to person within the relations of human personal authority. Is this work of Jesus, however, unique as to content, scope and effectiveness? [1]

Note to §89:2

1. The new thing in Jesus is not his teaching, but himself. His kind of fellowship with God, his God-consciousness, is unique. If you understand by uniqueness a *degree* of intensiveness which is unsurpassed, such a uniqueness you would seem to have to affirm of the God-consciousness of Jesus. But if it were entirely different in *kind,* it would be incommunicable, and so we should not have a gospel. I am not quite clear, however, that "unique" is a good word to use. It has been for about a generation a pale survival of the Second Person of the Trinity idea. Why should we not speak of the representativeness of Jesus, instead of his uniqueness? A unique apple might be the worst instead of the best. But the best may be taken as a representative specimen, showing to what extent the ideal is realizable.

If there is a new thing in the teaching of Jesus, it is his conviction of the infinite worth of human personality in the sight of God. He includes everyone — publicans, harlots, lepers, outcasts, little children. Jesus did not quite have the now popular cry of the universal brotherhood of man; rather was it the infinite worth of man. And this he did not get by empirical observation; he judged it on the basis of his own feeling, his own consciousness of being a child of God.

In the main I believe we are able to say what Jesus was, though we have not finished our historical work yet. The scientific study of Jesus of Nazareth has about reached the point where it is going to stay. Whether or not Jesus held that he himself was the Messiah may not be finally settled, however, and perhaps never will be.

Christianity is an historical religion — not a religion of historical facts, but of spirit and personality. The relation between history and

values is the relation between the garden and the flowers that grow therein. The values are grown in the soil of history. It is not the soil that you admire æsthetically, but the flowers.

3. Even if those who believe in Jesus become themselves bearers and organs of the divine life, they yet remain in a position of dependence upon Jesus by virtue of their attitude of faith. In other words, Jesus is the original, perfect and permanent bearer and mediator of divine life — the personal fountain of that life.

4. In this whole view of the being and work of God in Jesus the first and primary interest which church doctrine in its Christology would validate is preserved.[1]

Note to §89 : 4

1. I seek always to lash as closely to the conservative position and to the Church-experience as is possible in the interests of truth.

Yet I have won my academic freedom by the hardest kind of struggle, and I am not going to part with it.

There is a growing number of those whose faith will go to pieces unless these modern critical conceptions are made accessible to them. So I wish to bring in the newer truth just as fast as it is serviceable to the people.

§90. *Jesus' Being in God. Jesus the Perfect Man, Well-Pleasing to God.*

1. Since the being of God in Jesus is actualized in his ethico-religious personal life, the work of God in his inner life which is the basis of his personal life must be received by Jesus himself in free surrender of will to God. Therefore the being of *Jesus in God* forms the necessary obverse side to the being of *God in Jesus.* This being of Jesus in God is set forth in a two-fold proposition of faith. (a) Jesus fulfilled his vocation in *perfect fidelity.* This fidelity consists (α) in the perfect love of Jesus to God, therefore in entire faith and obedience toward his heavenly Father; (β) in the perfect love of Jesus to man who is to be saved. In both these ways he lives entirely in God's holy will of love, thus accrediting himself as Son of God. (b) Faith in Jesus' perfect fidelity to his vocation includes faith in his "sinlessness" (but see §86 : 1, b, for a criticism of the word). This sinlessness becomes cer-

tain to us through our confidence or trust in him as a sin-forgiving Savior. But as to the content of this sinlessness it may be defined neither in a naturalistic nor in a legalistic manner. This is best avoided, however, by making the idea of fidelity rather than of sinlessness the primary one.[1]

Note to §90:1

1. Naturalistically, historically you cannot demonstrate the resurrection of Jesus; but faith will say it cannot be that personality of the content found in the historic Jesus should be left to go into non-existence.

2. A two-fold proposition of faith is further included in what has just been set forth. (a) Since Jesus as Son lives in the Father he *fulfils or perfects the destination of man* to the religio-ethical ideal of divine sonship. Not as mere central Man, lacking individuality, but in his own special personality and ministry, Jesus actualizes the chief goal of a true God-man, a goal valid for all men. (b) But since this is the divine destiny of man, Jesus' person is absolutely worthful before God, or he is the object of the supreme divine good pleasure, and he is this all the more as he actualizes the will of God not only in himself, but also in those who have faith in him.

§91. *Jesus' Being in God. Jesus Our Representative before God.*

1. Since the divine life which Jesus Christ communicates to the believer (§89) as well as the divine life in himself (§88) comes to actualization as ethical personal life, the *efficiency* of Jesus Christ necessarily appears to us under this point of view at the same time. The corresponding proposition of faith then is as follows: Jesus will and can in priestly service uplift us also to a being in God which is like his own: i. e. (a) to true love toward God and man (v. §90:2, a); (b) to the fulfilment of our human destiny to become ethico-religious personalities (v. §90:3, a), and (c) to that inner state in which we are well-pleasing to God. In this relation also Jesus is our "Head," or is the "Firstborn" or "First-Fruit," or "Author and Captain" of faith, like to whom we ourselves are to become.[1]

Note to §91:1

1. Dogmatics may use pictorial language, but philosophy may not use it.

2. But how do we become like Jesus Christ? This is designated by another idea of faith which is connected with the being of Jesus in God, viz.: Jesus as Royal Priest (§87:3) is at the same time our Representative, or Advocate, or Intecessor before God. (a) There is a distinction between Jesus as our Representative, and Jesus as our "Head," or the "Firstborn," or "First-Fruit." In the latter we bring to our consciousness likeness with Jesus Christ; in the former, difference from him, i. e. we set his worth over against our unworth. Moreover we comfort ourselves with the idea that he with his worthful life appears before God on our behalf and that we are accepted before God on his account.[1] (b) This concept has its *historical basis* (α) in a series of Scriptural ideas, e. g. the intercession of Christ, and (β) in the history of ecclesiastical doctrine, for the thought of the merit of Jesus Christ has been uniformly emphasized in the Occident and revivified at the Reformation. (c) But the concept also has its good *inner basis* in Christian faith and life itself. The guilt-laden conscience harbors the question of doubt whether the holy God can really meet us in love and whether we dare appear before God in our guilt.[2] A thoroughly justifiable way — a way indispensable to the fearful conscience — is the reflection of faith that Jesus Christ is certainly the perfect object of the divine good pleasure, and that we may dare approach the holy God, not with an appeal to our worth, but to Jesus Christ's intercession for us, and to our belonging in faith to him. Jesus is thus the climax and end of all antecedent priesthood and sacrifice.[3] (d) But there are false thoughts to be reflected, such as (α) an alteration of God, making him more favorably disposed (instead of this, it is a representation by a part, and by the merit of a part, of the potential worth of the whole); or (β) the juristic character of intercession. Jesus has his worth before God as our intercessor only by means of his God-given power of ethical work upon us. Moreover, the goal of that ever necessary reflection of faith must be that we attain through the confrontation of Jesus and God to a believing knowledge of the

redeeming God himself in Jesus Christ, and that we also attain to a certainty of the full unity of God's holiness and love.

Notes to §91:2

1. There is a profound sense in which we do not become like Jesus at all. We must get rid of the old static, copy-theory of knowledge and morality and religion. The function of history in religion is to facilitate our participation in the eternal. And the basic religious process is our participation in the eternal. Our becoming like Jesus means our participation in the eternal values which have their home in him; and this participation is an active process. It is not even copying that life in its inner psychological form. We are not saved by facts of history, even by the facts of redemptive history (*Heilsthatsachen*); we are saved by values. Getting values from past history is like getting seeds for our garden, but growing values in the present is like growing flowers in our garden. We do not copy the flowers of the past, but the new flowers will be like those of the past, probably.

2. Is this pathological, or is it a real fact of religious experience to-day? There is a superficial humanitarianism which indicates the impoverishment of the inner world of man. Religion has lost its depths. We are distraught. Religion has become a multiplicity of things to be done. Our weakness to-day is that we have lost our *souls*. We must reconquer and regain an inner world. In our pathological sensitiveness to discomfort and pain, our inability to be poor and to do without carpets and hammocks and the like, we show the beggarliness of our spiritual condition.

3. Is there any practical significance in the traditional thought of the intercession of Christ? The presence of a representative specimen, showing what the potentialities of the species are, is a sort of intercession on behalf of the rest of the species. (Is it due to this line of thought having dropped out of modern religious life to such an extent, that it seems so hard to render intelligible the idea of Christ as our Intercessor?)

3. It is only when we have thus gained confidence or trust in Jesus Christ as Mediator and bringer of the sin-forgiving grace of God that under the influence of his communicating work (§89) we attain to a life in God with him, our Leader and Lord, and that we become like him as our Exemplar. But this thought carries us over into Christian ethics.

4. In this conception of the being of Jesus in God, and of Jesus as our Representative, or Head, or Fore-runner and Intercessor, the second interest is validated which ecclesiastical Protestantism has cared to preserve.

§92. *The Synthesis of the Two Points of View: God in Jesus and Jesus in God, or Jesus as the Mediator of the New Covenant.*

1. The two series of thoughts developed in §§88, 89 and in §§90, 91 unite in a total view. In Jesus' *own life* there is a union (unition) between God's being and work and human personality on the soil of human history. A new fellowship between God and humanity is actualized through him in the community which has faith in him. In so far the man Jesus, on the basis of the being of God in him, is the Mediator of the perfect righteousness.

2. Thus Jesus is at once Head and Creator of a new spiritual humanity in God, in which God lives and works, and which on its side uplifts itself to God. Jesus thus leads humanity to the fulfilment of its divine destiny, and thus he conducts the creative purpose of God to a conclusion [1] glorious beyond all human speculation.

Note to §92: 2

1. There are two ideas of evolution, one of which acknowledges, while the other does not acknowledge a principle of activity resident in reality. (Activity is not accounted for; it is discovered.) The activistic theory of evolution makes room for a religion in which man, especially Jesus, is creative.

3. The two-fold conviction, viz. that Jesus was the bearer and bringer of divine life and work during his earthly life (i. e. was Prophet), and that he was at the same time the perfect man, well-pleasing to God, and thus our Exemplar and Head (i. e. was Priest) is the indispensable basis of faith in *Jesus as Lord,* and finds its unity in this faith (v. §87: 3), while this recognition of Jesus as Lord and king points to faith in him as the exalted one at the same time.

4. The doctrine of the person of Jesus Christ developed in §§88 to 92 seeks to prosecute the fruitful thought further and yet avoid the byways which the critical survey has shown us in §§82, 84.

5. In these developed propositions we have the presuppositions for the Christian understanding of Jesus' suffering and death, to which we now turn.

β. The Suffering and Death of Jesus as Consummation of His Earthly Life.

§93. *The Problem and the Attempts to Solve it on the Part of Church Doctrine. Evaluation of these Attempts and Comparison of the Same with the Biblical Witness.*[1]

1. The offense in the proclamation that the divine counsel concerning humanity was fulfilled in a crucified one finds its solution only in the conviction of faith that suffering and death not only did not encroach in a disturbing manner in the Savior-dignity and work of Jesus, but is *of fundamental and permanent importance for our salvation.*

Note to §93

1. Bibliography on the atonement: Strauss's *Glaubenslehre;* Lipsius: *Dogmatik;* Biedermann: *Dogmatik;* histories of doctrine by Harnack, Fisher and Shedd; Kaftan's *Dogmatik;* Wernle's *Beginnings of Christianity;* J. Caird's *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity;* Bowne: *The Atonement;* Sabatier: *The Atonement;* E. von Hartmann's *Selbstversetzung des Christentums;* the recent volume of essays by several authors, under the title, "The Atonement."

2. It is this conviction that church doctrine seeks theologically to establish, since it deduces the necessity of the suffering and death of Christ from God's nature in its relation to sin, and accordingly expounds (a) the necessity of a penal satisfaction, (b) the sole possible *modus* of a *satisfactio vicaria* by the God-man, (c) the actuality of this satisfaction in Jesus Christ's *obedientia passiva et activa,* and (d) the effects of this satisfaction for us.[1]

Note to §93:2

1. Note the historical inevitableness of the death of Jesus, and its teleological necessity in religion.

Paulsen observed the Oberammergau play for thirteen hours, and then went home to his library and wrote to *Die Christliche Welt* that the experience confirmed what he had long believed on other grounds, that the death of the Man of Galilee on the cross was the most valuable asset in human history. In what does its importance consist? How can values be got out of it for to-day? Nothing in history is valuable for us that is not capable of being transmuted into personal life. A modern theologian has said, "So far as the religious value of the death of Jesus is concerned, it might as well have been

by pneumonia." But if it had been, would he have been the founder of a new religion?

Who died on the cross, according to Paul? Not the man Jesus, but the "Heavenly Being," the Messiah. After you have stripped off all the Messianic predicates, is the death of the man Jesus such as makes for the salvation of men? It was the death of a peasant, a man who had wanted to revolutionize theology perhaps, but who did not want to die and had no thought of saving men by his death. Is there a reduction of values, *pari passu*, as the Messianic predicates are reduced? Is not the human more than the Messianic? Perhaps the peasant of Galilee has "more to him" than the God-man had. If we can say so, there is a way out of our difficulty. Is not the essentially and ideally human the divinest thing we know anything about?

(We are saved by doubt as well as by faith; by struggle and bewilderment as well as by ease and peace and certainty.)

3. A systematic evaluation must recognize the deep ethico-religious content of ecclesiastical doctrine which seeks to bring to validity the grievousness of human sin as a contradiction to God's moral world-order, as well as to the greatness of the divine love. This church doctrine also rightly finds the significance of Jesus as our Representative in his suffering and death, but there are decisive objections to the mode and manner in which the Church has evaluated these thoughts and against the form which they have assumed. (a) As to (a) above (the necessity of a penal satisfaction), objection must be urged against the idea that God's love is in tension with his righteousness and is to be restricted to the condition of penal satisfaction.[1] (b) As to (b) above (vicarious satisfaction), objection must be urged against the idea that God's righteousness is to be satisfied by the transference of guilt and punishment to the guiltless.[2] (c) As to (c) above, objection must be urged against the idea that Jesus Christ in his holy suffering and death is to be considered as object of divine penal judgment and the bearer of the divine wrath and curse.[3] (d) As to (d) above, objection must be urged against the idea that the ecclesiastical doctrine has told us how and under what objective conditions the *remissio peccati* and *imputatio justitiae* is possible to God. That doctrine has not made clear, moreover, how the Crucified One himself makes us inwardly certain of the forgiveness of guilt and free from the power of sin.[4] [5]

Notes to §93 : 3

1. If what is true of the Father is true of the Son, why should the Father have a monopoly of wrath, and why should not the reparation be made to the Son as well as to the Father? The Second Person of the Trinity dies that the First Person of the Trinity may forgive. There must be penal satisfaction to God by God antecedent to divine forgiveness. This ecclesiastical form of the doctrine has become impossible. But is there no truth in it? The old theory was that a part of God suffered to appease another part of God. This idea of the divine suffering needs to be widened to include all deity. Forgiveness without suffering is immoral, and God is the great sufferer in this universe. In commenting on the statement of Dr. Strong, that if sin lasts forever, God suffers forever, certain editors remarked, "We thought it was the sinner that suffered forever." They had better think again. God is not a wooden God. We must interpret him according to the highest human analogy. But the suffering of God is not a menace to the divine blessedness; rather is it a condition of that blessedness.

2. See W. N. Clarke's *Theology*.

3. If God was with Jesus at any time, it must have been when Jesus was suffering on the cross. The momentary obscuration of the consciousness of Jesus is easily explicable psychologically. A God who would forsake Jesus on the cross is not the Christian God at all.

4. The dissolution of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the atonement. The Church-doctrine set forth the objective annulment of that which separates sinful humanity from communion with God. Therefore it set forth also the objective reconciliation of humanity with God as the personal priestly work of Christ, i. e. as the personal effect of that which he as God-man did and suffered by way of vicarious satisfaction for humanity. Now the inner contradiction in this doctrine is seen by elucidating the question (a) as to the subject and object of the vicarious satisfaction, (b) as to the mode, and (c) as to the effect.

a. The question as to the subject and object of the vicarious satisfaction. What was it in the God-man that vicariously satisfied and for what was the satisfaction? The Protestant Church doctrine answered as follows: The God-man, through everything which he did and suffered in the unity of the two natures, made vicarious satisfaction, i. e. with his perfect fulfilment of the law for the deficiency of sinful humanity, or his *active obedience,* and with his innocent suffering for their guilt, or his *passive obedience.*

But now as to his *active obedience,* the following is the criticism made by Socinians, Arminians, rationalists, anti-Trinitarians, the Protestant speculative movement, Kant, *et al.* Even if this obedience was sufficient in and of itself before God, yet it cannot be designated as vicarious for us, because the requirement of obedience for us exists after as well as before satisfaction was made for humanity. (Accord-

ing to Kant our obligation is all the greater for that obedience, if it makes any difference at all, for it shows the possibility of perfect obedience.) The active obedience of Christ, therefore, was not substitutionary, but typical, exemplary and obligating us to imitation. It is not vicarious for us; it cannot take the place of our obedience.

As to the *suffering* of Christ as substitutionary satisfaction for the guilt of humanity, (1) the *physical* suffering and dying of Christ as substitutionary satisfaction in place of our own suffering and death is not to be thought of. That suffering was such as belongs to earthly human nature, but in the case of Jesus it was only the personally guiltless result of the sin of the rest of humanity. But even this is not an instance of vicarious suffering, because as a fact it has not vicariously abolished even for believers, that for which alone it could be vicarious, viz. the physical evil of sin and the natural death of humanity. The passive obedience of Christ is not vicarious for us, as physical, for even the leaders in the early Christian Church suffered these evils.

(2) The moral act of voluntary surrender, on account of love, to suffering and death (which alone remains of that satisfaction) is not gained substitutionally. It is not a matter of transferability, but of imitability. There is nothing more intimate and unshared than the moral worth which accrues to personality. It cannot be disengaged from one person and transferred to another.

Therefore, having disposed of the active and the passive obedience of Christ in this way, all that remained which could pass as substitutionary was Christ's eternal death. But (1) the God-man did not suffer eternal death. His endurance of the punishments of hell could be only a moral sympathy, not an active endurance of the sufferings of the lost. Moreover, (2) the future punishments of sin as a matter of fact were not objectively vicariously cancelled by Christ's hypothetical death. Proof of this is the continuous seriousness of the menace of such punishments to the consciousness of every man.

b. The question as to the mode of the vicarious satisfaction. How is the action and passion of Christ to be conceived vicariously, substitutionally? The Church doctrine, which from its point of view consistently defined the sacrifice of the God-man as the objective solution of a transcendent conflict between righteousness and love, in reality (1) contradicted righteousness as well as love and therewith the absoluteness of God in general; (2) externalizes the relation of man to his guilt and also to his God. The transference (not annulment) of the Old Testament conception of sacrifice is the telling proof that the whole form in which the doctrine is drawn out has its roots in soil of law-religion, and not of morality-religion. It is a regress on the part of the Christian religion back to legalism, back to Judaism, and so it stands in an inner principiant contradiction to the specifically Christian problem of atonement, which sought, but did not find, its solution in law-religion.

c. The question as to the effect of that vicarious satisfaction. Here the critical understanding presented these alternatives: Either (1) if the work of Christ is really a substitutionary satisfaction, humanity is precisely as a matter of fact freed thereby from all that for which it was made, or (2) if this is not the case (and it is said not to be the case on all sides, said by the church-doctrine itself, in its doctrine of faith), then that action and passion of Christ were not objectively, substitutionally satisfaction.

Criticism on the basis of the historico-critical study of the life of Christ. (1) In Jesus' own thought of his death there is an entire absence of the doctrine that that death had an objective reference Godward, on account of which alone God would forgive sin. Witness, for example, the parable of the prodigal son, where the condition of divine forgiveness is solely human repentance. Witness, further, the preaching of Jesus concerning repentance, in which there is entire absence of the thought of substitutionary satisfaction. (2) The voluntariness of the death of Christ as set forth in the church-doctrine is not supported by the facts of the record of the life of Christ. That he voluntarily came from heaven to earth to die on the cross does not seem to have been an item of his consciousness. That he expected to be crucified from the beginning of his life or even of his public ministry is not a matter of certainty. The certainty seems to have been limited to the last days of his life only, and the synoptic narrative points rather to his hope that he may escape the fate of the cross, to unwillingness to die, than to any consciousness of a foreordained fate by virtue of which the wrath of God should be appeased. Nevertheless this position does not mean that his death as a fact did not have the value which all suffering and martyrdom of the righteous have, as the supreme and indispensable agency in overcoming the sin of the individual and of the race. The Pauline conception of the indispensableness of the death of Christ can be vindicated by an appeal to reason and to experience.

5. This is subsumption of the death of Jesus under a category with which all are familiar. It is the suffering and death of the martyr, the suffering of the innocent on account of the sins of the guilty that saves society. Note the worth for science of the martyr-death of Bruno. Four hundred years after his death, a monument was erected where he was burnt. His death more than his life made science possible. And if the sight of the toiling and suffering of the righteous for the sins of the guilty will not save, nothing will.

Can we predicate of God himself the redemptive suffering which Paul predicated of the heavenly Being? We must, or we lose something of the best that history has to give us. The category of the heavenly Being, or the Messiah, is not of the modern world, but the values it contained are eternal values. Our task is to substitute for the mythological vessel the vessel of immanence and to preserve the eternal gospel in the forms of our time. We have to find as im-

manent and constant that value and efficiency and purpose, that grace and love, which Paul found in one great episode only. God is always speaking, or he has never spoken at all. This does not mean that he spoke always with the same emphasis. He may have spoken with epoch-making definiteness in the life and death of Jesus. But with the change to the modern world-view, we can keep the myth of Messianism only by moral insincerity, and we are not in a universe in which one can be saved by moral insincerity.

In our doctrine of the atonement we must seek to give systematic formulation to "the deep and eternal truth hidden in the faith in the vicarious suffering of the righteous and the infinite worth of martyrdom" (Bousset). There are two interests to be satisfied in our doctrine of the meaning of the death of Jesus: first, can the modern man assent to it? and second, can the religious man be satisfied with it? Systematic theology must satisfy the scientific demand for reality and the religious demand. If this cannot be done, if we are obliged to say that what the intellect says is true the heart says is not good and not satisfying, and that when the heart judges, this is good, the intellect says, yes, but it is not true, then the only thing to do would seem to be to do as the "darkey" said he would do, in the old story — take to the woods!

§94. *Jesus' Suffering and Death as the Culmination of a Human Life Well-Pleasing to God and Vicarious for Us.*

1. Jesus' suffering and death reposes in accord with the philosophy of a divine immanence, on the being and work of God in him. But this is by no means mere passivity of Jesus, but *personal deed.*

2. The following propositions of faith with reference to the suffering and death of Jesus may be formulated. (a) Jesus' suffering and death in its *relation to God* is the definitive confirmation and exemplification of his faith and of his obedience in the performance of the work which his Father gave him to do. (α) *Jesus' faith* was led into the most grievous conflict in connection with his sufferings, for it was precisely in his suffering that his outer experience entered into sharpest contradiction with the inner certitude of his person and work, so far as he himself stood there forsaken by God's help and so far as even his Savior-work seemed to be not only thwarted through human sin but even converted into its opposite, viz. into a heaping up of sin and judgment for humanity. Moreover, under these outer circumstances the experience or feel-

ing of the gracious presence of God was repressed in his consciousness. But his faith was consummated in this conflict, since he held fast to God even when appearances and even when his own feelings were against him. This judgment of faith is not refuted but confirmed by the words of his prayer from the twenty-second Psalm. (β) In the struggle of faith *Jesus' obedience* led to the uttermost conflict between God's will and the tendency of the human, natural will, and with this to the severest temptation. But Jesus overcame, in full resignation to the counsel of God concerning his personality and concerning humanity. (b) Jesus' suffering and death *in relation to man* is the consummation of his Savior-love. This love finds its special expression in the fact that Jesus, suffering and dying, participates in all man's burdens. (α) *Jesus bears sin,* not indeed in the sense that he took their guilt upon himself and felt himself as jointly guilty, but in the sense that he felt in holy sympathy the guilt and power of sin resting upon *them,* and the judgment in its whole severity that threatened them. (β) Equally so, *Jesus endured punishment,*[1] *not* indeed in the sense that his suffering had the character of discipline or even of judicial punishment *for his own self,* but in the sense that he, the guiltless one, was affected in a special degree by that suffering which was ordained on account of sin, and in part directly caused by sin.

Note to §94:2

1. In Isaiah 53 we have a profound and beautiful conception of suffering, under which the death of Jesus can be brought by way of explanation and interpretation. It is truer to Jesus than to some ideal Israel or Messiah. Jesus was wounded for transgressions not his own.

3. Precisely in the crucified Jesus there was (a) the consummation of the true *religio-ethical destiny* of man, in his inner glory, in opposition to the Judaic and Hellenic views, yet not in the sense of asceticism; and (b) at the same time the perfect *worth* (*"merit"*) of Jesus in the sight of God. His death was the *offering* supremely well-pleasing to God and truly spiritual, and at the same time the acme of priestly service, through which Jesus purposes to lead us to God.

4. In all these relations the suffering and dying Jesus is

precedent and model for us. Above all the Crucified One is our Representative before God (v. §91:2). This thought is involved in the idea of his offering and priesthood; in our sins we do not satisfy the holy will of God, but Jesus' holy suffering and death perfectly satisfies that will, guarantees that not frivolity or levity, but earnest repentance and zeal for holiness shall awaken in those who believe in Jesus as the Crucified. Therefore God's holy will is not abridged, does not fall short, but is rather truly fulfilled. This *positive satisfaction* on the part of the Crucified is to be distinguished from the *negative penal satisfaction* of the church doctrine. This positive satisfaction also can comfort our fearful consciences before God, can appeal also to the Crucified as ethically effective warranty in our fear before God's holiness. The idea of propitiation, expiation, atonement, having so many meanings, may be employed only in the sense of a *personally* and *ethically* effective merit of Christ, a merit not really but only legally effective, or effective as cult in the church doctrine.

§95. *Jesus' Suffering and Death as Consummation of the Divine Work of Grace.*

1. A second series of propositions of faith belongs here side by side with the first, mentioned in §94. This second series expresses the faith that precisely in the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, God's *holy love* reveals itself and proclaims (a) the *redeeming* power of that love, and (b) its *educative* wisdom.

2. The crucifixion is direct actualization of the holy love of God toward sinful humanity in the following *four particulars:* (a) It is actualized as *love which forgives guilt,*[1] so that here first faith in forgiveness receives (α) its strongest proof and verification, and (β) its full depth. (b) It actualizes itself as a *holy, earnest love,* so that it is able to awaken in us along with faith in forgiveness the full consciousness of guilt and *honest pain over sin* at the same time. (α) Yet it is at the cross of Christ, especially in Jesus' bearing of sin, that the fearful mystery of sin, with its contradiction or antagonism to God, is first fully manifest. (β) But at the same time the whole seriousness of sin is made impressive to us through the greatness of the divine love, which, in Paul's phrase, "spared not

his own Son." (c) It is actualized as *sanctifying love* (love that ethicizes), so that it is able to break the power of sin. For whoever surrenders himself in real personal trust to the Crucified, for him is (α) negatively, the valuation of the world and of its goods and glory, as a chief good, destroyed, and an abhorrence of sin implanted; but also (β) the positive inner obligation and power to a life in the service of the Crucified and of those for whom he died. (d) It is actualized as *love that overcomes the world, suffering and death,* so that it is able to lead us to surrender to God's will and thus lead us also to freedom from the world.[2] For (α) *the world-order of suffering and death,* under which Jesus bowed, impresses us as an order of the holy and gracious will of God. (β) And also that which seems completely counter to the will of God discloses itself as subject, however, to God's love and wisdom.

Notes to §95:2

1. It is only guilt that is forgivable. Sin is to be overcome and healed.
2. Obedience to God is liberation from the world.

3. The effects just mentioned (under 2 above), proceeding from the Crucified, accord full right to our faith in Jesus as our Representative and Surety, but they are all combined in the faith that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself."

§96. *A Comprehensive Expression of the Redemptive Worth of the Suffering and Death of Christ.*

1. The question, Why must Jesus suffer and die? found its answer in §§94 and 95. There it was shown how far a crucified Savior was necessary to sinful humanity.

2. In *Biblical expression* the saving worth of the suffering and death of Christ for the individual and for humanity may be expressed in the proposition that it was necessary, in order to the consummation of the reconciliation and redemption of men, and to the establishment of the new covenant. With reference to these Biblical expressions, the idea of *reconciliation,* having special reference to the guilty separation of man from God, signifies the *divinely*-effected peace with sinful humanity,

a peace, however, to be accepted (appropriated) by the individual; and the *idea of redemption* signifies liberation from sin and the world, liberation which is complete, brought to us through Christ, yet to be eternally consummated; and the *idea of the covenant* signifies the establishment of a relation of perfect mutual fellowship between God and humanity — a fellowship originating from God and actualized through the death of Christ.

3. As a more *historico-philosophical* treatment, the suffering and death of Jesus Christ presents itself as necessary in order to the abrogation, the inner overcoming and surpassing, of the Old Testament with its legal order; but also to the unification of the religiously sundered humanity into *one* communion.[1]

Note to §96:3

1. Would it be possible under the true impression of the cross of Jesus, for Christendom to split asunder as it is to-day?

4. The interior attitude that the evangelical Christian and the evangelical community have to occupy to the Crucified is to be derived from the importance and significance of the death of Jesus Christ. That attitude is one of penitent faith in the conquering holy love of God. Also for the Christian and for Christianity the Crucified One abides ever as the Living One.[1] [2]

Notes to §96:4

1. "I am he that liveth and was dead, and behold I am alive forevermore." Whatever be the form of immortality it cannot be possible in a rational and moral universe that the content which makes up the true Jesus should go to naught.

2. Is salvation an end which can be attained *only* by the death of Jesus as means?

I fear that sometimes the negative answer involves too superficial a conception of the significance of what it is to die as Jesus died. "If it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." The costliness of an ideal, the price in agony that any of our ideals has cost the race, is fearful. Those ideals are borne by persons, and it is a fact that the history of Christian experience corroborates the statement that in one way or another those who bear the ideals fall victims to the vulgar reality about them. It looks as if their tragedy of life belonged to the very world-order. The bearer of the ideal falls into the ground and dies, but in and through this perishing bearer of the ideal, the ideal moves on apace. The perishing of the bearers is an indispensable condition

of the triumph and fruition, of the further development and power, of the ideals themselves.

Bruno is an illustration of this. He was a bearer of the ideal of veraciousness, courage and freedom in science. It was the lower ideal which put him to death. The science that already was burnt him, the bearer of this higher kind of science. It was the good putting the better to death. Bruno died that later scientists might live and have freedom. They enjoy freedom, because chains were put upon him. On his three hundredth death-day, February the 17th, 1902, a monument was unveiled on the very spot where he met his fate.

And what put Jesus to death? If you know a finer example of the general principle of the bearer of an ideal dying that the ideal might be accomplished than Jesus, where is it? Christian martyrs may have given their bodies to be burned, and yet they have not had love in the same measure as Jesus had. Yet truly Christian martyrs fill up the measure of the sufferings of Christ.

Does the death of Jesus have cosmic significance? How profoundly into history and even into nature does the principle of altruism reach? Is altruism cosmic? Does the triumph of the ideal according to the principle of dying to live show itself to be a basic and inviolable world-order? Does the death of Jesus come under this universal category? Is it true that there is purpose in everything, or else purpose in nothing at all? Or that if God is not immanent in nature and in history, there is no God at all? But if God is immanent and there is purpose in everything, what must be the degree of significance in such an event as the death of Jesus?

It is not meant that we can exempt all things in our lives from the category of capricious irrationality. But I am only a fugitive thought, an episode in the universe. If I could see all from the viewpoint of the center, this item which is so difficult for intellect, feeling and conscience might be seen to be of great value. There seems no impossibility in the dying of Jesus being among the culminating values of the whole cosmic movement. It is a question to be determined by religio-philosophical considerations ultimately. We should recognize that the intelligibility of the death of Jesus for us depends on our ability to get some general category under which to subsume it. If not, it is at most mere dumb, meaningless fact. We must look for something in experience like it.

I believe that the death of Jesus and all events of that kind have real cosmic significance. That death is an expression of what is in the cosmic process from the beginning. Note the costliness of our values. Even the stones in these university buildings were built up through the death of countless micro-organisms. Through science we are beginning to see what things have cost. There always have been others dying that we might live. And we can say that in all our Western civilization no institution has been built up, nor home established, nor child born, nor ship sailing the sea, nor nail driven,

that would not have been different, if Jesus had not lived and been crucified.

But why, it may be asked, should we single Jesus out in this way? In the first place, the facts of history seem to justify it. In the second place, it belongs psychologically to the nature of mind to take great historic exemplars and give them a symbolic significance. Ideals are personalized of necessity. Socrates and Bruno are other illustrations of this, and Abraham Lincoln, already idealized and mythicized into a symbol of American ideal manhood. It depends, to be sure, on historic circumstances to some extent whether one is selected or not. It is the wave that is at the right angle to catch the sun of history that is lit up and forever glorified. Yet it is not meant that it is accidental, a thing of mere mechanism. [The value must be there,] and we have been able to take Jesus in religion as the supreme illustration of the law which gives us the stones of the university buildings, and our daily bread.

The peculiar error of the orthodox doctrine of the redemptive necessity of the death of Christ, an error through which it falls into contradiction with essential Christianity, is this, viz. that it ignores the fact that love and holiness inwardly and organically belong together, and function together in God. Love does nothing in which holiness does not participate, and *vice versa*. And this error of orthodoxy is not a merely theoretical error; it is a practical and injurious mistake. For an idea of salvation attaches itself thereto which ignores the fact that salvation in its inner character is an ethically determined salvation. The orthodox proposition of the righteousness of God requiring satisfaction before his love can pardon contradicts the Christian knowledge of God. It is true that the orthodox thought of righteousness is more in accord with the Christian knowledge of God than the Socinian doctrine of God's arbitrary power on the one hand and levity on the other. But it is also certain that the Christian thought of holy love, of the inner belonging together of love and holiness, is better than the orthodox thought of righteousness, with its legalistic interpretation.

When we seek to understand the necessity of the death of Jesus to the Christian salvation, we do not expect a merely historical treatment to yield the desired result. Historical science at best can only show that an event was historically unavoidable under given circumstances. But the knowledge needed is not of the historical inevitability of the death of Jesus, but of its teleological necessity. And it is not enough to say that it was a means to an end; we must see that it was necessary as means to human salvation as end. This means that the end can not be attained by any other means. The end is an eternal end, the redemption and blessedness of man. But this end is to be attained in history, and the means to this end must be in history, so the question comes to be, May a thing historically unavoidable at the same time of necessity serve an end? Identification of the end in-

volves religious evaluation and lies in the realm of dogmatics, but the historical unavoidability of the occurrence and its necessity as means to a definite end do not lie in entirely different regions, since both are in history.

Now it is an historical law that in many turning points in history precisely the same circumstances which unavoidably usher in an event make that event also a necessity, i. e. indispensable means in order to the actualization of a definite end. For example, the breach with the hierarchical world-church at the Reformation was the necessary means for the existence of evangelical Christianity, because the hierarchy would have choked — would have had to choke — the faith that was *immediately* related to the grace of God. But the right of the breach to exist consists in the fact that evangelical salvation was not to be had without its mediation. And how did it come about that this breach, which was not originally intended or expected, became historically unavoidable? By the hierarchy and the free evangelical faith being mutually exclusive principles. Therefore the same circumstances which unavoidably led to that breach became necessary as means to the actualization of evangelical Christianity. According to this same historical law the necessity of the death of Christ as redemptive means is to be understood on the basis of its historical unavoidability. There are then three stages in our constructive task, viz. (A) to set forth the historical connection whose necessary result was the death of Christ; (B) to understand that this connection was nothing other than the necessary product of the antecedent history of revelation; (C) to reach finally the universal historical factors which participated therein, viz. the holy love of God on the one side and the sins of man on the other.

(A). We must first set forth the historical inevitableness of the death of Christ. In human history the holy love of God became personal in a special degree in Jesus Christ. That holy love in Jesus exerted a dynamic influence upon man, and it was unavoidably directed toward the sins of men. Now the party of the Pharisees, dominant in Israel, confronted Jesus. It was the Pharisees that killed Jesus. The Sadducees were only instrumental in the hands of the Pharisees. The Sadducees were the élite men of the world, too far removed from Jesus to join in any personal conflict with him. At the other extreme publicans and sinners received Jesus with joy, and on their own account would not have organized a movement against him. Now it was only in relation to the Pharisees — pious people who awaited Israel's salvation — that the condition was fulfilled under which a mortal conflict arose. They shared the same fundamental view, but within that fundamental view there was a principiant opposition between them. Jesus proclaimed the Kingdom of God as at hand. He awaited its appearing. With his disciples he gave himself to the life and endeavor after righteousness — the righteousness of the kingdom. But so did the Pharisees. They too were anxious to

plan and nurture righteousness in the people, as they understood it. But while Jesus proclaimed and confirmed the love of God which in the death of the natural man would create a new man unto eternal life, the Pharisees were bent on a fulfilment of the divine promises in a way that corresponded to the natural heart, i. e. they were bent on the satisfaction not of the lusts of the flesh, but of ambition, power, national pride; in short, of the most characteristic impulses of the morally cultivated man of the world. Again, in the case of Jesus there was a supramundane Kingdom, developed primarily as a kingdom of moral righteousness in the world; in the case of the Pharisees a supernatural world-kingdom in this world. Again, in the case of Jesus there was a righteousness of disposition that accredits itself and exemplifies itself in self-denial and love; but in the case of the Pharisees, righteousness in the observance of religious precepts, with which one can parade before men. Thus the opposition was as wide as it could be within the same category. Hence of necessity the conflict between Jesus and the Pharisees arose, since both parties claimed the people and since both claimed to offer the people God's truth and God's salvation. A reconciliation was impossible. Jesus could not forego the fulfilment of his vocation. It had been given him by the Father, and it was his own meat and drink. He could not change his ideas of God and man, of righteousness and redemption. But the Pharisees could not change either. Publicans and sinners change when God's truth touches their hearts, but those who unite the worldly mind indissolubly with faith in God do not change. Those do not change who are convinced that they carry on God's cause with their worldly disposition, impulses and deeds. There is no conversion or repentance possible for those who are really thus convinced. Therefore the conflict was historically unavoidable. Here, if anywhere, was historical necessity. But in the world it is always the children of the world who win the first victory. They employ means against which the holy one of God is powerless, just because he is the holy one of God. And so the conflict between the Pharisees and Jesus came to the bloody end to which it had to come.

(B). It is clear that more universal factors come into play here. The death of Jesus did not take place under accidental circumstances which might have been avoided in the development of the history of revelation, but that death took place of necessity in the connection of this development, and this position is clear from the following considerations: —

(a) The soil in which the event has its roots was the people of Israel, made ready for that event by the Old Testament revelation; and in its characteristic feature, viz. as murder of the Messiah, the event was possible only on this Judaic soil. If now we compare what Jesus preached and what his foes advocated, we see that both positions have their point of contact with the Old Testament. The deepest thoughts of the old covenant attain fulfilment through Jesus. On

the other hand, the Pharisees support themselves on the shell of the old covenant, on what was provisional and transitory in it. The conflict between Jesus and the Pharisees is nothing but the conflict between the kernel and the husk of the old covenant, the same conflict in which the prophets had fought and suffered and died. The death of Jesus is the conflict in which the transitory, worldly side of the old covenant apparently overcame and demolished its eternal kernel. In reality the shell of the old covenant was thereby burst, so that now the blessings of Abraham could come to all the people. Jesus, the servant of Jehovah, in his death fulfilled the vocation of Israel to bear as God's prophet God's life and righteousness to all people. His death, therefore, is the necessary transition from the old covenant to the new covenant. The New Testament renders the necessity of the death of Jesus intelligible by articulating it in this connection with the history of revelation (See Galatians 3 : 13, 14).

(b) The death of Jesus is therefore the necessary catastrophe of the divine revelation. The sins of men, their carnal mind, carried this with it, viz. that the kingdom of God could be introduced into history only in the form of a natural folk-state. Again, the sins of men carried with them that men should ever cling to the shell instead of penetrating to the kernel, and that they should do this also in a decisive moment, viz. in the fulness of time, and so it came about, as come about it had to, that the bearer of the perfect revelation of God was nailed to the cross by those who were called to be representatives of the preparatory revelation of God. The better became the bitter foe of the best.

(c) A look into the inner, spiritual side of the sufferings of Jesus is possible in this connection. The sensible pain needs no explanation. That is immediately intelligible to every man (but that also is not to be made little of). In the climax that pain brought with it the most grievous inner suffering of momentary God-forsakenness. That pain is never to be isolated, for it occurred under circumstances which gave rise to spiritual sting as well. But the spiritual sufferings need further explanation. If we try to gain an understanding of these, we must set out from the analogy of our own experience. The thing which gives the keenest sting to all human suffering is the guilt-feeling. There springs from the guilt-feeling a foretaste of what the Scriptures mean by "eternal death," "spiritual death." But we dare not use this analogy regarding the sufferings of Jesus. He had no guilt-feeling, since he knew no sin; and moreover a transference of the guilt-feeling, as guilt-feeling, is impossible. In another manner Jesus did bear the sin and guilt of man as soul-torture. What was that other manner? We must find another human analogy to which we can fasten on, if we are to understand the spiritual sufferings of Jesus; and to this end we must take account of the fact that it was the purpose and end of Jesus' personal life to work out and carry through God's holy will of love in a world of sin.

But through the contradiction of sinners he had continuously to fight with the imminent frustration of this his life's end and purpose. He had to fight this frustration in his foes, in his kindred, even in his disciples. There are few human experiences that can equal this in bitterness. Add to it the peculiarity of the vocation of Jesus, which consisted in revealing and actualizing the holy love of God in the world. Since this love was precisely for sinners whose hostility Jesus had to experience, this contradiction was at the same time a continuous disillusioning of his love — of love to men and especially to his people, to gather and save whom was the burden of his heart; and this again is the source of the bitterest spiritual suffering. The greater the love, the deeper this kind of suffering; deepest of all here then where love was the greatest. His death signifies the climax of his suffering. He suffered death from the hands of his people; was left by his disciples as an outcast alone with God, and, in his imagination, momentarily, was left by God himself in his uttermost agony.

(d) The death of Jesus then results of necessity in the order of the historical revelation. What necessarily brought it about was the carnal mind of Israel, the sins of the people and of their leaders. But the question now is, Why did God choose this people and no other to prepare the way for the perfect revelation? A sufficient answer to that question is that it would have been the same, had he chosen any other people. Israel was representative of sinful humanity, and it was the antagonism in humanity in general to the holy love of God that led to this result in Israel. On the causal side, therefore, the death of the Mediator was the necessary result of the revelation of the holy love of God in sinful humanity. The only way that death could have been avoided would have been for God's love to cease to be holy, in which case it would not have antagonized sinners; or for sinners to have ceased to be sinful, in which case they would not have antagonized the holiness of love. But both hypotheses are impossible. Therefore the death of the Savior was the necessary means for the actualization of that salvation which is grounded in the eternal redemptive purpose of God himself.

(C) Let us now take up the third of the three problems. Hitherto we have thought of causal connection. The death of the Savior was the necessary result of the revelation of the holy love of God in sinful humanity. But now it is precisely out of this fact that we gain the knowledge of its teleological necessity as the sole sufficient means for God's end. Recall the significance of the illustration of the breach at the Reformation. Precisely the same circumstances which usher in an event make that event the necessary means to the end that is to be actualized. So it is in the case in question. The death of the Savior is the necessary means to the actualization of the Christian salvation among men. (Salvation is the inner ethicization of the personal and social life which leads to filial com-

munion with God and brotherly fellowship with men.) The knowledge of the holy love of God has developed by virtue of him and his death. Through him men have been led by this love, which is both holy and forgiving. But in this connection the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead must be taken into account. It was in connection with the resurrection, however that event be conceived more closely, that the death of Christ won its historical importance for the church and its faith. This enlargement of the problem is required in the nature of the case, then. This factor is not taken into account in the historical causal explanation. There the point was as to the death of Christ as the necessary result of the historical development, but in the case of the dogmatic teleological elucidation, this complement cannot be dispensed with, for we are concerned with the death of Christ as deed of God, necessary to our salvation; but this deed of God is the death of Christ only as taken in connection with his resurrection from the dead. The necessity of the death of Christ thus supplemented as means of redemption has attested itself in the macrocosm of human history by the fact that the Christian church was called into life thereby. Moreover, the narrower circle of the disciples of Jesus was thereby first brought to faith, to right knowledge and to right life. The sin of humanity did its uttermost, its worst, when it nailed the Mediator of the holy love of God to the cross. Now follows the back-stroke, the knowledge of sin, repentance, faith and life in God — in the living God who has revealed his innermost being in this deed of saving love. We may not think lightly of this matter, since it signifies nothing less than that there would have been no Christianity in the world without it. But the same thing attests itself in the microcosm of the individual life of man, and in this way, viz. the preaching of the cross of Christ is seen to be the necessary, the sole sufficient means to awaken that faith which leads to salvation. It is the business of the doctrine of conversion, of regeneration, to set that forth. The Christian attains to the certainty of reconciliation when in the death of Christ he becomes aware of the holy love of God which at once judges and forgives.

Finally there remains the question as to the necessity of the redemptive death of Christ, not for the human macrocosm or microcosm, but for God. The orthodox satisfaction-theory affirms this. It is its merit to have done so, and the test of any theory on this great subject is its ability to make good this Godward necessity of the death of Christ.

The death of Christ was necessary for God, on the supposition that he meant to save sinners. But this necessity to God must be understood otherwise than was the case with the old church doctrine. The fundamental thought in both is the same, for the orthodox doctrine also thinks of God as the real and ultimate subject or agent of the redemptive endeavor. God himself effects the divine-human atonement through which his righteousness is satisfied. If now we remove

everything mythological, and if we substitute for the notion of a conflict between divine righteousness and mercy, as set forth in the orthodox theory, the thought of a unitary divine energy which proceeds from love and is conditioned in the mode of its activity by righteousness, then the general thought of the old doctrine is the same, viz. that in God there exists an inner necessitation to actualize salvation thus and not otherwise. But this does not destroy the difference between the two positions, the old doctrine and the new thought. According to the orthodox doctrine the necessitation for God signifies that satisfaction must be done to his righteousness prior to his forgiveness. But our point is this, viz. that the necessitation of the death of Christ consists in the fact that the holy God could not reveal himself among sinners in a way that would not involve this issue and such issues as this, and that sinners could not be overcome and brought to the faith apart from such a revelation of the holy God. The point common to the two expositions is the thought of a necessitation immanent in the holy nature of God. The difference between the two positions is that, according to the modern thought, the necessity of the means to the end is not to be found in a divine exigency, but in the moral constitution of man. The value of this change from the old to the new consists in deepening the doctrine of the atonement from the juristic to the ethical. If the juristic apprehension of the doctrine of the atonement is to be replaced by an ethical apprehension, it is indispensable that instead of the legal order of the state, the moral order of education shall underlie our understanding of the death of Christ. The death of Christ was not necessary as punishment, but only as means of education. The death of the Savior was the sole sufficient means to the end of man's highest education, and this end is grounded in the nature of the Educator, i. e. in God himself. For then all appearance of arbitrariness and of selection, which at first seems to cleave to the conception of means of education, vanishes, and it becomes clear that the necessity is a necessity for God. It is here that the bottom necessity of the death of Christ is disclosed. Any attempt at a change of conception that does not go as deep as this, so far as it holds to the old legal presuppositions is exposed to the danger of lagging behind the moral earnestness of the old doctrine, instead of ethically deepening it.

[The anticipated third main division of "The Superstructure of Dogmatics," viz. "God and the Holy Spirit" (see §42: 2), does not appear here under that head. However, much of the material which would have been introduced in that connection will be found in the following treatise on "The Ethics of the Christian Religion."]

SECOND TREATISE

THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

(A SYSTEMATIC DISCUSSION OF THE PRINCIPLES AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE CHRISTIAN MORAL IDEAL AND OF THE WAY IN WHICH IT IS ROOTED IN THE RELIGIOUS FAITH OF THE CHRISTIAN.) [1]

§97. *Introduction: The Task of Christian Ethics in Relation to the Task of Christian Dogmatics.*

1. Through faith in Jesus as the Revealer of God we are conscious not only of an invisible spiritual reality which actually exists and which determines our life, but also of a self-actualizing formation of the human personal and social life which the Christian judges to be the content of the will of God for us. On the one hand is the Christian consciousness of an invisible spiritual reality to which we accord actual existence, and on the other hand is our social personal life in which we are engaged in self-effectuation. This we judge to be the content of the will of God. What then is the task of ethics, and what of dogmatics, and how are they related? Dogmatics studies the spiritual being. Ethics studies the life. Since Christ has finished his work this goal is in process of actualization wherever faith in him exists. But it is more especially an ideal in consciousness to whose fulfilment as members of the believing Christian community we are obligated and capacitated. In other words, this goal is the ethical task. Christian dogmatics has as its subject-matter, or object, that spiritual reality which is certain to the believer, but Christian ethics, or theological ethics, has as its subject-matter, or object, this ideal which is to be actualized by the believer.[2] The positivist studies the latter as wholly disengaged from the former. Chris-

tian ethics is, as opposed to that, specifically *religious* ethics, i. e. the moral life conditioned by religious faith.[3]

Note to Christian Ethics

1. Bibliography: Volumes entitled *Christian Ethics* by Wuttke, Martensen, Dorner, T. B. Strong, and Newman Smyth; Herrmann's *Faith and Morals;* Wundt's *Ethics,* the chapter on the history of Christian Ethics; Paulsen's *Ethics;* Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory;* Gass: *Geschichte der Ethik;* Herrmann: *Ethik;* Calixtus: *Christliche Ethik;* H. Schultz: *Evangelische Ethik;* Pfleiderer: *Sittenlehre* and *Religion und Moral;* Jacobi: *Neue Testamentliche Ethik;* Dobschütz's works on the Apostolic Age; Harnack: *The Expansion of Christianity During the First Three Centuries;* Lecky's *History of European Morals;* Jodl: *Geschichte der christlichen Moral;* Lillie's *Principles of Protestantism.*

Notes to §97:1

2. Christian dogmatics and Christian ethics treat the same inner process of the human spirit and of the historical life, only one from the standpoint of the efficiency of God, the other from the standpoint of the self-activity of the human spirit.

3. It was first through Schleiermacher that the essential connections and equal justification of the two disciplines (dogmatics and ethics) were brought to validity, and their separate treatment became current.

2. In the Protestant knowledge of the importance of faith, the conditions both of an evangelical dogmatics and also of an independent evangelical ethics are already given. The scientific problem for us is this: How can an ethics which is religiously conditioned be autonomous? Philosophy requires that ethics shall be autonomous. Right here lies the most important criticism of Christian ethics. Is Christian ethics heteronomous (its ideal supplied by the will of another) or autonomous (its ideal imposed by the self)? A third characterization is theonomous (the ideal emerging from God and his will). Does Christian ethics involve theonomy, heteronomy or autonomy?

3. In particular the tasks of Christian ethics are to be defined as follows: (a) As *principle* it has to make clear the meaning and the basis of the Christian ideal from the point of view of its connection with Christian faith. (b) In particular the task of Christian ethics is to exhibit the content of the Christian ideal, therefore the individual and the social life required by that ideal. It has to bring out the main principles

of that life and keep aloof from casuistic treatment and special considerations of technique. These points (a and b) may be briefly expressed thus: to study the basis and the content of the Christian ideal. It grounds its conviction of the attainability of the ideal in the dynamic which faith supplies.

4. With these two tasks (a and b above) we move wholly within the Christian faith; but for all that we must look beyond the pale of Christianity in the theological treatment of ethics; for the ideal of the Christian moral life confronts us as one of the human moral ideals. In our faith, our Christian value-judgment, we are convinced that the Christian ideal is the culmination of the moral life of humanity, and that therefore this ideal is characterized by universal validity. Yet we must seek to establish this claim to universal validity, and in doing so we touch the region in which philosophical ethics moves.

§98. *The Relation of Christian Ethics to Philosophical Ethics, and the Task of Grounding, or Establishing, Christian Ethics.*

1. We are confronted with difficulties when we attempt to define more accurately the reciprocal relation of theological and philosophical ethics. The presuppositions of faith from which Christian ethics, as a member of theological science, sets out, may be easily exhibited. But the difficulty is that the task of philosophical ethics is so variously conceived.

2. In one series of the great philosophical systems philosophical ethics itself appears as the promulgator of an ideal of life with a definite content. This ideal ever according to times and peoples and also according to the personality of the philosopher, is very variously shaped. Even according as this life-ideal is opposite to the Christian, or allied with the Christian, or essentially identical with the Christian, such philosophical ethics has been either rejected or sifted by Christian ethics, or else has been greeted as an ally.

3. But philosophical ethics does not have as its essential task this exhibition of the content of an ethical ideal. On the contrary the following scientific task belongs to philosophical ethics, viz.: (a) By means of *psychological analysis* philo-

sophical ethics makes clear two main ideas of the moral life, and with this, two distinguishing characteristics of the moral over against other sides of the human life, such as the æsthetic, the logical, and the religious. (b) By means of *critical investigation* philosophical ethics makes clear the validity of these formal moral ideas, and the grounds on which that validity rests, and with this seeks criteria at the same time for the critical comparison of moral ideals as to their content. (This is the real task of philosophical ethics.) (c) By means of *historico-philosophical survey* philosophical ethics exhibits the factors which co-operate in the historical development of the moral ideal, and the stages which emerge in connection with that development.

4. In all three of these directions the work of philosophical ethics is important for Christian ethics also, and it is advisable to use that work. This is especially true in the first main division of our task, viz. the Foundation of Christian Ethics, which has to borrow a series of propositions from philosophical ethics.[1] In the foundation of Christian ethics we have to investigate (a) the peculiarity of the moral life in general which is especially disclosed in Christianity, and (b) the truth of the leading moral ideas which form the content of the Christian ideal, and the right of the claim it puts forward to universal validity.

Note to §98:4

1. The peculiarity of Christian ethics is that it considers morals in connection with religion, or ethical life as founded in faith. It sets forth ethical requirements as grounded in the will of God, a claim which philosophical ethics would not make.

PART I. THE FOUNDATION OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

A. THE PECULIARITY OF THE MORAL LIFE

§99. *The Conception of the Moral Law.*

1. To determine the peculiarity of the moral life as against other sides of the life of the human spirit (such as the æsthetic and the religious), we may not confine ourselves to the rudest, most undeveloped forms of the moral life, but must make the higher forms of the moral the object of analysis.[1]

Note to §99:1

1. There is a weakness and one-sidedness common to evolutionistic interpretations. They seek to understand the more developed stages by an examination of the genesis alone. But "a thing is what it is, not what it came from." If one had to determine the peculiarity of the human as against animal life, it would be a mistake to confine the comparison to the embryologically human on the one side and the animal on the other. It is hard to distinguish the human from the animal in the embryological stage. We must take man in the fruition of his moral development, not in the embryonic stage of his moral history. We cannot determine the essence of religion if we take no account of Christianity; in its embryological form religion was a very selfish thing indeed. Nor is the case of morality essentially different. See Münsterberg: *Ursprung der Sittlichkeit.*

2. As characteristic of this whole moral region we are confronted with the formal thought that *I ought* to do this or that, that this or that is morally required. Now the content of this "ought" is very diverse indeed, but the form is wherever the moral is found. Yet we can make clear to ourselves what we mean when we say "I ought," or, in other words, when we employ the concept "moral law."

3. "I ought to do something" appears in consciousness very differently from "I may," i. e. very differently from the determination of the will through the natural impulses and inclinations. The distinction is this, that we are conscious in

the case of the "I ought" of a uniform rule for similar cases of conduct. This distinction is clearest where the morally required and the agreeable are contradictory as to content. It is not wanting entirely, however, where desire and requirement agree as to content.

4. A moral commandment is to be sharply distinguished from rules of sagacity or of utility. (a) The latter also come under the category of rules of conduct indeed, and of such rules as are formed on the basis of experience at that. (b) Also on that basis of experience and on account of their partial agreement in content as well they are frequently confounded with moral requirements. (c) But a rule of conduct receives its distinguishing character of a moral commandment as follows: (α) We ascribe to it unconditioned validity, while a rule of sagacity has only hypothetical validity. (β) We employ it as criterion not merely for the content, but also for the interior form, or the motivation, of conduct. (γ) We even make the worth of the personality itself dependent upon its inner agreement or non-agreement with the moral law.[1]

Note to §99:4

1. The value of personality is not determined ultimately by its artistic or religious content or form, but by the moral criterion. The moral is the criterion of religion, even.

5. Similarly, sharp distinction is to be made between moral requirement and civil requirement. (a) The requirement of civil law and of the moral are formally similar in this, that obligation attaches to both in a wide scope. They coincide in wide scope. The two are not clearly differentiated in all the elementary stages of human life, and they are often confounded in the present. (b) But the distinction between the two may be seen from the following questions: (α) Upon what does the validity in each case rest? In the case of the state, upon external power and authority, which makes and executes the law. But in the case of morality the validity rests upon inner grounds.[1] (β) What is the result of the non-fulfilment of the civil and of the moral law? In the case of the civil, the result is outer punishment. In the case of the moral the result is inner unworthiness and inner self-depreciation. (Herewith

the result is also many times even physical evil to the community or to posterity.) [2] (γ) To what is rule or norm given in each case? To what does civil law give norm? To the outer relation of man. The moral gives rule, or norm, to this also, but primarily and fundamentally to the disposition.[3]

Notes to §99:5

1. Suppose the ethics of Jesus were actualized universally. Would the state be superseded?

2. Might there be an inner fulfilment of the moral law, and yet physical evil result to the community or to posterity? One of the great paradoxes on which religious faith lives is that moral good sometimes results in physical evil.

3. The ethics of Jesus is disposition-ethics, intention-ethics.

6. What is the relation of the moral requirements to those of social customs? What is the difference between the moral and the conventional? (a) There is a formal similarity, and to a certain degree also a coincidence of content. (b) Therefore the moral and the customary were not discriminated originally, and are frequently not discriminated even to-day. (c) But there is an essential distinction between the two. (α) The rules of good custom rest upon the outer authority of public opinion.[1] (β) The rules of good custom threaten the transgressor with social disesteem and its consequences. (γ) The rules of good custom regulate only the outer forms of human relations. The moral, as against this, rests upon inner authority, has as penalty inner disesteem and pain, and seeks to regulate the inner disposition.

Note to §99:6

1. Public opinion is the most powerful force, next to truth; for the latter one will lay down his life.

7. In view of what has been set forth in 3 to 6, and especially in 4, what stamps as a moral requirement any rule of our volition and conduct which has a definite content? In other words, what is it that clothes the rule with the character of "ought"?[1] Our acknowledging the rule (a) as unconditionally valid, i. e. our exalting it above considerations of inclination, of utility, and of external authority; (b) as norm for the inner form of our will, i. e. its having to do with motive and

intention; and (c) as criterion for the worth of the whole person.[2]

Notes to §99:7

1. We constantly subtract rules that cease to have the "oughtness," and add new ones that have taken on that "oughtness."

2. To-day we ask whether the game of gaining great personal wealth is worth playing, and whether it is being played according to rule, or not. Is "what a man is worth" a criterion of the real worth of the whole man?

Is it right to regulate life by a rule purporting to be moral which is not actually moral? For example, is "Sabbath-keeping" a criterion for determining the worth of the person?

§100. *The Essence of the Moral Judgment in Relation to the Other Value-Judgments.*

1. Moral requirements of the kind designated above determine the moral judgment. It is according to the standard of these requirements that we evaluate our own selves in our conduct and volitional tendencies, also the actions, dispositions and personalities of others, and finally indirectly various possible ends of the will. All these judgments are subsumed under the category of moral good or evil.

2. Moral judgments come under the universal category of value-judgments. They are in strong contrast with the natural or hedonistic value-judgments, but they may be classed with the intellectual, the æsthetic and the religious value-judgments.

3. In order to understand the essence of the moral judgment, it is especially necessary to distinguish it from the æsthetic judgment. (a) Frequently the moral and the æsthetic judgments play into each other and are occasionally made to approximate each other too closely by science. (b) But even when the two judgments — the æsthetic and the moral — are both directed to one and the same person or act, they yet both set out from entirely different standpoints. The moral judgment's question is as follows: In what relation does the will of the agent stand to a requirement acknowledged to be unconditional? But the æsthetic judgment is concerned with the following question: In what relation does the act or person under contemplation stand to our fantasy which images that

act or person, and in what degree and in what direction does the act or person stimulate a play of the fantasy in us? (c) From the standpoint of the diversity of the standards of judgment we may see the difference between the æsthetic and the moral judgment upon the same act or person, but at a higher stage the æsthetic judgment is not uninfluenced by the moral, but discovers in every moral volition and act something of sublimity and beauty.

§101. *The Idea of Freedom and Accountability.*

1. The idea of the *moral* freedom of the will is indissolubly united in our consciousness with the thought of the moral "ought," therefore with every moral judgment concerning ourselves and others, and with every moral demand. In distinction from the untenable construction of *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae* we understand by freedom of the will the capacity of man, by means of energetic regard for the moral law of which he is conscious, to give that law the preference against his natural impulses and inclinations in the decisions of life which he must make.[1]

Note to §101:1

1. *Liberum arbitrium indifferentiae* means characterless choice. The view overlooks facts of heredity and environment, and especially that in and through conduct there grows up a deposit of habit and character which inwardly determines choices and conduct. It overlooks this influence of previous choices on the present choice. It takes an atomistic view of life, according to which character is impossible and choice is always as free and undetermined as if the individual had never chosen before.

2. The moral freedom is to be distinguished from psychical or intellectual freedom in general. (a) By psychical freedom we mean that state of consciousness in which reflection upon the whole content of our ego is possible, and along with this a clearly conscious deliberation and decision of the will. This does not yet exist in early childhood, is abrogated by mental disease and is injured by diminution of clear consciousness. (b) The existence of this psychical freedom is the indispensable presupposition of the occurrence of any clear reflection upon moral requirements. Therefore we may subsume an act

of will under the idea of moral freedom of the will only so far as we may assume psychical freedom.

3. The intimate connection of this thought with that of a moral requirement comes to expression in this, viz. that we combine the two thoughts, psychical and moral freedom, into the unitary idea of responsible moral personality. We evaluate a man as responsible moral personality, when, abstracting from all other relations, we consider what interior attitude he occupies, by means of free decision of the will, to the moral law of which he is conscious, or what energy he has inwardly summoned in his conflict against moral evil and in order to keep that law.

§102. *The Processes of Conscience as Psychical Forms of the Manifestation of the Ideas of Moral Law and of Freedom.*

1. In actual moral life the ideas of the moral law and of freedom are by no means always conceived with conceptual clearness and conscious purpose. Rather they make themselves felt in us originally with involuntary power and under strong feeling in the so-called processes of conscience. These processes may be analyzed into different groups — into phenomena of a positive and others of a negative character after and before an act.

2. After the act the following features present themselves in the phenomena of a *conscience which condemns or censures:* (a) the frequently involuntary recollection of the deed that was done and at the same time a more or less clear idea of what we ought to have done; (b) a lively feeling of pain, which cleaves to the deed done and in which that deed in itself is felt to be a depreciation, a dishonoring of the self; (c) an inner necessitation to consider the self that wills as the decisive cause of the deed.

3. Before the deed, quite analogous features are exhibited in the phenomena of a *warning* conscience. (a) Here also we have the idea of the evil act designed, along with the more or less distinct picture of the act which we must acknowledge that we ought to do. (b) The feeling of pain which cleaves to the schism which the designated act threatens to bring into our

inner life. (c) Our impulse, founded in the consciousness that our will is decisive in the matter, to leave the act undone.

4. The phenomena of an approving conscience or of a good conscience before and after the act do not manifest themselves in so intensive feeling as is the case with the opposite phenomena. Still the thesis is not tenable that the good conscience is simply the absence of the evil conscience; rather there can be a positive feeling of inner certainty as to the act and of inner joyousness after the act mighty enough to outweigh the opposite feeling of pain.

5. These fundamental types of the phenomena of conscience exhibit in real life the most diverse individual modifications. Very diverse is the degree of the delimitation over against allied inner processes and deliberations; equally so the degree of intellectual reflection. These are given in the fact that the processes of conscience are frequently clothed in a religious form.

6. These observations are corroborated by the *history* of the theories concerning conscience. For example, history shows us a very gradual development of terminology. Moreover, various erroneous views have become associated with the apprehension of the processes of conscience. For example, there is the view of a special faculty of the soul, called "conscience." Again there is the view of a law-giving conscience innate in all men. As against these two views it must be granted that the content of conscience with different peoples at different times shows considerable diversity. There has been an historical development of conscience in human society, and the idea of an "erring conscience" is not true to this idea of development. A "growing conscience" had better be substituted.

7. In connection with all this the question arises, viz., Are the ideas of moral law and of freedom, to whose truth the processes of conscience so powerfully witness, rendered uncertain by that historic diversity in their validity to which we have referred?[1]

Note to §102:7

1. Are the moral ideas true, and what do we mean by their being true?

B. THE TRUTH OF THE MAIN MORAL IDEAS

§103. *The Controversies over and the New Interpretations of the Idea of the Moral Law.*

1. Moral conscience has its history. This fact has been employed not only to contest its universal validity but to deny all right to the thought of an unconditioned law at all.[1] (a) It is maintained that the ideas of "good" and "evil" are only the arbitrary invention of a part of society, i. e. of the strong who desire to establish their power over the weak in this way, or of the weak who oppose their slave-morality to the rule of the strong. The latter is best represented by Nietzsche (*Genealogy of Morals*).[2] (b) Others explain these ideas as an involuntary deception. Certain laws, customs, rules of life, were enacted originally merely for the common welfare, but this origin of these customs and rules was gradually forgotten. On this account the rules were honored as something unconditioned. But we have found out how the rule came to be, and hence it has lost its power over us. When one knows more accurately the genesis and growth of the moral and of conscience, their special dignity vanishes. That was practically the position of Feuerbach, some of the French encyclopædists, and in his later years of Strauss himself. There are hints of this in Hume's work also.

Notes to §103 : 1

1. Where in the course of its development has the moral conscience universal validity? Can you take the cross-section of a procession and absolutize it? You take some point in the relative and say that it is absolute, but you look again and it has gone on a stage. This constitutes the objection raised against formal ethics by teleological or functional ethics.

2. Nietzsche's notion of slave-morality as an invention of aristocratic individuals for the masses is analogous to the old idea of religion as an invention of the priests. But there is no use in talking of the bindingness of what is known to be an invention.

2. From another quarter it is admitted that the thought of "ought" along with the processes of conscience are inescapable for man and for humanity. They cannot be shaken off. But at the same time this thought is so interpreted that at bottom

its peculiarity and the peculiarity of the moral processes in general are lost.[1] We may distinguish the following tendencies, which also admit of manifold combinations: (a) Hedonistic morality. According to this the so-called moral laws or requirements are only counsels on the basis of experience and rational reflection, to the end that we may win the highest individual pleasure, or well being.[2] (b) The social-utilitarian morality. According to this the moral laws are justifiable rules, by following which a state of the greatest possible happiness to the greatest possible number will ensue. To be sure this view harks to (a) above in part. But in part also it points forward to (c) the altruistic moral impulse, or feeling. According to this the moral laws, or requirements, are the expression of the natural sympathetic or altruistic impulse which is powerful in man, either on account of original endowment, or on account of natural selection and heredity.[3] With this latter thought we touch upon (d) the evolutionistic ethics. According to this the moral laws are only the formulae which fix the natural law of human development, simply according to the stage of knowledge at any given time, and these laws of course bring to expression on one hand the developmental tendency of the individual nature, on the other hand that of the nature of the human species in general.[4]

Notes to §103:2

1. One cannot get rid of the thought of "ought," but one may so interpret it as to get rid of belief in its bindingness.

2. We are always inclined to hedonize the moral, instead of moralizing the hedonic.

3. The peculiarity of the moral is evaded in this view, according to which an impulse (albeit a noble one) takes the place of oughtness.

4. Does the evolutionistic and functional account of the genesis of conscience do away with its bindingness, or is it still true that a thing is what it is, not what it came from? It is the essence of formal ethics (e. g. Christian ethics) to hold that conscience is the voice of God in man, that the moral law is the divine command. Must it be regarded any the less as divine in view of its growing up from the sub-moral and the pre-moral? Is there a conception of God which does not leave out the essential reality of God, in harmony with which you can conceive the voice of conscience, even with this lowly origin, as nevertheless the voice of God? Can conscience come from an animal origin and yet express the will of God? Conscience

is characterized by becoming, as against mere being. May it be that God is Becoming, rather than static Being? May it be that it is at the end of the process rather than at the beginning that the Absolute is to be found?

Thus does the ethical problem land us in metaphysics.

3. Two questions are constantly confounded in all these controversies and transformations, viz. the *genetic* question and the *critical* question. The genetic question has to do with the becoming and the growth of moral ideas, whether it be of these moral ideas in general or of their definite content. The critical question has to do with the importance, or better, the *inner teleological necessity* of the moral requirements for the life of the individual and humanity. These two questions are to be carefully distinguished and kept apart. How much of numbers 1 and 2 above is correct as answer to the genetic question? Now it is not the task of Christian ethics to take up this genetic question. We must, however, more accurately define the critical question. (a) Is the thought of an "ought" at all unnecessary, as number 1 above affirms? (b) Is that thought inwardly necessary, but simply as means to the attainment of a natural end otherwise given? (c) Or is that thought inwardly necessary because it itself first discloses to us an absolutely worthful higher end?

§104. *The Truth of the Idea of the Moral Law.*[1]

1. In order to answer the complicated question we have to seek first of all *the inalientable worth for the individual man* of the requirement of conscience which involuntarily asserts itself. (a) By way of direct exposition it may be said that we have in the moral law a norm conceived and acknowledged by ourselves, as contrasted with our being driven about by natural law, and with this norm we also have a supreme inner end of life. We hereby see also a way opened up in order to the unity and freedom of our inner life; in order to the spiritual dignity of our personality.[2] (b) This proof is clarified and corroborated by the indirect proof that if we abandon obedience to an unconditioned "ought," we fall a victim to inner dividedness and dissipation, and to dependence upon nature in us and around us; also by the indirect proof that neither discretion

nor the clever calculation of utility, neither civil law nor social custom, neither art nor science can save us from this calamity.[3] (c) The two series of thoughts (a and b above) combine in the idea that in all the activities of man the basic tendency of the human spirit toward unity and freedom and toward an inner content of life is manifest; that, however, the tendency cannot be consummated without the collection and organization of the will under the requirement of conscience, or of the unconditioned "ought."

Note to §104

1. See Windelband's *Praeludien,* chapter on critical and genetic method.

Notes to §104:1

1. The self-dependence of the inner life must be maintained against naturalism as well as against traditionalism. Impulses must be converted into servants of moral purpose. There must be a remainderless ethicization of the sub-ethical.

3. The spirit of Jesus, which made modern culture possible, must ever save us from that culture. Culture and piety are not necessarily at variance with each other. The one thing needful is the perfect moral fellowship born of faith in God.

2. The acknowledgment of the imperative of conscience has similar worth for human society. (a) It is not meant by this that emphasis should be placed on the worth that the validity of the moral law has for the *outer condition* of society or of the folk. (b) Rather by way of *indirect proof* is it to be emphasized that humanity is dishonored and degraded by setting aside or by changing the moral law or the idea of the good, in order to a fellowship on the basis of nature or of interest, even though this fellowship be of a highly refined character. (c) But there is also a *direct* exposition which comports with this. In what does the dignity or worthiness of humanity consist, and in what does the sacredness and consecration of the collective life of man consist? The answer is, In considering the goal of humanity to be the organization of itself into a kingdom of moral personalities under the lead of an unconditioned "ought."

3. The above, in dependence upon the permanent thoughts of Kant, is an exposition of the importance and significance

which the imperative of conscience has for the life of the human spirit, and it decides in favor of the third and against the first two questions at the close of §103. But it offers at the same time the possibility of acknowledging at least the relative rights of the hedonistic, the utilitarian, the altruistic and the evolutionistic ethics, and of bringing this relative right to validity in the treatment of the genetic question of which mention has already been made.[1]

Note to §104:3

1. The germ can not grow without the stuff disintegrating.

4. The Christian view, which acknowledges a holy commandment of God in the moral law, not only can but must embody these considerations that have been set forth, must therefore combine theonomy with autonomy. But the Christian view reminds us that our treatment needs supplementing on two sides. The validity of the law of conscience will be able to attain to full clearness and power only (a) when it is first filled with a correct content, and (b) when it is articulated in the system of a comprehensive view of the world. This is the task for Part C in our general treatment.

§105. *The Truth of the Idea of Freedom. Determinism and Indeterminism.*

1. With the controversies and transformations which have to do with the concept of the moral law (§104) there is combined as a rule a controversy or transformation of the idea of moral freedom presented in §101, therefore a deterministic view of freedom. But diverse tendencies are to be distinguished within determinism itself, as follows: (a) A group by itself may be called *religious* determinism, which deduces the impossibility of a free will (α) from the power of human sin, or (β) from the work of divine grace, as well as (γ) from the omnipotence and omniscience of God, (α) being *anthropological* determinism, and (β) and (γ) *theological* determinism. (b) In distinction from this group there are two groups of *philosophical* determinism: (α) the *materialistic* group, which considers the processes of the will only as sequential phenomena of the processes of the brain which take place according to natural law; (β) the *ideal-*

istic group, which, to be sure, honors the spiritual life as self-dependent, but yet considers the course of ideas and also of the moral volitional processes to be according to natural necessity. In this connection we are concerned mainly with philosophical determinism, more particularly in its idealistic form.[1]

Note to §105 : 1

1. The point at which I deviate from most modern statements is with reference to that subsuming of motive and conduct under cause and effect, which is the essence of determinism. The cause and effect category does justice to the passivity-moment resident in all reality, but not to the activity-element also present in all reality. There is a gradedness of activity, which is a criterion of the dignity of all reality. If the static had been original, processes would not have started at all. The active moment is necessarily first. This much of truth there is in the notion of an *Urthat* — an original archetypal act by virtue of which man gave himself the character which thenceforth determines his acts. But instead of having the *Urthat* isolated, let it be immanent and constant. To say that the essence of *a* is that it is caused solely by *b* is to explain everything ultimately by nothing. If the old static view is right, then determinism is right; but if the static is a deposit of the active, then freedom is necessarily true. For why predicate activity of all else and deny it of yourself?

2. Philosophical determinism appeals for support to three groups of reasons, viz. (a) the metaphysical or epistemological consideration, that the causal law excludes the assumption of the freedom of the will; (b) psychological considerations, that observation of the psychic life shows that even every conscious act is determined by motives, and that the motives themselves in turn proceed from inner endowment and outer circumstances that render even a calculation of the decision of the will possible in many cases; (c) social-scientific considerations, that observation of the social life yields the fact of heredity, and that statistics, especially moral statistics, exhibit a natural legal regularity, even of the acts of the human will.

3. But the question arises whether these reasons of philosophical determinism are cogent. As regards (a) above, two remarks may be made. For one thing, the so-called causal law is nothing but a postulate of knowledge that a calculable regularity of happening exists. But whether and in what scope this postulate, so fruitful for natural knowledge, is also ap-

plicable to the life of the human spirit — this is precisely the question. For the other thing, metaphysics and epistemology have overlooked the moment of activity which is immanent and constant in all reality. As regards (b) above, the psychological investigation does establish the existence of motives, but it finds at the same time that in our moral decisions the consciousness of freedom is combined with this consciousness of motivation. If it be said that this consciousness of freedom is false or is an illusion, it is difficult to see why the same remark should not be made with reference to the consciousness of motivation. But the main point in this connection is that whether this consciousness of freedom be true or false, empirical psychological investigation cannot determine, and for this reason the appeal to psychology in support of determinism is defective. Now as to (c) above, social-scientific observation does rightly call attention to hereditary predisposition and to the influence of society and to outer relations and circumstances. These forces thus appealed to do render decisions in favor of the morally good difficult, but it is also true that eventually such decisions may be rendered easier by such predispositions.[1] But one thing is not excluded by these forces, viz. that the measure of energy with which the individual in his struggle against anti-ethical impulses and outer influences reacts upon the commandment of his conscience, is a thing of freedom. The so-called statistical laws do indeed declare that there is a certain regularity as regards moral actions, if we take into account large social groups and stretches of time. But these laws yield no such disclosure concerning the character of motivation in the case of the single agent.

Note to §105 : 3

1. As against the passivity of heredity, emphasize the activity resident in the individual life.

4. The above are considerations to be urged against the arguments for determinism. To these we may add counter-arguments against determinism. (a) Determinism must explain as illusions the convictions which involuntarily assert themselves in connection with moral conduct. (α) *Explanation* from determining inner and outer factors takes the place of

moral responsibility and accountability, or imputation. (β) The guilt-feeling and remorse become mere pain with reference to the situation, or the endowment of education which determines our will. (γ) Moral evil itself becomes a malformation similar to the pathological disturbances of mental life.[1] (b) Since determinism abrogates or transforms the consciousness, asserting itself in conscience, of the moral freedom of the will, it is not able to treat with entire seriousness the elevation of man above the stage of a nature-being. It is true rather that the postulate that the idea of the moral freedom of the will, along with the idea of the moral law, retains its validity, arises from the full recognition of the spiritual vocation and destiny of man. Such an idea, however, can attain to full certainty only in connection with the whole view of the world, and therefore with the religious view of the world as well.[2]

Notes to §105 : 4

1. Referring the ethical to the psychological, the psychological to the physiological, and the physiological to the physical — this is the naturalistic regress.

2. As John Watson maintains, a divorce between religion and morality means the destruction of both.

5. But an outcome of the whole controversy is that the affirmation of freedom, to be equal to the assaults of determinism, must keep to *correct limits.* (a) It is to be limited to the moral *decisions* for or against the command of conscience, of which the individual is himself conscious. (b) No moral decision is enacted in the sense of an entirely undetermined *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae* (v. §101 : 1). But each *decision* is made *difficult or easy* in a certain degree. (α) *From within* this is granted in the inherited endowment of the individual, which may be favorable or unfavorable to the moral volition. This remark is also true with reference to inner habituation. As an effect of the latter there is a steady bent of the will toward the evil side, and with this an approximation to the impossibility of willing the good, but also a fortification of the will in the good, and an approximation to what is called *material moral freedom,* or control of natural impulses.[1] (β) *From without* the influence of human society in which the indi-

vidual lives is important, not only for the formation of conscience, but also for the achievement of moral or immoral decision. In this way also the fulfilment of the commandment of conscience can be highly improbable without the moral freedom of the will, i. e. the capacity to struggle against temptation being thereby annulled. With this recognition of these aggravating and alleviating circumstances, justice is done to the facts adduced in 2 (b) and (c) above, i. e. to the psychological and the social-scientific arguments.

Note to §105 : 5

1. The impulses do not remain as wild horses outside the moral life. They enter into the moral life as constituents organized into it.

6. The conclusion of the whole matter then would seem to be this: the obligation of the will through moral law which presupposes freedom. By freedom is meant here, however, the capacity for self-determination according to motives of one's own. The possibility of freedom in relation to necessity is a problem of philosophy. The reality of such freedom is the subject-matter of ethics. In reflection upon this subject many theories have arisen. There is the idea of compulsion, or our determination by causes lying outside of ourselves, and not by motives originated by ourselves, i. e. of being determined on lower grounds, by natural necessity, and not by the higher necessity of the good. This type of determinism is what was once meant by "fatalism," what is now meant by "naturalism." If again the determination is not by a cause in nature lying outside of us, but by a cause in God outside of us, then this is predestination and in philosophy may be known as predeterminism. The sum of the objections to this abstract determinism is that the theory is in contradiction with the fundamental facts of moral experience.[1]

Note to §105 : 6

1. The problem of philosophy is to see how God is through all and in all, and on the other hand to see that our wills are ours. The solution of the problem is to be seen in the fact that instead of the divine efficiency being a menace to the human, it is the condition and reality of the human efficiency. Somehow in the core of the human willing there is the presence of the divine, but in such a way that the human does not cease to be free. The ultimate ques-

tion is whether there is freedom immanent in reality as a whole, or not. Only by participation in the whole do we enjoy freedom.

7. But over against the extreme of this determinism there is the abstract indeterminism — a theory which says that freedom is a groundless, characterless volition out of empty indifference. No matter what the heredity or the environment or the past life, each new act is done regardless of them. This theory presupposes an unnatural idea of the will, excluding any steady bent or inclination of the will. It excludes education, character-forming. It leaves out of account the fact that free will is a deliberating choice under motives, of which the strongest prevails. The will does not stand under accidental impulses in its choice, but by rational reflection can generate new motives which overbear the existing impulses.

8. Now as against determinism and against indeterminism there are a number of mediating theories. One is Kant's, according to which freedom belongs to intelligible character, the noumenal, but necessity prevails in empirical character, the phenomenal.[1] Schelling's and Schopenhauer's *Urthat,* "intelligible" according to Kant's idea, gives man the character of freedom, but this *Urthat* has in its expression ever thereafter a determined character. This again is predeterminism, which does not conform with the facts of moral experience. In these doctrines of Kant, Schelling and Schopenhauer, the relation between intelligible and empirical character, between free and determined, is obscure — in Kant's case, on account of his dualism; in the others, on account of their defective moral conceptions in general. But there is a definition of freedom in contrast with both determinism and indeterminism, as self-determination conditioned by character and environment in view of motives, and the emphasis is not to be put on the self to such an extent as to render uninfluential either the nature without or within, or the motive (idea of the end). Only by introducing those motives do we lead up to the higher necessity, the idea of the good.[2]

Notes to §105 : 8

1. Kant seems to say man is free noumenally and not free phenomenally.

2. The lower necessity is that of cause and effect. The higher

necessity is that of the true, the beautiful and the good. These grow, but as Windelband says, "to prove relativism is to destroy it," for relative proof is not real proof. We have here the old, beautiful problem (and I wish I could give my life to it) of the relation between cause and worth. It is the ultimate philosophical problem. Our ability to move toward values as an end, rather than toward consequences as an end, is our freedom. What is it that the will wills? Not consequences, but goods, values. Its doing that is its freedom. There is no force outside of us or in us of a nature-character which constitutes such a necessity as inhibits the higher necessity of the true, the beautiful and the good.

C. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL CONCEPTS, AND THE UNIVERSAL VALIDITY OF THE CHRISTIAN MORAL VIEWS [1]

§106. *The Factors of Progressive Moral Development.*

1. The moral knowledge and conduct of the individual are intimately bound up with the human community and with history. Already this fact has been touched upon in A and B, especially in §102:6, §103:3, and §105:5 (b). On the one hand the clearness of the moral conscience has only gradually emerged from implication and confusion with custom and right (v. §99:5 and 6). On the other hand the content of conscience has only gradually unfolded.

Note to C

1. What gives interest to this is the effort to harmonize the modern development-idea and the Christian view of the finality of the Christian moral ideal.

2. This unfolding has been essentially influenced by the development of the human cultural life in all its ramifications, viz. the family bond, the life of labor and of gain, custom, the civil order, and above all religion. With this knowledge the relative right of the views delineated in §103:1 (b) and 2 receives valid recognition. But in this development the individuals are not only determined by those great historical forces just mentioned, but they themselves react in turn upon the great cultural circles. Especially do the leading spirits in history exercise a determining influence upon these circles.

3. But this entire development, no less than that of science,

art and religion, has for its presupposition the existence of an original spiritual endowment, first of all of a *formal character.* This endowment, emerging in the phenomena of conscience, is nothing but the endeavor, essential to us, to order the life of our will according to unitary norms, and this endeavor is itself grounded in the fundamental tendency of the human spirit (sketched in §104: 1, c) to unity and freedom, and with this to an inner content of life. It is only by means of this endowment that the requirements of custom, of right, etc., arising within history, can become unconditioned norms for man's own self-evaluation, or can become content of conscience. On the basis of the content of conscience thus formed, he appropriates further content of conscience from the historical life, but exercises his critical thought at the same time upon the goods and tasks of life historically given him.

4. This view of the development of the moral ideal harmonizes with the Christian views of *man* as *the image of God,* and of the power of *sin,* both being rightly understood. This harmonization is possible from the point of view of a divine education of sinful humanity.[1] But the idea of development burdens us with the difficult problem as to whether the absoluteness of the Christian ideal of morality can be maintained.[2] To this matter we now turn.

Notes to §106: 4

1. Compare Lessing's *Education of the Human Race.* But Lessing does not take the sinful character of humanity into account.

2. It was easy enough to maintain this on the old idea of revelation as immediate communication of truth, and on the old view of the world. But if ideals, the Christian ideal included, have emerged out of the heart of historical life, little by little, you have a different problem. How can you reconcile the thought of the growing character of the moral ideal with its absoluteness?

§107. *Proof of the Universal Validity of the Christian Ideal of Morality.*

1. In order to answer the question just raised it is necessary to consider in their main outlines the *most important ethical ideals* which have emerged in history. These are the following: (a) the political ideal of the welfare of the state and of civic virtue, which arose in antiquity but has experienced

modern development (e. g. Hobbes); (b) the individualistic ideal of the self-sufficient wise man, which passed over from antiquity to the modern period (e. g. Nietzsche); (c) the ascetic ideal of world-flight, or world-negation, which is connected with mysticism on the one hand, with pessimism on the other (e. g. Buddhism and Schopenhauer); (d) the modern æsthetic ideal of energetic individuality on the soil of culture (e. g. romanticism); (e) the utilitarian ideal of the economic welfare of society. Now all these views are opposed to the Christian ideal, which on its *moral* side has for its content a fellowship of moral persons united by the principle of self-denying love.[1]

Note to §107:1

1. Fellowship from the Christian point of view, is not of nature-beings, but only of persons. It is the glory of the Christian religion that it stands for the total ethicization of the natural, the kingdom of moral personalities in which all are ends and in which love rules.

2. We may attempt to borrow from history itself our *judgment* concerning these various ethical ideals as compared with the Christian. (a) At all events this judgment is not to be gained by means of a simple empirical or inductive procedure, but only through a critical procedure. The latter requires that we familiarize ourselves with the various ideals as they have unfolded themselves historically into their consequences, and thus bring to consciousness inwardly and vividly the worth and unworth which they would have for our own life. (b) Such a procedure yields the following judgment: With reference to 1 a — the political ideal — positively the knowledge of the foothold the ethical life finds in the state is worthful. But negatively, what is to be opposed is the elevation of the state to an absolute ethical good and the consequent dependence of the moral ideal on natural limits and external authority (as in Plato and Hobbes). As to 1 b — the individualistic ideal — positively, the knowledge of the absolute dignity of the single personality is worthful. But negatively, the goal of the αὐτάρχεια, or self-sufficiency of the wise man and disengagement of the individual from the historical community, are morally questionable. As to 1 c — the ascetic ideal — positively, the

thought of self-denial is worthful. But on the other hand, negatively, the endeavor to demolish nature itself is in contradiction to the moral ideal.[1] As to 1 d — the æsthetic ideal — positively, the thought of individuality and of the importance of culture for the moral life is worthful. But negatively, wherever these goals are made the highest, even the instability of the individual as well as the deterioration of culture follow with inner necessity. As to 1 e — the utilitarian ideal — positively, the knowledge of the influence of economic relations upon the spiritual moral life is important. But negatively, wherever economic welfare is made supreme, it leads to the degradation of spiritual personality. (c) On the basis of these critical judgments we may attempt to show that all the worthful elements of the modern ethical ideal may find place in the Christian moral ideal, and that there may be avoided those onesidednesses of other ideals which have come to light in the course of their history.

Note to §107 : 2

1. The modern ethical ideal is that nothing in man should be *denied,* but all should be *organized.* Still, Christian thought retains this older idea of self-denial.

3. This historico-philosophical reflection must issue, however, in the effort at a direct proof that the Christian ideal of morality is in itself perfect and unsurpassable. (a) *It is in itself perfect,* so far as the worth which, according to §104, an unconditioned " ought " has for the spiritual life of man comes to full validity with and only with the Christian content of the moral law. The Christian moral law opens up to the individual the way to perfect unity and freedom, and with this to the supreme content of the inner life, and it also gives us the goal of a perfected spiritual fellowship for human society. (b) The Christian ideal of morality is *unsurpassable,* because according to the conditions of our human existence it can be neither extensively nor intensively transcended. There is nothing higher than moral personality, intensively, and nothing higher than the fellowship of love of such personalities. But this is the Christian ideal. What we have said is true, however, only because the Christian ideal has at the same time in

itself an infinite capacity for development — a development, however, which, if man forever remains man, shall be continuous with what we know of moral personality in the fellowship of love in moral society.

4. But the truth of the Christian ideal of morality can be comprehensively recognized only when it is understood in its connection with the religious faith of Christianity. This points us to our next thought.

§108. *Morality and Religion. Christian Revelation and the Question of a Religionless Morality.*[1]

1. It is precisely the connection between morality and religion that is opposed by the representatives of religionless morality. (a) They urge the following points against religious morality, or against the connection of morality with religion: [2] (α) that it renders the validity of the moral law insecure; [3] (β) that it establishes a dependence upon external authority; [4] (γ) that it cripples moral energy; [5] (δ) that it corrupts the moral motive by the outlook to rewards and punishments; [6] (ϵ) that it introduces morally worthless works along with moral conduct.[7] (b) In the positive working out of its standpoint as well as in the establishment of its religionless ethics, it itself occupies a very diverse attitude, now atheistic, now agnostic toward religion; also it tends to the deification of the moral.[8]

Note to §108

1. [See Pfleiderer's article in the *American Journal of Theology* for 1908.]

Notes to §108:1

2. Just as, historically, science and morality and religion were inextricably interfused, and one by one the sciences came to be emancipated from religious control, so morality seeks emancipation, as a part of the great movement for independence.

3. If morality is essentially connected with religion, how can it have more validity than religion? If duty depends on the will of God, and we do not know that there is a God, we do not know God's will, or our duty.

4. From the point of view of this criticism, the will of God is necessarily external to my will. This assumes a God-idea which, while once held, is not a necessary one.

5. For example, in quietism, predestinationism, and the appeal to providence instead of depending on one's own energy.

6. The religionless ethicists claim that promising happiness and heaven as the reward of virtue is immoral, in that it is supplying something other than the moral as a motive to the moral. The reward of morality is not happiness; it is morality, moral strength for further moral conduct. Do good because it is good, and not for any other reason.

7. We have only energy and time, and these ought to be devoted to the production of values. Ought any of our energy and time to be drawn off from the moral tasks of life, and devoted to cult, to religious exercises? Is it immoral to do that? Or is cult a means to moral activity and so a moral act?

8. The exclusion of God from ethics and the deification of the moral are analogous to the earlier outlawing of God by the scientists and their deification of law. God is moral, but that is not all of God.

2. Critical judgment upon religionless morality may be made as follows: (a) On the basis of history. An appeal to history shows that with individuals indeed an energetic moral life can persist without religious faith; but that in the case of the life of peoples, moral ideas have been pervasive and powerful only in connection with the corresponding religious views of the world.[1] (b) On the basis of systematic considerations. If we desire to become clearly conscious of our position as morally struggling beings, the question as to the meaning and order of the world in their relation to our moral endeavor must be raised.[2] To this question either a positive, a negative and pessimistic, or an agnostic answer is possible. Of these three answers the last two, if their consequences be not arrested, bring with them an inner exhaustion of the moral life.

Notes to §108:2

1. It does not follow that what is true in the case of a few individuals would be true of the whole people. The home can be kept up with one deaf, dumb and blind person; but if everybody were thus afflicted, it would be a different proposition. Is not the religionless moral individual upborne by religious convictions in the community about him and the traditions which enter into his very blood? I know of nothing which the religionless ethicists can urge against it. Much of the morality of such an individual is like the afterglow of a sun which has set. He is like a man who can keep a good degree of health while living an unhealthful life, owing to his patrimony of health. And is it not true that the moral individual may become

more beautiful and helpful through the influence of religion? Is there not a certain hardness and austerity about religionless morality, which needs to be softened and beautified by religion? Might not some great savage personality, looming up on pagan soil, be inclined to ask, What is the good of your civilization? And yet, does it follow that he would not be greater if he were civilized? There are elements of a humanizing character which come through religious influences. Moreover, the appeal to history shows that persistence of moral values depends on the religious values persisting.

2. If we did not believe that the structure and function of the universe were such as to render the production of values possible, we should not try to produce them. The attempt to raise a crop of moral values argues the belief that it can be done, and this is an essentially religious belief.

3. This criticism implies the assertion that a positive ethical view of the world is necessary as background of the practical moral life. (a) An *unconditioned* moral end may be assumed by us only upon the conviction that such an end is not only striven for by us, but is assigned us by the unconditioned World-Ground, and is at the same time the all-conditioning end of the world-reality itself.[1] (b) Thus the *postulate* of a moral end of the world and of a moral order of the world springs up from the ethical life itself. The concept of "postulate" implies that this assumption is required by irrepressible inner need, but that no coercive empirical or speculative proof can be given for the assumption.

Note to §108:3

1. If I am a part of the world-reality, and if by my nature and by the requirements of that reality my chief good is moral, it is impossible that the World-Ground should not be moral and have a moral end.

4. The postulate, however, first finds its authentication in religious faith. (a) Although the postulate arises with inner necessity, the *mere standpoint of postulate* is in itself insufficient. It impels us to the question as to the evidence of the sway of moral end in the world, evidence which even if not logically cogent to the intellect, is not on that account unintelligible and is yet convincing to the heart. (b) Such evidence is possible only as *revelation* that is accessible to religious faith, that is the correlate of religious faith. Within human

history we have such revelation in Jesus Christ, in the person of Jesus, i. e. in the world-conquering grandeur of his fellowship with God, in his holy love for man, and in the redeeming spiritual power issuing from him. (c) This revelation in Jesus Christ establishes the confident certainty both of the absolute truth of the Christian idea of morality as the God-given destiny and vocation of man, and of the necessity of the victory of this Christian moral ideal over all the world and the resistance of the evil of the world. Therewith the Christian moral life receives its unique motivation.

5. Therefore the Christian ethic is not touched by the reproaches which are raised, according to 1 a, by the religionless ethicists against religious ethics. As to α in 1 a, it is precisely in Christian faith that the validity of the moral law comes to full certainty. As to β in 1 a, the moral law is inwardly acknowledged as a law of freedom. As to γ in 1 a, the most powerful motive is given for moral conduct. As to δ in 1 a, the expectation of reward is freed from all egoistic character. As to ϵ in 1 a, every morally worthless task is done away.[1]

Note to §108:5

1. The common needs of common men take precedence over any creed or cult, any form or ceremony, any tradition or institution, however hoary or majestic. This was a fundamental position with Jesus. Note his attitude toward the Sabbath law and the hunger of his disciples, the temple offering (showbread) and the hunger of man. The money-changers in the temple were occupying space prepared for and devoted to the Gentiles, and so Jesus drove them out. How (even at that stage in the development of human ideals) he went directly to the core of the ethical thought of the primacy of man's needs as against the venerable institutions of the past. And Jesus was no iconoclast, no ruthless radical. He made no direct assault on traditional institutions. He said the end, the reaching of the moral goal was the thing of supreme value, and that other things were to be valued only as means to that end. And Jesus was willing to contribute his part toward the doing away of hindrances to realizing the moral end, even to the giving of his life.

The objections of the religionless ethicists are valid only against the excrescences of religion. To make the objection universal is like condemning art because there are vulgar post cards.

6. From this proof of the truth of the Christian moral views in which the foundation of Christian ethics terminates, it fol-

lows, however, that the superstructure of Christian ethics must take the revelation of God in Jesus Christ as its fundament.[1]

Note to §108:6

1. Parallel with this, other ethical systems would seek a metaphysical basis. Christian ethics, in its appeal to historic revelation, is more pictorial.

PART II. THE SUPERSTRUCTURE OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

§109. *Sources and Method.*

1. Christian ethics undertakes to expound the Christian ideal of life on the basis of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Like Christian dogmatics, Christian ethics is dependent upon the Scriptures. In the New Testament especially it finds a rich ethical material. Not only in the narrative of Jesus' words and deeds, but also in the epistles, with their instructions to the churches and their disclosures of Christian personalities. But the Old Testament also is rich in ethical doctrines.

2. *Certain principles* are valid for the employment of this ethical material of the Bible in Christian ethics. (a) It can *not* be employed in the sense of a statutory law, on account of (α) its unequal worth, (β) its special historical relations, (γ) its unsystematic character; above all, however, on account of the peculiarity of Christianity itself.[1] (b) Rather this ethical material is to be critically sifted and ordered. In this task we may be guided by the following question: What can and ought to be certain and practicable for us, through self-dependent personal trust in the Savior, Jesus Christ, as being content of the Divine Will?

Note to §109:2

1. Christianity is not a religion of the letter, but of the spirit; not of legalism and casuistry and consequent atomism of conduct, but of disposition and of the unity and freedom of the moral life.

3. This interrogatory determines *in general the procedure of Christian ethics.* Christian ethics thus shapes itself as parallel to Christian dogmatics. It not only allows the authoritative eternal validity of the revealed will of God to come to its right, but it indicates at the same time that the divine will can be known only in *self-dependent* appropriation on the part of man, and can be applied to changing human relations.[1]

Note to §109:3

1. Only that in the Bible is authoritative which is revelation of

God, and only that is revelation of God which is *capable* of being appropriated by the ethico-religious life of man, i. e. by faith. If this be criticized as landing in subjectivity, I admit it and point out its inevitability.

4. The history of Christian morals is an essential auxiliary to Christian ethics. It shows us rich progress in knowledge, but also the by-ways of error which have been taken. Even the confessions of the various evangelical churches are of importance in this history, as yielding the Protestant understanding of the ideal of the Christian life.

5. The special task of Christian ethics requires that a free employment of the ethical material of the Scriptures and of the confessions be much more universally recognized than in Christian dogmatics. Yet in the existing elaborations of ethics those diverse methods are reflected which may be distinguished from Christian dogmatics (v. §36 *supra*), viz. the development of moral doctrine out of the Christian consciousness and experience. There are also the speculative, the biblicistic and the confessional methods in Christian ethics as in Christian dogmatics; but there are many transitions and mediations between them. The important thing for all these methods is that they shall take into account (a) faith's understanding of the historical revelation, (b) the teleological unfolding of the Christian goal of life thus known with reference to the various relations of life.

6. Our task now is to see in what sense the *revelation* of God in Jesus Christ is the basis of the *new Christian life;* then secondly to see this Christian life in its unfolding in connection with the secular tasks of history.

A. THE REVELATION OF GOD IN JESUS CHRIST AS THE BASIS OF THE NEW CHRISTIAN LIFE

a. The New Ethical Goal of Life Revealed in Jesus Christ.

§110. *The Kingdom of God Revealed in Jesus as the Chief Good and as the Ethical Norm.*

1. In faith in God's revelation in Jesus Christ we become certain of the *kingdom of God* as the absolutely worthful di-

vine end of the world. This idea of kingdom of God is used in Christian dogmatics as a central idea. Whether this same idea is admissible as central in Christian ethics, whether the idea of kingdom of God may be employed at all as an ethical concept, is a question which has been much discussed in modern times.

2. From an investigation of the synoptic concept of the kingdom of God the following may be concluded. (a) "Kingdom of God" does not primarily designate an ideal to be actualized through the activity of the human will, but the future state of the unlimited kingly dominion of God, a state to be hoped for on account of God's omnipotent power. But it is precisely because kingdom of God is thus rule of God that it presents itself as the chief good which Jesus proffers to man, and this chief good is throughout of a spiritual ethical character, viz. the full fellowship with the holy, perfect God, and participation in the perfect fulfilment of his holy will. (b) But ethical requirements are united with the proclamation of this good. The kingdom of God is promised as reward for conduct according to God's commandments. Yet it is at the same time itself the supreme norm of our will.[1] For the divinely commanded conduct is as to content nothing but the seeking after, and a filial acceptance of the proffered kingdom of God and likeness to the perfect God, all of which we win even here with the practice of true righteousness, especially of self-denying love, but which is to be perfected only in full fellowship with the heavenly Father. (c) Thus the fulfilment of the ethical requirements themselves become the paving of the way of the kingdom of God on earth. The kingdom of God, at least according to its inner side, becomes actual now and here, where men (α) through faith in Jesus Christ trust God as their heavenly Father, and (β) practice true righteousness — above all, brotherly love. The former (α) is the religious relation; the latter (β), the moral relation. According to this understanding of the words of Jesus worked out into their consequences, the chief good of the kingdom of God itself becomes the supreme ethical ideal after all.

Note to §110:2

1. Topic for investigation: Is Jesus' conception of reward ethical?

3. Now this ethical import of the concept "kingdom of God" recedes in the apostolic witness in favor of the eschatological side, but does not drop away entirely. Paul in particular gave it clear expression, especially in Romans 14:17, "The kingdom of God is righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost."

4. Also in the *history of Christian doctrine* the idea of the kingdom of God has been employed again and again according to its ethical side, viz. in the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church, where it was indeed perverted into a secular world-power; also in the evangelical purity of the Reformers, whose view experienced an abridgment in subsequent Pietism and a moralistic turn in philosophy.[1]

Note to §110:4

1. The "Kingdom of God" notion has oscillated between the exclusively religious and the exclusively moral, between the apocalyptic and the secular. When primitive Messianism dropped out, and men had to turn attention to the secular side of life, the outcome was a great reaction from the apocalyptic notion of the kingdom of God to the secular. Luther stands for reaction against that acute secularization in Catholicism, and returns with power to the religious content of the kingdom of God, and on the moral side away from the Catholic secularism to duties in state and family. In pietism the view of the Reformers suffered abridgment, and in Kant the idea becomes exclusively moral. Today historical science maintains that the primitive Christian conception of the kingdom of God was of something wholly miraculous and future, which man's will could do nothing to bring about, but which he could be prepared for through repentance. Yet the core of Jesus' thought of the kingdom of God is ethical.

5. The idea "kingdom of God" is in fact peculiarly fitted to be a designation of the *ethical ideal of Christianity,* for it indicates (a) the founding and the finishing of that ideal by God himself; (b) the preparation for that ideal in an ethical — indeed, in both a religious and an ethical — self-activity on our side; (c) the individual as well as the social side of that ethical ideal; (d) the capacity of the ideal to pervade earthly relations as well as to point to a future in hope, which is essential to the ideal. Thus one and the same idea "kingdom of God" can be central in Christian dogmatics and in Christian ethics.

§111. *The Divine Law Preached by Jesus in its Distinction from Other Laws of Life.*

1. The direction of life which is implicitly defined in the concept "kingdom of God" is explicitly unfolded by Jesus in a series of commandments, or in a *new law of life* for his disciples. In this particular there is a similarity with other religions which are bound in legal precepts for their disciples; but there is a fundamental difference, not to be overlooked.

2. Jesus' law of life may remind us of the *ascetic law* of other religions of redemption.[1] (a) In recent times in particular the commandment of Jesus has been explained on many sides as essentially ascetic (e. g. Tolstoi, Nietzsche). (b) In fact there are many words in which Jesus seems to require celibacy, poverty and the foregoing of one's rights (this last being what Catholics call "humility" in their "celibacy, poverty and humility").[2] (c) But the following considerations are to be urged against the idea that the ascetic tendency was dominant with Jesus: (α) Jesus' own appearance and the impression which he made upon the people;[3] (β) Jesus' judgment that not the absorption of self in God, but the redemption of the soul is the highest goal;[4] (γ) Jesus' warfare against all self-chosen performances through which the simple and obvious commandments of God are subordinated and abbreviated;[5] (δ) Jesus' express rejection of fasts for his disciples.[6] (d) But while the ascetic tendency is not the dominant one, the commandments of self-denial retain for Jesus their full significance. (α) The positive commandment of Jesus to seek the kingdom of God and its righteousness imposes the requirement upon all his disciples to equate no earthly good with the kingdom of God, and to crucify all impulses and inclinations which resist true righteousness.[7] (β) But it was simply upon a narrower circle of his disciples that Jesus imposed the requirement to take upon themselves all the denial and privation involved in the calling of a preacher of the gospel at that time.

Notes to §111:2

1. Was Jesus an ascetic?

2. The Catholics said obedience to Jesus is necessary, and so is the secular life in the world, but the same person cannot do both. So they divided Christians into two classes, one to obey Jesus, and

the other to do the work of the world. The first class, it was held, might gain superfluous merit, such as could be used to help out with the salvation of the large number necessarily engaged in secular callings. Against this Luther protested that what we know to be the will of God is just our vocation, our daily task in the secular life. The Roman Catholic Church is a great political institution, but its solution of the moral problem is worthless. It evades the problem, really. The worst feature of monasticism has not been its immorality, but its ideal of perfection. Luther saw this, and that to live in one's God-given vocation, falling in line with the order of the world is to obey God. In determining what was morally necessary, he started from the requirements of one's position in the world, interpreted as the will of God. He did not start from the precepts of Jesus. He was no connoisseur in the art of modernizing Jesus. And the Reformers were right in this insight that the natural duties of life are the will of God, in the doing of which one finds God, even if it may have been a truth which was not in their Bibles.

But is not the question as to whether we can confess Jesus as Leader and Lord a question of the life and death of Christianity? Even so, may we not be outwardly detached from him and inwardly bound to him, and may not the former be a condition of the latter? It is not his words as such, but the morally necessary that must be obeyed. The words of Jesus are not new, but he was. We can be like his character, only by being unlike his conduct. Imitation of Jesus leads to unveraciousness. Let us apply Jesus' own principle to his own words, binding our lives to the eternally good in him, and thus exemplifying not the subjection of the servant, but the obedience of the free.

3. He was not like John the Baptist and the Essenes.

4. Schopenhauer says Jesus was an ascetic; that he would have us end with the absorption in God, which is the dissolution of personality. But Jesus' thought was the opposite of this; he would have us *become* personalities.

5. The Catholic system of morality has initiated, selected, invented and stipulated things to be done which are not in the moral order of the world, but capriciously tacked on to it. This arbitrary invention of devices other than the moral order of the world to discipline one's own life is to take our discipline out of the hands of God.

6. Jesus would have nothing in morality but the moral; nothing in religion but the religious.

7. Note the parable of the rich fool, the question about dividing the inheritance, and the saying about plucking out one's eye or cutting off one's hand.

3. Also the distinction between Jesus' law of life and all law-religions is a fundamental distinction. This is already based

in the *relation* of Christianity *to the Old Testament law.* To be sure, Jesus developed his religio-ethical law of life in direct adhesion to the Old Testament law. But for all that it can be designated a *new law,* for (a) as to *content,* Jesus made the new law, in that it is the sum of the law and the prophets. This position signifies a sharpening and an internalizing of the Old Testament law, but also a *critical reduction* of that law, which yet at the same time amounted to an enrichment. (b) Also as to its *character,* the law is thus transformed into a *law of freedom* which will be inwardly acknowledged and fulfilled from within outward. Moreover, it has a different position in the whole of religion. This relation to the Old Testament law is confirmed by the apostolic, especially the Pauline apprehension of the content and character of the Christian law of life, which is that of the fulfilment of the law.

4. With this new spiritual understanding of the law, the problem arises how the "good and honest heart" comes to be, for such a heart alone can freely fulfil the internalized or spiritualized law.

§112. *The Law of God in its Main Content as Preached by Jesus.*

1. The content of the law of life as preached by Jesus is most briefly summed up in the two basic laws, i. e. in the *religious* commandment of unlimited love to God, and in the *moral* commandment of love to neighbor.

2. The *central moral commandment* of neighbor-love, which finds a practical elucidation in the words, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," possesses a critical power over against our self-love. But it wins its comprehensive normative power through the concept "kingdom of God," and thus primarily through the love of God himself, which he discloses to us.[1] In this connection the idea of neighbor-love may be more sharply defined as follows: (a) The supreme *end* of neighbor-love is fellowship with the neighbor in the kingdom of God. Every external benefit, but also all deference or compliance, find their supreme justification in this larger thought; find also their standard and limitation. (b) The *object* of love is the neighbor as a being

homogeneous with us by nature, and with us destined to spiritual personality. (c) The *scope* of love is so designated by τὸν πλησίον (the neighbor) that the fellowship of love transcends all external limits, but yet is capable of an articulation and individualization according to the natural orders of God.[2] (d) According to psychological *form,* love is a disposition and tendency of the will, combined with self-denial. (Love of enemy is the supreme test.) But love is at the same time a feeling of joy in one's neighbor.[3] (How can joyous love be commanded by a "Thou oughtest"?)

Notes to §112:2

1. According to Nietzsche no one does or can love his neighbor as himself. Is he right?

2. The fellowship of love transcends rank and vocation, the national and the sexual, conditions of poverty and wealth, stages of culture, the color of the skin, and goes out to man as man. But along with this and on the basis of the natural order of the world, I may feel toward my own race and nation and parents and friends as I do not toward others. At one extreme is an attenuated universalism; at the other is jingoism all around.

3. The end of love is fellowship. The limitations of love must be inwardly, not outwardly determined. If an enemy sets limits to love, love has lost its freedom. The enemy is the supreme one of those external limits which love ought to transcend. One hears few sermons on the love of enemies. It is because it seems a Utopian demand, and because its signficance is not understood.

3. Along with, or rather *before* the moral commandment of neighbor-love, we have the central religious commandment of love to God. (a) In distinction from the mystical absorption in God the Christian love of God corresponding to the Christian God-idea has for its subject the real ego living in the world which teleologically subordinates all the experiences and tasks of this world to God. But just on this account it is opposed to the love of the world. (b) Its essence is reverence and trust toward God — these in intimate union. (c) Its practical manifestation is the practice of trust in God, of resignation to God, of joyousness and thankfulness in all the experiences of life, but at the same time of obedience to God's moral commandment, above all the fulfilment of the commandment of

brotherly love. It is in this connection that we see how intimately the two great commandments belong together. (How can love to God be commanded by a "Thou oughtest"?)

4. The two commandments, love to God and to neighbor, taken together *determine the entire Christian ideal of life,* and at the same time regulate the entire region of human life. For although they give norm *directly* only to the relation to God and to fellow-men, they yet *indirectly* give the guiding principles for the formation of *one's own personal life,* and for the *relation to the world of nature.* They remind us how our whole life in all its relations ought to be consecrated to God, and therefore like the holiness or perfection of God; and they set us a task whose greatness is at once uplifting and humbling.

§113. *The Revelation of the Christian Ideal of Life in the Person of Jesus Christ Himself; or, Jesus as Example.*

1. Jesus not only preached the Christian law of life; he ideally manifested it as revealer of God and the perfecter of humanity in his own person. He thus presents himself as exemplar or model to which we are to become similar.[1]

Note to §113:1

1. But note the just criticism directed against all mere imitation in morality and religion, as also against the copy-theory in knowledge. There is a copy-theory in ethics and religion. But we are active in knowing, and in framing and realizing ideals also.

2. Jesus' all-regulative model does not consist, as the Catholic Church and mysticism say, in the peculiarity of his vocational work and the external circumstances of his life connected therewith. But Jesus is model in the disposition expressed in his vocation, i. e. in his inner bearing to God and to man, or in his whole personality consecrated to God.

3. Thus understood the model of Jesus, in spite of his historical limitedness, is yet intensively perfect and all-embracing. It is true that he has not moved in all the regions of life, yet he gives the supreme spiritual norm which can and ought to be applied *freely* (in freedom) to all regions of life.[1]

Note to §113:3

1. It is not right to follow any calling which renders the practice of the spirit of Jesus impossible.

b. The New Ethical Power of Life Given in Jesus Christ.

§114. *The Need of a Renewing Ethical Power of Life.*

1. Is the Christian goal of life attainable, and if so, how? This question points first of all to the *concreate moral and religious endowment of man.* On the basis of this endowment a moral conscience is formed in the individual under the influence and culture of human society (v. §102). This conscience is religiously determined, however (v. §108). We have here then in this religious determination a point of connection for the recognition of the Christian ideal of life. We have herewith then an indispensable presupposition, but we do not have a guarantee for the actual fulfilment of this ideal.

2. The deeper we recognize in conscience the right and the height of the Christian norm of life, the livelier does the *consciousness* of our contradiction to that norm and so *of our guilt* become, but at the same time *of our inability* to attain to a real inner love of God and neighbor solely on the ground of that universal human presupposition. For we are convinced through our conscience of the power of the "flesh" dwelling in us, which does not persist moreover without our guilt, and which is aggravated by sinful habit. At the same time we experience also the power of sin and temptation surrounding us in human society. Thus we become aware of a *kingdom of sin,* of which we are ourselves members.[1]

Note to §114:2

1. Sin is not mere "vestigia," mere survivals of animalism in man. That position has as its general theory the naturalistic view of the world, and instead of its being ennobling to man, it is degrading. If man is active in his goodness, he cannot be merely passive in his badness. There is a moment of activity in all reality. Sin is an activity, a product of the spirit of man. The naturalistic view of sin is as full of error as the naturalistic view of man in general. No man can disown his sins till he first owns them. One of the errors and evils of the development theory is this wrong idea of sin.

This idea of the "kingdom of sin" may be over-emphasized, but it is no figure of speech, but a fact. Sin is a social reality as well as an individual reality. There is action and reaction between the individual and society, as there is between the individual organ and the organism.

3. In this idea of kingdom of sin there is no religious determinism which transforms sin into a determinateness of nature (spirit). Yet there is the conviction of the universality of sin and this expresses the element of truth in religious determinism. Freedom to fight for the good known to us, guilt and responsibility are not annulled by the thought of the kingdom of sin, or by the element of truth in religious determinism. Still we are not able to calculate the degree of this guilt or responsibility, nor even the degree of the freedom.[1]

Note to §114:3

1. It is pretty certain that any harsh judgment is liable to be wrong. No condemnation of an evil is quite moral which does not involve the condemnation of ourselves in connection with it. No judgment passed upon conduct from without can be adequate. The crimes of a city are fruits on the tree of life of that city, and mere denunciation on the part of the public is like the tree assuming a damnatory attitude toward its own fruits. "Make the tree good and its fruit good."

4. From the fact of this state of sin, however, it follows that if an honest love of God and neighbor are attainable by us, we need an ethical power of life, annulling the separating power of guilt and counteracting the power of sin in us and around us, and able to draw us on into the perfect good.

§115. *The Renewing Ethical Power of Life Given to Us in the Idea of the Holy Spirit.*

1. That postulated divine power of life is proclaimed in Christian faith as reality. We are directed to divine grace and its efficiency through the Holy Spirit.

2. And this is in accord with the New Testament idea that the "Spirit of God" (πνεῦμα θεοῦ) is not only the cause of extraordinary "gifts" (χαρίσματα), but also the effective power which produces the ethico-religious life of the Christian. But the Holy Spirit does this not as mere nature-power, working in a nature-like way, or by magic, but as an ethically obligating norm.

3. The task of Christian ethics is to make intelligible how far and how the Spirit of God is able to exercise this motivating power in us. Paul identifies the Spirit with the exalted

Christ, working in the believer.[1] In the gospel of John the earthly and exalted Christ inwardly appropriated by us is set forth as the creative power of the new religio-ethical life. In Jesus Christ's spirit, i. e. in the controlling tendency and determining power of his personal life and work, God's Spirit, or God, is operating as the One who inwardly communicates himself to us.[2]

Notes to §115:3

1. In the time of Paul demoniacal possession was taken literally, as an actual psychological fact. And so it was no figure of speech when Paul said that Jesus dwelt in him and in the believer, and said the same of the Holy Spirit. It would have been hard from their point of view to have thought otherwise. What in this old psychology was time-historical and transitory and any longer impossible? And what can we retain? We can take "the fruits of the spirit" in our lives, and in face of the universal and common mystery of the relation of God and man, we can interpret them as due to the universal spirit, immanent in the spirit of man.
2. Jesus does it, and yet God does it.

4. In this manner the way to the solution to the ethical task is opened. Our question now comes to be the following: In how far is Christ himself operating as impulse and power to new religio-ethical life, or the supposition of faith in Jesus Christ as it is awakened in the Christian through the gospel?

§116. *The Operative Motive for the Ethico-Religious Life Proceeding from Jesus Christ.*

1. The question now to be considered was prominent in the time of the Reformation. It was the old *controversy concerning faith and good works.* It was the fundamental conviction of the Reformers that out of faith itself good works must grow.[1] This conviction of theirs was unfolded into various single thoughts as follows: (a) Good works come from the Holy Spirit, being simultaneously given with faith. (b) Good works must be done *propter mandatum Dei.* (c) Good works are indications or proofs of gratitude, and also a confession. (d) Good works are necessary in order to the practice of faith. (e) Good works serve to strengthen the certainty of redemption (v. the Apology to the Augsburg Confession).

Note to §116:1

1. An interesting topic for investigation is the history of the Protestant controversy concerning faith and good works. A generation or two after the Reformation proper, faith was defined not as trust, but as assent to doctrine on the basis of proof or of authority. When faith was so defined, and yet faith was made the necessary precondition of good works, there naturally ensued the reaction of rationalism and ethicalism, culminating in the religionless morality of the modern ethical culture movement. Under the pressure of experience at first, since good men were found to differ in doctrine, a distinction was made between fundamental and non-fundamental doctrines. Biblical doctrines were regarded as fundamental. But Biblical criticism has undermined this distinction. But is there no connection between faith and character? A moral-less faith developed, and then by reaction a faithless morality. Both are wrong.

2. If we seek for the living point of unity in these different thoughts, we shall find it in what the trust in Jesus on the part of publicans and sinners saved by him included and includes to-day still. One side of that trust is the awakened consciousness of one's own guilt and neediness. We have in this, however, only the indispensable presupposition of the new life, but not its direct object. The latter is rather to be sought in the Christ-awakened faith in forgiveness and justification itself, i. e. in the joyous conviction that through God's love in Jesus Christ we are admitted into fellowship with the holy God, and into his kingdom. But this certainly includes (a) the living impulse to the religious and moral life required by Jesus, and this is a direct positive impulse to the activity of faith in the world, therefore to the practice of the love of God and of the neighbor in the sense of §112. This is grounded in the content of faith in God, who wills to actualize his kingdom through faith in Christ, but also (b) in the character of faith which strives to become experience itself, and which is thus destined to a testing here in the world.[1] At the same time justifying faith has the power to practice the will of God. (α) Our inner contradiction to the will of God gives way to the free and joyous conviction that God's love, which we have in Christ, draws us to himself, even in his commandments also. (β) Moreover the allurement of the goods of this world is broken through faith in the Crucified One,[2] and the paralyzing fear before the

outer world and the untoward results which the fulfilments of the divine commandment can bring are overcome through the faith that this world also must serve the will of God and those who do the will of God.

Notes to §116:2

1. Both liberals and the orthodox to-day are preaching salvation by character. Is it salvation by character, or character by salvation, or are both one-sided? There is no salvation apart from character. But all in all in the long run is there any character apart from salvation? No, not apart from the processes by which we pass on from nature-beings to become spiritual beings. Character is achieved in and through salvation. The two are obverse sides of one and the same thing.

2. There is nothing in history so able to keep this world's empty glory from costing us too dear, as the cross of Christ.

3. This analysis of the motive implicit in faith releases a series of problems (a) First, the question propounded in §115: 3, 4, as to the work of the Holy Spirit. Is this work mediated through word and sacrament, as even Protestantism has historically maintained for the most part? The facts involved would seem to require us to hold both to psychological and to historical mediations and to a new birth effected by God himself. (b) There are also the questions raised in §111:4, §112:2, 3, §113:4 and intensified by §114:2. How can an inner fulfilment of the law of God take place in sinful humanity? This question is also answered by the foregoing. (c) The formulae in No. 1 above, concerning faith and the connection between faith and good works, find their unitary connection and internalization. It is in faith itself that Christ's spirit (1 a, above) and the impression of God's perfect will (1 b, above) become powerful in us; also, along with this, grateful joy (1 c, above) over the calling to be co-workers in God's work (1 d, above), inner impulse to prove faith, and (1 e, above) thereby experience the reality of what is believed. (d) Some solution of the old controversy is reached, viz. whether good works are necessary to salvation (*opera bona necessaria ad salutem*). Good works do not serve in order to the acquirement of salvation and of eternal blessedness, but the verification of faith in and through good works is necessary to the preservation of blessed fellowship with God received in faith.

This in the new form is the problem of the relation between salvation and character, and the old problem of faith and good works is in its new form the problem of the relation of religion and morality.

4. In this conception of the work of the Spirit justice is done both to God's grace and to human freedom. (a) We are conscious that the origin of our faith is being inwardly apprehended by Christ, and that in the progress of faith in inner receptivity we are still face to face with Christ. We are also aware that the outer guidance or providence of life by which we were led to Christ was not our work, and should be put under the category of the grace of God. (b) But we are not less conscious of our own responsibility to surrender ourselves to the spirit of Christ and to let ourselves be educated by him, also to utilize the outer guidance or providence of God on our behalf. This guidance of God, or providence, is the truth in religious determinism.

§117. *Methodic Conclusions for Further Treatment and Division of Christian Ethics.*

1. From our knowledge of the foundation of the Christian life, of its basis and beginning, we gain the following *methodic conclusions.* (a) In philosophic ethics the opposition between Kant and Schleiermacher led to the controversy as to whether an *imperative* or a *descriptive* treatment of ethics was the true one. The conclusion as regards Christian ethics was that it had to describe what motives are given in faith in Jesus Christ, or what effects issued from Jesus Christ. But since the latter are operative not as natural forces but as ethical motives, the character of the Christian norm of life as supreme "ought" remains in validity, and thus an imperative treatment of ethics is required also. (b) Within Christian ethics the question as to the relation between social and individual ethics was propounded. From the concept of "the spirit of Jesus Christ" it follows that both are equally indispensable in Christian ethics. Yet it would seem that precedence belongs to individual ethics, since only in personal faith in Jesus Christ do the motives important for the community life enter into effect.

2. In the following we treat first (B) the Christian forma-

tion, or construction, of the human personal life, i. e. individual ethics; secondly, (C) the Christian formation of the human social life, i. e. social ethics.

B. THE CHRISTIAN FORMATION OF THE HUMAN PERSONAL LIFE, OR INDIVIDUAL CHRISTIAN ETHICS

a. The Christian Personality as Gradually Becoming.

§118. *The Idea of Conversion in Relation to the Temporal Development of the Christian Life.*

1. When we investigate the renewal of the personal life arising from faith in Jesus Christ we meet with the idea of conversion, or repentance. (a) Ecclesiastical doctrine has ever fluctuated concerning the relation of conversion to regeneration. (b) Even the New Testament does not present a logical definition of the expressions ἐπιστρέφειν (conversion) and μετανοεῖν (repentance). (c) But the history of the idea of conversion gives us the right to define it in its relation to the idea of regeneration. The two ideas designate a transition in the life of a person who is upborne by religious faith. The idea of *regeneration* designates the transition from the point of view of the creative divine causation or efficiency. The idea of *conversion* designates the transition from the point of view of changed human relations. Two other intimately related questions are connected with these two, viz. (α) whether this transition is to be defined as *a single instantaneous turning-point in life,* and (b) whether it is to be defined as one that is homogeneous in all Christians.

2. In the first of these two questions the New Testament reckons naturally everywhere with the decisive transition from paganism and Judaism to Christian faith. But the preaching of Jesus and the relations of the New Testament communities lead us to see that a repetition of ἐπιστρέφειν and μετανοεῖν is necessary. The relations of present Christianity are such that a turning-point may arise capable of being temporarily fixed. But such a phenomenon is not necessary and normal under all circumstances. In either case no *miraculous* transformation needs to be assumed, but only the formation of the Christian

life in continuous turning to God and turning away from the world.

3. As to the second of those questions, conversion is by no means uniform with all. There is the difference between temporal development and the character of the starting-point. Yet there is a general similarity in the conversion of all true Christians, and this consists in becoming persons reconciled with God and sanctified (made holy) by God, instead of remaining nature-beings in mere nature-relations and processes.

4. This distinction between the two questions is directed against the attempts to regulate conversions according to definite methods.[1] Experientially such regulated conversions lead to evil. There are several dangers connected with this revivalism. These dangers are the following: (a) Mere natural excitement;[2] (b) the absence of self-dependence over against the movement of the mass, or of the organization, or of some masterful personality; (c) therefore the evil of a recoil subsequently, and the evil of making religion mechanical. (d) All this may become an encroachment, an irruption into God's order and into the right of free personality, at least where it is *intentionally* sought.

Notes to §118:4

1. People want to dictate, pre-determine and legislate as to how it is to be done.

2. Through stentorian preaching and realistic pictures of an eschatological character, the excitement produced has sometimes been terrible.

5. On the whole the Christian life presents itself to us as one that gradually becomes. This becoming of Christian personality is effectuated (a) as a continuous organization of the energies of the natural life into the Christian direction of life;[1] (b) as a continuous warfare against the power of sin persisting in us.

Note to §118:5

1. This is of far more importance than questions of the Trinity, etc. This commonplace has not been given its proper place in preaching in this country.

§119. *The Character of True Repentance.*

1. In the concept of conversion the *negative* side of turning from the anti-divine and anti-ethical direction of life is essential, along with the positive side of turning toward God. We may designate the former as repentance in the *narrower sense,* or as turning away from sin, and to use this designation is to be in harmony with the main side of the New Testament concept of μετάνοια, and with the later development of ecclesiastical usage.

2. During the Reformation the question of the correct motivation of repentance arose. The Reformers held on the one hand that *contritio* in the sense of the *terrores incussi conscientiae* is effected by the *law;* on the other hand that the *vera contritio* first comes through faith in the *gospel.* The two theses are not necessarily contradictory, but present an *historical* and a *systematic* problem.

3. As to the historical appreciation, the personal experience of the Reformers affords full explanation of the coexistence of the two series of thoughts in the first period of the Reformation; but at the same time it is intelligible from the experiences of the church visitation and antinomian controversies that the first series of thoughts, viz. contrition effected by the law, was pushed into the foreground.

4. The systematic judgment in view of the relation of Jesus Christ himself to the sinner and the full unity of the gospel of Christ, must emphasize the second side, viz. that only faith in Jesus Christ, the Crucified, can awaken sincere Christian repentance. A law-repentance antecedent or prevenient to faith is possible, but it is not yet true Christian repentance, and is not to be set up as norm either for the genesis or the growth of the Christian life.

5. From the connection between repentance and faith the following is clear: (a) the normal content of repentance in the case of all Christians, viz. knowledge or recognition of sin, suffering over sin, confession to God and it may be to men eventually, and purpose of improvement;[1] (b) the prolongation of repentance through the whole Christian life.[2]

Notes to §119:5

1. Topic for investigation: The relation between forgiveness and improvement. It is necessary that forgiveness should have its fruitage in improvement; the forgiven prodigal must not return to his evil ways. What must be done to save the moral life from the paralysis that may come to it from forgiveness? Few things are more urgent than a consideration of this question.

There is something confused and superficial and unsatisfying about the notion of forgiveness of sin. What is it for God to forgive sin, in view of the inviolability of law? If anything is a reality in this world it is punishment for the violation of law, even when the violation is unintentional. "God never speaks," said Emerson. If this is so, then forgiveness and improvement are two sides of the same thing. Split a cell, and the first thing it does is to regenerate itself. Is it something like that in the moral realm that forgiveness is? Is it something so ontological and law-abiding?

2. Thus repentance is like prayer, which is not an act but a character, not an episode but a life.

The good of revival is that it starts with an initial act of repentance. The evil of revival is that it often stops there.

§120. *The Problem of Christian Perfection.*

1. The prolongation of conversion and repentance throughout the whole Christian life, according to §§118, 119 above, would seem to exclude the application of the idea of perfection to the Christian. Yet the New Testament, as well as Protestant usage, makes the idea of perfection a problem for us.

2. In opposition to the Catholic thought of a *perfectio evangelica* which was sought in the monastic life, the Reformers affirmed that true *perfectio* consisted in having and exercising faith and love within the daily life. This thesis means that life in the spirit of Jesus Christ is perfect in kind, i. e. is qualitatively perfect. Thus understood this doctrine has its good right according to the whole standpoint of the New Testament, and in the employment of the idea of τέλειος ("perfect") in single passages.

3. As to the state of the single Christian, (a) it is thus said that he is led into this perfect life by means of the work of the Spirit of God. (b) But it is also true that the Christian's appropriation of this spiritual life is ever incomplete; therefore he sees the τελειώτης (perfection) in this sense ever before him as a goal not yet attained.

4. In this way we arrive at the idea of stages of Christian development.[1] (a) One stage of the Christian life, especially of Christian *knowledge* attainable in the earthly life, or actually attained, is designated by the concept τέλειος. (b) But this employment of the concept may not lead us to mark off the single stages of the Christian life from its beginning on to the stage of perfection by empirical characteristics, and to distribute the individual Christians along these stages. Rather the gradual progress and various tendencies of the Christian life are to be determined only in humble self-examination and self-valuation in the presence of God, and to be recognized as task that can end only in eternal perfection.

Note to §120:4

1. The Christian life is not a ready-made finished product, which we go and get as something given to us. There is an activity-moment in our growth. Our life is not simply a gift, but a task; it is not a possession, but a product; not a finality, but a movement. But it is not so much a task as to make it necessary that we do it in dissociation from the great work of God. The word "growth" consistently worked out would cover what is essential in the thought of sanctification. (We may soon need a glossary for such words as "sanctification.")

b. The Growth or Becoming of Personality in the Doing of Duty and the Fulfilment of Vocation.

§121. *The Idea of Duty and the Validity of this Idea for the Christian Life.*

1. Christian ethics has always subsumed the life of Christian personality under the two formal concepts of duty and virtue, taken over from antique ethics. The concept of duty is intimately connected with that of law.

2. To be sure the application of the idea of law to the Christian region is in general justified (v. §104:4, §111:3, §117:1, a). Kant defined the dutiful act as an act performed out of regard for the unconditioned law; but the question arises whether this idea of duty pertains to the life of the individual Christian, which is a life in the spirit of Jesus Christ, and therefore in freedom, and how the one (duty) is compatible with the other (spirit and freedom).

3. On the soil of the Reformation this problem was already felt and was elucidated in doctrinal controversies over the question as to the validity of the law for the regenerated also (the Antinomian controversy).[1] (a) The decision of ecclesiastical doctrine was as follows: the Christian *secundum interiorem hominem* is free from the curse and compulsion of the law, but yet lives *in lege Dei;* but on the other hand the Christian needs the *lex scripta* with its threatening and punishment, because the "old man" still lives in him. (b) But in this way a *unitary norm* of the Christian life is not attained. There is simply an unhealthy oscillation between the standpoint of the old man and that of the new man which works out very badly.

Note to §121:3

1. Antinomianism was a greater foe to the Reformation than the Peasants' War. It maintained that law (duty) was not in force for the regenerate, but only for the sinner. The inner life was not yet in its freedom mature and strong, so that its freedom could be moral through and through.

4. Instead of all this it must be clearly urged that on the one hand the validity of the statutory external law (*lex scripta*) is entirely done away with on New Testament soil, even as regards the old man; that on the other hand the Christian knows that he is under the unconditioned "ought" of the will of God, even *secundum interiorem hominem,* not only so far as he is still sinful, but so far as he is a man and a struggler with sin. Thus not only Paul knows that he is bound by a new law in spite of his liberation from the Old Testament law, but even Christ himself during his earthly life put himself under the "must" of the divine will which he fulfilled in holy reverence.[1] But the idea of *duty* in this way retains its power for the Christian life, for duty is the obligation of a single subject to fulfil an unconditioned law or a single commandment necessarily derivable from that law.

Note to §121:4

1. There are those to-day who are prostituting freedom. They stand for an atomistic freedom which is neither cause nor effect of character, a sub-ethical freedom, untrue to philosophy and injurious to practical life. Freedom with content costs the sweat and blood of a

Gethsemane-struggle; but these people bandy the word about with people who are a menace to society.

5. In the midst of the consciousness of duty the Christian can and ought to exemplify his freedom (a) through the *self-dependent recognition* of the divine will, and (b) the *self-dependent derivation* of his special duties from the universal laws of God, and (c) through joy in doing what he does according to the will of God.

§122. *Vocation.*

1. The idea of vocation or calling is intimately connected with that of duty. (a) This idea of vocation itself grows out of the idea of duty with inner necessity, for the derivation of our special duties from the universal law of God (§121:5) we cannot effectuate from case to case, but we must mark off a circle of duties to be done as the region of our religio-ethical activity, i. e. as our vocation. (b) According to Christian standards and in the long run this vocation cannot be that of self-culture simply, but it must somehow serve the character of a διακονία ("service") in social relations established according to God's order.[1] (c) Since we are placed simultaneously in different circles of human society the entire calling of life, i. e. *vocation in the wider sense,* is made up of the different circles of duty, but our life calling becomes a unity when one duty-group is erected to the dignity of our real task in life (*vocation in the narrower sense*). (d) There is no expression in the New Testament which quite corresponds to this idea of "calling," but the thing is there, and is there especially in the life of Jesus himself.[2]

Notes to §122:1

1. Self-culture as an ideal ends in a refined epicureanism or in a pessimistic stoicism, and the thing it wants to do is the very thing it does not do. Service is the way to culture, though culture is also a means to service.

2. In New Testament times they did not realize the need of a calling.

2. The worth of vocation is clear from the derivation of the concept as given above. On the one hand vocation has *social*

worth as joint labor at the actualization of the moral fellowship of men and therewith of the kingdom of God ultimately. On the other hand it has *individual* worth as a field for the acquirement of religio-ethical perfection and thus for the fulfilment of our *eternal vocation* (i. e. the originating and maturing of personality).

3. From this two-fold worth of vocation there follows a two-fold standard to be applied to the multiplicity of vocations which have been formed in the history of human society. Measured by this standard many callings must be adjudged from the social point of view as injurious or worthless or doubtful, and from the individual point of view as ruinous to the soul or dangerous or grievous.[1]

Note to §122:3

1. Does our vocation function serviceably for society? What is the degree of its serviceability? Does it promote the religio-ethical development of the individual who follows it? May there be a calling which promotes society's welfare but which injures the individual who fulfils the calling? May a calling that promotes the growth of the individual work injury to society?

4. On the basis of the Christian conception of calling the following may be said: (a) Certain principles at least should be regulative in the choice of a vocation. Each one should enter upon the vocation in which presumably or prospectively he will be able to employ his gifts most certainly and most fruitfully for the common weal, and from which he yet does not need to fear danger to his ethico-religious personality. (b) There are universally valid norms of a moral kind and of religious content applicable to the *fulfilment* of vocation. Those of a moral kind are, for example, acquiring an independence and civil validity, rights and equality, also fidelity to those who are dependent upon us, and ministering love. Those of a religious kind are, for example, matters pertaining to the household of faith, to church and to worship.

§123. *The Self-dependence of Moral Personality on the Basis of Vocation, or the Question of the Collision of Duties.*

1. A large number of single duties are definitely mapped out

and appointed to every one who has taken up a fixed calling so that he can exemplify his freedom only within the recognition of their limits. But there ever remains, especially in the higher callings most of all, a region in which the individual must decide on his own responsibility what is duty for him. This self-dependent responsibility must not be withdrawn from the Christian, or abridged — not even by ecclesiastical authority, e. g. by the Confessional, or by what is called "probabilism." [1]

Note to §123:1

1. Probabilism is the doctrine that of two ecclesiastically permissible courses of action, you may take that one which accords with your inclination. Here we have ecclesiastical authority taking the decision out of the realm of conscience and lodging it in the inclinations. (See Herrmann: *Faith and Morals*). It is giving up the moral autonomy of the human person for an infra-personal heteronomy.

2. This holds good for the so-called collision of duties, or more accurately, for the collision of moral interests, i. e. for cases in which within our calling in the wider sense there are simultaneous different requirements, only the one or the other of which we can fulfil. For such *casus conscientiae* no casuistic rules can be given once for all. The conscience of each one must decide as to individual relations. The main questions to be considered are the following: (a) Which deed is most intimately connected with my calling in the narrower sense? (b) Which deed yields the most fruitful service for my fellowman? (c) Which deed *requires* my initiative? (That is, Which deed must be done by me if it is to be done at all?)

3. Not only in various duty circles which form vocation in the narrower sense, but also outside of these circles the requirements of beneficence may press upon us with special urgency (charity, doing good). But the decision concerning these *extraordinary duties of love* is individual also. We may and ought to do them, as under the existing circumstances we are "neighbors" to the end of satisfying these needs, provided we do not omit more important tasks of life thereby; but from this point of view these deeds of love come under the head of dutiful deeds.

§124. *The Question of a Super-Dutiful and a Sub-Dutiful Act.*

1. The idea of "works of supererogation" (*opera supererogatoria*) is to be rejected not only in the cases mentioned in §123:3 above, but in all other cases whatever. The idea springs from the application of legal points of view such as underlie the Catholic distinction of "required" (*praecepta*) and "advised" (*consilia*). The evangelical understanding of the law as a law of freedom does not permit the assumption of a superdutiful deed.

2. But at the same time we have with this the problem of a sub-dutiful deed. (a) The *question* is whether there is not a region of the permissible, of the ethically indifferent, even in the Christian life, alongside of the region of vocation-duties and the extraordinary duties of love referred to in §123 (b). Historically this subject has been designated ethical *adiaphora* (indifference). In the *history* of the evangelical church this question, already emerging in the New Testament indeed, was hotly discussed in the adiaphoristic controversies. In modern scientific ethics it is treated as the problem of the permissible. (c) In answering the question *three regions* of activity come into consideration.

3. For the *first,* those activities which come under the head of recreation (or amusement) occupy a special position. (a) They all have the character of a *free* engagement or expression of our energies in *play.* (b) But just on that account they are withdrawn from *direct* subsumption under the concept of duty. (c) But of course they are for all that indirectly regulated by that concept and limited by that concept in reference to scope, content, and personal relation.

4. For the *second,* we have to do with decisions connected with our vocation in the narrow sense of that word, and with our personal relations in life, e. g. society, friendship, and the like. Frequently the duty-judgment does not lead to an all-around determination, but to one point from which the ultimate decision may and must be made in accord with inclination and natural impulse. But this decision too is surrounded with inviolable limits by the duty-judgment.

5. For the *third,* the functions of the natural, so far as they are dependent upon the will, may not be brought directly under

the duty-concept in all particulars, but are subject to only an indirect regulation by that concept as to scope; eventually as to content and relationship.

6. On the basis of this evaluation of these single regions the following decision may be arrived at: (a) Concerning the *idea of the permissible:* There is a permissible deed in the sense of a deed regulated not directly but only indirectly by the idea of duty. (b) Concerning *the idea of ethical adiaphora:* (α) There are no morally indifferent deeds, for even the region which is not directly subject to the duty-idea is yet indirectly normed by it, and to be made serviceable to the moral life as a whole. (β) Also there are no indifferent religious deeds, for even those religious ceremonies as regards which freedom is to be left to the individual, and the ecclesiastical community can decide differently, are yet subject to a regulation through the end of "edification" (οἰκοδομή).[1]

Note to §124: 6

1. Modern scientific ethics and the standpoint of Jesus agree on this point.

Is there any ceremony, rite, or institution, which can be justified save only so far as it serves a moral end? Are there two kinds of conduct, two kinds of duties, the one religious and the other moral? Have we any duty to God which lies outside of our duty to humanity? Or must religious conduct be brought under the head of moral conduct? It is not taught that the moral serviceability of religious rites is their sole justification, but simply that it is their import for morality that gives them their importance for religion. If they serve an important end, they are religiously as well as morally obligatory.

Matthew Arnold defines religion as morality touched with emotion. But Muirhead points out that all conduct is touched with emotion; that otherwise it would not be conduct at all. He goes on to maintain that it is the way we think of duty which makes it simply moral, or else religious also. A deed done with reference to the narrower duties is a moral deed. The same deed viewed as serving the ends of the cosmic process is religious. And since all fully good conduct has reference to a universal end, all such conduct is religious.

Does this modern view of the world and of human conduct (represented by Muirhead) logically land us in a religion without cult? Does the religious sentiment functionally express itself in cult, or simply in moral or æsthetic or scientific conduct? Royce has something to say on this subject, and he is worth listening to still, even if the pragmatists are after him with a sharp stick. In his *Outlines of Psychology* he claims that in the attempt to cultivate and support

religious meditation of the higher type, the ritualist, with his recognition of the central place of sensory experiences in our lives, is on a better psychological basis than the Puritan. In his opinion Puritanism, rejecting ritual as a confusing or corrupting appeal to the senses, has tended to the impoverishment of religious experience. (Royce is a member of no church; will take none of their obligations. He is of the opinion that only philosophy can perform the service which religion needs, but that he himself can do this work better outside the church than in it, for it is to this that he is going to devote himself in the future [this was in 1905]).

Is what Royce says of the religious effect of Puritanism true? It is true that Puritanism would eliminate all the Catholic appeals to the different senses, the pictures and statues, the swinging of the censer, the perfume, the holy water, the host, the music, the gorgeous vestments, the altar, and would attach itself to Paul, who held that nothing mattered but doing the will of God, faith touched by love, and a new creature. As an aid to worship, the presence of the cult is the main thing, says the Catholic. The absence of the cult is the main thing, says the Puritan.

But are not the sermon and the rational, intellectual reading of the Scriptures specific forms of the expression of religion, as structurally as the church's cult is? May it not be that what we are missing in the churches is an organic expression of the religious life, rather than any particular type of ritual? It is getting to be as in the days of the old English deism and rationalism, when the Greek virtues were preached, but specifically religious sermons were not preached. In the preaching of to-day the moral and the practical have been substituted for the religious, and we are given such interesting bits of information as that a proof of immortality is likely to come from Professor Hyslop's researches. "The heart is restless till it rests in Thee!"—where is that constitutive and regulative in preaching to-day? Spurgeon and Alexander Maclaren, Robertson and Maurice used to preach *religious* sermons. Let us bring back the religious sermon and perhaps we will get back religious worship.

Is not the neglect of the religious in the interests of the moral, the substitution of the moral and the practical for the religious, a part of the cause of the immorality in our American life? It looks as if the modern man had not at his disposal the stuff which makes a great man. The great trouble with the church life is the lack of religion; we talk all around the trouble. We must get back the right kind of sermon and the right kind of hymn. I remember my great grandfather's hymn-book—"The Psalmist." It was full of religious hymns. Has that become a waste-product? "Before Jehovah's awful throne"—I wish I might have heard Spurgeon read that hymn and his people sing it. The old hymns are never old; you might as well speak of the atmosphere or water being old. Is there something wrong in paying a German choir to sing, "Dis is der day der Lord has made"? It looks

as if we were losing the inner world, losing our souls, the depth and richness of the life of the spirit. What the people clamor for is religion, not the highly trained and efficient German choir. The hunger of man as man is for the life and love and companionship of the Great Companion.

Is it true that the organic externalization of the religious sentiment is moral conduct, instead of cult? Are not cult and dogma and church the specific and structural externalization of the religious sentiment? The artistic sentiment does not embody itself in moral conduct as such, and the ethicist makes no objection to that. They tell us that the ritual cult of the worshipper is a waste of energy. But they might as well berate the tortoise for growing his shell; because he is a tortoise that is what he does. Would not the patriotic life suffer abbreviation without the flag and holidays and national songs and public buildings and soldiers marching? So cult is initially effect, but in turn it comes to be cause.

This cult-moment in religion is not an episode in the history of religion. It is more organic to religion than either dogma or institution. The burden of proof is with the man who says cult must be eliminated. It will change, and must do so, but it will not disappear. This reaction against a fixed cult or doctrine or church is going too far. Because a particular worship is meaningless or bad, away with all worship! But you cannot have life without the expression of life, and through the expression of life you have the communication and expansion of life.

Must doctrine go from religion? Is religion a part of the life of man in which thought has no place? I attended a meeting of "The Independent Religious Society." The speaker was bitter and hard. He is intense and honest and intelligent; but his address was an attack upon religion, which is just religious speculation according to him, and he undertook to show that morality could get along without it. He left out of religion emotion and volition, and considered only the intellectual element. He identifies religion with the most one-sided and dangerous of its externalizations, and then damns it vigorously. He was educated at Princeton Theological Seminary, where doctrine is held to be more important than life in religion. There is the fountain of his bitterness. He said Swing's independent movement died out, and wondered if his would. It will. He does not permit religion to function according to its organs. His protest is legitimate in the main, but he has not got it right, and it will not live. Religion is not intellectualism. The intellectual output of religion is dogma; its emotional output is cult; its volitional output, the church. Religion becomes sterile if not allowed to function in all of these ways.

c. The Becoming of Christian Personality as Formation of Virtue and Character.

α. The Concept and Main Features of Christian Character.

§125. *Virtue and Virtues; Character and Characters.*

1. Along with the idea of duty that of virtue is applied to the Christian life. (a) Already in *ancient ethics* "virtue" designated the permanent character of the will (ἕξις), which came to be what it was through the single decisions of the will, and from which will in turn the single decisions proceeded. This inter-relation between the will and its decisions obtains in *modern philosophical ethics* as well. (b) According to Christian ethics the spirit of Jesus Christ is the source of the right fulfilment of the divine commandments. But on the basis of the surrender of faith (Paul's "obedience of faith") to Jesus Christ and of conduct in his spirit, a *steadfast* direction of the will to the end of the kingdom of God as well as a corresponding determinateness of the ideational and emotional life should be formed in the Christian himself. (c) This foundation of our inner life to steadfastness of Christian willing and thinking and feeling is possible only through the existence of a regularity or orderliness in psychical processes — a regularity in no sense in conflict with the freedom of moral decisions, but a regularity which manifests itself in habit (v. §105 : 5, b, α).[1]

Note to §125 : 1

1. Compare the Psalmist's expression, "My heart is fixed." This fixedness of heart is not simply a gift, or donation; it is a task. It is not a mere possession, but a vocation.

2. According to 1, b above, Christian virtue is at bottom *only one;* it is unitary. But since it has to exemplify itself in diverse relations, both in our inner and our outer life, we may distinguish different sides of the one virtue; the one virtue differentiates and specializes into many virtues.

3. That unity is designated in ethics by the concept "character." This is especially true in modern ethics. (a) In general this word "character" designates the peculiar direction and connection of psychic activities acquired through conscious

self-formation. (b) But the concept "character" comes to its full actualization only in the morally good character, and that is the Christian character. (c) This concept of character is not directly contained in the New Testament, and yet the thing is there in various ways ("Life in the Spirit," "walking in the Spirit," "the mind of the Spirit," etc.).

4. To be sure, Christian character in its fundamental bent is everywhere the same. Yet we speak of a variety, a manyness of Christian character. It is not simply that the stages in the formation of the Christian character are various; it is also that the types of which character is capable are likewise many. (a) As a given basic fact of the psychic life, there is the infinite manifoldness of individual endowments. These endowments can never be exhaustively scientifically described, but they may be arranged in main groups, e. g. sexual differences, so-called temperaments, intellectual endowments, family types, race peculiarities, types due to geographical and climatic modifications; all these are to be taken into account in connection with this basic fact of the psychic life. That these individual differences are employed for the formation of Christian character is required both by the ideal of Christian character and by the ideal of community which is embraced in the idea of the kingdom of God.[1] (b) The one goal of the kingdom of God gives the direction for the diverse *content* of the life of the spirit, and is striven for in the diverse *forms* of psychic activity. Thus, the unity of the Christian character is combined with its manifoldness.

Note to §125:4

1. Do we need to occidentalize as well as Christianize the Orientals? The Germans are the most enthusiastic missionary workers in Japan. There is an intellectual sympathy between the two peoples. But German scholars are warning the missionaries not to think that they must Germanize the Japanese.

To Christians of the German-Anglo-Saxon mind, the leaving out of the person-idea in God is the dissolution of the God-idea. But the Orientals think in terms of substance rather than in terms of personality; they are more metaphysical than ethical, more ontological than psychological. What we do to exalt God is to them to lower the thought of God. The difference is not a moral matter; it is a matter of thought. Must we westernize the oriental God-thought, that it may be Christian? Or can we Christianize them and leave them or-

iental still? This is one of the most serious questions in the missionary world to-day.

Is personality essential to the Christian God-idea? The Church did its work for a thousand years with no personal God-idea in our sense of the term. The Christianity of the orthodox Greek Church in the early centuries would have found more hospitality in the oriental mind than in our German-Anglo-Saxon type. Is the Greek Church a Christian Church? (According to Harnack the Greek Church is a combination of Greek religion with Christian imagery.)

Is there an intellectual communion with God as well as a moral communion? May it be said, "Other sheep I have which are not of this moral fold"— Spinoza, for example? Mysticism is that communion with God from which moral effort is excluded; the mystics found God, but not through moral action. "Hew the wood and thou shalt find me; lift the stone and I am there." That is the western idea. The eastern way is that of introspection and contemplation. The western type is the Martha-life, but Jesus preferred the oriental type, the Mary-life. Are we too narrow in our ethical rigorism? Is not God the God of the mystic and of the philosophical approach, as well as the God of the ethical, practical approach?

With regard to missions to Orientals, one of three courses is possible: Either you may Christianize from the western point of view, but to do this you must philosophize from the western point of view; or you may give the Christian kernel, not insisting, however, on the personal God-idea; or you may make up your mind that Christianity is a folk-religion, especially adapted to western minds.

5. The everywhere *recurring main features* of Christian character Christian ethics has to define. They designate partly the religious and partly the moral sides of the Christian life, and of course from the basic Christian standpoint the religious character of the Christian is the foundation of his moral character.

§126. *The Main Features of the Religious Character of the Christian.*

1. The *content* of the religious character of the Christian is *filial sense* toward God (v. §110:2, c). In this filial sense the love of God required in the Christian norm of life is actualized. But it must take shape in *two essential* directions, if it is to give the permanent stamp of sanctification to the whole personal life and to all its relations toward the world.

2. The religious character of the Christian on the side of

knowledge. (a) As personal Christian *conviction* in distinction from authoritative assent, it has its basis in the heart's trust in Jesus Christ and grows to experiential certainty by means of the initial experience of the redemptive effects of his spirit. (b) As clearness of the Christian *judgment* concerning the world and life in their relation to God, together with capacity of critical judgment as regards foreign religious views, it has a similar experiential basis.[1] (c) *Outwardly* the Christian conviction is led to protect itself in a personal confession of that conviction and vindication of it.[2]

Notes to §126:2

1. We should send to the foreign field our foremost Christian personalities with formed Christian judgments.
2. Christian apologetics is an intellectual process which has a religious and ultimately a moral function.

3. On the side of *the will and the feelings,* the Christian character must exemplify and effectuate itself. Trustful resignation to God and joy in fellowship with God must remain in mastery in the essential relations to the world.[1] There are two relations which come essentially into consideration here: (a) In the *experiences* of the earthly life the Christian maintains his religious character (α) by accepting the *joys* of this life from God's hands in inner freedom and with simplicity[2] and thankfulness; (β) by bearing the *sufferings* imposed upon him as saving pedagogic means for himself and under some circumstances as means of blessing to others; on the whole as bearing the "cross" imposed upon him in patient and courageous silence, struggling for the supreme goal of "glorying in tribulation" (*καυχᾶσθαι ἐν θλίψασιν*). This suffering is to be distinguished from the predominant sentiment of Old Testament piety and from stoical apathy.[3] (γ) The Christian religious character is further maintained by meeting death not in the fear of death, but in victorious confidence that even it cannot separate us from God's love, but can only contribute to the consummation of God's redeeming work.[4] (b) As regards the *tasks* of life, the Christian shows his religious character by joyously accepting them as the calling given him by God.[5]

Notes to §126:3

1. We are not Christianized if joy in God is not present in all the providential occurrences of our lives. This is not the Stoical ἀταραξία. It is more akin to the feeling of the fireman who realizes that he has rescued the child, but at the cost of his own life.

2. The truly "simple life" is found in the inner world of man.

3. It is a patient and courageous silence, the silence of inner joyous blessedness.

4. What is the Christian attitude toward death? What is it on account of which the fear of death is eliminated from human life? We must return to what made our fathers great in this particular. It is a wonderful thing for man not to fear death — a certainly triumphant foe!

5. Christian joy in prosperity and in adversity, in life and in death, is the purest test of Christianity. The coal-heaver who accepts his vocation from God is better off and more dignified than the king who makes no such reference.

4. The Christian religious character lives in prayer. (a) The source but also supreme norm of Christian prayer lies in faith in Jesus Christ himself. Prayer impels to communion of the heart with God as the heavenly Father, and to prayer in the name of Jesus Christ, i. e. in his sense and spirit. (b) Every prayer springing from faith must contain an element of thankfulness, i. e. of joyous thought of God's benefits, especially of his revelation of love in Jesus Christ; and prayer must strive to the goal of a prayer of thanksgiving. But the necessary way to that goal for finite and especially for sinful man is the petition (supplication) which is kindled to true power in thankfulness for benefits experienced. (c) The subject-matter of Christian supplication (petition) is especially spiritual gifts, but also outer interests as well. It is precisely in honest petition that we come to learn the superior importance of the goods of the kingdom of God, that we come also to resignation to God's will, in which Christian character is more powerfully manifest than in our stormy petitions. (d) Hearing of prayer is assured to true prayer in the spirit of Jesus. It consists not only in the inner self-uplifting of the petitioner, but in communication of the Spirit to him (i. e. the ethico-religious content which we have in Jesus Christ). The hearing of prayer may also involve the bringing about of what one prays for, and will do so if it is in accord with the counsel of God.

To be sure *our* prayer does not first make *God* willing. Our beseeching receptivity first makes our own selves capable of receiving the gifts and the blessings of God, which could not be communicated to us without our prayer.[1] (e) The unspoken uplift of the heart to God, which can and ought to be a settlement lastingly accompanying life, is real prayer. But gratitude and petition are first shaped into clearness by inner speech, and they can come to audible expression in the individual in the stress of the heart, and must become so in public worship. Regularity in the forms and times of our daily life promotes prayer, but on the other hand all mechanicizing kills prayer.

Note to §126:4

1. "What does Professor Foster believe?" asks a Southern paper. "He denies the Deity of Christ, the inspiration of the Scriptures, atonement by blood, and the efficacy of prayer, save as it has reflex influence."

I do not understand that I am saying that. That would be like trying to lift one's self by tugging at our own bootstraps. Prayer is a part of the process of the divine life. It is natural for the birds to sing, but in singing they are not making God will to do something. It is a part of the process of reality. Prayer is inalienable to human nature. It is God doing the thing. Our prayer does not make God willing; but there is something worthful even in connection with the prayer for rain. Prayer is as inalienable a function of the human spirit as the swimming of the fish is to the fish. It is not properly defined as doing something to God without which he would not do something which he does.

See Wimmer: *My Struggle for Light.*

As B. W. Bacon maintains (*Current Literature,* 1905, p. 401), the prayer of faith opens channels for the grace which works according to law.

§127. *The Main Features of the Moral Life of the Christian.*

1. The fundamental fact of the moral character of the Christian is *love to neighbor,* which springs from true love to God and which is an expression of the life of true love to God. This character also, like the religious, must shape itself in two essential directions, if it is to give the permanent stamp of sanctification to the personal life in its relations to the world.

2. What belongs to the moral character of the Christian on

the side of moral insight? (a) First of all, a personal *moral conviction.* This manifests itself in a self-dependent moral conscience, whose *endowment* is of course given, but whose development and individualization for the personal life is an *acquirement* of personality. (b) This conscience expresses itself in (α) the clearness of moral judgment; at the same time in (β) the critical capacity of judgment with respect to foreign moral views and principles, but especially in (γ) tenderness (sensitiveness) of moral feeling, while passionate violence of feeling is more an affair of nature than a mark of moral character.[1]

Note to §127:2

1. There is much in the business world and in the theater which tends to blunt the sensitiveness of moral feeling. There is a brutal obtuseness which is both cause and effect of the "practical life" of the hard-headed business man.

3. How does the moral character of the Christian exemplify itself on the side of the *activity of the will?* (a) As regards one's own *physical and psychical nature,* not merely in a negative independence, but in a positive mastery of the physical and psychical forces given us, where we are called upon to employ them in the service of moral tasks.[1] (b) As regards the *outer world,* negatively, in independence of its temptations; positively, in our using the goods that fall to us in the promotion of our moral vocation; again, not in indolently letting sufferings come upon us, but when they are inescapable, utilizing them as means of culture for ourselves and as a field for the exercise of love toward others.

Note to §127:3

1. Modern science insists on the unity of man's development. According to physiological psychology there is no salvation of soul apart from the body.

4. A test of the acquired rightness of moral insight and also of the culture of the will is especially the sure selection and employment of means which are the correct means for the prosecution of moral ends. The Jesuitical principle is anti-ethical, viz. "if the end is permissible, the means are also permissible" (*si finis licitus, et media sunt licita*). This principle in an

unjustifiable way subsumes the end under the category of the permissible rather than under that of the morally necessary, and in false isolation considers the means only in its relation to the *one* end, instead of in its own import and in its other relations and consequences.

β. The Formation of Christian Character, Especially in View of Sin.

§128. *Education and Self-Education.*

1. The religio-ethical character can be developed only through the interconnection of education and self-education. (a) Within the Christian community under normal circumstances the catechumen is to be placed under a regular educative influence which aims at the formation of religio-ethical character; but the supreme problem of this hetero-education is to awaken (α) religio-ethical self-dependence and (β) the capacity to self-education by the determining influences from without.[1] (b) Moreover, whoever has outgrown education in the narrower sense of the word remains under the pedagogic influence of human society, and of the destiny of life, and the fortunes of life, in which faith recognizes a *divine* education. Still this higher education is after all but a phase of the more specific task of one's own self-education.

Note to §128:1

1. The old emphasis was upon "sound doctrine." That has its worth, but it was putting the part for the whole. Let the category of *good* and *bad* have the central place in teaching, as it has in personality. A brief outline of Christian ethics as a catechism should be put into the hands of young people.

2. The activities through which self-education toward the end of Christian character goes on may be analyzed into three groups. (a) First of all, Christian character is developed through the practical life itself, viz. through the fulfilment of the vocational and extra-vocational *duties of love* (v. §122, §123, §127:3), and through trustful subordination in all of life's experiences and tasks, to the will of God. (b) Also the activities of recuperation, or *recreation,* correctly used, serve to develop the psychical functions which are the material of

character-building, and to bring them under the mastery of the will. (c) Still more immediately *edification* serves the formation of steadfast religious and moral life, i. e. both religious edification in work and prayer, and moral edification in self-examination, in self-clarification, and in self-encouragement.[1] *Vows* belonging in this region of edification are permissible on evangelical soil only in the sense of earnest resolutions in the presence of God, or of solemn promise in the presence of man in connection with moral society.[2]

Notes to §128 : 2

1. To turn recreation into vocation is immoral.
2. Vows in the old sense have place only in the Catholic dualism of the moral life.

3. The normal relation of the three groups admits of only general definition. Group (a) — duties of love — should be the leading one, of course. As to groups (b) and (c), the former — recreation — should preserve and increase the natural powers or the practical activity of the Christian, and the latter — edification — should preserve and increase the religio-ethical motive for the practical Christian life.[1]

Note to §128 : 3

1. To this extent Muirhead is right when he maintains that the function and test of cult is the preservation and increase of human powers for the practical life.

4. On the basis of the necessity of an alternation of work on the one hand and of recreation and edification on the other, the *order of Sunday* finds its inner justification. In the Christian church Sunday has taken the place of the statutory Sabbatic commandment.[1]

Note to §128 : 4

1. As Hermann Schultz says, the inner attitude and outer habit with reference to Sunday is a sure test of piety and a wholesome ethico-religious life. But we must eliminate the appearance of arbitrariness and legalism from the Sunday-idea. This will leave it with the inner vindication which the functional always has. The Puritans made the mistake of eliminating recreation and leaving only edification. But if recreation and edification were both recognized, perhaps each would be the better on account of the other. Some Sunday

amusements may be injurious, but we must learn to kill bad things by extracting the element of worth out of them and presenting that in unobjectionable form.

§129. *The Question of Asceticism and the Struggle with Temptation.*

1. The problem of the *means* of virtue and of *asceticism,* i. e. of the doctrine of the means of virtue, is broached in connection with the definition of our various activities. (a) The question is whether according to evangelical principles there may be a deed which is only drill or discipline, or practice for ethico-religious activities, but is not itself any actualization of the religio-ethical ideal. Some ethicists have answered this question in the negative most decidedly. (b) It must be granted that the activities of recreation and edification (v. §128 : 2, b and c) seem to serve the practical religio-ethical life *only* as means (v. §128 : 2, a). Yet we may not ignore that on the one hand the practical Christian life in vocational work and in the exemplification of faith is not only direct actualization of the Christian ideal, but also means of character-building, and that on the other hand again the religio-ethical character is not only formed but its ideal is actualized in the free activities of play and in the hours of edification also. In fact, therefore, nothing should be mere means in the Christian life, but everything should be both intrinsically worthful and also serviceable in character-building.

2. Asceticism in the narrower negative sense, i. e. activity directed toward the weakening or deadening of natural powers, is right according to evangelical views only so far as all positive Christian character-building requires a negation of impulses and inclinations that contradict the Christian norm of life. But this asceticism does not go dualistically alongside of the activities of the practical Christian life and of recreation and edification, but takes place within that life, viz. (a) in the self-denial which the tasks of one's vocation and the experiences of one's life impose upon one; (b) also in the self-discipline, (c) in the activities of recreation and use of powers, and (d) in serious self-collection for, and in the hours of edification.

3. This negative side of the Christian life comes to validity

especially in connection with *temptation,* i. e. *incitement of the natural and especially of the sinful will* awakened from within. By such a will is meant a will that is counter to God's will. Even the life of Jesus was a conflict with temptation, so far as he negated such natural impulses of the natural life — impulses even which in other directions indicated the will of God. But the following considerations are to be urged against the idea that the ascetic tendency was dominant with Jesus: (α) Jesus' own appearance and the impression which he made upon the people; (β) Jesus' judgment that not the absorption of the self in God, but the redemption of the soul is the highest good; (γ) Jesus' warfare against all self-chosen performances through which the simple and obvious commandments of God are subordinated and abbreviated. It is absolutely true that character can be constructed only in constant struggle with temptation in our case, for in us a sinful bent of the will persists. In us, therefore, the stimuli of the outer world and of sinful human society evoke a sinful resistance to the will of God; hence the need, not of Catholic asceticism, but of self-denial, self-discipline, self-collection, in the moral, religious life.[1]

Note to §129:3

1. Pfleiderer bases his discussion of this matter on the words of Jesus: "Watch and pray lest ye enter into temptation." He says that *watchfulness* is required in order to self-knowledge. This self-knowledge is required because of our weaknesses and defects, but in connection with this self-knowledge we also gain a knowledge of the world and of the spirit of the times. In connection with *prayer* he discusses self-discipline, and that discussion leads to what he calls bodily and psychic dietetics and ascetics. He raises the question as to what is the end to be accomplished by these. His answer is, Not mortification of our sensibilities, but free mastery of ourselves; not the reduction of the energies of our life, but the mastery of them. He even justifies fasts as voluntary abstinence from sensuous gratification. He closes with a caution against making the means of self-education an end, or valuing as meritorious those practices whose necessity presupposes an existing defect in the moral life and in skilfulness.

With reference to all this, it should be said that we should not presume to dictate to other people ascetic habits on the basis of our own conscious need of them. Let their own needs regulate them. Let us not legislate for other people with reference to dancing, the

theatre, and the playing of games. Asceticism must be an individual matter entirely.

See E. E. Purinton: *The Philosophy of Fasts.*

§130. *Christian Character and Recurring Guilt.*

1. We do not escape lapse and *guilt* in our struggle with temptation. The more the Christian conscience is developed, the finer does the feeling concerning any transgression of the divine will become (v. §127:2, b). The guilt-*feeling* thus becomes keener also, and in this feeling we are conscious of our own schism with God and separation from him.

2. The stability of Christian character in respect to guilt can be maintained only through that which forms its basis, viz. the forgiveness of sin granted us in Jesus Christ, which admits us into the full fellowship with God in spite of the daily recurring guilt, thus avoiding paralysis and discouragement through failure. This forgiveness is appropriated in the prayer of faith. This faith itself, however, is established and strengthened through the gospel as it is proffered to us in the Scriptures and in preaching and public and private proclamation.

3. This faith can grow in us toward the goal of a steadfast certitude of redemption, and yet in its growth it passes through stages and fluctuations.[1] We advance toward that goal of certitude by our faith receiving the confirmation of experience. We experience the forgiving love of God not only in the communion of prayer, but also in the practical life, as often as we see in the guidance of life something of God's fatherly education, and find in the tasks of life something of the incentive and power of God's Spirit.[2] But this confirmation of experience remains fragmentary. Hence the basis of faith in the gospel of God's forgiveness in Christ underlies everything else. To that gospel we return as to a fountain.

Notes to §130:3

1. There are periods of silence and periods of revival. In the former probably forces are gathered. Nowhere is there an ortholinear development.

2. Theoretically revelation is as universal as the process of the world. But that is *actually* revelation for us which fulfils some func-

tion within our experience as the educative purpose of God. While potentially all reality is revelation of God, actually that is revelation in which we can trace God's hand.

γ. The Fundamental Frame of Mind of the Christian (Basic Temper or Disposition of the Christian Character).

§131. *Relation between the Dignity of the Christian Character and Honor in Human Society.*

1. On the basis of God's forgiveness the Christian is certain that he possesses *supreme dignity,* or absolute personal worth; even in his first nascent religio-ethical character is he certain of this. (a) The religious dignity which the Christian has as child of God is gift of God, however, and as such is hidden from man, since it is appropriated only by the faith of the heart. (b) Equally so does the moral dignity that the Christian has as a member in the kingdom of righteousness and love depend upon God's grace and the work of his Spirit. Therefore it is God's judgment that is regulative in this whole matter of dignity and honor.

2. It follows precisely from this that this supreme dignity of the Christian is independent of appreciation in empirical society — in other words, is independent of honor among men.[1] (a) The Christian, therefore, may not aspire after this honor among men as the supreme thing. He must lay aside timidity before the judgment of men.[2] (b) He may and ought to consider the *dis*honor which really comes to him in the fulfilment of his vocation as an exaltation of his honor.

Notes to §131:2

1. Dignity is inner, and has religious references; honor is outer, and has social reference.
2. He must so fear God that he fears no one else.

3. However, the recognition of religio-ethical personality on the part of the religious and ethical community of men (in other words, ethical honor) is a *relative good.* As such we ought to seek to acquire and preserve it. But the means to this end is the exemplification of Christian character itself. Of course the result in question is not always guaranteed to this exemplification.

4. We must consider social or official or professional honor entirely as a relative good, as compared with the dignity of Christian character. (a) This honor is not always coincident with honor from good and devout men, nor is it always coincident with religio-ethical dignity in the presence of God. (b) Yet even this honor has its worth as means to the prosecution of our special calling which we have to carry on in human society with its conventional requirements. (c) Therefore the demands and conditions of social honor are to be fulfilled, but only so far as they are ethically justified; and professional honor is to be preserved, but only so far as it can be done with ethically justifiable means. If this is not thus possible, then injury to us from this source is to be borne as a burden imposed upon us in the providence of God himself.

§132. *The Christian Life and Hereafter: the Question of Eternal Life.*

1. Even here the Christian possesses an eternal life, i.e. a life exalted above this transitory world. He possesses this life in the certainty of his divinely given dignity and in his overcoming of the world and of sin. But this is to say that eternal life is not simply a gift, or donation; it is an achievement. The enjoyment of eternal life is what is meant by blessedness; therefrom constant blessedness would seem to be required as the fundamental frame of mind of the Christian, or basic temper of the Christian character.

2. But even Jesus Christ in his earthly life could not enjoy blessedness of the life with God in a static way, but had to achieve this blessedness through trouble and struggle and temptation and sorrow. But if that be true in the case of Jesus, much more is it true in the case of the Christian. For the Christian reaches this goal of blessedness not only through conflict, but through guilt and through the appropriation of forgiveness in faith. Therefore the success of the Christian is partly dependent upon the burdens of his life, how heavy they are or how light they are. His success on the whole is dependent also upon the entire character of his mind which God has given to the individual. The goal is to attain a steadfast enjoyment of life in God.

3. There is a yearning or longing on the part of every Christian after entire release from inner and outer warfare, and after an undisturbed enjoyment of communion with God.[1] But this yearning, though it springs from God, must be patient at the same time and maintain fidelity in the present calling.[2] Impatience is in contradiction with the Christian character.[3]

Notes to §132:3

1. "As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God!" "Whom have I on earth beside Thee?" "Come unto me, and I will give you rest." "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and the soul is restless till it rests in Thee."

2. Exaggeration of transcendence tends to yearning without patience; exaggerated immanence to patience with yearning. Philosophy has tried to combine the two reflectively, and to have the meaning (values) in the fact here and now. Thus it would overcome the dualism between joyless labor here and laborless joy hereafter.

3. Paul could say, "I have learned in whatsoever state I am therewith to be content." Note the antithesis of Christianity to suicide. It is a life without values which logically leads to suicide — the life in which there is no yearning and no patience. Christianity from its central principle (that God is the soul's portion) is antithetic to suicide. (See sermons by Phillips Brooks on "The Light of the World.")

4. The hope remains that God himself, through death, will bring eternal life, hidden in the Christian, to further light. The hope of full redemption and consequent blessedness, and of the consummation of Christian character on to full godliness — that is the Christian hope.[1]

Note to §132:4

1. Is there any importance in the Biblical thought of the resurrection of the body for the Christian? Is Christian life poorer by stripping that life off? Does that thought function serviceably in any way in the Christian life? Is a bodiless immortality a thing that man longs for? Has the Christian spirit any hankering after a bodiless immortality? If you snip off from our Christian symbolism the resurrection-of-the-body idea, would our feeling of the roundness and perfectness of our salvation and blessedness be intact? If we cannot keep it scientifically and philosophically, would it be well to keep it poetically, as a means of expressing our need of a whole rich round life?

It seems to be the business of the cosmical process to produce ethical personalities. If so, would it not damn the process, if, when

that was done, they were snuffed out? If the individual perishes, the race perishes ultimately, and by so much as the individual perishes, the race perishes. I do not see any way to vindicate the rationality of the whole process on the basis of the destruction of the Exemplar. The basis of my own hope and conviction is in the fact that the cosmic process seems to be tending to make ethical personalities.

There is much agnosticism among thoughtful people today with regard to immortality. What then about the grounding of ethics on the belief in immortality? Is it not a dangerous doctrine today? What *modus vivendi* can there be for those who cannot subsume immortality under the category of reality? Is there no life hereafter? Then pitch this life high, and love your loves now.

Bibliography: Ingersoll lectures by Royce, James, Osler, G. A. Gordon, Crothers; Münsterberg: *The Eternal Life;* Fiske: *Everlasting Life;* Wundt: *System der Philosophie,* the section on Religion.

δ. The Single Virtues.

§133. *The Task of this Section, and the Matter of Division.*

1. Part b was upon the becoming of Christian personality in the fulfilment of vocation and duty, and part c was on the becoming of Christian personality as formation of virtue and character. We are now concerned with the coördination of these two sections concerning duty and virtue. Individual ethics terminates in a table of duties and virtues.[1] (a) An analysis of the Christian norm of life into a series of duties for every individual follows from the idea of the fulfilment of the duty of vocation. This was worked out in §§121 to 124. This analysis, however, does not admit of being pursued into its specialization for individual vocation and into all the special relations of that vocation, but universal principles of duty for the common inner and outer relations of life may be developed from the Christian norm of life. (b) From the idea of the formation of virtue and character, §§125 to 132, it follows that Christian personality is exhibited in a series of virtues. Again, it must be pointed out, these virtues may not be exhausted in their specialization, ever according to individual natural endowment; but, as in the former case, they may be exhibited in their common inner and outer relations. (c) The principles of duties and the virtues may be coördinated, i. e. correlated. Virtues prove themselves, reveal themselves,

in a corresponding act of duty, and the fulfilment of the principles of duty serves the development of the corresponding virtues.

Note to §133:1

1. The relation of virtue to duty is analogous to the relation of organ to function.

2. The grouping may be drawn from the distinction of the essential relations in which the exercise of Christian duty and the formation of Christian character stand. Each of these has relation both to God and to the neighbor. But in addition to this, the *external world* is material for the exemplification of love to God and love to neighbor. Also one's own *personal life* takes shape through the exercise of duty and of virtue. Therefore there is no fulfilment of duty and no formation of virtue which does not aim at the ethicization of the material world and of our own personal life (v. §112:4).

3. While these different sides (love to God, love to neighbor, moralization of the world and of the self) are wanting to no Christian, yet they appear in different degrees in different persons, and one excels on one side rather than on another. These groups of principles and the virtues may be divided as follows: (a) the principles of duty and the virtues of self-moralization and world-moralization; (b) the principles of duty and the love of God; (c) the principles of duty and the love of neighbor.

§134. *The Principles of Duty and the Virtues of Religio-Ethical Moralization of the Self and of the World.*

1. A moralized inner life arises in the forms of the inner life which have been unfolded in the concepts of the religio-ethical character. It is the Christian duty to develop and organize these forms of life. In them the Christian virtues of character are exhibited at the same time. These two have analogues in the antique cardinal virtues; in the latter also the formal construction is primarily sketched which the inner life of man must win under the lead of an unconditioned norm. But what those antique cardinal virtues lacked was precisely that religious foundation of the ethical life which Christian

ethics supplies. (a) On the side of *religio-ethical knowledge* we have an analogue to the antique wisdom (*σοφία*) on Christian soil, also the duty and virtue of wisdom in the valuation of the true religious and ethical goal of life, and sagacity (*τὸ φρόνημον*) in the correct appreciation of the special tasks, circumstances and also powers of our own life. Both wisdom and sagacity proceed only from full inner truthfulness (*ἀλήθεια*) in the true religious sense.[1] (b) In the relation of the *will* to the religio-ethical dictates of conscience, we have the virtue and duty of conscientiousness and faithfulness, necessarily combined with inner sincerity. Now this is an analogue, at least on the inner side, to the antique justice, or righteousness (*δικαιοσύνη*). (c) In the relation of the will to our own *impulses,* we have the duties of self-control, watchfulness and sobriety, both in the religious and in the moral life, but at the same time the duty of development of psychic forces and the virtue of cultivatedness (although this side is not made much of in the New Testament). This has its analogue in the antique moderation, or self-control (*σωφροσύνη*). (d) In the relation of the will to *external circumstances* and relationships we have the duty and virtue of manliness, of firmness, or stability, of perseverance, as well as of enthusiasm and industry. The analogue is the antique courage (*ανδρεία*).

Note to §134:1

1. He who has that wisdom will be enabled to form a world-view which escapes a frivolous and superficial optimism and a melancholy and paralyzing pessimism. He will also be able rightly to appreciate the drift of the age, the provincial or locality drift, and the personal, individual drift.

2. The ethicization of the personal life embraces, however, the *ethicization of the bodily life,* which is intimately connected with that of thought and impulse. The duty and virtue of *chastity,* or purity in bodily life (*ἁγνεια*) are to be mentioned here. Side by side with this, however, is the positive duty of the preservation and exercise of bodily powers and functions, with the corresponding virtue of control over one's own body.

3. With this ethicization of the body a portion of the eternal world is already consecrated to God. But the entire world confronting us should be religiously and morally consecrated by us.

The former, the religious, takes place by means of the religious elaboration of the experiences of life delineated in §126:3, as well as by means of the knowledge of the rule of God in the world. The latter, the moral, takes place by the employment of the world as material of moral activity, sketched in §127:3, b. The evaluation of the world as symbol and organ of the spirit is effected through both in a manner that corresponds to Christianity. The relevant virtue for this duty may be comprehensively designated as at once freedom from the world and dominion over it.

§135. *Love to God from the Standpoint of Duty and Virtue.*

1. Love to God includes trust in God as an essential moment (§112:3). This love also has its roots in faith in the sin-forgiving God (§116). Thus *faith* itself is the religious basic virtue of the Christian. But one may also speak of a duty of faith, for those who have received an impression of Jesus Christ upon the conscience, there is the duty to surrender to that impression, and for those who have attained to faith there is the duty to exercise and confess that faith.[1]

Note to §135:1

1. It is faith, not a doctrinal statement, that one is required to confess.

2. The specialization of the duty and virtue of faith is ever conditioned by various outer relations of life.[1] (a) Corresponding to the *benefits* received from God there are the duty and virtue of *thankfulness.* (b) Corresponding to divinely sent *suffering and privation* there are the duty and virtue of *resignation* and *patience,* also of *Christian contentment* (αὐτάρχεια). In the face of future needs there are the duty and virtue of freedom from anxiety or care as set forth in the sixth chapter of Matthew by Jesus. (c) Corresponding to our earthly *lot of death,* there are the duty and virtue of *joyousness over death* and also of the *Christian hope* (ἐλπίς).[2]

Notes to §135:2

1. Is faith a duty?
2. There is too little preaching of this Christian attitude toward death.

3. With this trust in God love to God includes also (a) the duty and virtue of reverence toward God, manifesting itself in thought, word and deed (φόβος, εὐσέβεια, and θεοσέβεια). (b) Intimately connected with reverence is humility towards God (ταπεινοφροσύνη). We do not attain to humility by making ourselves small before God in an artificial way, either (α) through the awakening of a mystical feeling of nothingness or vanity, or (β) through the pietistic "poor sinner" feeling. We win humility only when we become aware of the greatness of God's omnipotent holy love in our believing filial acceptance of his grace. It is from this love alone that the honest bowing of the heart before God flows, both as the bowing before his holiness on account of our sinfulness, and the willing bowing before his omnipotent will which disposes of us, a bowing that is in sharp contrast with all murmuring against God as well as with all vain glory (ἀλαζονεία, v. James 4:13–16). Humility is related to one's neighbor as well as to God. With reference to the neighbor it is the heart to serve, but this last arises only from faith, and it is only from faith and love that the exemplification of humility flows in self-appreciation in connection with appreciation of one's neighbor.

4. The matter of oath is a corollary of the discussion of the duty of love to God, of the duty of reverence and humility. Flippancy and sacrilege must be excluded here, and oath should be used only in connection with moral duties and values. Great scruple should exist against the compulsory imposition of religious oath by any authority.

§136. *Love to Neighbor from the Point of View of Virtue and Duty.*

1. Love to neighbor includes esteem for one's neighbor (v. §112:3). Thus duties and virtues of esteem are basic, and they are also an outflow of love: (a) in the duty and virtue of righteousness with reference to the neighbor as a person who has rights, i. e. legal rights; (b) in honor with reference to one's neighbor as a social person; (c) *moral* esteem in the narrower sense (v. §135:3) with reference to neighbor as *moral* person (all this involves approval and toleration, the prohibition of judging, mildness yet clearness in judging); (d) upright-

ness and veraciousness arising from inner truthfulness (v. §134: 1, a), as against lying, false-witnessing, any conscious deception of neighbor concerning our views and thoughts, i. e. a deception that would injure the relation of confidence. (Query: Does the Christian ethics exclude as inadmissible the so-called "lie of necessity"?)

2. The duties and virtues of love in the narrower sense are mainly the following: (a) friendliness in intercourse with one's neighbor; (b) thankfulness in reception of benefits, and piety toward moral authority; (c) gentleness and placability in the reception of evil; (d) in communicating benefits, or goods, service and helpfulness, which are limited and fulfilled by the end, viz. the bringing of the truly good, the chief good, to one's neighbor.

3. Further modifications of neighbor-love in the special relations of human society find place properly only in social ethics, to which we now turn.

C. THE CHRISTIAN FORMATION OF THE LIFE OF HUMAN FELLOWSHIP, OR SOCIAL CHRISTIAN ETHICS

a. Christianity and Culture in General. (By "culture" is meant objective culture, or civilization.)

§137. *The Concept and the Diverse Ramifications of Civilization, or Culture.*

1. A human life of fellowship is necessarily formed already in the common work of the race at civilization. By civilization, or culture, we understand all those activities of man by means of which (a) *a technique and ideal control on the part of the human spirit over nature are actualized.* (b) The natural fellowship of man is exalted to a *spiritualized* fellowship at the same time.

2. The *main branches* of civilization have to do with 1 (a) above, with the exception of those activities which are directly related to the *body of man* as the organ of his labor. (a) The kinds of work which are directed to the employment of nature for the practical ends of man are (α) original production, (β)

industry, (γ) business (trade, commerce, exchange). (b) The activities which directly effect only an *ideal dominion of the human spirit* over nature, but also indirectly serve the technical control of nature are (α) science (technical and pure science) and (β) art.

3. Where these activities (science and art) are carried on, a spiritualization of the human natural fellowship is consummated. This has reference to 1 (b) above. (a) In common work *large unions on the basis of interest* are formed, which are brought together through calculations of utility. These, however, are only themselves a higher *natural* communion. (b) A spiritual order guided by ideas begins with the establishment of legislation, a *code of rights,* and the formation of a *state.* (c) At the same time the free intercourse of man is regulated through *custom.* (d) But the moral order is above all this. This moral order itself yields certain guiding ideas for the fellowship of legal right and of customs mentioned above.

4. In the widest sense of the word, civilization also embraces *the religious life of humanity.* But considered from another point of view, secular culture and religion striving after the supramundane, or really uplifting itself to the supramundane, stand opposed to each other, secular culture having to do with relative goods, religion with the absolute good, or with blessedness. By way of division, then, we have two sections, the communions or orders of secular culture on the one hand, the religious communions of the church on the other.

5. The question of Christian social ethics is the following, viz., *From the standpoint of Christian faith* how are the orders of culture formed prior to and apart from Christianity to be evaluated, and what are the requirements to be demanded of them?

§138. *The Fundamental Relation of Christianity to Civilization, or Culture.*

1. The history of the relation of Christianity to culture shows many changes and transformations. (a) An express positive valuation of the work and goods of culture is to be found only in a limited degree in the *words of Jesus.* (v. *The*

Finality of the Christian Religion, chapter IX). It did not fall to Jesus' Messianic calling to mould and to bring into prominence the worth of the relative moral goods of civilization. He was concerned in principle only with the absolute worth of the supramundane kingdom of God. On the whole the attitude of the *primitive Christian community* was the same as that of Jesus. (Query: Was the reason solely the παρουσία-expectation, or does that reason inhere in their judgment of values itself? In other words, was their attitude due solely to an historical situation, or was it involved in the principle of the new religion itself?) (b) *The ancient and mediaeval church* united more and more with the traditional Graeco-Roman culture, or civilization, yet that church looked with distrust and suspicion upon cultural work, so far as that work (α) did not serve the supply of the necessities of life, or (β) was not put into direct religio-ecclesiastical service.[1] (c) The *Reformation* carried over in part this sentiment of the ancient and mediaeval church, but it prepared the soil for a Christian appreciation of secular culture, and it did this by virtue of its knowledge of the spiritual values and worthiness to be gained in secular callings; and by virtue of its knowledge also of the self-dependent divine calling of parenthood and secular authority — in other words, by its apprehension of the divineness of the family and the state. Still, if the organic danger which threatens Catholicism is ever an abstraction from naturalism, that which similarly threatens Protestantism is a false naturalism.

Note to §138:1

1. Is Catholicism committed in principle to that type of civilization with which it was originally as an institution amalgamated?

2. With all freedom over against the New Testament, the *systematic evaluation* of secular culture dares not deny the basic view given in Jesus. (a) As against the scientific, aesthetic and practical glorification of culture, it must adhere strictly to the Christian judgment that *not* secular culture, but only the supramundane kingdom of God is *absolutely good.* (b) Of course a *relative worth* can and must be attributed to secular culture as auxiliary means to the earthly paving of the

way for the kingdom of God. (α) *Humanity* is first united through culture-work to a real communion, or order, on the basis of which the fundamental universalism of Christianity and its world-mission can be effective. (β) Moreover, *the individual* finds only in the culture-communion of man his useful vocation (toward his fellows), therefore the material of religio-ethical activity and also an education preparatory to Christian (subjective) culture, i. e. to the formation of the Christian character.

3. The culture-world of every historical period has its own special signature. It thus offers to Christianity special difficulties and means of advancement as well, special *tasks* also along with both of these.

4. We are now to consider the various social circles or orders of secular culture, viz. family, folk, industrial life, science, art, social intercourse, church.

b. The Individual Orders, or Communions, of Secular Culture.

α. The Family.

§139. *Christian Marriage.*

1. The family and the order of marriage underlying it is not a product of Christianity, but rests on the natural relation of man and woman, which yet takes the form of marriage when it is firmly ordered through custom or right or law. This order of marriage and therewith the family life have been subject to a *development in history* everywhere, even outside of Christianity. It has been brought into intimate union with religious and ethical views.

2. But the supreme moral and religious value of marriage was first possible on the soil of Christianity. (a) *Jesus Christ* recognized it as an original and inviolable order of God. (b) *Paul* rejected all *legal* requirements of celibacy, commended marriage as means of correction against fornication and burning lust, and exalted it to a symbol or picture of the relation between Christ and his church; yet he set forth celibacy, on account of the παρουσία-expectation, as an *easier* state of life, more favorable also to service of Christ, and it does not appear

that the New Testament in general deviates from Paul in this point. (c) The *ancient and mediaeval church* advanced to the principiant higher evaluation of virginity, yet it carried through and established a more serious conception of the marriage relation over against heathen views. (d) It was the *Reformation* that first deduced from the evangelical basic thought the knowledge that as a rule marriage possesses high ethical worth as against celibacy, and to be sure (α) as means of chastity, (β) as training-school and as actualization of a personal fellowship in faith and love, (γ) as means of preservation of humanity and of Christianity.

3. The *systematic judgment* concerning the ethical import of marriage is given with these three points of view just mentioned. Of course this judgment has (α) its *right* only in dependence on two other positive reasons. These themselves are so related to each other, however, that (β) the *social import* of marriage can be correctly apprehended only from a point of view on the basis of which (γ) the *self-dependent worth* of marriage is acknowledged.

4.. From the Christian valuation of marriage the norms for the Christian formation of the married life follow. (a) The kingdom of God should be actualized in the state of marriage by the *ethicization* of the conjugal union to a special inner form of fellowship in the Lord, and of the fellowship of mutual love and fidelity. (b) This religio-ethical formation of the conjugal union, however, does not abrogate the *natural,* the *legal,* the *economic* relation of married people, but rather purifies and ennobles it. (α) The *natural impulse* is to be ennobled to morally regulated reciprocal love of man and woman. (β) The *legally determined reciprocal duties* find their higher sanction in monogamous marriage. The position of man as head of the house is not only acquiesced in as a social legal order, but justified as a divinely willed order, but therewith at the same time regulated by Christian ideals. (γ) But also the *economic community of the household* is acknowledged in its moral worth. Just on that account it founds moral duties for man and also for woman, and it is a social abuse when they are withdrawn from the fulfilment of these duties through universal economic conditions.

5. The principles that should determine the entrance upon marriage depend on 3 and 4 above. (a) In general, to enter upon marriage is duty where nature, the providences of life, special obligations and social relations do not make a morally normal marriage impossible or render it grievous. As to the *choice* of a companion, individual inclination has its right from the Christian standpoint, yet only so far as the conditions of an ethical formation of marriage are given. The authority of experienced counsel belongs to the parental will; and where moral reasons compel thereto, the right of veto from the ethical standpoint likewise belongs to the parental will. (b) Query: On the basis of Christian Protestantism, is it ethically required that marriage should be ecclesiastically consummated, or is it only a civil officer that must officiate from ethical necessity in marriage? Again, what constitutes the ethical necessity of the state's participation in the entrance upon marriage?

6. Divorce. The position of traditional Protestantism is in general the following: in adhesion to the words of Jesus, the *Christian moral judgment* is held to be that divorce under all circumstances is due to sin, and is a breach of the supreme divinely-willed goal of marriage.[1]

Note to §139:6

1. Is this position correct? Ethically, what is the structural or basic justification of divorce? Is it necessarily sin, or is it rather mismatedness in marriage?

§140. *Conclusions from the Christian Valuation of Marriage as to the Relation of the Sexes.*

1. On the basis of the Christian apprehension of marriage, there follows an irrevocable judgment of condemnation upon sexual intercourse outside of wedlock. It is degradation of moral personality and is not less so in the case of man than in that of woman. Besides, the social effects of this vice corroborate the Christian judgment and require warfare against the vice — a warfare, however, whose correct means are not a matter merely of ethical, but also of technical considerations.

2. The so-called "woman's rights" question touches the whole status of woman as regards man. (a) It is itself a complex of diverse problems, viz., the education of woman, the in-

dustrial activities of woman, the legal status of woman married and unmarried, the political rights of woman, the bindingness of our present conventions and customs upon woman. (b) From the Christian view of marriage as a divine order of nature to the end of the kingdom of God, certain general points of view may be derived. But their application requires not merely ethical but also medicinal, economic, political considerations, both general and particular, concerning the relations of women. (c) One thing is cited. In Christianity the full religious and moral equality of woman with man is immovably fixed. So also difference of sexual character, which is not so superficial a difference as to be adequately set forth as physiological merely, must be taken into account in the questions concerning woman's education, vocation, and legal, political and industrial status.

§141. *The Christian Household.*

1. The relation of parents to children. Underlying the ethical relation there is a natural relation again. There is a natural subordination of children, and a natural love on the part of parents. But this is to be exalted to religiously and morally sanctified authority and pedagogic love. Training children becomes a school for the training of parents.

2. As to the relation of children to parents, Jesus Christ emphasized the relation to filial duty as divinely commanded, and did so as against self-chosen performances (Mark 7:10–13). The apostolic proclamation expresses the Christian principles concerning the formation of this relation of children to parents. The Reformation, in polemics against ascetic perversions, occupied the general New Testament position. Through the Christian ideal the natural dependence of the child is ennobled to confiding, thankful love and to respectful obedience. However, anti-ethical requirements on the part of parents, otherwise only entrance upon a self-dependent vocation, form the limits to filial obedience — but not a limit to the duty of piety to one's parents.

3. The collective life of children in the parental home should become a school of Christian neighbor-love in miniature, and therewith preparation for social duties of later life at the same time.[1] However this collective life should be the basis also of

a specially intimate lifelong friendship among brothers and sisters themselves.

Note to §141:3

1. The home is the microcosm of which a society of neighbor-love is the macrocosm.

4. In the New Testament the relation of master and servant finds Christian regulation, although the form of slavery prevails there still. With its eschatological mood and its well-founded fear of social revolution, primitive Christianity did not seek to set aside slavery; yet it did validate a religio-ethical equality of the slave and the free, and sought inwardly to transform the reciprocal relation of master and slave. Under the changed relation of modern times, a change still going on, the Christian requirement as to service still remains and involves two fundamental points. (a) There should be faithful work and inner sympathy for the home that is served. This insures the Christian dignity of the service and of the servant. (b) For those who have control of service there is the duty to treat the servants not only legally and humanely, but also as much as possible to let the servants partake of the spirit of the home, and especially of its religious and ethical life.

5. Hospitality no longer serves as in primitive Christianity an essential practical need. All the purer, therefore, can its ideal worth, viz. giving and taking of spiritual possessions, come to validity for those who enjoy them and practice them.

6. The character of the Christian home, as of the individual Christian, is on the one hand everywhere the same; on the other, however, it is capable of and needs an individualizing, ever according to the special relations and endowments of the household.

β. The Economic Life.

§142. *The Idea and Problem of Economic Life.*

1. It is on the soil of the legal, civil order that the economic life moves, i. e. the collective work of human society directed to the satisfaction of human needs and to the acquirement of property (goods). This economic life is in part national, the state being an industrial unity; in part international, being a

connecting link between peoples. By economic order we understand the regulation of labor and capital, or work and gain, each by itself and also in their reciprocal relations. In part this regulation is legally fixed, in part ordered through custom, and in part founded on force.

2. The economic order is in constant historical movement and has already passed through a series of stages. This movement ever passes through conflicts and crises. In this way comprehensive ideals of economic life reaching far beyond momentary needs are formed. Especially has the ideal of a communistic and state-socialism economic order been set over against that of the individualistic order.

3. The social question of our time is an exceedingly ramified problem. The question is this, How can the evil conditions attending different vocations, conditions which the economic process of development itself has brought with it, be ameliorated and avoided, and especially how can the contradiction between the economic dependence and even servility, and the status of freedom and equality which is to be actualized in political life be resolved?

4. Christian ethics must seek clearness as to whether Christianity relates itself indifferently to questions of economic life, or whether Christianity itself sets up certain ideals and norms for that life, and for the treatment of this problem.

§143. *The Attitude of Christianity to Capital and Labor, or the Life of Work and of Gain.*

1. Different epochs in the historical attitude of Christianity to the economic life. (a) Jesus Christ set the saving of the soul and the possession of the kingdom of God, as absolutely worthful, over against all earthly gain and possessions.[1] Yet Jesus required abandonment of all possession only under definite circumstances, and recognized the order of labor and reward as a justified earthly order. According to this Paul did not assail the order of property, and himself worked and required others to work for support; but Paul did emphasize more strongly still the independence of the Christian of all external possessions, and introduced the beneficent employment of possessions. (b) The ancient church gradually sanctioned the

ascetic view of property as the really Christian view. In the mediaeval church ideas of national right were interwoven therewith. It was in this soil that enthusiastic efforts of an apostolic communism could grow again. (c) As against this, Luther justified property as an order of the creation of God. Influenced, however, partly by the mediaeval views, partly by evangelical ethical views, Luther turned against single factors of the existing order of property, especially against interest and rent; but he left the redress of mal-conditions to the legal authorities. (d) In recent times the long-repressed social thoughts of Christianity have been emphasized again — in part one-sidedly.

Note to §143:1

1. Is it the Christian task to make the poor self-respecting and cheerful, or to change their lot? Granting the obligation to ameliorate the lot of the distressed, is not modern Christianity losing the proper appreciation of the internal?

2. Christianity imposes ethical requirements on individual men who are bearers of the economic life, requirements in which the principles of the New Testament come to expression. (a) It is required of capitalists that they consider their property only as a good entrusted to them as stewards of God, which obligates them to (α) humanity and equity toward those economically dependent upon them, and (β) to beneficence toward the needy. (b) It is required of the poor that they do not allow themselves to be consumed by avarice, but in their low estate to maintain their Christian dignity, and even in their poverty to seek to make others rich.

3. But also the economic order as a whole must be subjected to ethical evaluation from the Christian point of view. For although ripe Christian character can live in all economic relations or conditions, even the most unfavorable, e. g. slavery, yet grievous and helpful conditions are given in the economic order, for the formation of Christian character.

§144. *The Ethical Requirements that Christianity Makes of the Economic Order.*

1. From this evaluation there flow ethical requirements for the formation of the economic life. Those requirements are

not to be borrowed in a legal manner from the Scriptures. They are to be developed in a free manner from the norms of the gospel and from the given conditions of human society. Two universal ethical requirements may be mentioned.

2. The ethical principles of the kingdom of God come to their rights in the economic order as a whole, only when that order promotes righteousness and the public welfare, and not an inconsiderate, regardless egoism. As requirements to this end mention may be made of the following: (a) By no means the abrogation of private property, but legal protection; yet also the legal norming of the acquirement and transmission of property. (b) By no means equal distribution of the products of labor, but yet an approximate proportionality between the public value of labor and the reward of labor to the individual. (c) By no means a removal of all competition, of private interests, but yet a limitation of inconsiderate conflict, and as much as possible the drawing of all members of society into a solidarity of their interests with those of the whole.

3. The ethico-religious training of the individual member of society is alleviated where the economic order guarantees to him as much as possible the fundamental conditions of an ordered external life, viz. (a) opportunity to work for him who wants to work; (b) a living support for his person and his family for him who works, and also care according to his incapacity to work; (c) along with work the possibility also to lead a family life and to satisfy the essential spiritual needs of man.

4. The developed social ethical demands can never be approximately attained merely through private good intention, but only through social politics, which look toward legal regulation on the part of the state. But there are three points in which social ethics rather than social politics must decide: (a) The best ways and means to the actualization of that goal may never be construed *a priori* out of that goal iself, but may be discovered only through the *widest investigation of real relations,* and through the most difficult deliberations of a technical character; and this is so because everywhere there is a choice between the different ways, and because undesirable collateral results are associated with any means. (b) Social

movements may not be set on foot from caprice. They are at least in part *processes of natural development,* and they are *historical processes.* They require regard for natural laws and connection with the historical situation. (c) Also it must be borne in mind that the best social order does not create different *men,* as if by mechanical action upon them, but at best only alleviates conditions for the formation of moral character, but ever certain temptations also.

5. Although a solution, ever only temporary, of the social question is not possible without the help of the state and its legislative order, yet all other social circles are called to co-operation, the *church* as well. The church has not only to keep intact the ethical requirements of the gospel, but should be guided in all its work by the social spirit. Above all, *every individual* should be socially active in his *circle,* should be a reconciling influence, through personal intercourse with people of different callings.

[The discussion of Social Christian Ethics is left incomplete (see §138:4). The following are the section headings under *Folk, Right (Law) and the State:*

§145. The Concepts "Folk," "Right" and "State" in their Reciprocal Relations.

§146. Ethical Appreciation of Folk, Right and State on the Part of Christianity.

§147. The Requirements that Christianity Makes with Respect to Right and the State.]

GLOSSARY

actiones, actions.
actiones creaturarum, actions of creatures.
ad fines Dei, to God's goal.
auctoritas, authority.
casus conscientiae, cases of conscience.
causae secundae, second causes.
causa prima, first cause.
communicatio idiomatum, communication of characteristics.
communio naturarum, communion of natures.
concursus, co-operation.
conservatio, conservation.
contritio, contrition.
coöperatio, co-operation.
creatio, creation.
de duabus in Christo naturis, concerning the two natures in Christ.
de una Christi persona, concerning the one person of Christ.
ecclesia, church.
efficacia, efficacy.
extra ecclesiam nulla salus, no salvation outside of the church.
gubernatio, government.
imago, image.
imputatio justitiae, imputation of righteousness.
in lege Dei, in the law of God.
justitia originalis, original righteousness.
lex scripta, written law.
liberum arbitrium, arbitrary free will.
liberum arbitrium indifferentiae, free will of indifference.
mens humana naturaliter Christiana, the human mind is naturally Christian.
modus, way.
modus vivendi, temporary makeshift.
natura, nature.
obedientia passiva et activa, passive and active obedience.
opera bona necessaria ad salutem, good works are necessary to salvation.
peccata actualia, actual sins.
peccatum originale, original sin.
peccatum originale originans, original sin as cause.
peccatum originale originatum, original sin as effect.

perfectio, perfection.
perfectio evangelica, evangelical perfection.
persona Christi, person of Christ.
perspicuitas, perspicuity.
providentia, providence.
providentia generalis, general providence.
providentia specialis, special providence.
providentia specialissima, very special providence.
providentia universa, universal providence.
remissio peccati, remission of sin.
satisfactio vicaria, vicarious satisfaction.
secundum interiorem hominem, according to the inner man.
secundum nostrum concipiendi modum, according to our way of conceiving.
similitudo Dei, likeness of God.
status exaltationis, state of exaltation.
status exinanitionis, state of humiliation.
status integritatis, state of (original) innocence.
sufficientia, sufficiency.
terrores incussae conscientiae, terrors of a stricken conscience.
testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum, inner witness of the Holy Spirit.
unitio et unio personalis, personal uniting and union.
unus triplex, the threefold one.
vere peccatum, really sin.
via causalitatis, way of causality.
via eminentiae, way of eminence.
via negationis, way of negation.
vox et praeterea nihil, empty sound and nothing more.
παρουσία, advent.
ψυχή, soul, life.

(Greek, Latin and German expressions not included in the above list will be found to be translated in the context.)

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